Tag Archives: dictatorship

Vulnerable Democracies — An interview with János Kornai

János Kornai, professor emeritus at Harvard and Corvinus, is the foremost economist in Hungary today. Several of his books have been translated into English, including a book that made him a maverick in the tightly centralized planned economy of the 1950s titled Overcentralization in Economic Administration (Oxford University Press, 1959). He is also the author of Anti-Equilibrium (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1971; 2d ed., 1975 in English); Rush versus Harmonic Growth (Amsterdam: North Holland, 1972); Growth, Shortage and Efficiency (Oxford: Basil Blackwell and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1982); Road to a Free Economy. Shifting from a Socialist System: The Example of Hungary (New York: W. W. Norton, 1990); Vision and Reality, Market and State: New Studies on the Socialist Economy and Society (New York: Routledge, 1990); The Socialist System. The Political Economy of Communism (Princeton: Princeton University Press and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992);  and By Force of Thought. Irregular Memoirs of an Intellectual Journey (Cambridge-London, The MIT Press, 2007), his autobiography. Professor Kornai has been awarded honorary doctorates from dozens of prestigious universities.

The online version of the interview that follows appeared in two installments in HVG on December 28 and 29. The first bears the title “Immovable powers, autocracies and their Hungarian variation.” The title of the second is “There is no way Viktor Orbán’s government can be removed peacefully.”

This interview, conducted by Zoltán Farkas, originally appeared in the print edition of Heti Világgazdaság, vol. 2016/41 (October 13), pp. 10-13. In the online version only Zoltán Farkas’s questions and János Kornai’s answers are presented. The Hungarian original also includes a map and a summary of the central ideas. The latter are not presented here as both are available in the longer paper “The System Paradigm Revisited” in Acta Oeconomica vol. 4, (2016). The interview was translated by Dóra Kalotai and Christopher Ryan. Zoltán Farkas and János Kornai are indebted to them for their careful translation.

Hungarian Spectrum has had the privilege of publishing a number of János Kornai’s shorter works in English, either in full or in summary form. For example, his essay on “Centralization and the Capitalist Market Economy,” “Threatening Dangers,” “Hungary’s U-turn,” and “Breaking Promises, The Hungarian Experience.” I’m grateful to Professor Kornai for permission to publish this interview.

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Source: HVG / Photo by István Fazekas

It was six years ago when you first wrote that many important basic institutions of democracy in Hungary had been dismantled, and Hungary had become an autocracy. Now, in a study recently published in Közgazdasági Szemle, you have already summarized the characteristics of autocracies. Has your previous premonition been proved correct?

I feel I have been proved completely correct. Usually, a researcher is filled with pride when he is among the first to recognize a tendency. My pride, however, is overshadowed by bitterness, because the fact that my predictions have come true makes me depressed and bitter.

But Hungary is not unique in this sense. You write that barely one-tenth of the population of the 47 post-socialist countries live in democracies and fifteen percent in autocracies, while the vast majority live in dictatorships. It’s almost as if democracy was the exception. Were we chasing illusions at the time when the regimes changed?

If we start from the knowledge that we possessed at the time of the regime change, based on the experience of democratization carried out in other countries, our hopes for a more successful development – compared to what actually happened – were not just an illusion. It is worth taking a look at the two largest countries, China and Russia. In the latter the elements of democracy were beginning to emerge, free elections were held, and under the leadership of Yegor Gaidar a liberally inclined government was formed. But it did not last long. Anti-democratic elements came to the fore, led by Vladimir Putin, who established his own autocratic system. Repression grew heavier and heavier. China is another story. Perhaps for a while it was not only an illusion that it was, even if slowly, making progress towards democracy. The example of Taiwan is well-known: a tough dictatorial system gradually turning into a democracy. But in China events did not take this turn. How a regime defines itself is always revealing; according to the Chinese regime, theirs is “a socialist market economy with Chinese characteristics.” In my interpretation, on the other hand, China’s system is a capitalist one, even if the ruling party calls itself communist. And politically they have a dictatorship: a one-party system, without elections, with terror. Among countries that changed their regime, democracy has stabilized in very few places as well as it has in the Baltic states. Since 2010,  many fundamental institutions of democracy have been demolished in Hungary, and an autocratic regime has come out on top. Poland has taken the first steps in the same direction, but that particular match has not yet been played out. The abandonment of democracy is a threat in the other post-socialist countries of Central and South-eastern Europe as well.

Which are the characteristic features of autocracy, the marks that set it apart?

Before anything else, I have to say that there is no consensus on the interpretation of democracy, autocracy or dictatorship among political scientists, politicians and people working in the media. There is complete conceptual chaos; I can’t even begin to hope things can be put in order here. Thus I shall undertake a more modest task: I would like to supply my readers with a sort of explanatory glossary of what I mean by these expressions. The main distinguishing characteristic of autocracy can be linked to Joseph Schumpeter, one of the most significant thinkers of the 20th century. Many authors, among them Samuel Huntington, follow his lead in viewing democracy as a procedure: a course of actions in which the government can be removed in a civilized way: legally, without bloodshed. This is in contrast with non-democracies, in which the change does not take place in a civilized fashion, nor does it usually happen without blood being shed. For instance, the tyrant is assassinated, or his regime is overthrown by a palace revolution. An example of the latter case was when the First Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, Nikita Khrushchev was removed from power by his opponents within the Party. In other places the change of regime happens in the wake of a military coup or when a revolution by the masses threatens. If the government cannot be removed or is, to use an everyday phrase, cemented in place, there is autocracy. Schumpeter and others following him, myself included, restrict the name democracy to that politico-governmental form, and only that form, which guarantees that the government can be voted out of office. This is the minimum requirement. The other point is that in an autocracy the ruling group dismantles those checks and balances which would offer a realistic chance of forcing the government to correct its mistaken measures between two elections, and of changing the government at elections.

Fareed Zakaria defined as ‘illiberal democracies’ those systems in which the government came to power via legal elections, and has maintained the outward forms of democracy, but has systematically dismantled the checks and balances. You maintain that there are no illiberal democracies. Why?

