This essay is based on a survey conducted on Szabadság tér, a historic square in Budapest, to inquire into whether the Orbán regime can be characterized as fascism or not.
The survey followed the criteria of the Italian historian and eminent expert in the field, Emilio Gentile. The questionnaire listed his seventeen points as to what is required to qualify a system as fascist. Nobody expressed any doubt as to whether there are signs of fascism at work in Hungary; the question is only its extent. Following a short discussion of each item, the participants graded the Orbán regime on that particular item. The marks were given as a percentage, from zero to a hundred. The principle of evaluation, as discussed in advance, was to what degree, in the opinion of each participant, the criterion had already been accomplished. This, of course, included the supposition that fascism, to whatever degree, is already established in the system.
Of the large number of people present, only fifty chose to submit their questionnaires. Even the guarantee of anonymity was not enough to convince everybody, so, the number of questionnaires containing the gender and age of the person was only forty. Nevertheless, I included the ten genderless and ageless sheets as well. A few, however, either misunderstood the method of marking, or intentionally sabotaged it, so, those sheets I discarded. There was one individual who filled out only the first half and another who filled only the second half; those two, I regarded as one questionnaire. There were some also who gave either only their age, others only their gender; therefore, the evaluation based on age is based on 43, while the evaluation based on profession is based on 40 answers.
Although it has little relevance, nonetheless, there were 21 women and 29 men in the sample. The age groups may be subdivided thusly: 30-40 years – 3, 40-50 years – 3, 50-60 years – 10, 60-70 years – 19, over 70 – 7, and over 80 – 1 person.
What is the importance of the basic question? The efforts to define the nature of the system go on almost continuously. Some call it autarchy, dictatorship, corporatist state, or the return of the Kádár-era. One such attempt to find a definitive description is the recently published book of essays, edited by Bálint Magyar, Hungarian Octopus, the Postcommunist Mafia State. This set of essays provides a truly ingenious analysis of the corrupt and self-serving regime, providing much-needed original thinking and expert contribution. However, its main goal is to define the system, to give it a name, because, as it claims, as long as the system doesn’t have a name, it cannot be discussed effectively. The new invention, this new name, is extremely apt and convincing too, but the authors are still reluctant to face reality and rather invent the new theory just to avoid the reckoning. The authors chose to go as far as naming the system, but did not face the implications of reality: that the object of their theorizing is the revival of the fascist monster.
Similarly, Rudolf Ungváry, one of the most relentless and consistent critics of the system, on similar grounds, calls the Orbán system a fascistoid mutation, because, as he explains, we must give it a name to know what we must fight against. He also goes some distance, pointing out a certain group of parallel characteristics with fascism, but recoils from making a final judgment.
As far as the suggestion of Ágnes Heller is concerned, namely that the Orbán system is Bonapartism, some similarity cannot be denied. But there is only a partial resemblance, and the suggestion falls short of covering all aspects of the system.
The vast majority of the critical intelligentsia, however, hasn’t even begun to recognize any of this. They bashfully turn away, or even protest as soon as the word fascism crops up. (Such an example is György Bolgár, the respected and very popular host of a daily talk show on Klubrádió, who protests immediately as soon as the subject crops up. And it does crop up with increasing frequency.) They do so mostly because they have a general, fabulistic, superficial idea of what fascism actually is, thereby making them unable to identify fascism when they see it. And then there are others who are simply unwilling to face the facts.
Regarding the nature of fascism, the specific differences of its numerous permutations and the differences between them are much less important than their similarities. Namely, the goal of forcing the country and society into the service of the State, commanded by the ‘Leader.’ And the final result of this is always, without exception, social and economical disintegration. With the narrow exception, of course, of those operating the stratagem, at least until the system itself inevitably collapses.
Examining and evaluating this phenomenon is invariably subject to the shortsighted mistake, at least at the present time and at least in Hungary, that most people look at the system and take cognizance of its state. As if taking a snapshot: what is the state of the country at the moment. In fact, the question is not the state of the country, but rather the process that is taking place, where we are coming from and where we are headed. This is a process that has been going on relentlessly for some time, reached a certain stage, and that must be recognized and evaluated. But the process is not yet complete; and the purpose of the discussion was to reveal how this circle of participants sees its progress towards becoming a fait accompli. The ordinary viewer, as much as he or she knows of fascism, forms a judgment accordingly. Considering, however, the familiarity of the populace at large with history, perhaps not too farfetched to say that the opinion based on such superficial ground, must also be quite superficial as well.
