Tag Archives: amendments to the constitution

The polling game: think tanks in the service of the Hungarian government

A few days ago Index received secret polling data that the Orbán government had ordered from Nézőpont Intézet, one of the two “think tanks” it relies on for information. (The other one is Századvég.) Since it was only yesterday that we talked about Fidesz’s heavy reliance on public opinion polls as a basis for policy decisions, the responsibility of these think tanks is enormous. Their results can make or break the government. If studies are improperly framed or if wrong conclusions are drawn, the government in its currently fragile state could make unpopular decisions and become dangerously vulnerable.

It is for this reason that many of us have wondered in the past about the efficacy of polls produced by Nézőpont and Századvég, whose results, in comparison to the other four or five pollsters, are always way off. Well, now that Nézőpont’s poll on the public’s reaction to amendments to the constitution and the Orbán government’s educational policies is no longer a secret, we understand how the commissioned polling game is played. The modus operandi of at least some of the hundreds of analysts who work at these two institutions can be compared to that of tax evaders who keep two sets of books. They prepare one study for the government that reflects the real state of affairs. Part of that study is then adjusted to take into account political expediencies and released to the unsuspecting public.

A perfect example of this kind of dirty game is the February study ordered from Nézőpont. The Fidesz government wanted to know what the public thought about the two important questions I mentioned above: educational policies and amendments to the constitution in the event of a threat of terrorism. Of course, that information was not shared with the public. Only from a poll by Medián did the public learn that 71% of the population consider the teachers’ demands justified. With a different set of questions Nézőpont arrived at similar results, which indicated that only 33% of the population think that the “educational reforms” have achieved “positive results.” With the exception of introducing daily gym, Hungarians think that the teachers’ dissatisfaction is legitimate and their demands reasonable.

think tank

How much did the public learn about the results of this wide-ranging poll conducted by Nezőpont? Not much. On February 24 Nézőpont released its findings with this headline: “Fidesz-KDNP is securely in the lead: The opposition parties haven’t profited from the teachers’ demonstration.” Századvég came out with the same results. Nothing has changed. It doesn’t matter what has happened in the last few months, Fidesz’s popularity is still soaring.

Other, well-respected pollsters came to different conclusions. Medián’s results were the most dramatic: they measured a 6% drop in support of Fidesz among active voters. Even more importantly, opposition parties gained voters. Publicus Intézet also came to the same conclusion. Fidesz gained considerably before December 2015 but since then has been steadily losing voters. According to their calculations, only 23% of the total population would vote for Fidesz today.

This downward slide is almost inevitable in light of public opinion on education. It is doubly so when we learn from this secret poll that Hungarians were not fooled by the Orbán rhetoric of a terrorist threat. Only 17% of them fully agree that amendments to the constitution are necessary. All in all, the population is divided on the issue. Slightly more (44%) oppose the amendments than support them (42%). Given this split, the decision was made to drop the idea.

But now that Orbán “adopted Brussels’ terror threat,” he decided to try to push through his proposed legislation. The rationale is that “thanks” to the terrorist attacks in Belgium, those who were opposed to the amendments back in February might have changed their minds. It is very possible that Nézőpont is already busily compiling its latest poll to guide the government’s strategy. We don’t know whether public opinion has changed on the subject since the events in Brussels, but the opposition leaders haven’t wavered. They are still united on the issue: no opposition party can ever vote for amendments that will result in what amounts to martial law.

Finally, here is a good example of how government client polling firms try to influence public opinion. We know from two very different sources (Nézőpont and Medián) that Hungarian public opinion is solidly behind the teachers. Yet Századvég about a week ago came out with its findings, which was summarized in the headline as “The majority of Hungarians don’t support the demonstration of the teachers.” Do they cheat outright or do they formulate their questions in such a way as to achieve certain desired results? The answer is most likely the latter.

So, let’s see how these pollsters go about their “task.” Századvég wanted to know what Hungarians think of the quality of education and came to the conclusion that “the Hungarian adult population is divided” on the issue. Forty-one percent think that it is “közepes,” a grade of C, and only 34% would give it an F, while 23% percent think that it is good (B) or excellent (A). Even Századvég felt that it had to say that “the majority thinks that there is plenty to change in the system.” But, according to Századvég, the overwhelming majority of the population “disapproves of the methods by which [the teachers] want to push through these changes.”