When he first wrote about the topic Zakaria did not concentrate on the possibility of voting out the government, but rather on how the majority voted during the election, and on how the winners would uphold certain democratic structures later on, but dismantle others. When the Hungarian prime minister introduced the concept of illiberal democracy into public discourse at Tusnádfürdő, Zakaria, disagreeing with Orbán’s interpretation, refined the explanation of the notion. Personally, I consider this concept a dead end: illiberal democracy is like an atheist pope: the adjectival structure itself is contradictory. In my view all democracies are liberal. I lost my taste for concepts of democracy with an adjective when the communist dictatorship referred to itself as a ‘people’s democracy’, clearly distinguishing itself from the so-called ‘bourgeois’ democracies. But let us return to the significance of checks and balances. Let’s consider the case of President Nixon in the United States, who felt inclined to ‘consolidate’ his position, and had his political rivals bugged, but after being exposed was unable to get his Republican party colleagues, the attorney general or the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee to stop the proceedings against him. The representatives were not bound to a ‘party line’: they wanted to find out the truth – the checks and balances functioned. These are necessary in a democracy. Just like a free press, in which the voice of the opposition is at least as powerful as that of the government. At the same time, it is also true that democracy is vulnerable because the enemies of democracy can also make use of fundamental rights – the freedom of the press, the rights of assembly and association. Those who have built an autocratic order have learned from this. They do not allow themselves the luxury of being voted out at an election where there is the real possibility of a variety of outcomes.

But if this is so, why is it not a dictatorship?

Dictatorships and autocracies do share some common features. One is that in every important issue; indeed, often even in less significant matters, it is the leader who makes decisions. But there are also significant differences. A dictatorship abolishes the multi-party system by law as well. The opposition is not weak; it is non-existent. It is driven underground. In contrast, opposition forces are allowed to function in an autocracy. Autocracies also make use of intimidation, but they do not go as far as extracting confessions by torture or executing large numbers of people. Many people have good reason to be afraid in autocracies as well because they may be thrown out of their jobs or become victims of character assassination; maybe they will be arrested on trumped up charges. But anybody who believes that there is only a difference of degree between autocracy and dictatorship has not yet lived under a dictatorship. Having said this, autocracies do have a tendency to turn into dictatorships. Maybe modern Turkey will illustrate this, almost before our very eyes. We shall see whether they reach the stage of complete, total dictatorship.

You did not list nationalism as one of the characteristics of autocracy. In Hungary, however, one has the impression that they go hand in hand.

I tried to mention only those characteristics of autocracy that appear exclusively in this political-governmental structure; that is, the features which differentiate it from democracy and dictatorship. An obvious counter-example would be corruption, which can be observed in all three types. Innumerable cases of corruption crop up in certain democracies, while there are puritan dictatorships in which money cannot buy everything. Unfortunately, nationalism is another anomalous phenomenon: democracy does not make us immune to it. One of the most tragic examples of this is the period of World War I, when a wave of nationalism swept through both sides; through both of the coalitions that were to go to war against each other. It was a nationalist thirst for revenge that was at work in the politicians of Western European democracies when they imposed humiliating and impossible peace terms on Germany. In this context, to take a great leap through history, the Trump phenomenon is worth mentioning. One of the great parties of the United States nominates the extreme nationalist Trump for the presidency. Even if he does not win the elections, the political camp that supports him will remain strong, and because the United States is a democracy, they will make their voices heard. Recently, a strong wave of nationalism has been felt in Great Britain as well.

What is your impression of Hungarian nationalism?

I am really worried about it getting stronger, not for myself, but for the future of the country. Because I do not deny that in Hungary autocracy and nationalism go hand in hand. An autocrat is indeed able to turn the wave of nationalism to his own advantage; Trump is doing the same. The main element of his rhetoric is xenophobia, especially against Latin Americans. He adds that the gates are too wide open also to immigrants from overseas, and rejects President Obama’s suggestion that ten thousand Syrian refugees should be allowed to the country. By the way, communist dictatorships that advocated internationalist theories were nationalistic as well. Non-Russian minorities were oppressed in the Soviet Union, and the same can be said of non-Chinese ethnic groups and speakers in China. Nationalism exists in both dictatorships and democracies, not only in autocracies.

In this conceptual framework why do you define Viktor Orbán’s system as an autocracy?

Because it bears in itself all the important characteristics of autocracy, both its primary and its secondary features. This period started with the leader announcing that he intended to establish a system which would last for at least ten or twenty years. He declared that he wanted to cement himself in place. Since the day he came to power, he and his party have been continuously dismantling the system of checks and balances. Not like in a revolution, when they take over every powerful position at the same time, but step by step. Every week, something has happened. One of the first things they did was to reduce the Constitutional Court’s sphere of authority and pack the Court with people connected to Fidesz. Then came the new media law, which created almost endless opportunities for government propaganda. They also took over a significant part of the private media. The bureaucratic dismantling of checks and balances is combined with the use of market methods. The process culminated in the changing of the law on elections.

You write that the interplay of anti-market and anti-democratic elements has formed Orbán Viktor’s system into a coherent one; the mechanism of the state does not work according to the rules of the capitalist market economy. So how does it work?

Even in democracies it is taken for granted that the market cannot be left entirely to its own devices: there is not a single economist with any common sense who would oppose some regulation here and there when there is a real reason for it. In cases of monopoly, state regulation is clearly necessary. Even then, mistakes can be made. For example, the authorities may set prices too high or too low because they don’t understand the situation or are incompetent. Too high, and whoever is running the monopoly will make a handsome profit; too low, and they will make a loss. It is possible for regulation to be done badly as a result of incompetence, but it can also happen if other people’s interests, for example. cronies’, are prioritized. A business can be ruined through regulation so that a friend or client can buy it up cheaply. The tendency towards regulation that is not compatible with the functioning of the market is one of the characteristics of an autocracy. The Hungarian government exercises far more regulatory power than would be reasonable. There are numerous possible underlying motives for their unnecessary, excessive and – not infrequently – distinctly damaging interventions. On the one hand, the central authorities wish to extend their power across as many activities as possible. The knowledge that “I control everything: nothing can happen without me” is a very powerful motivation. An equally strong motive is the need to court political popularity, to make populist promises.

What are the results when autocracy works this way?

