Tag Archives: Demokratikus Koalíció

Not on Viktor Orbán’s Christmas list: A European Public Prosecutor

The establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) has been on the table since at least 2013. In the last three years, despite intensive negotiations, progress has been slow because of the resistance of some of the member states, among them Hungary. As it stands, in order to create EPPO 25 member states have to support the proposal because the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark have opted out. According to reports, 20 member states support the plan while Poland, Hungary, Sweden, and the Netherlands oppose it. The reluctance to cede certain national rights to the European Union is understandable from the point of view of nation states, but we can be sure that Hungary’s unwillingness has other sources as well.

EPPO will have the authority “to investigate and prosecute EU-fraud and other crimes affecting the Union’s financial interests.” Currently, only national authorities can investigate and prosecute EU-fraud. The existing EU bodies, such as OLAF, Eurojust, and Europol, don’t have jurisdiction here. OLAF can investigate, but the prosecution must be carried out by the authorities of the member states. As we know, in the case of Hungary OLAF finds plenty to investigate, but the Hungarian authorities never find anything wrong. Europol has no executive powers, and its officials are not entitled to conduct investigations in the member states or to arrest suspects. Eurojust, an organization I have not mentioned before, is merely a coordinating body which is supposed to improve the handling of serious cross-border crimes by “stimulating” investigative and prosecutorial coordination among agencies of the member states. This is another body that has no power over the justice system in the member states. Eurojust could “stimulate” Péter Polt’s prosecutor’s office till doomsday and it would never investigate crimes committed by Fidesz officials.

From the description of EPPO’s structure on the website of the European Union I have some difficulty envisaging how this independent prosecutorial body will function. Under a European prosecutor, investigations will be carried out by European delegated prosecutors located in each member state. These delegated prosecutors will be an integral part of the EPPO, but they will also function as national prosecutors. I must say that I have my doubts about this setup, which Viktor Orbán’s regime could easily manipulate. But it will probably never come to pass because, among the Central European EU members, Hungary and Poland have no intention of going along with the plan which, according to Věra Jourová, commissioner in charge of justice, consumers and gender equality, should be voted on within three months.

The head of OLAF, Giovanni Kessler, naturally supports the plan because the number of cases his organization has to investigate increases every year. In 2015 OLAF opened 219 investigations and concluded 304. Hungary alone had 17 possible fraud cases, the third highest after Bulgaria and Romania. But OLAF can only make recommendations to the member states, which at least in Hungary’s case are not pursued. Interestingly, several chief prosecutors in member states support the idea of the setting up a European Prosecutor’s Office, among them the prosecutors of Belgium, Bulgaria, Greece, Spain, France, and Romania. As we know, in Romania corruption is just as bad if not worse than in Hungary, yet there is a willingness to allow an independent body to investigate cases of fraud and corruption.

Last July the Hungarian media reported that the negotiations were in an advanced stage since Jourová called together the ministers of justice for an informal talk in Bratislava. At that point HVG reported that “Hungary supports the goals of the organization but is afraid that the sovereignty of the Hungarian prosecution may be undermined.” The explanation Justice Minister László Trócsányi gave for Hungary’s hesitation concerning EPPO was that in the Hungarian judicial system the chief prosecutor is appointed by the parliament and therefore the sovereignty issue might be a constitutional problem. By December, after Jourová’s visit to Budapest, this hesitation became a flat refusal. In addition to the argument about the parliamentary appointment of the chief prosecutor, a new argument surfaced in parliament, which had its source in Trócsányi’s proposed additions to the Fidesz constitution about Hungary’s “national identity and basic constitutional arrangements.”

Practically on the same day that the parliamentary committee said no to the proposal “in its present form,” Věra Jourová told Handelsblatt Global that “the European Commission could impose financial penalties on Poland and Hungary if they block the creation of a European public prosecutor.” Poland and Hungary receive more aid from the European Union than they pay into the budget, and therefore their refusal is unacceptable. She disclosed that on the basis of the known cases, €638 million of structural funds were misappropriated in 2015. The actual figure is most likely much higher. This must be stopped, she added.

Věra Jourová, commissioner in charge of justice. Despite her pleasant smile she’s apparently tough.

On December 8 EU justice ministers gathered again in Brussels to discuss the creation of EPPO, but while the majority of them support the plan, a few member states refuse to budge. To quote euractiv.com, “with no end in sight to this blockage, France’s Minister of Justice Jean-Jacques Urvoas and his German counterpart Heiko Maas decided to propose an enhanced cooperation deal for those countries that are in favor of this ‘super prosecutor.’” Enhanced cooperation is a mechanism that allows EU countries to bypass the requirement of unanimity. A group of at least nine member states may request a draft regulation. If this draft fails, the states concerned are free to establish enhanced cooperation among themselves. I fail to see how that would be disadvantageous to rogue states like Poland or Hungary. Orbán would gladly acknowledge the fact that EPPO has no jurisdiction over Hungary, and he and his friends could continue to steal about a third of the structural funds EU provides. A perfect arrangement.

Now let’s turn to how the opposition parties see the issue. As far as Jobbik is concerned, the establishment of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office is the first step to the dreaded United States of Europe. In fact, Jobbik accuses Fidesz and the Orbán government of not fighting hard enough in Brussels against this proposal. Jobbik must consider the issue very important because they published a statement in English in which Gábor Staudt, a Jobbik MP, explains the party’s position. He recalls the Fidesz members of the European Parliament not having the guts to vote against the proposal; they only abstained. Jobbik’s opposition is based strictly on its nationalistic defense of Hungarian sovereignty whereas Fidesz worries primarily about the legal consequences of an independent European prosecutor’s office investigating crimes of government officials.

The democratic Hungarian opposition parties are all enthusiastic supporters of a European Public Prosecutor’s Office. DK was actually campaigning with the idea ahead of the 2014 European parliamentary election. Benedek Jávor, a member of the European parliament delegated by PM (nowadays Párbeszéd), joined DK’s demand soon after. István Ujhelyi (MSZP), also a member of the European parliament, is of the same mind. He wrote a lengthy piece, published on the party’s website, about the necessity of such a body in the absence of a functioning Hungarian prosecutor’s office. Ujhelyi is sure that if EPPO is set up “the Fidesz hussars will be behind bars in crowded rows, including those corrupt officials who assist them.” He criticizes Fidesz members of the European Parliament for abandoning the position of the European People’s Party to which they belong. They “almost alone abstained” at the time the matter was discussed in Strasbourg.