It is at this point that Századvég’s analysis becomes murky. It looks as if Századvég researchers reached the above conclusion based on answers to a question concerning the participants’ approval or disapproval of the decision of some parents to keep their children home as a sign of support for the teachers. This seems to me to be intentionally misleading because this particular issue was quite controversial at the time. A lot of people, although they wholeheartedly support the teachers’ demands, were against or ambivalent about involving students, especially small children, in the struggle of the teachers. A negative answer to this one question cannot be generalized to an overall disapproval of the “methods” the teachers employ.

Another misleading question dealt with the negotiations. As Századvég put it: “The percentage of those (78%) who think that results can be obtained only at the negotiating table and not on the streets greatly outweighed the 21% who believe that only demonstrations and ultimatums can achieve results.” The false dichotomy here is, I think, obvious at first glance. Everybody knows, including the teachers, that results can be achieved only at the bargaining table, but it is also clear that without pressure the government will either not negotiate or, if it does, it will do so on its own terms.

These kinds of misleading questions and conclusions are the daily fare of these polling clients of the Orbán government. This is especially so when they add that “these results tally with what László Palkovics and János Lázár said: that difficult technical questions cannot be discussed on the streets.” The conclusion? The government’s position perfectly reflects public opinion. Perfect harmony exists between the government and the governed. That’s why “think tanks” like Nézőpont and Századvég are at their core propaganda instruments of the Orbán government. Moreover, both are described as money laundering vehicles into which billions are poured from taxpayer money.

March 27, 2016

The Orbán government’s proposed amendments

A few days ago I wrote at some length about the Orbán government’s attempt to limit democratic freedoms under the guise of an unspecified terrorist threat that can be declared unilaterally by the government whenever it feels that such a move is warranted.

To introduce such “a state of terror threat,” the constitution must be amended, for which the government party needs a two-thirds majority in parliament, which it no longer has. Therefore, on January 12 István Simicskó, minister of defense, called a meeting of all five parliamentary parties, which the socialists boycotted. LMP and Jobbik did attend, however. András Schiffer expressed his misgivings about the proposed law, his greatest objection being that the declaration of a state of terror threat would depend exclusively on the will of the government. On the other hand, Előd Novák, whom Jobbik delegated to represent the party, was enthusiastic. When Origo’s reporter asked him about the extraordinary powers granted to the government in the amendments, he lightheartedly remarked that in a state of emergency “one cannot be too squeamish. That is the natural order of things.”

police state2

Between January 12 and January 19, however, something happened. It looks as if the Jobbik leadership was less elated about the proposed amendments than Novák initially was. Indeed, Novák dramatically announced on his Facebook page that although the document he received from the ministry of defense has been made secret for thirty years, he is ready to face three years of jail time. He cannot remain quiet. Here is proof that the government is planning to introduce a police state any time it claims the need for such measures.

This morning Ádám Mirkóczki, the spokesman for Jobbik, announced on Hír TV that his party agrees that the government should have wider powers in case of a terror threat, but it cannot accept the present proposal that gives the cabinet the exclusive right to identify the existence of a terror threat. They will not support governance by decree. They will not sign a blank check. Moreover, they insist on a four-fifths majority to pass the amendments. Both Népszabadság and Magyar Nemzet triumphantly announced that “the government’s proposal failed.” Indeed, even with Jobbik support, Fidesz would not have a four-fifths majority.

According to Gergely Gulyás, Fidesz stands by its original proposals, but its representatives are ready to negotiate a possible decrease in the duration of the state of terror threat.

Here is the English translation of the document that was officially made public by Előd Novák. It contains both the wording of the amendments and a detailed exposition of what the vague words in the constitution actually mean in reality.

♦ ♦ ♦

Sixth modification of the Hungarian Fundamental Law

 

Article 1.

The following subheadings and the following 51/A. Article are inserted into the Fundamental Law:

Terror threat-situation

Article 51/A.

 (1) The Government can proclaim terror threat-situation in an event of significant terror threat or in the case of a terrorist attack, and it can introduce extraordinary measures defined in cardinal law.

(2) The Government can issue decrees in a terror threat-situation that  according to regulations defined by cardinal laws – can suspend the application of certain laws, deviate from certain legal provisions, and it may take other extraordinary measures.

(3) The Government regulation (1) and (2) shall remain in force for sixty days, unless the Government – under the authorization of the National Assembly – extends the scope of the regulation.