It is a mistake to believe that there are so many things wrong with the economy, that because of the numerous incompetent and biased interventions it functions so erratically, that it is bound to collapse in the end. This may happen, but it is by no means bound to happen. A state that gets along badly with the market does not push the economy over the edge into catastrophe; it just makes it harder for it to fulfill its potential. It will not be innovative enough, not competitive enough; it will lose the best experts. This will become obvious only in the long run. The trams still run, only more rarely, the teachers complain, but teaching doesn’t stop, health care is beset by dire problems, but they still try to look after patients in hospitals. It is not that the economy is unable to function, only that it fails to achieve as much as it could. As a result, it falls behind its rivals, behind those countries where the state and the market work together in greater harmony, where people involved in the economy discuss what they have to do, where they listen to people before passing laws that affect them. In the past, I had many arguments with people who claimed that the Soviet economy did not work. The truth is that it did not collapse until the very end: it functioned, however badly and inefficiently, in spite of all the well-known, serious inadequacies and problems. It fell further and further behind its historic rival, the capitalist West. The question arises: does the state play a lesser role in a democracy than in an autocracy? At any rate, it would never occur to anybody in the U.S. or the Scandinavian welfare states that education should be brought under the control of a single center, as has happened in the Hungarian autocracy.

Every day we hear Fidesz trotting out some of the well-known catchwords of socialism. They promise full employment, they consider state ownership superior; they utter anti- profit slogans. Are they leading the country back to socialism? Is that what they want to restore? Even in a different form?

I do not see any danger of this. At the time of the regime change, people used to say “You can make an omelet out of an egg, but an omelet will never turn back into an egg.” Whatever happened is irreversible. Autocrats coexist happily with capitalism. Indeed, it is the only system they can really coexist with because they make use of the opportunities offered by capitalism to maintain their own authority. Looking at it from the other side, some capitalists are attracted to stable and authoritarian governments. Many western or multinational companies that have set up shop in China would not like the situation there to change. It is just the same in Hungary. Anybody who enjoys special advantages in public procurements and certain tenders, in the opening times of shops or the purchase of raw materials, who can count in bailouts if they get into financial difficulties, they are having a good time. In autocracies, given the private economy, a wide circle of clients can be built up from the supporters of the system who receive financial support. They can pay for these favors if and when the time comes. Far from wishing to bring socialism back, this regime gets on very well indeed with capitalism.

Has this system reached a point where the government can no longer be voted out of power?

Only the historians of the future will be able to answer that question. If it turns out that the government can be removed peacefully, in a civilized way, in the voting booth, then I have been wrong. I’m not making any predictions. What I can say is this: in Hungary, the regime has done and will continue to do everything possible to make itself irremovable. I hope you will not misunderstand me: the last thing I want to do with my analyses is to discourage those who are prepared to fight to change the situation. People for whom the values of democracy are important: individual autonomy, freedom of speech, freedom of the media and press, constitutionalism, legality, rule of law–they should not make their behavior dependent on the likelihood of change. They should not lie low during these years, but they should act, in their own ways, using the methods of their choice.

December 29, 2016

THE LANGUAGE BELONGS TO THOSE WHO CULTIVATE IT: FINKELSTEIN-GOEBBELS 2.0. Part II

Today I’m summarizing and excerpting the second half of Mária Vásárhelyi’s essay on the language of dictatorships and the Orbán government’s conscious imitation of their well-tried methods to change people’s political views and create devoted servants of the regime.

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The colonization of  language

Besides the seizure of the media, the most important tool in Goebbels’ propaganda campaign was the expropriation of language. Gradually the Third Reich created a language of its own and everyday linguistic usage adjusted to it. As Klemperer noted, “the absolute rule that was created by a handful of people was the linguistic command of one man that eventually spread across the whole German-speaking world … Oration must be understood literally: to say nothing in a raised voice, or more precisely to yell nothing. This boorish style became compulsory for the whole world…. The language of the Third Reich attempted to kill the person in his individuality and make him a person without will.”

Soon enough it became customary that every Friday night someone on the radio would read the Goebbels article that would appear in the Saturday paper. In this way the government designated the topics that would define political discourse for the next week. In Hungary, Viktor Orbán’s Friday morning radio interviews serve the same purpose. In these conversations Viktor Orbán not only sends the pro-government media a message about what topics should be discussed but also makes sure they understand how these topics should be interpreted.

One key distinguishing feature of the language of the Third Reich was its linguistic poverty. After 1933 the language of Mein Kampf became the language of the people. It occupied public as well as private life. This primitive language served several purposes: to reach as many people as possible, to simplify the understanding and functioning of a complicated world, and to express the essence of the centralized power of one man. The same linguistic poverty can be found in the political language of Viktor Orbán and other Fidesz leaders. They make sure that their messages get to even the least educated segment of the population. They translate complicated relationships into simple sentences.

Given the poverty of the language of dictatorships, it is interesting to note that sentimentality, pathos, and kitsch are also part and parcel of their style and their way of speaking. These mask the emptiness of their phrases. Kitschy phrases are integral to Viktor Orbán’s speeches. For example: “I readily accept the advice of boys attending tea parties when sailing on Lake Balaton, but we are on open sea. A captain of a ship in the middle of rolling billows and among reefs who is being told that he should be a little more careful with the rudder can only laugh.” Or, “Under the uniform there is also a heart, not only muscle.”

The cult of strength is an important feature of the language of dictatorships. As Klemperer pointed out, it was the cultivation of the body that held first place and intellectual endeavors last place in education. In the Third Reich an incredible amount of public money went to the support of sports. Surely, the same can be said about Viktor Orbán’s infatuation with sports as the most important ingredient of the education of youth.

The emphasis on the “Volk” served two purposes. It was supposed to strengthen the feeling of community and, even more critically, it was designed to destroy the person as a distinct individual. One of the posters of the Third Reich declared that “You alone are nothing, your people are everything.” According to Klemperer, “the word ‘people’ appeared as often in speeches and in writing as salt in our meals.” In Hungary, instead of “people” the favorite turn of phrase is “the nation” or “the Hungarian people.” The constant use of these words has rendered them meaningless. Their overuse leads to such ridiculous combinations as “National Tobacco Shop” or “National Parking Company,” but unfortunately by now we don’t even have an inclination to laugh at them.

The instruments of linguistic occupation

An important stylistic element of the word usage of dictatorships is repetition, which is supposed to ensure that people learn the meanings of newly created words or words with new meanings. This tendency is also recognizable in Orbán’s Hungary. Once a word has been chosen to hammer into the heads of the population, all Fidesz politicians will repeat it ad nauseam. This is what Gábor Kuncze, former chairman of SZDSZ, dubbed the “parrot commando.”

