Tag Archives: European Parliament

Brussels after the Hungarian referendum

Although the Hungarian media is full of the story that Antal Rogán lied about his extravagant helicopter ride to a wedding, I would rather talk about the Hungarian referendum’s reception in Brussels.

The initial reaction came from Margaritis Schinas, the first spokesman of the European Commission, who, in his October 3 press conference, tried to give the impression that the Commission takes an absolutely neutral position as far as the result of the referendum is concerned. As he put it: “If the referendum had been legally valid, we would have taken note of it; now that it is declared legally void, we also take note of it. We respect those who voted and those who didn’t vote.” A day later, in response to a question from a Hungarian journalist, the European Commission spokesman said: “The pertinent authorities declared the results of the referendum invalid. I leave it to you to draw the conclusion how this will influence the decision-making process of the European Union.”

We know that there was a sigh of relief in Brussels after the referendum failed. Martin Schulz, president of the European Parliament, indicated that Viktor Orbán’s failure to produce a valid referendum had weakened his position in any future negotiations with the officials of the European Union. As he put it, “Budapest should take it … seriously that it was not a majority and we have therefore a good chance for a dialogue.” This indicates that Viktor Orbán will most likely have a harder time in his negotiations in Brussels after the referendum fiasco.

On October 5 Jean-Claude Juncker made it clear in a speech to the European Parliament that he has no intention of lifting the quota of 1,294 refugees that Viktor Orbán himself approved already in February 2016. His remarks were interpreted by the anti-EU British Daily Express as a “brazen statement [that] is likely to cause consternation in Budapest.” Again today in Paris Juncker called on the member states to honor the decision on the distribution of refugees that was agreed upon in February. The Hungarian internet site Index seems to agree with the British paper when it predicts that Juncker’s hard-line attitude regarding compulsory quotas will only provide further ammunition for Viktor Orbán. However, Juncker’s steadfast, hard-hitting words of late don’t bode well for a friendly future encounter with the Hungarian prime minister, especially since Juncker looks upon referendums as the death knell of the European Union. Apparently, Juncker was specifically thinking of the Hungarian referendum when he talked about the problems of the European Union.

On October 6 Bertalan Havasi, head of the public relations department of the prime minister’s office, released the news that Viktor Orbán had sent a letter to Jean-Claude Juncker in which he gave details of the result, emphasizing that “3.33 million people expressed their will that without the approval of the Hungarian parliament no foreign nationals can be settled on the territory of the country” and therefore “he is initiating an amendment of the constitution.” He reassured Juncker that the proposed amendments will be in accord with European Union law as well as with Hungary’s international obligations. Copies of the letter went to Donald Tusk, Martin Schulz, and Robert Fico as the current president of the Visegrád 4 Group.

Jean Claude Juncker's door is always open Source: The Telegraph, credit AP

Jean-Claude Juncker’s door is always open / Source: The Telegraph, credit AP

At the October 3 press conference Margaritis Schinas, again in an answer to a question by a journalist, said that if Viktor Orbán would like to meet with the president of the European Union, “Mr. Juncker’s door is always open to all the heads of the member states.” Although Havasi made no mention of any such request, apparently Orbán did ask for an urgent meeting with Juncker in the same letter, as Népszabadság learned. But since Juncker already had a fixed schedule yesterday and today, “he could give Orbán only an impossible time that Orbán couldn’t accept.” As someone half-jokingly said, perhaps Juncker suggested meeting him late afternoon today, which certainly wouldn’t have suited the football-crazy Orbán who wanted to be present at the Hungarian-Swiss game held in Budapest. I suspect that the meeting between the two men will take place soon.

There is another issue in connection with the referendum. Tibor Navracsics, once one of the highest office holders in Fidesz and the Orbán government, is currently an EU commissioner. On the very day of the referendum he gave an interview to pestisracok.hu, a far-right Fidesz internet news site. In the interview he disclosed that he had voted “no” on the referendum question because in his opinion the question has nothing to do with the European Union or the European Commission. It is a national issue and therefore, despite his position as one of the commissioners, he can freely express his opinion. Index’s “Eurologus” agreed with the commissioner and quoted the European Commission’s “Code of conduct for commissioners.” Csaba Molnár, DK European Parliamentary member, thinks otherwise and asked Juncker to investigate the case. The leader of the Alliance of Socialists and Democrats of the European parliament, Gianni Pittella, agrees with Molnár that European commissioners have a duty to promote the general interest of the EU, not the interests of their own national governments.

The comments by Commissioner Navracsics on the failed referendum in Hungary calls this into question. A legal decision was taken on the resettlement of refugees, and the question in the referendum went directly against this and against the proposal coming from the EU Commission, of which Navracsics is a member. If Commissioner Navracsics does not believe in what his own Commission put forward and on the contrary thinks that national governments should not follow decisions taken by the whole of the EU, then we have a problem. If this is how he feels, then why is he working for the European Commission? Commissioner Navracsics must clarify his comments immediately.