Our instinctive reaction to the process rolling on in front of our eyes is that we seem to already envision on the horizon a country doomed, and above it the specter of the single Ruler. It is not surprising, therefore, to call this emerging system, most aptly, fascism.
Let us return to the aforementioned explanations!
Bálint Magyar’s well-founded theory, formulated over several years of experience, incisively describes the nature of the system and its social conditions recognizing its structure as a mafia organization, and although he gives an excellent description of this social construct and its processes, remains within his self-imposed sociological limits. Thus, although the theory is quite wide-ranging, it doesn’t reach far enough; instead of calculating the prospective political implications, it mostly settles for the “money for power and power for money” formula.
Rudolf Ungváry is far more pessimistic and while he searches farther and deeper, he also remains within his own preselected limits. The conclusions he draws are from the historic predilections of Hungarian society to lean towards right-wing ideologies, a paternalistic state, a traditional distaste for, and general fear of democracy. This allows him to go as far as the conclusion of “fascistoid mutant.”
Both authors explicitly insist, however, that their main motivation in developing their hypotheses is to find the language and definition that will ultimately help in naming and confronting the system they describe.
I find both theories valuable, in fact fascinating. Yet, they confirm my conviction that there is a definite need for a list of criteria encompassing most versions of fascism, applicable to any time and place. I find the most suitable ‘shopping list’ in Emilio Gentile’s summary. Of course, the application of the list may turn out to be less than airtight, but to the extent that it is applicable, the suspicion that we are faced with fascism is justified.
Finally, it is essential to remember that the participants in this survey represent only one segment of the Hungarian public, in that they are in opposition to the Fidesz government. Therefore, the results must be taken with a degree of reservation. Even if an automatic “discount” is not recommended at the evaluation of the results, a sober skepticism is certainly necessary in viewing the outcome. Also quite important to consider are all the historical, economic, social, political, and most of all, technological progress, that have taken place since the era of ‘classical’ fascism. Thus, it is necessary to interpolate each individual criterion to today’s conditions. If I should refer to such an adjustment, I shall call attention to it.
So, what are the requisite conditions of fascism, on a scientific, historical basis? What does the angry crowd of Szabadság tér think about this? And how creditable is the opinion of this mostly intellectual company, concerning the criteria and their applicability to the actual facts?
1. coercion, imposed through violence. Repression and terror are considered as legitimate instruments for the affirmation, defense and diffusion of the prevailing ideology and political system;
Aggregate mark: 55.5%, Men: 66.6%, Women: 46.81%
Clearly, the women were more forgiving than men in this case. The marks given are somewhat lower than would be justified, because the participants didn’t take into account the countless refined techniques applied by the regime that are making redundant the presence of black-shirt squads on the streets. Nevertheless, the memories of the street brawls in the fall of 2006 are still alive, plus the fact that the government is outsourcing the violence to football hooligans and sundry right-wing guards, and the fact that the police looks away when those guards are on their threatening marches. Beyond that, the government is applying a countless variety of economic threats. Starting with the fining of ‘unruly’ members of Parliament, through the tendentious expropriation and redistribution of businesses and markets, to the use of the Tax Authority and other public institutions as instruments of threat, as well as the establishment of exclusive ‘professional chambers,’ with mandatory membership for the professions, all are intended to increase society’s feeling of fear and insecurity.
The only way to escape the general climate of fear (short of emigration) is to fall in line with the system. This doesn’t eliminate the cause of fear but simply palliate its effect temporarily until the next attack begins.
2. demagoguery exerted through constant and all-pervasive propaganda, the mobilization of enthusiasm, the liturgical celebration of the cult of the party and the leader;
Aggregate mark: 83.08%, Men: 96.30%, Women: 84.19%
It’s clear that both genders are equally aware of the permanent demagoguery. They see and understand the participation of the churches, the relentless self-congratulatory propaganda of the government and the governing party: “Only the Fidesz!” goes their slogan. This is further boosted by the constant flood of ‘communication’ hammering home the greatness of the Leader, stating, or implying that the exclusive representation of national interest rests only in his hands and his mind. Beyond that, the religious propaganda is also increasing, stressing that there is no possible alternative leader to the Leader. Interestingly, even the opposition parties are falling for this pious adulation, so they often speak of the Leader as “Viktor Orbán miniszterelnök úr.”