Ujhelyi somewhat optimistically points out that if Hungary remains outside the group of countries that are ready to be under the jurisdiction of the European Public Prosecutor, the distinction between honest and dishonest countries will be evident. In case Fidesz refuses to support the decision, “it will be an admission that it is a party of thieves.” I’m afraid Viktor Orbán and his government simply don’t care what others think of them. At the moment Viktor Orbán is in Poland on a two-day visit. I understand that he and Jarosław Kaczyński had a leisurely three-hour dinner. I’m sure that the threat of a European Public Prosecutor to the sovereignty of Poland and Hungary was thoroughly discussed.

December 11, 2016

What’s the remedy? Boycott of parliament and/or elections?

Over the weekend Ferenc Gyurcsány called together the elected leaders of the Demokratikus Koalíció to discuss the party’s strategy in the wake of the political developments of the last week and a half. Apparently, after a very long and passionate debate, the politicians came to the conclusion that the party’s four members of parliament–Ferenc Gyurcsány, László Varju, Ágnes Vadai, and Lajos Oláh–from here on will boycott parliament. They will not attend the plenary sessions, they will not take part in the work of the committees, and hence they will not vote unless their vote would make a difference as far as Fidesz’s two-thirds majority is concerned. The four realize that they may not receive their salaries and/or may be fined. But, as Gyurcsány said at his press conference, they refuse to be a cog in Orbán’s “System of National Cooperation.” They will not cooperate with a dictatorial power.

The idea of a boycott is not at all new in Ferenc Gyurcsány’s thinking. He was still a member of MSZP in 2011 when he first suggested a partial boycott of the plenary sessions. The occasion was Viktor Orbán’s sudden decision to write a new constitution. MSZP had already decided not to attend the preparatory meetings, but Gyurcsány’s suggestion went further: MSZP should boycott parliament altogether when the new constitution was on the table. At that time no party was ready to heed Gyurcsány’s advice.

In February 2016, after skinheads prevented István Nyakó from turning in his referendum question at the National Election Office, Gyurcsány came up with the idea again. He suggested a boycott of parliament as long as the government party refuses to change the rules on holding referendums. The opposition parties didn’t support the idea. LMP’s András Schiffer went even further in his condemnation of the idea when he declared that “people must decide whether they will support the rule of law or follow Ferenc Gyurcsány.”

An intelligent critique of Gyurcsány’s suggestion came from Sándor Révész, Népszabadság’s op-ed page editor, who felt that between 2010 and 2016 Orbán had done everything in his power to destroy all vestiges of Hungary’s weak fabric of democracy and therefore a boycott was justified. But, he continued, staging a boycott because of one particular undemocratic step of the government is “not a very good idea.” He rightly pointed out that Orbán, “together with his Fidesz accomplices,” would come up with some clever way to “remedy” the objectionable piece of legislation and everything would go on as before.

The idea of a boycott, this time of the national election, was on the agenda again when Miklós Haraszti, SZDSZ member of parliament (1990-1994) and OSCE’s representative on freedom of the media (2004-2010), was interviewed by 168 Óra in May 2016. According to his argument, one of the sources of Fidesz’s overwhelming power is the electoral law that it created for its own benefit. Fidesz, with a 44.87% share of the popular vote, in 2014 achieved a 66.83% presence in parliament, which allowed the government to do anything it wanted, ignoring the powerless opposition. In order to stop the dictatorship of a supermajority, this lopsided, disproportionate electoral system must be abolished. In Haraszti’s opinion, all opposition parties should join ranks to force Fidesz to adopt an entirely different electoral system where 40% in the polling station means 40% in parliament. The parties should make it clear that if the government party doesn’t play ball, the whole opposition will walk out, refusing to participate in the next election. Such a move would create a “European scandal.”

The reaction to Haraszti’s idea was mixed. Márton Kozák, a sociologist and journalist, wrote a glowing endorsement in Magyar Narancs, praising Haraszti for calling attention to the electoral law as the key to curtailing Fidesz’s power. The opposition parties from here on should concentrate on enlightening their voters about the importance of this issue. And, he continued, the opposition parties must not assist Fidesz in its attempt to make small, unimportant changes in a basically faulty electoral law.

As usual, others violently disagreed. Someone who calls himself Nick Grabowszki found Haraszti’s plan naïve. “What European scandal?” he asked. Western European commentators and politicians already look upon Orbán as a representative of the far right. They compare him to Erdoğan, Putin, and Lukashenko. The European Union expects Hungarians to take care of their own little dictator. Moreover, Orbán is very careful not to cross any red line when it comes to his dealings with the European Union. Brussels will not get involved. Yes, says Grabowszki, the electoral system produces disproportionate results, but it is beneficial not only to Fidesz but to all parties that manage to achieve a certain percentage of the votes. Even if Fidesz were stupid enough to agree to the plan Haraszti has in mind, it would still win the election. It would simply be forced to find a coalition partner. Grabowszki is certain that Jobbik would not join the boycott, and therefore all people critical of the Fidesz government would vote for Jobbik. Grabowski’s conclusion is that “a left-wing boycott would lead to a Jobbik government.”

To return to DK’s current suggestion, the reaction of MSZP to DK’s announcement of a boycott is slightly different from its earlier stance when the party insisted that boycotting parliament would offend its constituency and that being in parliament still gives them a certain measure of influence. This time their argument is that a party which is large enough to have a parliamentary delegation (frakció), with the privileges that come with this status, “cannot boycott because that would mean ceding the role of opposition to Jobbik.” On the other hand, according to Gyula Molnár, DK, which has no such delegation, “made the right decision.”

osszefogas

It would be indeed wonderful if all the opposition parties could together decide on a joint action, as Haraszti’s theoretical model would demand. But here even the two largest democratic parties cannot agree when it comes to the decision to boycott parliament.

Despite this, there is some hope that these parties are coming closer and will be, we hope, acting jointly. For example, Fidesz organized a five-party discussion of the proposed amendments to the constitution. The five parties are the ones with their own delegations: Fidesz, KDNP, Jobbik, MSZP, and LMP. For a while it looked as if LMP would attend, but at the end only Fidesz-KDNP, which is in reality a single party, and Jobbik had a friendly chat. From the media coverage of the event it seems that the two parties are largely in agreement on all points.

Another promising development is that MSZP, DK, Párbeszéd, and Modern Magyarországért Mozgalom (MoMa) will celebrate together in front of the Astoria Hotel on October 23. This will be the first time that, on a national holiday, these parties will hold their rallies together. Együtt is missing from the list. Only recently it announced that it will not cooperate with any other opposition parties. Broad-based democratic cooperation is a painfully slow process, but the events of the last few days, I think, will convince more people that Orbán’s regime must go. As Ferenc Kőszeg, founder of the Hungarian Helsinki Commission, said in an article that appeared in Élet és Irodalom recently, “nothing is more important than the removal of Viktor Orbán from his position.” He added that “against him one can even vote for Gábor Vona.” Of course, this remark raised quite a few eyebrows, but I agree with him. At the moment Orbán is a great deal more dangerous than the leader of Jobbik.