(4) For the National Assembly’s (3) paragraph decision, two-thirds vote of the present Members of Parliament is needed.

(5) The Government informs continuously the President of Republic and the National Assembly standing committees that have relevant responsibilities and powers about the measures taken in the time of terror threat situation.

(6) The Hungarian Defense Force may be used during the terror threat-situation, if the use of the police and national security agencies are not enough.

(7) The Government’s decree is repealed if the terror threat situation ceases to exist.

Article 2.

 (1) This modification of the Fundamental Law shall enter into force on the first day of the month following its promulgation.

(2) This modification of the Fundamental Law is accepted according to the Fundamental Law’s Article 1. Paragraph (2) Point (a) S) article Paragraph (2) by the National Assembly.

(3) The consolidated text of the Fundamental Law after this modification of the Fundamental Law entered into force shall be published immediately in the Official Gazette.

General Explanation

The security environment of the transatlantic region, including Europe and Hungary has fundamentally changed since the creation of the Fundamental Law. New type of security challenges have appeared in the world that cannot be answered by the previous same special legal answers given to classical interstate threats sufficiently and in accordance with the requirement of necessity-proportionality. The special legal order rules of the Fundamental Law create a logically closed system for the classical challenges. In this system the state of national crisis answers the classical war threat, the state of emergency answers the fundamental threat of the state or social order from inside, the state of preventive defense ensures the preparation of a coming war, the unexpected attack situation answers a situation when an external armed force attacks the country. This system provides more and more authority to the government according to the severity of each situation. The new type of security challenges cannot be implemented fully into this system.

Taking into account the security situation nowadays, this modification serves the goal of supplementing the special legal authority for the prevention and management of the new type of security challenges of terrorism, given that these types of – armed and unarmed – threats have intensified in Europe.

Detailed Explanation

For Article 1.

The purpose of the amendment is to give the government powers to immediate action in the case of terror threat – including armed or cyber threats as well – with the National Assembly’s post factum confirmation. With this amendment the prevention or elimination of these new types of security challenges does not require the introduction of the state of preventive defense that was designed for war time emergency or the introduction of state of emergency that was designed for managing an internal crisis. The latter two special laws include the systematic modification of governmental operations and the ordinary life of a citizen; which in a state of emergency situation involves fundamental legal order changes as well.

The terror threat and certain attacks do not require the introduction of state of emergency, because the immediate management of these problems could be handled by the Government with the option of extraordinary measures. In contrast, the introduction of the state of emergency is needed, if more serious attacks happen that massively threaten the life and property safety, or the constitutional order of the state is endangered fundamentally. In the case of these types of extended threats the state of emergency seems to be justified, where the President of the Republic has the decision-making powers, and the operation of the state has system-wide changes, it opens a broader extraordinary executive power in order to ward off the threats.

The regulation of terror threat-situation follows technically the regulation of emergency, with an additional overhead warranty. For the prolongation of the Government’s regulations, the Fundamental Law requires a qualified majority, and regards to the nature of the situation the Government has a permanent obligation to provide information to the President of the Republic and to the National Assembly.

The promulgation of terror threat-situation provides for the Government quick intervention opportunity to deviate from the regulations concerning the public administration, Hungarian Defense Force, law enforcement, national security agencies. In addition, it provides opportunities for the Government to introduce measures that have an effect on the everyday life of an ordinary citizen proportionately to immediate threats, with providing continuous information to the President of the Republic and to the National Assembly at the same time. The terror threat-situation does not necessary require the use of the Hungarian Defense Force, but it provides an opportunity for that. The Government can decide on the usage of Hungarian Defense Force at the same time, when it promulgates the terror threat-situation. Additional warranty condition is that the deployment of Hungarian Defense Force can be used if the Government evaluates the usage of the police and civil national security services are not sufficient to handle the situation.

For Article 2.

It includes the enacting regulation.