In the Third Reich folksy turns of phrases played an important role. Viktor Orbán’s speeches are crawling with such phrases as well, which otherwise don’t serve any political or stylistic purpose. And that’s also why one can see Viktor Orbán stuffing sausages on Facebook or singing a folksy (not folk) tune on a video circulating on the Internet.

Antal Rogán, Hungary's new propaganda minister. In the background: Hungary performs better

Antal Rogán, Hungary’s new propaganda minister. In the background: Hungary performs better

Another element is the militarization of the language, the use of military metaphors, pointing out the enemy and constantly fighting against him. All this is designed to strengthen the feeling of community. If there is no enemy, there is no reason to be afraid and to hold onto each other. In the Third Rich, according to Klemperer, the most used words were: struggle, warlike, fight, storm, black marketers, domestic enemy, imperialist agents, saboteurs, and clerical reactionaries.  Orbán is always fighting against someone: communists, beneficiaries of the former regime, those on public aid, liberal traitors, the European Union, the multinationals, or lately, the illegal immigrants. Such words as war of independence, war, struggle, defense of the country are the fodder of everyday political discourse. Just the other day the Hungarian prime minister while in Bavaria talked about himself as “a knight at the battlefront against a threat of brutal strength” in connection with asylum seekers traveling across Hungary. The refugee crisis provided an excellent opportunity to use such language and to incorporate more military terms into the political vocabulary: units of border hunters, line of defense, etc.

The creation of new words was a feature of the language usage of the Third Reich.  In Hungary examples of such words are “rezsibiztos” (commissioner of utilities), “rezsiharc” (struggle for lowering utility prices), and “elszámoltatási biztos” (commissioner who is supposed drag politicians of the former government to court).

“History” and “historical” were favorite words of the Third Reich. As Klemperer put it, “the regime finds itself so important that every small thing is considered of historic importance.” The same is true about the present Hungarian government. Viktor Orbán is walking along the “high street of history.” In fact, he gave that title to a volume of his collected essays (2003) which is—to use Klemperer’s phrase ,“a dramatic and shocking time travel in history.” Klemperer’s phrase is apposite because, as Orbán claimed in this book, “until now it was history that formed our character [but from here on] our characters will form our history and thus we will again have our own past.”

The constant exaggeration and the use of superlatives serves a similar purpose: the bravest soldiers, the most dangerous enemies, the greatest battles of history. And Goebbels used words for Jews like “parasite,” “worm,” “pest,” which soon enough spread to everyday usage. Fidesz politicians have played this kind of verbal game for years, but now with the appearance of the asylum seekers they had new targets: the “migrant hordes [that] stampede across our country.” Orbán now talks about “the attack of the extremist Islamic horde,” and a pro-government journalist called Angela Merkel “an aberrant magnet of migrants.”

Klemperer noticed the Nazis’ preference for foreign words, which in his opinion not only sounded elegant but, more importantly, served to confuse and confound: “the fewer people who understood them the better.” Foreign words serve the same purpose in Fidesz’s propaganda. Instead of the usual Hungarian words, they use foreign words not understood by everybody: illiberalizmus/illiberalism, hipokrita szellem/hypocritical spirit (instead of képmutató, álszent), szub-szaharai-térség/Sub-Saharan area (instead of dél-szaharai), migráns/migrant (instead of bevándorló). For most of the less educated Hungarians “migráns” means nothing; it creates a fear of the unknown.

Klemperer says the following about the language of the Third Reich. “They achieved the greatest impact not so much through speeches, articles, broadsides, posters, or flags. Nazism penetrated the body and soul of people through words, through turns of phrases which were repeated countless times and thus were pressed upon the people who mechanically and unconsciously took them over … Words can be the infinitesimal amounts of arsenic we swallow unnoticed, but the effect of the poison will be felt after a while.” All totalitarian dictatorships try to poison the consciousness of the people. Fidesz included.

The language belongs to those who cultivate it: Finkelstein-Goebbels 2.0

In the United States Arthur Finkelstein is not widely known although, as can be seen from his biography, he has been one of the most important movers and shakers in Republican politics ever since the 1970s. He was instrumental in devising a campaign for Ronald Reagan’s presidential bid and, in general, was behind a number of conservative candidates’ spectacular and unlikely wins for the U.S. Senate. In Hungary, by contrast, he is very well known as the man behind Viktor Orbán’s successful political career.

The article that I will summarize and excerpt (part 1 today) is by Mária Vásárhelyi, the well-known sociologist whose works deal primarily with media affairs and public opinion. It analyzes language as an instrument in forming public opinion by the ruling political elite. As you can gather from the title, Vásárhelyi doesn’t share the “educated” Hungarian public’s belief that Finkelstein gave Viktor Orbán the tools of modern communication that can assure him power for years to come. In her view, he merely refined some old tools of totalitarian dictatorships.

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In a short time the name of Arthur J. Finkelstein became a household word. In the eyes of the government’s supporters he is “the miracle doctor” who handed Viktor Orbán the weapon of communication that allows him to get and hold onto power for a long time to come. For the democratic opposition he is the devil incarnate who has supplied the prime minister with the most extreme negative propaganda tools–lies and slander included, which can destroy democratic political culture. What Finkelstein did, however, was no more than the modernization of the instruments of totalitarian dictatorships, including the communist one. The reason Vásárhelyi points to the similarities between the propaganda of the Orbán regime and that of the Third Reich is that we have at our disposal a unique source: Viktor Kemperer’s LTI–Lingua Tertii Imperii: Notizbuch eines Philologen (1947), which was translated into English under the title The Language of the Third Reich.

Viktor Klemperer

Viktor Klemperer was a literary historian of Jewish origin who in 1935 was stripped of his professorship but who in his home in Dresden kept a diary throughout the remaining days of the Third Reich. He paid special attention to language: how the Nazi regime changed the German language to serve its own image. His diary, which he kept for ten years, is “the linguistic analysis of the propaganda instruments and practices of Joseph Goebbels’ propaganda ministry. The Language of the Third Reich depicts how the Nazi empire took hold of and formed German society through language.”

Viktor Kemperer

Viktor Kemperer

Expropriation of the sphere of communication

The secret of Goebbels’ success lay, on the one hand, in the government’s total domination of the field of communication and, on the other, in the transformation of language. Setting up a propaganda ministry was one of the first moves of the leadership of the Third Reich, which very quickly supervised and subordinated all publicly available communication channels. Antal Rogán’s new ministry cannot even dream of such an “ideal” situation.