October 11, 2016

The deadly embrace of Hungarian television propaganda

Yesterday, while waiting for the results of the anti-refugee referendum, I decided to take a look at Channel M1, one of Magyar Televízió’s four or five channels. This particular channel is devoted to news and political discussions. I must admit that I hadn’t bothered to watch it before, though of course I knew that since 2010, when Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party won the election, MTV had become a servile mouthpiece of government propaganda. I heard all the jokes about its being the Hungarian version of North Korean Television and that anyone who has a cable connection avoids M1 like the plague. Insufferable, unwatchable, disgraceful; these were the verdicts coming from Hungary. And then, yes, there’s the astonishing €160,191,200 yearly budget on channels few people watch, although MTV can be received across the country and beyond. (Of the private stations, only RTL Klub and TV2 have nationwide coverage.) Well, yesterday I took the plunge.

Watching Channel M1 while the voting was in progress was a shocking experience. The intensity of the propaganda could easily be compared to the times of Mátyás Rákosi–if, that is, Hungary had had television broadcasting in those days. Friends of mine who worked as journalists during the last two decades of the Kádár regime tell me that, despite the limitations imposed on them by the regime, they had more freedom than those journalists who still work at MTV. The better ones were fired years ago; those who remained do what they are told.

I hate to think how much money MTV spent on this last-minute campaigning for a valid and successful referendum. One reporter was sent to Belgrade to interview “migrants” who are stuck there. Another went to France. Another was dispatched to the “capital of Székelyföld,” which is a fiction of the Hungarian right since there is no way Romania will grant autonomous status to the two counties where Hungarian-speaking Szeklers are in the majority. Another journalist stood in front of a former refugee camp in Debrecen.

The anchor at intervals asked for the latest developments in Belgrade. The correspondent there reported that the “migrants” are breathlessly waiting for word on the outcome of the referendum. If it is not valid, they are planning to storm the Hungarian border first thing Monday morning. Ten or fifteen minutes later the anchor got in touch with the reporter in Belgrade again for “the latest developments.”

Then came the turn of the reporter from France. She was in the village of Allex in southeastern France where, as several French- and English-language papers reported in mid-September that“furious villagers have plunged France’s asylum system into chaos after demanding a vote on whether to kick out migrants re-homed in their neighborhood.” Allex had to take 50 refugees and the locals, egged on by the Front National, created a situation that became explosive. They demanded a referendum, which couldn’t be held because localities cannot decide on immigration issues. This news was picked up by right-wing Hungarian internet sources like Origo, 888.hu, and Pestisracok.hu around September 15. So MTV sent a special correspondent to this village to record a conversation with the mayor about “the lack of democracy” in France.

The reporter in Csíkszereda told MTV’s audience in Hungary about the great enthusiasm among the Szeklers for this referendum. Népszabadság’s Bucharest correspondent, who was also in Csíkszereda, reported otherwise. According to the Hungarian consul-general, 17,525 people asked for ballots and instructions to vote on Sunday but 11,820 (67.45%) didn’t bother to pick them up. In Cluj/Kolozsvár the situation was a bit better. All in all, there was not much to see in Csíkszereda. Most people had already voted by mail and, as we know, more than 16% of the ballots were invalid. According to the National Election Office, 30,705 ballots came from Transylvania before October 1.

Then came the story of all the atrocities that “migrants” had committed in the last year or so in Hungary. The reporter stood in front of the by now empty barracks that used to house refugees in Debrecen. The whole neighborhood was ruined, there was litter everywhere, fighting broke out over some dispute about the Koran, every time they wanted something some migrants climbed up on a tower and threatened to jump if their demands were not met. In short, it was sheer hell and, if migrants were allowed to enter Hungary, the whole country would be like that. The story then continued with the “terrorists” in Röszke who threw rocks at the policemen, people at the Keleti Station, and the march toward Vienna. A long litany of atrocities committed by the “migrants.”

Finally came a series of interviews with politicians and ordinary citizens who all voted no and who explained their weighty reasons for doing so. These stories were packed into one hour of non-stop propaganda, which was outright stomach turning.

television-propaganda

I decided to write about the hour I spent on the state propaganda channel of a so-called democratic country because the defeat of Orbán’s referendum is even more momentous when viewed in the context of this government attempt at brainwashing voters.

Although most foreign and domestic observers consider the result a colossal failure for the Hungarian government, the Fidesz leadership gathered stone-faced in front of a small and somewhat artificially enthusiastic crowd to announce the government’s great victory. Journalists were forbidden to be present. In a short speech Viktor Orbán shamelessly claimed that nine out of ten Hungarians voted for the sovereignty of Hungary. “Brussels or Budapest. That was the question and we decided that the right of decision lies solely with Budapest.” Although I often get confused with numbers, I’m pretty sure that 2,978,144 is not 90% of 8,272,624 eligible voters.

As for his future plans concerning a change of the constitution, it is about as illegal as the referendum itself was. I know that Jobbik will support it because Gábor Vona’s original suggestion was a simple change of the constitution, which Fidesz refused to consider and instead launched the referendum campaign. We don’t yet know whether the democratic opposition parties will present a common front. So far DK and MSZP have announced that they will boycott any parliamentary action concerning an amendment to the constitution. The small Magyar Liberális Párt also expressed its disapproval of changing the constitution on account of the refugee quota issue.

Tomorrow I will attempt to shed some light on the very complicated issue of the relationship between the referendum and the constitution. Meanwhile we will see how Orbán handles this new situation. I suspect with belligerence and even more hateful speeches against both the refugees and the opposition. 444.hu recalled today an interview with Anikó Lévai, Orbán’s wife, in Story magazine a couple of years ago. She told the reporter that her husband is unable to lose and gave a couple of examples. When they run together, he pretends that he is close to chocking and is far behind, but in the last minute he revives and sprints ahead, beating her. Only once did it happen that they took part in a ski competition where she came in first and he second. By the time the results were announced Orbán had arranged to separate the sexes, and thus he was first in the men’s category. He is always ready to change the rules of the game. I think this is what we can expect.

October 3, 2016

Blunder after blunder on the left

When I woke up this morning and took a quick look at the latest news, I found stories about a murder and an abandoned baby. Nothing of import seemed to be happening politically, so I figured I’d have to turn to one of the subjects I put aside for no-news days. But then, about five hours later, I learned of two events that will most likely have serious repercussions for the future of the democratic opposition. One was the forced departure of Szabolcs Kerék-Bárczy from the Demokratikus Koalíció; the other, an interview with Gyula Molnár on HírTV regarding MSZP’s policy on “compulsory quotas.”