 

  1. year…law

Terror threat-situation modification of certain laws

  1. §

The XXXIV. law on Police from the year 1994.;  1. § Paragraph (2) Point 9. is replaced by the following:

[The police in the Fundamental Law, in this law and based on an act in other regulations among defined crime prevention, public administration and law enforcement responsibilities]

            “9. Shall carry out the law enforcement tasks delegated to it in time of state of national crisis, state of emergency, state of preventive defense, terror threat-situation, unexpected attack and in time of emergency, furthermore in time of state of national crisis and in case of unexpected attack participate in capturing and unarming the people who crossed the state border armed or with weapons,”

 

  1. §

The CXXV. Law on national security services from the year 1995.; 9. § Point b) is replaced by the following:

[The national security services]

            “b) shall carry out the tasks delegated to them in time of state of national crisis, state of emergency,  state of preventive defense, terror threat-situation, unexpected attack and in time of emergency;”

 

  1. §

The CXIII. Law (hereinafter: Hvt.) 36. § Paragraph (1) Point f) which is connected to homeland defense and Hungarian Defense Force and measures in time of special legal order is replaced by the following:

(The Hungarian Defense Force shall carry out the following tasks with the right to use weapons)

            “f) application,”

  1. §

(1) The Hvt. 64. § Paragraph (1) is replaced by the following:

“(1) The operational regulations and measures are defined by this chapter in time of state of national crisis, the state of emergency, state of preventive defense, terror threat-situation. The national measures in accordance with the NATO Crisis Response System can be used independently, and in consort with other extraordinary measures. “

(2) The Hvt. 64. § Paragraph (4) is complemented by the following:

(The Government can introduce)

            “c) in terror threat-situation measures according to the 78/A. §

(3) The Hvt. 64. § Paragraph (5) is replaced by the following:

“(5) Where this part mentions regulations, it means extraordinary measures introduced by the Hungarian Defense Council in time of state of national crisis; the President of Republic in time of state of emergency; the Government in time of state of preventive defense, terror threat-situation and unexpected attack. Any conflicting legislation with these does not apply.

 

  1. §

The Hvt. is complemented with the following 46/A. sub-heading:

“46/A. Extraordinary measures that can be introduced in time of a terror threat situation.

 

78/A. § The Government may order in compliance with the Fundamental Law Article 51/A Paragraph (2)

  1. obligatory publication of agreed and coordinated information, official resolutions for public service broadcasters
  2. stockpiling, regulating and restricting the circulation of  products, energy sources, consumer goods that are important for the protection of the country
  3. the replenishment – with simplified procedure – and overwork of  important positions in public administration, defense management, the Hungarian Defense Force and law enforcement organizations
  4. the simplification of management system in certain sectors of public administration, the modification of regulations – administration period, authority, jurisdiction and scope of cooperation – of public administrative institution’s work schedule, and public proceedings.
  5. restrictive regulations on frequency management and broadcasting, and order introduction of special modes
  6. necessary restriction of air traffic in the Hungarian air space and airports
  7. the employment of the Hungarian Defense Force, and  law enforcement forces and equipment to protect the country and the critical infrastructure of public services
  8. the limitation of ownership rights and locking interests of other states, natural persons, legal persons, and organizations without legal persons that threatens the security of the country
  9. cumulating special reserves, speeding up purchases of imported goods, export restrictions, introduction of commercial quotas, suspension of public procurement
  10. introduction of special counter terrorism measures
  11. tightening the traffic control on state borders regardless of any international regulations and conventions
  12. the use of alert levels for citizens as well
  13. the use of special access control procedures and technical control in public institutions and public places
  14. the tightening rules, introducing conditions or denying,   personal or vehicle entry into buildings and facilities of public administration, Hungarian Defense Force, law enforcement and other organizations that contribute to defense. The traffic’s evacuation, limitation or diversion on their approach routes’
  15. the searching of individuals or vehicles in the above mentioned objects and approach routes, in addition finding and destroying unattended things with unknown origins
  16. making rules for service time – differently than the procedure in time of peace – concerning the Hungarian Defense Force’s operative military units and official cadres of law enforcement agencies
  17. increased control of the internet, letters, baggage and mail traffic
  18. the restriction of residence in certain parts of the country, and subjection it to a permit
  19. curfew in the affected settlements with determination of the exact time period
  20. prohibition of organizing events and demonstrations in public spaces
  21. the use of rooms, studios, broadcasting stations, equipment,  and facilities of radios, TV-s and other mass communication institutes, unbundling or ignoring them for use.
  22. the suspension, limitation and controlling of postal and electronic communication services, furthermore the use of telecommunication and information technology networks and equipment, and the unbundling or ignoring the use of electronic communication equipment
  23. the limitation of road, rail, water or air vehicles in certain parts of the day and in certain places (routes), or prohibiting their transport temporarily in all over- or some parts of the country
  24. requisition or limitation of the usage of repair capabilities, stations, airports and storage units  in order to ensure the road, rail, water and air transports, and perform transport services in expenses of the vehicle owner
  25. the limitation or prohibition of entry of foreigners
  26. the limitation or prohibition of contact and communication with foreigners and foreign organizations, institutions
  27. an obligation to non-Hungarian citizens that stay in Hungary to report themselves to authorities, and the Government may introduce limitations on their stay
  28. that traveling to, across, or out of certain parts of the country is possible only with a permit
  29.  that the population in certain part of the country has to evacuate for a necessary time, and at the same time the Government appoints a new place of residence for them
  30. the use of regulations different from the rules on public finances, implementation of appropriation transfers between budget categories, suspension of execution of certain expenditure appropriation, fulfillment of expenditure not included in the law on the central budget, requirement of extraordinary payment obligations, establishment new type of fines, changing the rate of payment and fine obligations, elimination of exemptions and discounts.”
  1. §