3. capillary organisation of the masses, that involves men and women of all ages, in order to carry out the conquest of society and a collective indoctrination;
Aggregate mark: 72.19%, Men: 78.52%, Women: 69.29%
Some of the examples of this are the professional chambers for entrepreneurs, teachers, the Academy of Art, etc. The same strategy is used to concentrate the government’s power by centralizing public education, the students’ organizations, and the countrywide emergency services. This runs concurrently with the emasculation of the trade unions to prevent the operation of any parallel organization protecting group interests against government intrusion in competition with the ineffectual, official chambers. The test of acceptability for these chambers is to prove constantly how faithful they are to the Party, and, by extension, to the Leader. To insure their ‘functionality’, the government dictates their bi-laws; makes membership mandatory for the practitioners of each profession; and jobs are available exclusively to their members. The government invests substantial efforts in organizing and expending financial resources in these chambers (mostly the humiliated members’ money), while obstructing the parallel organizations. The official chambers are scaring away and luring the prospective members at the same time. Also manifest here is the ‘modern’, refined version of fascism: realizing the desired goals by economic pressure and legislative means, without resorting to violence.
4. totalitarian pedagogy, carried out at high level, and according to male and female role models developed along the principles and values of a palingenetic ideology;
Aggregate mark: 72.98%, Men: 76.67%, Women: 73.84%
For those who followed the invasion and expropriation of the education system in the last two years, it is clear that the concentration of power over elementary schools and the sudden hamstringing of secondary and postsecondary education serve precisely this purpose. The introduction of mandatory religious or morality classes, concurrent with the vast increase of gym classes has been achieved by sacrificing humanities classes: less education for more indoctrination. The obvious goal is the urgent dumbing down of the curriculum in order to dumb down the students. The principles and values of indoctrination are the constant references to Hungarian historic and prehistoric national greatness, pagan and Christian ideals, and the persistent sycophantic reference to the Leader. The severe curtailment of the subjects available to students is intended to eliminate classic education and substitute it with government-issue propaganda. The alumni of these schools will be at a severe disadvantage when applying to higher institutions, should there still be any in existence later. The System will have completed its destruction of education, and the remaining institutions will either have shrunk, or have gone out of business altogether: in any case, they won’t be able to provide quality education.
In my opinion, the marks given to this item are presupposing the latter development. So far, the process hasn’t reached this degree of completion, but because of the numerous teachers amongst the participants, they apparently interpolated this inevitable outcome from the present trends.
5. discrimination against the outsider, undertaken by way of coercive measures, that range from exile from public life to physical elimination of all human beings who, because of their ideas, social conditions and ethnic background are considered inevitable enemies, because they are regarded as undesirable by the society of the elect and, duly, incompatible with the objectives of the totalitarian experiment.
Aggregate mark: 74.66%, Men: 79.00%, Women: 74.19%
This policy has been in effect for a long time. This may have been the earliest step Fidesz took on the road to power: “The Nation cannot be in opposition!” Their opposition was “alien in their hearts,” they said; they grabbed onto the idea of “Gypsy crime;” identified the persons and the names of socialist and liberal politicians to criminality; and fostered the double talk implying anti-Semitism. It is possible that the first act of separating all others from their own followers was the refusal to celebrate national holidays together with others. The result by now is that society is cloven in two. Considering all this, the marks that were given are perhaps too low.
6. a mass movement, with interclass aggregation but in which, in the military and directional cadres, young middle class generation new to political activity are organized in…
Aggregate mark: 59.85%, Men: 63.89%, Women: 59.67%
The attempt to create a mass movement was done via the organizing of Civic Circles following Fidesz’s loss of the 2006 election. This network originally fulfilled Fidesz’s expectations, but because of society’s resistance that it was intended to conquer, has proven to be quite feeble indeed. The organization wasn’t worth maintaining, given the necessary investment; Fidesz was able to succeed without them.