Goebbels concentrated on radio communication. Already in 1933 he created a Reich Radio Association which every radio employee had to join. At the same time the government removed anyone whom they suspected of a less than loyal attitude toward the new regime. All regional radio stations were placed under one company, the Reich Broadcasting Corporation. Even the manufacture of radios was placed under state supervision. The Nazi state heavily subsidized the manufacture of inexpensive radios. By 1939 70% of all German households owned a radio, a world record.

The subordination of newspapers took longer and followed a multi-pronged strategy. Some of the successful daily papers were purchased by firms sympathetic to the regime. The government tried to ruin other papers not to its liking by withholding advertising money from them. There were more forceful acts as well: intimidation or suspension of the publications. The two official telegraphic agencies were taken over by the state, and thus both domestic and foreign news were effectively controlled. By 1939 two-thirds of all German newspapers were owned by the state company, Eher Publishing House.

It is not difficult to find similarities between the illiberal Orbán regime’s communication strategy and the propaganda of the Third Reich. But since the Orbán regime is not a totalitarian dictatorship and because in the last 80 years developments in communications have made complete central supervision impossible, the comparisons are not in their realization but only in their methods and aspirations. Both in 1998 and again in 2010 one of the first moves of the Fidesz government was the seizure of public radio and television as well as MTI, the Hungarian news agency. At the same time a political purging of undesirable employees took place. They bought up media in private hands deemed unloyal, and, in the case of radio stations, they simply took away their frequencies and gave them to loyal friends. On the positive side the Orbán government, unlike the Third Reich, doesn’t forbid the activities of opposition media, but its plan is to make their existence impossible.

In the Third Reich important ingredients of the propaganda machine were broadsheets and posters which, as Klemperer describes them, “are all the same. One can feel physical strength and fanatic will. All power, firmness, the obvious lack of any thought.” Lajos Simicska already in the early 1990s realized the importance of posters both as a business venture and as a propaganda tool. By the time Fidesz won the election in 1998 Simicska owned 90% of all poster surfaces. By 2010 these posters served as the most important venue for Fidesz campaign communication.  The billboards carried aggressive and primitive messages like “The deed is first,” “Only Fidesz,” “Honor the Hungarians,” “Enough,” “Trust Fidesz,” “Now is the time.”

But back to the Third Reich. In July 1933 the new Nazi regime voted in a law on referendums that made holding one practically impossible. Instead, they introduced the practice of “national consultations.” Doesn’t that sound familiar?

In today’s Hungary, in addition to some independent organs, the most important guarantors of democratic norms, however limited their influence, are the new forums of communication, which even the most brutal dictatorships haven’t been able to keep under their supervision. But the Orbán government is trying; it is testing the freedom of the internet. A good example is its successful intimidation of Deutsche Telekom Hungary, leading to the firing of the editor-in-chief of the internet news site Origo. We can also be pretty certain that trolls paid by the government make it difficult if not impossible to carry on intelligent and fruitful political discussions among people of different political views.

To be continued

Jean-Claude Juncker: “The dictator is coming”

More than a million people have looked at the YouTube clip of the by now infamous scene where Jean-Claude Juncker, president of the European Commission, greets Viktor Orbán with “The dictator is coming” and raises his right hand in a quasi-Nazi salute. The news spread like wildfire. I found well over fifty articles in the Hungarian media describing this 26-second video. I’ve seen an unusually large number of references to it in American papers, in addition to the usual German and Austrian avalanche of Hungarian news items. Those commentators who are critical of the Orbán government found it hilarious, while the two pro-government organs, Napi Gazdaság and Magyar Hírlap, decided to remain quiet on the subject. Orbán’s press secretary explained that there is nothing new in this exchange. Juncker always greets Orbán this way and, in return, Orbán calls Juncker Grand Duke. How jolly.

A commentator from the right Dávid Lakner didn’t find the scene at all funny. Instead, it struck him as embarrassing, especially at a time that more and more people view the European Union itself as a joke. Lakner called Juncker “an imprudent clown.” He suspects that the president was inebriated. (Juncker has been accused of heavy drinking by some of his critics.) On the other hand, journalists of Luxembourger Wort, who ought to know Juncker very well, were not not shocked, nor did they accuse him of drunkenness. They simply noted that “Juncker lived up to his reputation for straight talking … when he hailed Hungarian Premier Viktor Orbán as ‘dictator’ on his arrival at an EU summit in Riga.”

I have also have objections to Juncker’s joking mood, but on very different grounds from Lakner’s. Hungary’s sinking into a one-man dictatorship is no laughing matter. It is not a joke. It is a deadly serious business. Merriment over what Orbán is doing in Hungary is an inappropriate reaction from the president of the European Union.

And this brings me to an op/ed piece by Sergei Guriev and Daniel Treisman in yesterday’s New York Times titled “The New Dictators Rule By Velvet Fist.” Their short article is based on an earlier longer study, “How Modern Dictators Survive,” prepared for the Centre of Economic Policy Research in London. Their argument is that modern dictatorship no longer needs to have totalitarian systems and tyrants like Stalin, Hitler or Mao. Instead, “in recent decades, a new brand of authoritarian government has evolved that is better adapted to an era of global media, economic interdependence and information technology.” These new dictators achieve a high level of control over society by stifling opposition and eliminating checks and balances–and they achieve this without any violence at all.

Among “these illiberal leaders” we find Viktor Orbán alongside of Alberto K. Fujimori of Peru, Vladimir Putin of Russia, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, Mahatir Mohamad of Malasyia, and Hugo Chávez of Venezuela. What illustrious company! But at least the others are not being financed by European democracies the way Viktor Orbán’s dictatorship is being subsidized by the EU. I wonder how the taxpayers of Western European countries would feel if they fully realized to what end Viktor Orbán is using their hard-earned money. I doubt that they would find it a joking matter.

According to Guriev and Treisman, “the West needs to address its own role in enabling these autocrats.” This is certainly true about the European Union vis-à-vis Hungary. But the authors also talk about lobbying efforts on behalf of these dictators. We know from earlier posts what an incredible amount of money is being spent by the Orbán government on foreign propaganda just in the United States. The four-year contract Connie Mack and Századvég signed was for $5 million.