Szabolcs Kerék-Bárczy’s departure from DK

When Kerék-Bárczy joined DK in 2013 it was a real coup for Ferenc Gyurcsány because he came from the moderate right. Although his political career began in Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF), after 1998 he became the chief-of-staff of István Stumpf, who headed the prime minister’s office in the Orbán government. Later he served as an adviser to Foreign Minister János Martonyi, and in 2001 he was named consul-general in Los Angeles. He stayed in this position even after Fidesz lost the election in 2002. Between 2007 and 2010 he served as the spokesman of Ibolya Dávid’s moderate, right-of-center, by now defunct MDF.

kerek-barczy2

For the last three years he has been an enthusiastic supporter of DK. If he had any doubts about the direction in which DK was heading, it was not at all obvious. But then came today when he published an article in 168 Óra titled “Paradigm shift!” in which he described the generally sad state of the opposition and offered his solutions. Support for the left, he wrote, hasn’t changed substantially in the last six years and, to win the next election, “the democrats would need between 500,000 and 1,000,000 new voters.” The Orbán government doesn’t enjoy the support of the majority, but the left cannot win “with its present structure.” The parties don’t trust each other and the electorate doesn’t trust them. The leadership is the same as it was in 2014, and if remains the same, failure is guaranteed.

He pointed out that competition among the parties of the left hasn’t resulted in any one party breaking loose from the pack. They are only taking votes from each other. The rivalry among the parties only deepens the gulf between those who are destined to cooperate. The strife caused by this competition alienates the moderate “middle.”

So, what is Kerék-Bárczy’s answer? It is his conviction that elections can be won only from the middle, which for him means “the moderate conservative, conservative-liberal community,” without whom there can be no victory.

Before I continue, I want to make it clear that I consider criticizing one’s own party’s decisions a perfectly legitimate, most likely even useful enterprise. But for an insider to publish a “tell-all” party-bashing article is another matter entirely.

So, let’s see what the DK leadership found so objectionable. First of all, Kerék-Bárczy accused members of the democratic opposition of not even wanting to win the next election. He let the public know that on DK’s own board there are people with different visions: (1) Fidesz can be beaten. (2) DK will be the largest party on the left. (3) DK can’t elect more than 15-20 people to the next parliament. “Putting these three together is absurdity itself.”

In his opinion DK’s strategy is fundamentally faulty. It first wants to be the largest party on the left. Once this is accomplished, the party will turn toward the middle in the hope of electoral victory. According to Kerék-Bárczy, this strategy has already failed. “It occurred to many of our members that our strategy doesn’t serve a 2018 victory but that only a couple dozen of our leaders will manage to receive parliamentary mandates.”

It didn’t take more than 20 minutes for DK’s board to decide that they no longer want to see Kerék-Bárczy in the party. Several called him a traitor. The pro-government media was delighted. On the left journalists reported Kerék-Bárczy’s departure from DK without comment. 444.hu was the only exception. It described him as one of the greatest political survivors of the post-1990 period who now is leaving the sinking ship because “it just occurred to him that the opposition will not win in 2018.” They also insinuated that perhaps he is hoping to become an ambassador somewhere thanks to his earlier position as consul general during the Fidesz administration.

Gyula Molnár is mighty confused

Last night, in an interview that lasted only about five minutes, Gyula Molnár got so mixed up that we have no idea where his party stands not just on “compulsory quotas” but on the whole refugee crisis and Viktor Orbán’s policies. I suggest that those who understand the language take a look at the interview. His key message was that “in legal terms we consider the referendum superfluous and from the point of view of Europe risky. But if the question of [compulsory quotas] ever comes up, we are ready to support the government in its fight against it.” The interviewer almost fell off his chair and reminded Molnár that, in that case, his party’s position on the issue is identical to Fidesz’s. That response so confused Molnár that he started piling contradictory remarks one on top of the other until one could find neither rhyme nor reason in the whole confused mess. At one point he argued that the money spent on the referendum could be spent better, for example, on giving it to the soldiers defending the border. But a few seconds later he condemned the very fence the soldiers were defending. It was a communication disaster.

molnargyula3

Magyar Narancs was not kind to Molnár when it published a short opinion piece titled “The chairman of MSZP bravely squeaks from the pocket of Fidesz.” In the paper’s opinion, either Molnár thinks that there will be no compulsory quotas and therefore it matters not what he says or Fidesz bought him. But, they added, there is a third possibility: “this man is an imbecile.” In normal circumstances what Molnár says wouldn’t make any difference, but “in a referendum campaign it means canvassing for the nay votes, in other words, for Fidesz, or more precisely for Viktor Orbán. But what else can be expected from the head of the largest opposition party?” The “head” here has a special meaning, of course. Magyar Nemzet also interpreted Molnár’s confused message as MSZP’s attempt at “jockeying.”

Finally, let me add a few observations. I understand that Facebook is full of condemnations of MSZP’s latest blunder. Just because Fidesz has been successful with its xenophobic messages and its harsh, un-Christian attitude toward people escaping war and hunger, the MSZP leadership shouldn’t assume that it could boost its support by joining Viktor Orbán’s pack. On the contrary, those who oppose the government might just shrug their shoulders and say, “Why should I vote for MSZP? After all, both are cut from the same cloth.” Or, perhaps even worse from the point of the party, MSZP supporters will decide that DK’s message on the issue is much more straightforward, simple and consistent. The message of MSZP on this issue was always murky, but by now if I were an MSZP voter I really wouldn’t know what my party’s stance is on the issue. There are times when I think that the majority of the politicians on the left are total nincompoops.

September 1, 2016

A CANDID INTERVIEW WITH HUNGARIAN FOREIGN MINISTER PÉTER SZIJJÁRTÓ.    PART II

Yesterday I covered only about half of the lengthy interview Péter Szijjártó gave to Index a couple of days ago. I talked about Viktor Orbán’s foreign advisers who are attached to the prime minister’s office and described U.S.-Hungarian relations, with special emphasis on Szijjártó’s relationship with Ambassador Colleen Bell and Assistant Secretary of State Victoria Nuland. It is now time to move on to the Hungarian perception of Russia’s diplomatic and military plans. In addition, Szijjártó described at some length his ministry’s active support of even opposition politicians seeking political or business opportunities abroad. This claim came as news to many of us.

If we take Szijjártó’s comments on Russia at face value, the Orbán government has complete trust in Vladimir Putin. The conversation on Russian-Hungarian relations began with the reporter recalling recent statements about possible military threats from the east as well as the south. Does Szijjártó hesitate “to say that this eastern threat means Russia,” the reporter asked. The answer boiled down to the following. The Hungarian foreign minister “doesn’t think that Russia would decide on any threatening act against any of the NATO countries.” Therefore, the fears of the Poles and the inhabitants of the Baltic countries are based only on intangibles like past experience or geography. They look upon Russia as a “threat to their sheer survival.” Hungary’s situation is different: “we don’t consider Russia an existential threat,” he repeated several times. Therefore, he doesn’t think that “NATO soldiers should come to Hungary to defend us from Russia.”