The Hungarian military is pretty well insignificant; and so, the government embarked on the consolidation of the security establishment and augmented it by creating numerous quasi-military and uniformed police forces, amongst them, the Terror Prevention Police (the prime minister’s Praetorian guard), the Parliamentary Guard (the Speaker’s Praetorian Guard), the Budapest public transit police, the uniformed Civil Guard and many others, created by local municipalities. At the same time, the government also increased the number of secret services: the military, the National Investigation Service, and the Constitution Protection Service, which are all working independently of each other. But also belonging to this movement are the countless private security services that work in tight cooperation with the official police forces and which serve the goals of the system. There was also a semi-private secret service in Fidesz’s employ, UD Zrt. It was rescued from its original semi-legal status and with an unseemly amount of financial ‘compensation’ its personnel was reentered into the official secret service after Fidesz was reelected.
The creation of a new young middle class is noticeable everywhere and every time when any change of cadre happens. And since it happens continuously, the Fidesz-friendly alumni of the church run universities, the soon-to-arrive graduates of the new Public Service University, and the withering, or suitably transformed higher education are all in the service of creating an ‘acceptable’ supply of faithful cadre intended to fulfill the role of the new, national middle class.
7. … a militia party, that bases its identity not on social hierarchy and class origin but on sense of comradeship and which invests itself with a mission of national regeneration and considers itself to be in state of war against political adversaries and aims at acquiring…
Aggregate mark: 59.06%, Men: 63.70%, Women: 58.33%
The Fidesz has so far neglected the establishment of a militant organization. Instead, militancy was outsourced to Jobbik, the various Guards, the Outlaw Army, and the Sixty-four Counties Youth Organization, some of whom are regularly holding armed “exercises.” Nevertheless, the system is in a permanent struggle, even without its own militants.
The government, the Fidesz, that is, conducts a permanent, multilateral struggle against its opponents and its allies, picking the enemy of choice as they please and as the daily necessities require for the best effect in the propaganda war. In order to nail down its enemies, Orbán was forced to come up with the idea of a new, almost singular form of state, the “illiberal state,” providing an unlimited opportunity to choose any social formation as the enemy, be that foreign or domestic. Every battle report, of course, is a glowing boast of success, leaving the purported enemy oblivious of having been the object of the battle.
8. … the monopoly of political power, using terror, parliamentary tactics and the compromise with the leading class to create a new regime, destroying parliamentary democracy;
Aggregate mark: 89.46%, Men: 90.26%, Women: 93.33%
This item received the highest mark of all. Accordingly, the system has almost completely solidified its grip on power. The impoverished society, partly due to its innumerable disappointments, has become very sensitive to intimidation, so, the relatively modest economic threat is enough to accomplish the desired retreat of any group so far. In the invention of parliamentary tricks, Fidesz has proven to be immensely creative, and not only in qualitative, but in a quantitative way it has been prodigiously productive, sweeping all opposition aside. Coming to terms with the economic upper class was not necessary, because after their accession to power, they ‘appointed’ a new upper class of a handpicked few. They were tamed already to support the government. The newly invented System, the “illiberal state,” is intended to take the place of democracy, whose existence was intolerable to Fidesz and Prime Minister Orban already in the previous four years.
9. an anti-ideological and pragmatic ideology that proclaims to be anti-materialist, anti-individualist, antil-iberal, anti-democratic, anti-Marxist, populist and anti-capitalistic, expressed more esthetically than theoretically through a new political style and through myths, rites and symbols of a lay religion, established to favor the process of acculturation, socialization and fideistic integration of the masses in order to create a “new man”.
Aggregate mark: 81.13%, Men: 82.74%, Women: 84.05%
Here, near unanimity was reached. Fidesz is very active in the fields of political culture as well as in cultural politics. It is frequently reaching back for examples to emulate to the times of the early 1800s, the era of ultramontane, aristocratic, Catholic privileges. A large number of Fidesz politicians imagine themselves as aristocrats, and in the absence of a real aristocracy, attribute the ancient privileges to themselves and their coterie. This is where they find their legitimacy for their discriminative social policies. The myth of this continuity failed in 1848, but there is the convenient connection in the person of István Széchényi whom Fidesz misuses as the seal of legitimacy on their own myth. The steady propaganda of a tragic national ethos of eternal misfortune and enmity from every quarter is supported by the application of a selective and tendentious version of history.