The Hvt. 80. § is complemented with the w) point:

(In the application of this act and legislation concerning national defense)

“w) application: participation in time of state of emergency and terror threat-situation in elimination of violence.”

  1. §

This Act shall take effect on the first day of the month following its publication.

  1. §

This Act considered being a cardinal law based on the Fundamental Law Article T) Paragraph (1), Article 45. Paragraph (5), Article 46. Paragraph (6) and Article 54. Paragraph (4).

 

GENERAL EXPLANATION

The act is aimed to implement the sixth amendment of the Fundamental Law about homeland defense and the Hungarian Armed Force, in addition to implement the modification of the CXIII. Law (hereinafter: Hvt) on measures in special legal order from 2011. The regulation expands to the XXXIV. Law on police, from the year 1994. (hereinafter: Rtv.), and to the CXXV. law on national security services (Hereinafter: Nbtv.) and supplements them.

 

DETAILED EXPLANATION

For the 1. §

The constitutional appearance of the terror threat-situation made necessary the supplementation of Rtv. concerning special legal order. The amendment serves this purpose.

For the 2. §

The constitutional appearance of the terror threat-situation made necessary the supplementation of Nbtv. concerning special legal order. The amendment serves this purpose.

For the 3-6. §

For the Hungarian Defense Force, the sixth amendment of the Fundamental Law is necessary to carry out tasks in a terror threat-situation. The deployment of the Hungarian Defense Force has to be expanded to this special legal order besides the state of emergency, in favor of making every other regulation concerning the national defense interpretable.

The Proposal contains the Hvt. 46/A. sub-heading supplementation with the terror threat-situation. The Hvt. new 78/A. § contains in detail – within the cardinal law regulation framework of the Fundamental Law – what kind of measures are in the scope of the Government’s authority.

For the 7. §

The section contains a giving effect provision

For the 8. §

The section contains a cardinal clause.

January 22, 2016

 

Conservative critics of the Orbán regime and its “new” constitution

First and foremost I would like give a link to Professor Kim Scheppele’s latest article, “The Fog of Amendment,”  about the latest changes to the Hungarian constitution adopted less than a year ago. She who worked at the Hungarian Constitutional Court during its most heroic period, right after the change of regime in the early 1990s, is most worried about the castration of the court.

László Sólyom, former president and chief justice who was one of the authors of the constitution the Fidesz government replaced with its own, decries the death of a democratic constitution and its replacement with one in which the separation of powers is destroyed with the introduction of the so-called “fourth amendment.” Sólyom argues, correctly I believe, that the amendments, fifteen pages in length, fundamentally change the spirit of the constitution.

I would like to spend a little time on Sólyom’s arguments. I think I should mention that I considered Sólyom a disaster as a president. He didn’t even try to hide his political sympathies; he openly favored the man, Viktor Orbán, and the party that was responsible for his election. Sólyom would gladly have continued as head of state, but the new prime minister had other ideas. Sólyom was a pain in the neck as far as the socialist-liberal governments were concerned, and there was every likelihood that he would continue in the same vein and find almost every new piece of legislation unconstitutional. The members of the court naturally obliged. After all, the former chief justice knew the constitution he himself helped write. And, naturally, this was the last thing Viktor Orbán wanted. So instead came Pál Schmitt. He had no objection to anything. He most likely didn’t even read the documents. Too bad for Orbán that his faithful servant in the Sándor palota (the office of the president in the Castle District) was found to have plagiarized and had to step down.