The authors suggest, and I fully agree with them, that “lobbying for dictators should be considered a serious breach of business ethics.” Although Representative Dana Rohrabacher, speaking to Kriszta Bombera of ATV, denied that he was coached by the Hungarian government through Connie Mack and said that holding the hearing was his own idea, the director of Századvég made no secret of Connie Mack’s usefulness as a top lobbyist in Washington in getting a hearing on U.S.-Hungarian relations during which the chairman and his Republican colleagues defended the Orbán government with full force. “It was a breakthrough,” said Kristóf Szalay-Bobrovniczky of Századvég.

And finally, let me talk about other enablers, specifically the two Hungarian-American associations whose leaders claim that for years they have been tirelessly promoting better understanding between the two countries. They are the Hungarian American Coalition and the American Hungarian Federation. Although they claim to be politically neutral, in fact they are conservative lobbying groups which support right-wing Hungarian governments. I know from personal experience that the Coalition at least moves into high gear only when a right-wing government is in power. After Fidesz lost the election in 2002, the Coalition paid for a group of Fidesz members of parliament to spend two or three weeks in Washington to learn something about American democracy. When I asked why only Fidesz politicians were invited, I was told that the socialists were simply not interested in spending time in Washington. I found the explanation improbable. So I wrote to Ildikó Lendvai, who was the whip of the socialist parliamentary delegation at the time, and it turned out that the socialists had never received any such invitation. That should give you some sense of the true nature of these organizations.

I was therefore somewhat surprised when I heard that the presidents of these two organizations decided not to attend Rohrabacher’s hearing. I thought that perhaps they realized that something was very wrong in Orbán’s Hungary. Perhaps they decided that they would no longer stand by the Hungarian dictator with a velvet fist. I was hoping that the statement Maximilian Teleki, president of the Coalition, released on May 22 would explain his reasons for not participating in the hearing. Instead, we learned only about the dangers of Jobbik and the great achievements of the Orbán government, which in 2010 “faced a Greece-like economic and financial crisis” and which by now has achieved “a respectable economic growth.” As for Jobbik’s anti-Roma and anti-Semitic propaganda, the only thing Teleki could say is that “the Hungarian government has taken a zero-tolerance policy,” adding that much still remains to be done.

Maximilian Teleki with April H. Foley, former U.S. ambassador to Hungary ad a great supporter of Viktor Orbán

Maximilian Teleki with April H. Foley, former U.S. ambassador to Hungary and a great supporter of Viktor Orbán

In his opinion, the United States “has done little to assist Hungary in developing a long-term [energy] strategy and implementing an effective action plan.” He mentioned “Russia’s aim of reestablishing Cold War-era borders and spheres of influence in the region” but had nothing to say about the close Russian-Hungarian relations and Paks II. What should the United States do to improve the “bilateral relationship” between the two countries? The U.S. should offer more opportunities for Hungarian decision makers to visit the United States; more U.S. officials and decision-makers should obtain first-hand experience by visiting Hungary frequently; and the U.S. should “make possible meetings at the highest political levels: it has been more than 10 years since Hungary’s Prime Minister was received in the White House.” And yes, the United State should support educational and cultural programs sponsored by NGOs. In brief, the dictator with a velvet fist should be rewarded for degrading Hungarian democracy into a modern-style dictatorship.

The shadow of János Kádár’s happiest barrack

In November 2009 the Pew Research Center conducted a survey in nine former communist countries. Twenty years had passed since the fall of the Berlin Wall, and researchers wanted to know how public sentiment had changed in the intervening years.

The countries selected were East Germany, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland, Lithuania, Russia, Bulgaria, and Ukraine. The results can be found on the Internet. A quick look at the interactive public opinion poll on some of the more important political questions reveals a lot about the mood of the people in these countries in 2009. The most startling finding was that Hungarians were the most dissatisfied and most disappointed people in the area. I believe that if a similar survey were conducted today, the divergence between the Hungarian figures and those of the other countries would be even greater than it was five years ago. Since then the lot of most of the neighbors has improved, while the Hungarian economic and political situation has worsened.

Here are some selected data from 2009. While in 1999 80% of Hungarians were looking forward to the coming of the market economy, by 2009 only 46% had any trust in the capitalist system. The only other country with similar results was Ukraine. Hungarian’s satisfaction with democracy was the lowest (21%), compared to Poland’s 53%, the Czech Republic’s 49%, and Slovakia’s 50%. But perhaps the most interesting finding was that it was in Hungary where most people (72%) thought they were better off during the communist period than in 2009. Compare that to 35% of the Poles, 39% of the Czechs, and 48% of the Slovaks.

Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project / November 2009

Pew Research Center’s Global Attitudes Project / November 2009

Political analysts have been trying to find an explanation for this discrepancy between Hungary and her closest neighbors (the Czech Republic, Poland, and Slovakia) in attitudes toward the regime change and what followed. Clearly, there were heightened expectations everywhere, but while, for example, in Poland, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic there was only a slight drop in the population’s positive attitude toward the market economy, in Hungary the drop was huge–from 80% to 46%.

What makes the Hungarian situation so different from that of the other countries? From repeated surveys we know that there is something in Hungarian culture that makes Hungarians consistently dissatisfied with their lot. That by itself, however, is not enough to account for the incredible disappointment reflected in these numbers. It is also unlikely that Hungarian politicians who were responsible for the introduction of democracy and a market economy in Hungary were totally unfit for their jobs. Or that they were significantly worse than their colleagues in the neighboring countries. All countries had their own political upheavals, and they also made bigger or smaller political mistakes. So, I don’t think that the key to the puzzle of Hungarians’ dissatisfaction with their political and economic situation can be found in either the national psyche or the political leadership.

There has to be some other fundamental difference between Hungary and the other countries that accounts for the huge divergence in attitudes and outlook. The answer, I believe, lies in the unique nature of the Hungarian version of the socialist system. Ironically, Hungary’s troubles today most likely stem from the fact that the Hungarian people had it too good under János Kádár. If they had had to live in the kind of dictatorship that existed in Czechoslovakia under Gustáv Husák or in Romania under Nicolae Ceaușescu, today they would have a much greater appreciation of democracy. If Hungarians had had to face empty shelves in the stores as the Poles did or to suffer as much economic hardship as the Romanians, they would have a much more positive view of the market economy.