How fast some people forget. It is true that Hungary, unlike Poland or the Baltic states, didn’t encounter Russian encroachment until 1849, but Hungarian aversion toward the Russian Empire and later the Soviet Union has been strong in the last two centuries. The Russian occupation of Hungary after World War II, which lasted almost 50 years, seems to have faded from Hungarian consciousness, and pro-Russian editorials have been abundant in the pro-government, right-wing media. The absence of fear of a Russian military threat can be at least partially explained by the fact that Hungary is no longer a direct neighbor of Russia. As Semjén Zsolt, deputy prime minister, said rather crassly at the time of the Ukrainian crisis in 2014, “It is a good thing to have something between us and Russia.” But, of course, the main reason for the current cozy relationship between Russia and Hungary is Viktor Orbán’s admiration of Vladimir Putin and his, I believe mistaken, notion that Hungary can act as a bridge between Russia and the European Union.

Although Orbán often quite loudly proclaims his opposition to the economic sanctions against Russia, time and again Hungary obediently votes with the rest of the EU countries to extend the sanctions. This was also the case at the end of June when the next six months’ extension was approved. So, not surprisingly, Szijjártó tried to camouflage Hungarian action by first saying that “the approval was reached at the level of deputy permanent representatives only and that it had to be accepted without any discussion because that was the expectation.” Soon enough, however, it became clear that the approval of the extension of the sanctions didn’t go exactly the way Szijjártó first described it. It turned out that there was in fact discussion “and at the beginning there were a few of us who were opposed to it, but the opposition melted away and at the end everybody accepted it.”

One segment in particular from this lengthy interview caused quite a stir in liberal circles. The conversation took an odd turn after a question about instructions the foreign ministry gives to Fidesz politicians when they go to Russia. The journalists were especially interested in Antal Rogán’s trip to Russia in May 2013. It was a secret trip to Moscow to discuss ways in which the Hungarian government could accumulate foreign currency reserves in Russian rubles because of the unstable position of the dollar. This trip created a scandal in Hungary. I wrote about it in “Viktor Orbán’s Russian roulette.”

Szijjártó, who at that point had nothing to do with the foreign ministry, couldn’t enlighten the journalist on this particular event, but he offered juicy information on all the assistance his ministry gives to politicians, and not just those who belong to Fidesz. He continued: “Perhaps it is surprising, but the Demokratikus Koalíció indicated that Ferenc Gyurcsány was going to China. It was the most natural thing for me to ask the Department of Chinese Affairs to put together some preparatory material for the former prime minister.”

Eorsi Matyas

That kind of information shouldn’t prompt an extended discussion in an interview, but in Hungary such simple and customary courtesy astounds everybody because it is so unexpected from the boorish lot that leads the country today. Once Szijjártó saw the astonishment on the faces of the journalists, he decided to tell more about the government’s generosity toward its political opponents. “But I can also tell you some breaking news! Recently I had a visit from Mátyás Eörsi, who lives in Warsaw and works as deputy-secretary general of an international organization called Community of Democracies. This organization has 18 members, among them Hungary, and Eörsi would like to run for the post of secretary-general, but he needs the nomination of his government. He asked me whether such a nomination would be possible, and I said: of course. I visited the prime minister and told him that this was a good idea. He said that [Eörsi’s] merits at the time of the regime change deserve respect even if we have since disagreed on many things.” It was at this point that Szijjártó learned that Mátyás Eörsi is actually a member of the Demokratikus Koalíció.

First, a few words about the Community of Democracies, which was established in 2000 at the initiative of Polish Foreign Minister Bronisław Geremek and U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Its purpose is to bring together governments, civil society, and the private sector in support of democratic rules and to strengthen democratic norms and institutions around the world. As for Mátyás Eörsi, his political career is studded with important positions domestically as well as internationally. The English-language Wikipedia has a shorter and the Hungarian version a longer description of his political importance ever since 1990. Given Eörsi’s solidly anti-Fidesz political activities, his endorsement by the Orbán government is indeed a great surprise.

Eörsi, prior to the appearance of the Szijjártó interview, published an announcement of his nomination by the government on Facebook. Ever since, a fierce debate has been going on both in the media and among people on Facebook about Eörsi’s decision to seek the nomination from the Orbán government. There are those who find Eörsi’s move unacceptable. Among these is Christopher Adam, editor of Hungarian Free Press, and Tamás Bauer, formerly an SZDSZ member of parliament and nowadays a member of DK. Christopher Adam is worried that if he actually becomes the secretary-general of this organization he might not be able to publicly condemn Fidesz’s pro-Russian and anti-EU policies freely. Tamás Bauer argues about the inappropriateness of Eörsi’s decision because, while in democratic countries it is perfectly natural for a government to nominate for an international position someone holding different views, in this case we are dealing with a government that has completely destroyed democracy. Eörsi’s decision, Bauer continues, gives the false impression that Hungary is still a democracy. Thus endorsement is in the interest of Fidesz but not of Hungary. This is what Eörsi doesn’t understand, Bauer concludes. Zsolt Zsebesi in gepnarancs.hu called on Eörsi “not to be Orbán’s useful idiot.”

On the other side, Judit N. Kósa of Népszabadság expressed her dismay that the Hungarian political situation is so distorted that Eörsi had to explain why he turned to Szijjártó for a nomination. She expressed her hope that this is not just a trick from the Orbán government but that they truly mean that even an opposition politician can represent Hungary in the Community of Democracies.

Finally, today Ferenc Gyurcsány himself stood by Eörsi, also on Facebook. He assured Eörsi of his support but admitted that he doesn’t understand the government’s motives. “We shouldn’t doubt our colleague’s obvious decency…. It is not Eörsi who should explain the reasons for his action but Viktor Orbán. He should be the one who ought to explain to his own why he supports one of the symbolic representatives of the liberals, one of the leaders of DK for such an important position.” He added that Orbán may know that under the present circumstances it is unlikely that the board of the Community of Democracies will vote for a Hungarian secretary general because that would be considered an endorsement of Orbán’s regime. His final sentence was: “I would be glad if I were wrong . . .”