The deceitful boosting of the curse of the Paris Peace Treaty – Trianon – serves to make the claim that Hungary and Hungarians have ‘always’ been victims, as they are today, and the government uses this supposedly tragic fate to support its own legitimacy, as well as for nationalistic propaganda. However, it does it in such a manner that it expropriates Trianon exclusively for themselves as their own, as if Fidesz were the only institution entitled to govern. Fidesz in fact denies that the opposition could possibly relate to Trianon in any sensitive manner.
This attitude is tightly connected to belittling the importance of the Holocaust, partly because that is the “enemy’s” problem, not theirs, and at the same time to buttress their own position in the eyes of their followers, as was seen in the case of the Cursed Memorial.
Fidesz’s policies towards youth are in a state of flux at the moment, but its contours are becoming slowly apparent. The education system, gradually integrated into one state-run organization, with the cooperation of the churches, has already been transformed. The production cycle of producing subjects, victims, and zombies takes a while to produce results, although some are already evident. But the vision of their intended society is clearly visible in the government’s educational policies.
10. a culture based on the mythical thought and on the tragic and activistic sense of life, seen as manifestation of the will power, as the myth of youth creator of history, as wanly model of life and collective organization;
Aggregate mark: 76.79%, Men: 75.30%, Women: 83.57%
The ideology of the system does not rest on any particular theory, or program. It is rather characterized by frequent occasional extemporaneous statements in the populist vein. However, the government, while constantly referencing Christian principles (without really applying them) finds therein the grounds for rejecting materialism and for the bristling opposition to liberal ideals. The lack of a program is helpful to the government because it saves them from expanding financial resources to implement and maintain them.
The so-called new style, be it verbal, or the exercise of power, is dumbed down to the deepest extent, thus appearing that the system, but most of all, the Leader, has descended to come and dwell amongst his People. Symbols long out of use, such as the Royal Crown and the Turul, and the retelling of heroic national deeds, do not only serve as identity-boosting devices to the masses and inducements to unite, but also help to create the illusion of a false historical continuity and exclusive legitimacy.
However, the husbanding of a “New Man” hasn’t occurred to anyone yet. Instead, Fidesz experiments with the creation of a new society, inasmuch as they forcibly legislate a new, restrictive family model, new religious and church system. So far, there has been quite slim support from society.
11. a totalitarian view of the primacy of politics, as integral experience and continuous revolution, to enact through the fascist State, the fusion of the individual and of the masses in the organic and mystic union of the nation, as racial and moral community, adopting measures of discrimination and persecution against those considered outsiders of this community, because enemies of the regime or because they belong to races considered either inferior or dangerous for the safety of the Nation;
Aggregate mark: 70.38% Men: 70.11%, Women: 75.86%
For the government’s System of National Cooperation (NER), not only is politics most important, politics is all there is, but only its own kind of politics is admissible. Negotiation, conciliation, or alteration of policies is out of the question, even if the predictable outcome of a policy would make it necessary. Permanent revolution and political overreach is present at all times, from the granting of miserable public works jobs, through the choice of state procurement suppliers, to the granting of state monopoly licenses. Be it a small issue, or a great one, all decisions are made on the basis of Fidesz’s perceived interests. A large part of Fidesz’s politics is defining who is included and who is excluded from The Nation. Although the discrimination of the Roma people, for example, is a clear case of racial discrimination (with the enthusiastic cooperation of the Jobbik party), the list of those being discriminated against is far larger: the increasing numbers of poor are automatically included, as are the dispossessed agricultural workers and the struggling civic organizations. Those professing liberal ideas are automatically stamped as being Jews, and therefore, also are considered enemies. Everybody is an enemy – internal or external (the European Union and the United States) – who is endangering The Nation in their view. But who the Nation is, is being decided by the Leader on a contingency basis. Since, however, the numbers of enemies are increasing prodigiously, and elastically extending to ever newer groups, The Nation is proportionately shrinking. If this process continues, soon the Fidesz hierarchy will remain alone to represent The Nation.