Sólyom points out that both the constitution of 1990 and even the one that replaced it were based on the principle of a separation of powers. In that system, the constitutional court ensures the sanctity of the basic laws while the parliament represents the public will. Each is the highest organ within its own domain. By contrast, in the communist system the parliament was the single “power” over the affairs of state. “Unrestricted parliamentary powers in Hungary as well as in Central Europe have never been democratic and bring back very unpleasant memories,” writes Sólyom.

www.globalpost.com

www.globalpost.com

The move to place parliament and through it the government over and above the constitutional court did not start with the adoption of these latest amendments. From the moment Viktor Orbán and Fidesz won the elections it was evident that the power of parliament was going to be enhanced at the expense of the judiciary and the constitutional court. They began to use the constitution as an instrument of political power. Between June 2010 and January 1, 2012 they changed the old constitution thirteen times, affecting twenty-six paragraphs. Between January 1 and March 11, 2013 they changed their own new constitution four times. This time they practically created a new constitution. According to Sólyom, the “Basic Laws” enacted by parliament in April 2011 could still be considered to be a democratic constitution. With these new amendments, however, Hungary has ceased to be a democracy because from now on the parliament has the last word as far as constitutionality is concerned.

We arrived at this sorry state of affairs as a result of the government’s decision to ignore the rulings of the constitutional court that found several of the so-called “temporary measures” unconstitutional. Yesterday the Fidesz faithful in parliament voted to incorporate all those unconstitutional measures into the main body of the constitution. And at the same time it forbade the constitutional court from examining the constitutionality of these provisions.

Gábor Török, not exactly a liberal commentator, pointed out that perhaps the most worrisome passage in this newly amended constitution is Article 2(3), which reads as follows:

“(3) The Speaker of the House shall sign the adopted Fundamental Law or the adopted
amendment thereof within five days and shall send it to the President of the Republic. The
President of the Republic shall sign the Fundamental Law or the amendment thereof sent to
him within five days of receipt and shall order its publication in the Official Gazette. If the
President of the Republic finds a departure from any procedural requirement laid down in the
Fundamental Law with respect to adoption of the Fundamental Law or any amendment thereof, the President of the Republic refers such departure to the Constitutional Court for a revision. Should the revision by the Constitutional Court not verify the departure from the requirements, the President of the Republic shall immediately sign the Fundamental Law or the
amendment thereof, and shall order its publication in the Official Gazette.”

From here on the government through its two-thirds majority in parliament can do anything its heart desires. There is no control over the laws they put into the constitution. Because, let’s not fool ourselves, unless Orbán is stopped ever new amendments will enable him to do whatever he wants.

This latest rape of Hungarian democracy is too much even for some so-called conservative writers. Like Bálint Ablonczy of Heti Válasz who complains that the Orbán government has lost its sense of reality. He calls the constitution a “legal lasagna” and says that “it is not the least bit consoling that there is no horse meat in it.” Ablonczy argues that “those Fidesz politicians who came up with this scandalous procedure not only cause damage to themselves but  further tear into the already unstitched fabric of our common affairs.” Ablonczy finds it incomprehensible that the Orbán government is ready ignore the danger signs coming from the Council of Europe, the European Commission, the American administration, and the German foreign ministry. “It is time to think a little bit.” Surely, the editorial board of Heti Válasz had to approve this article. Maybe they want to send a message to Viktor Orbán.

Even more outspoken criticism came from Dávid Lakner, a member of Mandiner, an online site for young conservatives. They also seem to be waking up to the fact that the ideology of the Orbán government has nothing to do with conservatism in the classical sense. This is an undemocratic, authoritarian system heading toward full fledged dictatorship.

The German conservative paper Die Welt described Orbán, after the enactment of the “new” constitution, as a man “who no longer trusts the free play of democratic forces and instead relies on unfettered power…. Orbán isn’t protecting his country. He is leading it into a dangerous rigidity. But things that are too brittle break all too easily.”

Finally, Barbara Stamm, president of the Bavarian parliament, cancelled her scheduled meeting with László Kövér. This must be a real blow because if Viktor Orbán’s regime had one steadfast supporter, it was Bavaria’s governing party, the Christian Social Union (CSU). Viktor Orbán loved visiting Munich where he was always welcome. And Bavarian politicians came to Budapest to sing the praises of the Orbán government. No longer, it seems.