But the Kádár regime, especially in its last ten years, was a benign one-party system, what Hungarians call a “soft dictatorship.” The great majority of people wouldn’t have had any reason to complain about their limited freedom since their demands were modest in the first place. Most people were satisfied with their lot because they noticed a steady growth in their living standards year after year, almost to the very end. It’s no wonder that with the exception of a very small group of “dissidents,” really a handful of people, there was no serious opposition to the regime.

The lives of Hungarians in economic terms have not changed for the better since 1990. Yes, there are people who have become very rich, but in Hungary in 2009 77% of the people believed that “the rich just get richer while the poor get poorer,” as opposed to around 50% in the neighboring countries. I’d bet that if we had a similar poll today, even more Hungarians would think that in the last five or six years the situation has deteriorated further. Today poverty is widespread. All in all, there are very good reasons for economic dissatisfaction, which cannot be counterbalanced by positive feelings about the introduction of democracy, especially since Viktor Orbán’s system is a far cry from democracy as most people understand it.

The relatively good economic situation of the population during the Kádár regime, the fact that slowly but surely people became satisfied with their lot might also be responsible for some of the failures of the new political elite. Many of the economic ills of Hungary in the last twenty-five years stemmed from a fear of moving in a direction that might lead to a severe drop in living standards, to which Hungarians, given their relative well-being under the Kádár regime, would react very negatively. Much more negatively than the populations of other post-communist countries who were accustomed to hardship and privation. Therefore, a restructuring of the economy was postponed time and again because of fear of a backlash. Over the years, governments overspent in order to satisfy economic demands only to be forced later to introduce austerity measures when the deficit spiked. No one dared to bite the bullet and make the Hungarian system a fully functioning market economy in the western sense. The irony of it all is that the economic system that more than half of Hungarians hate is not really a market economy in the classical sense. As someone rightly put it, Hungarian capitalism has all of the negative features of the market economy without any of its benefits. János Kádár’s system continues to cast a dark shadow over today’s Hungary.

In Viktor Orbán’s absence anti-regime forces are gathering

The Hungarian media is full of articles and opinion pieces about Viktor Orbán’s disappearance since Christmas Eve, when he posted a silly selfie peering from behind a Christmas tree. He missed his customary New Year greetings and was not spotted anywhere getting in or out of his Volkswagen minibus. Given the less than friendly domestic atmosphere, the media and the public suspect that he’s in one of his alleged depression cycles that usually happen when things aren’t going well for him. When asked, the chief of the prime minister’s press department claimed that he is not on vacation. He is working as usual, but from home. And those Hungarians who can scarcely wait for one of his Friday morning monologues will be happy to know that the prime minister will deliver his pearls of wisdom tomorrow.

Orban 2014 karacsony

In Hungary everything revolves around Viktor Orbán. If he disappears for over two weeks, the domestic news flow shrinks to practically nothing. Issues that are currently making waves are the results of earlier bad decisions, like the law on Sunday closings and the introduction of tolls on roads that were until now free.

Since nothing is happening on the government front, I’ll turn to a recent article by András Bruck, one of my favorite political commentators. About this time of the year, a day after Christmas in 2013, I wrote a fairly lengthy summary of one of  his essays entitled “The Sign” that appeared in Élet és Irodalom. Unfortunately, the essay is not available for non-subscribers to ÉS, and therefore I suggest that you read my post, “András Bruck’s new encounter with George Orwell’s 1984.” In brief, Bruck recalls that in the early 1980s, when he was first able to read 1984, he was disappointed. The book was about “a different bad world” from the one in which he lived. While making love he felt neither fear nor hatred. He didn’t consider the three famous slogans of Ingsoc, WAR IS PEACE, FREEDOM IS SLAVERY, IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH appropriate for Kádár’s Hungary. However, re-reading the book, he came to the conclusion that “every word of that book from the first to the last is about this sick, deformed regime in which, just like in the novel, the binding agent of power is lying.” His conclusion is that Hungary is a dictatorship pure and simple and that those who claim that Hungary is still a kind of democracy are kidding themselves.

Lately, András Bruck’s essays no longer appear in ÉS but in HVG, perhaps because he would like to reach a wider audience. Earlier he wrote infrequently, but since early November he has published two articles and gave an interview to Sándor Friderikusz on ATV. This radical critic of the Orbán regime seems to be optimistic for the first time in the past five years. The title of his November 7 article is “Before newer demonstrations.” He correctly anticipated that the first large demonstration would be only the first of many. As he said in the interview, he had enough of “a regime in which a well-developed socialism came into being for the rich minority and an underdeveloped capitalism for the majority.” This rich minority receives undeserved benefits without competition while the majority gets only the burdens of a poorly developed capitalism.

It is this deformed political system which at last is meeting resistance, not only by those who went out to demonstrate but also by those hundreds of thousands who are by now openly critical of the regime and want to put an end to it.

Bruck maintains that although a lot of people charge that Orbán’s political decisions are ad hoc, the truth is different: “Here everything happens according to a master plan.” It all started with two concepts cunningly devised: (1) a centralized political field of power that ensures permanent governing with a weak opposition and (2) the introduction of unorthodox economic planning. These two concepts, once put into reality, “enabled Viktor Orbán to establish a one-party system and his own personal rule.” His “illiberal confession” last summer merely marked the finished job.

Just as the socialist one-party system was impossible to reform, the Orbán regime cannot be “corrected” either. But the good news is that “this sick, deformed regime … has as much chance of survival as all its similar predecessors.” And “this new mass on the streets last week sent a clear and understandable message and for a moment the government took notice.” But only for a moment because they are convinced that they will be lucky and “there will never be a last straw.” In dictatorships it is quite often the case that there is a “total lack of any sense of danger” among the perpetrators. The people who have been serving this regime believe that they have nothing to worry about. It doesn’t occur to them that one day a new parliament may declare the present system a dictatorship and hence illegitimate. They think that their clever lawyers will save them and that their wealth will be safe stashed away somewhere outside of the country. But this time these sins shouldn’t go unpunished. Only unblemished individuals should sit in judgment. Some opposition politicians are not worthy of the task.

Bruck finishes his essay by quoting Gergely Gulyás, whom he describes as “the young star of Fidesz’s good cop department,” who said in Berlin recently: “Hungarians know very well the difference between democracy and a one-party system, the rule of  law and dictatorship.” Bruck added, “He said that well. Yes, we know it.”