12. a civil ethics based on the absolute subordination of the citizen to the State, on the total dedication of the individual to the national community, to discipline, to virility, to comradeship, to warly spirit;
Aggregate mark: 70.17%, Men: 69.26%, Women: 76.33%
With respect to ethics, Fidesz submits to the ‘superior’ strictures of the Christian Democratic People’s Party and its coalition partners, and by doing so, they can masquerade as practitioners of good, old-fashioned, Catholic morality. In fact, it demands moral submission from the citizenry while in its own conduct tends to distance itself blithely from any morality. I refer here most of all to the burgeoning corruption practiced by Fidesz and the State, virtually without any self-restraint. Meanwhile, for the populace, Fidesz mandates an increasingly rigorous morality in their policies towards the family, and are preoccupied with hypocritical prudery towards sexual mores, and a distinct animosity towards single people and singledom.
Otherwise, there are still processes that are incomplete: the promulgation of the “warly spirit” is not yet on the agenda. In view of that, the mark appears to be more severe than would be justified.
13. a single party which covers the function of organ of the “continuous revolution”, of providing for the armed defense of the regime, of choosing the directive cadres and of organizing the masses in the totalitarian State, making them part of a process, both emotional and fideistic, of permanent mobilization;
Aggregate mark: 68.75%, Men: 67.78%, Women: 75.00%
Orbán’s invention of the “Revolution of the Voting Booth” is still in effect, and keeps society in a state of permanent agitation. Augmented by the institution of the System of National Cooperation (NER), it is the tool of reorganizing the entire society according to the retrograde ideas of Fidesz under the constant pressure of existential fear. Although popular support for Fidesz and the government is in steady decline, the determination and arrogance of the remaining supporters and the hierarchy are steadily increasing; they have no choice but to participate, even if somewhat reluctantly, in the permanent mobilization and in the enmity. Concurrently, they must persist in their declarations of fidelity, because not only their advancement, but their very survival within the hierarchy depends on it.
14. a police apparatus, which prevents, controls and suppresses, even appealing to terroristic measure, dissension, and opposition;
Aggregate mark: 56.50%, Men: 56.90%, Women: 56.90%
This mark is decidedly low, perhaps because it originated before the assault of the police against the civic organizations. It is unnecessary to enumerate the countless police and quasi-police organizations created by this government, just as it is needless to point out the politically directed, pro-government bias in their operation. It is more important to realize that apart from the police, the administration of the justice system is under increasing government pressure and influence.
As is frequented mentioned in defense of the Fidesz government, there are no journalists in jail. So, how could it be fascist? Perhaps this is the moment to point out that silencing the voice of opposition and dissenting voices by stifling some individuals would be an inefficient, ‘retail’ method. This is why there are no precedents for the ‘traditional’ harassment, or jailing of individual journalists. The ‘modern fascism’ operates in an industrial, or wholesale manner, by intimidating the entire media by way of legislative means. In this case, there is no need to bother with journalists one by one.
15. a political system ordered in a hierarchy of functions, nominated from above and dominated by the figure of the “capo”, invested with charismatic sacrality, who commands, directs, and coordinates the actions of the party, the regime, and the State;
Aggregate mark: 86.35%, Men: 87.56%, Women: 89.81%
Shoring up arguments to prove this point is almost superfluous. It is enough to point out that within this hierarchy is the inception and completion of the Mafia State. Consequently, there is no conflict between this and those two attempts described above (see page 2, f.n. 2, 3) defining the Fidesz phenomenon; the existence of mafia is a reality, however, not as its inverse, but merely part of the larger fascist system as its organizing principle.
Here, the marks given probably correctly register how far the ultimate goal of the fascistic reorganization of society is complete.
16. a corporate organization of the economy, which eliminates union liberty, enlarges the spheres of intervention of the State and aims at achieving, on the basis of technocratic and solidarity principles, the collaboration of the productive classes under the control of the regime, in order to reach its goal of power while preserving private property and class division;
Aggregate mark: 76.92%, Men: 75.67%, Women: 83.38%
It is hard to miss the conglomerating intentions in the government’s economic policies. The expropriations and purchases under the guise of the national interest; the secret “strategic contracts” with certain corporations; the frequent inexplicable cadre changes; and the government’s equity purchases in strategic sectors, are all evidence of the assembling of Magyarország Zrt. (Hungary Inc.) — of course, in accordance with the interests and decisions of the Leader. Naturally, in this process, the public support is courted by shameless propaganda, constantly invoking the “National Interest.” In many cases, it is hard to tell whether there is, or isn’t, public support for government involvement in business, but, the government ploughs on regardless. The government spends exorbitant sums of money on popularizing such involvement. Although this propaganda is not really necessary, the goal is obvious and the campaign would work fine without it.