August 4, 2016

Ferenc Gyurcsány replies to questions from readers of Hungarian Spectrum

On June 26 Hungarian Spectrum published an essay by Ferenc Gyurcsány, former prime minister of Hungary and currently chairman of the Demokratikus Koalíció. The essay elicited great interest. The readership that day was double of the daily average. The post also prompted a large number of comments, including quite a few questions. I wondered whether Mr. Gyurcsány would agree to answer questions posed to him by readers of Hungarian SpectrumA few days after I approached Mr. Gyurcsány’s office I was happy to report that he had agreed to answer all the questions I forwarded to him. My thanks to Mr. Gyurcsány for his willingness to participate in this exchange of ideas.

♦ ♦ ♦

time4change: Mr. Gyurcsány, how can we persuade the EU to stop funding Orbán’s corrupt government? And if it takes throwing Hungary out altogether, how soon can this happen?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: DK has asked the European Commission to restrict the government’s exclusive rights over the use of EU monies. We don’t want to lose the development funding, but we wouldn’t like the money to end up with the oligarchs close to Fidesz.

time4change: When Hungary joined the EU in 2004, it was under your leadership, as a PM with a clear understanding of the importance of forging strong links with the West, and with an enlightened vision for Hungary to develop as a proper democracy. Under the mafia leadership of Orbán, your vision and all your hard work have been almost entirely eroded. I believe that one of the reasons the UK, and probably other countries too, are disenchanted with the EU is because it does not abide by its own principles of democratic values, as evidenced by the continued funding of Hungary in the full knowledge that the moneys have created and continue to do so, an aggressive mafia oligarchy. How can this continue and why is the EU so inept at putting a stop to it?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: Talking to EU leaders, I believe that they have had enough of Hungary or rather the Hungarian government. At the moment there are too many problems at once and they don’t want to add a lengthy conflict with Hungary.

LwiiH: Fun, I suppose we should list questions here. (1) Given the level of institutionalized and even legalized corruption that exists in Hungary, is it possible to elect anyone who has not been tainted? If so, how can the electorate be assured that any candidate is clean?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: What I can tell you is that I was accused of many things, but no one ever said that I used my influence for my own enrichment. DK is clean, and I think the same of Együtt, or PM, or LMP.

LwiiH: (2) How would you deal with past cases of legalized corruption. That is laws were passed by those involved in order to legalize a corrupt practice or to allow them to be involved in dealings where there is a clear conflict of interest.

Ferenc Gurcsány: You are right about Fidesz not simply stealing public money. They have also stolen the legislative process, thus making stealing legal. This has become the legal norm. Still, with the restructuring of the prosecutor’s office and the removal of the supreme prosecutor, a legal proceeding may begin to explore layers of corruption, the way it is being done in Romania today.

LwiiH: (3) What is your current feeling on legitimacy of the current constitution. What are your plans to fix it and why isn’t anyone talking about it.

Ferenc Gyurcsány: It is unconstitutional for anyone to strive for exclusive power of authority. Fidesz at the moment is doing just that. If someone without any input from society writes a new constitution, then that constitution is not legitimate. This is the situation now in Hungary. Still, one can change the constitution only in a constitutional manner, for which at the moment there is unfortunately very little prospect.

LwiiH: (4) Why do we not see very much in the way of opposition to the campaign against Brussels regarding the upcoming referendum. And how is it that the state is funding only one side of this campaign?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: We will campaign forcefully and visibly in the fall. It is unfortunately true—and this was also true during our time—that there is no common practice of a government—any government—giving monetary assistance to those groups that support a opinion contrary to a government-initiated referendum.

Julian Edmonds: Mr Gyurcsany, what would you say to the c. 200,000 Hungarian citizens living in the UK who have now just suddenly been made to feel a lot less welcome there?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: Oh my, this is a very difficult question. But if the EU stands by its current position, that is if the Brits want the free movement of goods and services, then they will have to accept the free movement and employment of people. In this case EU citizens may live and work in their chosen second homeland peacefully and in security.

Julian Edmonds: Is now the right time to come back and start trying to change Hungary for the better?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: I didn’t return because I never left. ☺ I have no doubt that from a historical perspective we are right, but I do know that it is very difficult to gain a majority for this change. But my party, the Demokratikus Koalíció, and I are working on the project.

Stevan Harnad: Mr Gyurcsány, let me first express my admiration and appreciation for your courageous perseverance in the face of the unspeakably unjust vilification campaign to which you have been subjected by Viktor Orbán and his followers.

My question is whether you have any new plans for unifying the democratic opposition in light of Brexit and the changed leadership of MSzP?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: Thank you very much for your kind words. My opinion hasn’t changed in the last two years when I first suggested that the democratic opposition parties should unite in a new Democratic Party. Then the answer was a quite vehement rejection. But I’m certain that we will go in this direction.

Roderick S. Beck: Mr. Gyurcsány, Hungary had the highest per capita real GDP in Communist Eastern Europe when the Wall fell. Today Czech per capita real GDP is 20% higher. And the gap is even greater on a disposable income basis due to Hungary’s world record VAT charges and 45% social taxes (employer pays 25% and employee pays 20%). The consumption per capita in real terms is about 25% to 30% less than in the Czech Republic.

Clearly the policies of Left and Right over the last 27 years have failed.

What do you propose today that is different?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: There are no big secrets, in my opinion. What one needs is a predictable economic policy, increase of labor productivity, much better education, increasing wages, incentives for investment.

wrfree: Thank you Prof Balogh for enabling this very interesting ‘exchange of ideas’ with Mr. Gyurcsany. It is evident here that those very intimate with Magyar history and the actual wielding of power are providing insights towards understanding the big questions facing Magyarorszag today.

Real good questions above. Mine go along these lines.

A. With the current political situation in the country what is the future of ‘democracy’ and ‘democratic’ institutions in the country? A ‘blip’ perhaps because of ‘acute’ events or get ready for more of the axe with all the consequences of that?

And B. What underlies the propensity of Magyar political life after the experience of ’56 to not really ‘get dressed’ for strong democracy and its traditions? It would appear that the clothes were ill-fitting. Does it mean the tailors are to be blamed, those who shape its form in the country? Or is perhaps underneath governments and the people just don’t ‘understand’ it thus affecting its traction in getting pulled along within the country?

Thank you. Personally, I wish you success in your future endeavors.

An American of Magyar parents who gave me a rich heritage of Magyarorszag, its lands, history and people. I treasure my ‘Europeaness’ and hold it close. I easily walk the two worlds thanks to my parents.

Ferenc Gyurcsány: The change in the political system brought along freedom and independence, but millions have been disappointed because their personal lives have become more difficult. As Bill Clinton said: Democracy must deliver! If we cannot provide a better life for millions, then people will view democracy as an opportunity only for the elites and will abandon it when someone promises prosperity. Orbán realized this and is doing exactly that. There is no other possibility but to combine democracy with increased opportunities. Of course, I know that this is easier said than done.

Charliecharlieh: London Calling!