What happened on June 16, 1989? Another falsification of history?

Time flies. It was twenty-five years ago today that the remains of Imre Nagy, Miklós Gimes, Géza Losonczy, Pál Maléter, and József Szilágyi were reburied. On Heroes’ Square a large crowd gathered to listen to speeches. Six coffins were displayed. The sixth, empty one symbolized those people who were killed (or executed) during and after the revolution.

Negotiations over and preparations for the reburial were conducted by the Történelmi Igazságtétel Bizottság (TIB), whose members had spent years in jail after 1956 because of their participation in the revolution. (One member was Imre Mécs, who in the last two months has been demonstrating against the erection of the memorial that commemorates the occupation of the country by the German army.) Although the relatives and the majority of TIB wanted to have private reburials, eventually a large public event was organized with the approval of the opposition parties. Originally, only well-known participants in the revolution were supposed to speak: Béla Király, Sándor Rácz, Miklós Vásárhelyi, Imre Mécs, and Tibor Zimányi.

How did the young Viktor Orbán, one of the leaders of a youth organization, end up being included in this group of illustrious revolutionary veterans? István Csurka, the writer and one of the leaders of Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MD), suggested in a radio interview that “representatives of young Hungary should be included.” It was decided that a leader of Fidesz should deliver a speech right after the veterans of the revolution. So, in a way, Viktor Orbán must thank the late István Csurka, subsequently the founder and leader of the anti-Semitic Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja (MIÉP), for an auspicious beginning to a very successful political career.

In the last few years Mária Schmidt has become Fidesz’s history ideologue, entrusted with crafting an interpretation of the past that suits Viktor Orbán’s political agenda. I wrote at length about her efforts at rehabilitating the Horthy regime, but in the last few weeks, most likely in anticipation of the 25th anniversary of Viktor Orbán’s most famous speech, she also embarked on rewriting the history of 1989-1990. Schmidt in her speech in Washington practically attributed the whole regime change to Viktor Orbán. He was the only person who dared to openly demand the departure of the Soviet troops.

The young Viktor Orbán, June 15, 1989

The young Viktor Orbán, June 16, 1989

Yes, it was a brave speech but not because Orbán demanded the withdrawal of Soviet troops. In fact, only about half an hour earlier Sándor Rácz, chairman of the workers’ council in 1956, in a very harsh anti-communist speech demanded the troops’ departure. What was new and significant was that Orbán was the only speaker to call attention to the incongruity of party and government officials standing by the coffins of those who were killed by the same regime that they represented.

The speech was different from the others in another sense. It was not a eulogy but the kind of speech that is normally delivered at a political rally. The significance of the speech didn’t lie in its anti-communist rhetoric. The others were equally anti-communist. But as Zoltán Ripp, a historian of the period, pointed out, his speech “was a denial of national reconciliation and not only considering the past.” The message was that the Magyar Szocialista Munkáspárt (MSZMP) is and always will be the enemy. Therefore we should not be surprised that shortly after the 2010 election he seriously contemplated banning MSZP as the legal successor to MSZMP.

While Imre Mécs wanted the members of the audience to hold hands, Orbán wanted to wipe out the past and all its actors who, in his opinion, were guilty, regardless of what they did or did not do during their lifetimes. I think that this speech explains a lot both about Orbán’s character and his rather undifferentiated worldview. I always complain about his lack of differentiation with regard to the Stalinist period, the early Kádár era, or the years of the 1980s. For him, judging from this speech, it was all the same. And, let’s not forget, Imre Nagy and the rest of the bodies in those coffins had been members of the communist elite. Later Orbán unequivocally stated that “Imre Nagy is not our hero.”  I’m certain that he was not his hero on June 16, 1989 either, but he had to give an oration at the funeral of the man after all. So, he carefully but obviously made a distinction between the communist Imre Nagy and the one “who could identify with the will of the nation and who could set aside the holy communist taboos, that is with the unconditional service of the Russian empire and the dictatorship of the party… We learned from their fate that democracy and communism are irreconcilable.”

Viktor Orbán was not present at the 25th anniversary ceremony, attended by the presidents of Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Poland. Instead, he delivered a speech at a meeting of the European People’s Party held in Portugal. Earlier, however, he gave an interview to Bild, on the basis of which the journalist came to the conclusion that it was Viktor Orbán who “knocked the first stone out of the wall.” So, President Reagan ordered Gorbachev “to tear down that wall” and Viktor Orbán grabbed a hammer. This is how historical myths are created.

In the same interview Orbán said that “the struggle against the communists nowhere lasted as long as in Hungary…. I have to admit that our opponents were talented when it came to hanging onto power … They were good fighters. It took me twenty years to defeat them.” According to him, that fight lasted until 2011 when Hungary had a new constitution. So, it seems, Viktor Orbán hasn’t changed as much as most people claim. His attitude toward his opponents has not changed in the last twenty-five years.

Mária Schmidt’s interpretation of the end of communism stands in sharp contrast to Viktor Orbán’s. According to the former, it was Viktor Orbán who first talked about free elections and the withdrawal of the Soviet troops and, since the armed forces didn’t break up the meeting, it was clear to everybody that “we buried communism on that day.” On the other hand, according to Orbán’s interview in Bild, communism ended only in 2011. Complicated, isn’t it?

Mária Schmidt was also in charge of the celebration to commemorate Viktor Orbán’s historical role on June 16, 1989. She declared that it is supposed to be “a day of rejoicing,” and so the organizers invited two rock bands from the 1960s and 1970s–Omega, a Hungarian group, and the Scorpions, a German group–to give a free “Concert of Freedom.” The granddaughter of Imre Nagy, the wife of Pál Maléter, and the daughter of József Szilágyi protested. To them June 16 is a day of mourning because it was on that day in 1958 that the people who were reburied in 1989 were originally killed. To make a day of joy out of it is sacrilegious.

June 16, 1989 was, of course, more than a day of remembering and paying homage to the dead. It was a political event of national importance. It was part of a process that ended in the collapse of the Soviet empire. But Mária Schmidt distorts history when she tries convince us that it was Viktor Orbán’s speech that ended communism in Hungary and forced the Soviet troop withdrawal. And Viktor Orbán’s idea that communism in Hungary ended only in 2011 is outright ridiculous. Another falsification of history has begun.