As a result, the ‘protection’ of private property is realized so that the right to property is more assured for some than for some others. In this respect, the modern Hungarian fascism doesn’t honor the established rights of all, but prefers to respect only the property rights of those expropriated properties slipped into the hands of their adherents. A specific internal contradiction of this system lies in the insistence on redistribution of ownership even if it results in manifest losses and disadvantages. In these cases, despite the losses, they still insist upon the expropriation, because it is justified by ideological principles, the national interest. This is well exemplified by the redistribution of the tobacco licenses, that led to a 40% reduction in the over-all turnover of the tobacco market; the forcible intrusion of the banking sector that led to an almost complete secession of lending in the country, or and many others, that all lead to substantial losses to the state and to those industries. In reality, behind these redistributions there is always the favoring of some in the Fidesz hierarchy who eventually receive the right to those properties. The question, whether the Leader personally benefits from these property redistributions, is, for the moment, subject to guessing.
17. an imperialist foreign policy inspired by the myth of national grandeur and of the New Civilization, aiming at supranational expansion.
Aggregate mark: 58.81% Men: 64.52%, Women: 56.24%
The people giving these marks, in my view, did not quite appreciate how timely and important this point. They took the limited view of military expansion only and thus marked it too low. Of course, the minuscule Hungarian military, and the peaceable policies of the European Union absolutely preclude any possibility of armed conquest beyond Hungary’s borders. But that says nothing about ideological expansion. Fidesz is hard at work building bridgeheads in those countries where Hungarian ethnicities dwell, by creating and supporting Fidesz-clone parties in most areas. In these intentions, they are competing with even long-established local Hungarian political organizations, trying to replace them with Fidesz creations. This is an effort to break the independence of those local parties, so far, with pitiful results. The goal is to export Hungarian nationalism. To that end, the government extended Hungarian citizenship and voting rights to ethnic Hungarians of those territories: a quid pro quo.
This is the pipsqueak imperialism of a pipsqueak country’s pipsqueak government.
 http://www.oslo2000.uio.no/program/papers/s12/s12-gentile.pdf or elsewhere: http://www.libraryofsocialscience.com/ideologies/docs/fascism-and-the-italian-road-to-totalitarianism/
 Magyar Polip A postkommunista maffiaállam, ed. Bálint Magyar (Budapest: Noran Libro, 2013. The book has received wide attention and a second volume was published in September 2014.
 In point of fact, Rudolf Ungváry’s book on this subject just has been published a mere days before writing this summary. In this book he is mining to a much deeper degree the phenomenon and provides a much more detailed analysis. Rudolf Ungváry: A láthatatlan valóság; fascistoid mutáció a mai Magyarországon (Pozsony: Kalligram, 2014) (The invisible reality: a fascistoid mutation in today’s Hungary)
 Historian Zoltán Ripp has provided a remarkable analysis and critique of “ungvárysm” in an article: Ripp Zoltán: Jobb- vagy balmagyar – Az ungváryzmus téziseiről. (Right, or left Hungarian – about the theses of Ungvárysm) Mozgó Világ (July 2010). http://mozgovilag.com/?p=3593
 Laszló Kálmán expresses his reservations about the efficacy of this debate and the competition for the winning name for the regime. Élet és Irodalom (November 2014) http://www.es.hu/kalman_laszlo;elnevezesek_es_hasonlatok;2014-11-14.html
The worst example of this presently is the Chamber of Teachers, but a Chamber of Bailiffs and a Chamber of Notaries Public are in the process of being forcibly created.
 The symbolic, mythical bird of the fighting Hungarians of the prehistoric and medieval age.
 There is an increasing activity in share purchases, or full expropriations, such as the oil and gas market and the recent drive to buy out as many foreign-owned banks as possible.
 Zrt. is a Hungarian acronym, used for ‘closed’ private corporations, which operate without publishing reports, not traded on the stock market, and whose ownership is determined either in private negotiations or by government fiat.