As a Londoner I would like you to know that I voted for you – well DK – at the last election. My Hungarian partner and I drove specifically to Hungary the day before to cast my vote – and she allowed me to put my cross in the DK box. We photographed the ballot paper for display in our Hungarian home.

I voted to counter the votes of those who neither live nor pay taxes in Hungary – I call them the ‘Trianon’ voters. I voted in a very rural part of Hungary and the excitement was palpable – and the calls in the street and the people punching the air shouting ‘Fidesz’ was sickening.

I therefore expect my question to receive especial attention from you as is the custom in Hungary – I paid heavily for my vote!

This is my question.

Engaging in Orban’s warped parliamentary debates is neither democracy – nor worth the effort, where most legislation is presented through private member’s bill which you and others don’t even have time to read before voting – I believe this was the reason you cast a vote recently, against your intention.

Engaging in this farcical game legitimises Orban’s ‘government’ which I call an authoritarian government in transition – a Commocracy.

Would you consider forming – or causing to be formed – an umbrella opposition which can unite as a clear opposition option on the ballot paper?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: Thank you for your vote. I’m working on a common alternative to the democratic opposition against Orbán. This is what my party is working for, but the process is slow.

Charliecharlieh: I would then ask you to refuse to take your seats – and persuade even Jobbik into the ‘big tent’ – so as to show the Hungarian people, the EU and the world what is happening in Hungary?

This is the only effective response to Orban’s government. The people need to wake up from a bad dream.

The next steps would need to be considered carefully but I am sure it would lead to a second – more honest election – with parallel legislation being passed by the ‘umbrella’ government to ‘unwind’ Orban’s stranglehold, for example, on the basic law or constitution.

Ferenc Gyurcsány: I don’t think that we should leave parliament. Who would benefit from a one- party legislature? But I also don’t think that we should cooperate with Jobbik in an institutional sense because we are talking about a party infected by neo-fascist ideas. Of course, I don’t rule out the possibility that in a new legislature Jobbik would also support a change of the current constitution.

Webber: If the democratic opposition win the elections in 2018, how should they go about dismantling the Orbán system? What should be done first, and why?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: Legality can be created only by constitutional means, and that means that we can change the present constitution only if two-thirds of the legislators agree. Clearly, this is the goal.

Pappp: (1) Can (if yes, how) the democratic opposition parties avoid the “mutyi” when it comes to holding fideszniks accountable? (Given – among others – the fact that many MSZPniks are clearly in bed with Fidesz and Fideszniks will have unlimited funds to buy the generosity of leftists?)

Ferenc Gyurcsány: We established a new party, the Demokratikus Koalíció, because we would like to create and serve a decent and transparent world. But I see decency, for example, in Együtt, in PM, even in LMP. The rule is simple: a politician doesn’t steal under any circumstances. It is not so difficult to follow that principle.

Pappp: Does the democratic opposition have by now (because historically it did not) the human resources in law who (1) at least understand the workings of the legal system (constitutional court, prosecution etc.) and (2) who can lead and execute, given their professional respect, charisma and determination, the fundamental rearrangement of the legal system (ie. within the prosecution it is not only Polt who is thoroughly corrupt, the entire constitutional court is not much more than a Fidesz party chapter etc.)?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: It will be hellishly difficult to dismantle Supreme Prosecutor Polt’s world. I know the plans of the opposition, but perhaps you will understand if for the time being I cannot share them with you. I’m sorry.

Pappp: 3. Are there many in the democratic opposition who want to conclude a “grand bargain” (a kiegyezés) with Fidesz (leaving top Fideszniks unprosecuted and/or leaving the current constitutional setup basically intact in exchange for some support in amending some laws or the Basic Law)?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: I don’t believe that one can or should conclude a deal with the Orbán-Kövér-led Fidesz. If there is another line-up, then it is possible that we could return to the ideals of the republic and constitutionality together.

Pappp: 4. Does he think that the democratic opposition now has the cleverness to drive a hard bargain with Fidesz, given that in the past it was always, but always Fidesz who fooled, duped, purchased the MSZPniks (whether it was the election of constitutional court judges who somehow later switched ideology or the forcing of MSZP to accept the crown in the Parliament or the standing of the pengefal at Terror Háza or the Turul statute in district 12 despite that fact that they lacked construction license in the first place etc. etc. etc.)

Ferenc Gyurcsány: Today it is not MSZP that dictates the politics of the democratic opposition. The picture is much more colorful. This is exactly our guarantee: that we cannot and must not make unprincipled compromises with Fidesz.

Pappp: 5. What can the democratic opposition do with about 800,000-1,000,000 ethnic Hungarian votes (voters) who, though smaller in number back then, voted 98% Fidesz in 2014? Is this advantage Fidesz has at all surmountable, if yes, how?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: Actually far fewer people voted in 2014. We hold that only those should have electoral rights who live in Hungary on a permanent basis or who lived in Hungary in the not too distant past.

Jean P.: Mr. Gyurcsany,
It seems to me that the migration of people from poor overpopulated countries to rich underpopulated countries is in accord with a general law of nature once called horror vacui. The greater the differences in population density and availability of life necessities the greater is the driving force for migration. The driving force is now immense. Can an individual be blamed for obeying a natural law and migrate?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: Come now! If we don’t do something against the flagrant differences between certain regions of the world then the migratory pressures will remain. People want to live. One cannot blame them for it.

Jean P.: According to socialist thinking all people are equal and differences in fortune should be compensated by society. The unfortunate should be helped. Does this thinking apply to migrants? If yes why only migrants? Why not everybody in poor overpopulated countries?

The socialist dilemma is that altruism will ruin the altruist society. So why talk about it? I noticed that you didn’t.

Ferenc Gyurcsány: A really complicated question. I don’t think that all differences can be eradicated. Well being created by talent, diligence, and work is justifiable.

István: I would ask Mr. Gyurcsány if he believes that the current Fidesz government will step up its evolution towards Putin’s Russian Federation and eventually break with NATO?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: Putin looks upon Hungary as the weak link of the European Union. Unfortunately, this is actually true. But as far as I can see from the activities of the Fidesz government, they don’t want to exit either from the European Union or from NATO. They only play a dangerous game by tugging on the whiskers of the lion. Of course, this is an expensive game.

Mutt: When Gyula Molnar, the newly elected president of the MSZP was asked about the possibility of the cooperation on the left he said “there has to be one challenger [of the FIDESZ] but it’s too early to tell how can we achieve that”. Do you know how can that be achieved? Would the DK endorse the candidate of another opposition party in 2018 if that candidate has a better chance to be elected?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: Yes. One must nominate the person who has the greatest chance of victory. It is immaterial to which party he belongs.

Alex Kuli: The political system created by Mr. Orbán in 2011 bears a lot of similarities to the Democratic Party machine that took root in Chicago a century ago, later perfected by the late Mayor Richard J. Daley and his family. The similarities include rewards for party loyalists (especially in the form of jobs), party control over private business, legal coercion, political pressure on the media, cheap populism (rezsicsokkentes), and public stigmatization of anyone who diverges from the party line.

In both systems, party organizers use these tools to ensure that voters cast ballots for the power elite. The key to making this work is a strong citywide/nationwide political network in which the party maintains close, personal contact with individual voters.

To this day, there is only one Republican alderman out of 50 on the Chicago City Council. In Hungary, the opposition managed to win just 10 of the 106 constituency seats at the 2014 elections, even though opinion polls showed that a majority of voters were dissatisfied with Orban’s governance.

In your essay posted on Hungarian Spectrum last week, you envisioned a system of “competitive social networks in which parties, advocacy groups and virtual communities work together based on their own beliefs and their own solutions.”

My question for you is:

Since Orban controls both a Chicago-style political machine PLUS a strong virtual network, how can the opposition hope to compete with Fidesz without a nationwide, brick-and-mortar organization – the kind the MSZP and SZDSZ used to have, and Jobbik has successfully created? Defeating Fidesz will require no less than a ballot-box revolt, and it is very difficult to organize a revolt by email alone. How can opposition leaders hope to overcome their negative public image, acquired both through their own shortcomings and Fidesz’s eternal propaganda campaign, unless they galvanize voters through personal, consistent and competent contact?

Ferenc Gyurcsány: There’s no doubt that in thousands of ways we are at a disadvantage, but even more fetid regimes than Orbán’s have collapsed. Of course, it is not immaterial when and under what circumstances that will occur. Especially what they leave behind. We have no alternative but to show that there exists another possibility: a democratic, European Hungary. It is not easy. I know. But we are doing our jobs without any compromises that would affect the essentials.

 July 4, 2016

László Kövér on liberals, socialists, and the nation state

I was somewhat surprised that László Kövér, president of the Hungarian Parliament, within the course of a week gave not one but two very long interviews. The first appeared on June 26 in Pesti Srácok, an internet site catering to the far right of Fidesz loyalists and well-endowed by means of government advertising. The second was published on July 2 in Magyar Hírlap, an equally right radical organ owned by billionaire Gábor Széles.

As usual, these lengthy interviews covered many topics, from Brexit and migration to party politics at home. In deciding what to analyze, I ruled out Kövér’s comments about George Soros and the European Union, which only repeated what his fellow politicians have been saying ad nauseam. Moreover, most of Kövér’s views on European politics are so bizarre that they can be safely ignored.  The only thing that caught my eye was his visible rejoicing over the rise of the extreme right in some Western European countries. His message was: what wonderful lessons they are delivering to Brussels. As he put it, “By now the people of Europe have awakened and share our views.” He was clearly delighted by the results of the Dutch referendum which rejected a Ukraine-European Union treaty to forge closer political and economic ties. And he deemed the Austrian presidential election results “a smack in the face” that EU politicians deserved.

As Kövér’s statements demonstrate, the current leaders of Hungary openly and without shame identify with far-right groups that are gaining strength in France, Germany, Austria, and elsewhere. It is time to acknowledge that there is only one country in Europe that is being governed by a far-right political party, and that is Hungary. (Although the Polish government is trying to imitate the “Orbán miracle,” so far the imitation is pale.)

Kövér’s ideas about the nation and the socialist-liberal political forces place him solidly in the far-right camp. His thoughts were most fully spelled out in his interview with Magyar Hírlap. Kövér, by all indications, fervently believes in the necessity of nation states. If they were destroyed, which he maintains the socialists and liberals want to do, it would result in a tragedy akin to the Chernobyl disaster.

Moreover, a multicultural society, another ideal of the left, would be the end of the social order in Europe. Just look at what happened in Yugoslavia. The internecine war of the 1990s was the direct result of “Yugoslavism,” the forced gathering of different nations into a federated state. Once the conflict was over, liberal analysts came to the conclusion that “religion and nation” had been the culprits. They insisted that once national and religious differences disappear, war will become obsolete. But human beings “instinctively want to belong to a community in which the predictable behavior of others offers them security, [which] can be achieved only by sharing a common culture.”

Liberals, who can be found everywhere, even in Christian Democratic and conservative parties, want to create a multicultural society in Europe. Their “model is the United States.” What does Kövér’s United States look like? “There is no national culture there. The community is held together by external bonds, like cheap fuel, the artificially maintained myth of equal opportunity, and their belief in their superiority, their star-spangled banner, and their knowledge that they are able to put the rest of world in its place if a given president is in the mood.”

Kövér2

Kövér’s hatred of the socialists and the liberals, which is palpable in every word he utters, stems from his conviction that they are, by virtue of their rootless cosmopolitanism, the gravediggers of the nation. In the Pesti Srácok interview he elaborates on this point. Liberals and socialists, like some of the politicians of DK, “have been poisoning the air here and undermining our community for at least the last 120 years.” They are not part of the nation but are a cosmopolitan group, “people without a country” (hazátlan társaság). One cannot read these descriptions without suspecting that, in addition to communists, socialists, and liberals, the Hungarian Jewry is also included in this “hazátlan társaság.” All the markers of anti-Semitism are present here.

In Kövér’s eyes, the socialists can still redeem themselves “as long as they break with their anti-national heritage, which reached its moral nadir under Gyurcsány.” MSZP should be truly independent and “not the pawn of outside forces.” Who are these outside forces? Naturally, the liberals. For Kövér, “the big question is whether MSZP will team up with those Gyurcsány-types who betrayed their nation (nemzetárulók).” But MSZP’s remaining an independent party is not enough for its survival. It must abandon its age-old ideology of internationalism because if it cannot be a “national party,” it will simply disappear from Hungarian political life. One ought to be careful of advice coming from one’s enemies, and there is no question that Kövér is a mortal enemy of those he views as traitors. His advice would lead MSZP into oblivion given the electoral law Fidesz devised for itself.

Kövér’s parting words to the reporters of Pesti Srácok were: “We must set straight not only the history of 1956 but Hungarian history in its entirety.” This will entail of course a new kind of “national nurturing” (nemzetnevelés), which in effect means brainwashing children. He sadly noted that nothing happened in this arena after 1990, and even 2010 didn’t bring a real change. “Today the intellectual heirs of those who had earlier wanted to erase the past in the name of proletarian internationalism still want to dictate to us.” Obviously, they must be removed from all positions. In their place a new set of intellectuals lights, the likes of Sándor Szakály, will interpret history and nurture the masses in the national spirit.

July 3, 2016