Alexander Winterstein, deputy chief spokesman for the Commission, when asked about Navracsics’s action by euroactive.com, was evasive, claiming ignorance of the case. By today, however, it looks as if Juncker’s office is looking into the matter, asking for translations of Navracsics’s interviews and statements. Népszabadság learned that the officials of the commission find Navracsics’s public statements ambiguous, from which it is not clear whether they side with the Hungarian government or the commission on the issue of “the compulsory settlements.” Winterstein announced today that Juncker will bring the topic up at the meeting of th commissioners.

It is possible that in purely legal terms Navracsics is correct when he claims that no conflict of interest exists in this case. But one thing is sure: as euronews.com reported a day after the vote, Brussels considers Orbán’s failure to be their victory.

October 7, 2016

In the service of the Orbán regime: György Schöpflin and the pig heads

I would advise György Schöpflin, Fidesz member of the European Parliament ever since 2004, to stay away from Twitter. It is a dangerous instrument in the hands of politicians, especially politicians who can’t keep their mouths shut. And it seems that he can’t. Two weeks ago his name came up in connection with one of his unfortunate tweets about a Hungarian journalist “and his ilk” who in a dictatorship would already be “in the jug.”

But that was nothing in comparison to what happened yesterday when several English-language papers reported that Schöpflin on Twitter suggested placing pig heads on the fence built by the Orbán government. They would be a deterrent and might keep out hundreds of refugees trying to cross into Hungary.

A week earlier HVG published an article about an anti-immigrant group that calls itself “Magyar Rendőrök és Katonák, vele-TEK vagyunk”(Hungarian policemen and soldiers, we are with you). It included photos of frightening-looking masks, apparently carved from sugar beets, that appeared on Facebook. These masks were most likely put up by self-appointed border guards who occasionally make side trips “to hunt” for illegal migrants. The “vele-TEK” group claims that the masks are effective. Perhaps that’s why Hungarian authorities haven’t made any effort to remove them.

Repafejek

The Twitter exchange in which Schöpflin played such an inglorious role began with a remark by Human Rights Watch director Andrew Stroehlein, who wrote: “Refugees are fleeing war & torture, Hungary. Your root vegetable heads will not deter them.” Schöpflin reacted: “Human images are haram. But agree pig’s head would deter more effectively.” Stroehlein retweeted: “Pig heads an ugly idea. Worse is reality of Hungary border abuses with violence against kids.”

I hate to disappoint György Schöpflin, but his idea was not very original. On the Facebook page with the photos of the carved heads, several people suggested the same thing. Here are a couple of the recommendations: “Pigs’ heads cut off would also work” and “Pig’s intestines and heads or huge pictures of pigs with the caption: THIS IS WHAT’S WAITING FOR YOU. YOU EAT IT.” Yes, György Schöpflin, you sank to that level. But at least these people are not university professors as you are.

schopflin2

It seems to me that György Schöpflin must lack emotional intelligence because, as it turned out, he sees nothing wrong, demeaning, or humiliating in his suggestion. In an interview with András Stumpf of Mandiner.hu, which Magyar Narancs described as “the repugnant mixture of stupidity and cynicism,” Schöpflin insisted that he didn’t humiliate anyone. When he “noted in reaction to a raised question that pigs’ heads would be more effective than masks carved from sugar beets, it was a small thought experiment, nothing else.” It was a simple statement of fact as far as he is concerned. And, as is his wont, Schöpflin immediately launched into one of his annoying mini-lectures. This time on the phenomenon of pork consumption. “This is a very interesting question from the anthropological perspective. That for so many people the eating of pork is a sensitive issue while in Europe it is considered to be normal.” He seemed to be surprised that he received at least 150 antagonistic responses, but as far as he is concerned, all that it is just a storm in a teacup. Or, even better, he would use the title of one of the books of his grandfather, Aladár Schöpflin, “Storm in the Aquarium.”

I’m so glad that he mentioned his grandfather because that gives me the opportunity to say something about this important figure in Hungarian literature. Yes, Aladár Schöpflin wrote several novels, but he was best known as a literary critic and literary historian. He supported and promoted modern literature. He worked for the progressive Huszadik Század, edited by Oszkár Jászi. He was involved with the famed literary review Nyugat. He was one of the organizers of the Hungarian PEN Club and co-editor alongside Gyula Illyés of Magyar Csillag. Right after the birth of the Second Hungarian Republic in 1946, he was made a member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He died in 1950. He certainly didn’t belong to the official cultural establishment of the Horthy regime. On the contrary. He was highly regarded even during the Kádár regime. It is enough to check the account of his accomplishments in the Magyar Irodalmi Lexikon, published in 1965. The accolades go on for pages. I really wonder what he would think of his grandson’s working for a regime that emulates the Horthy regime, which was not at all to his liking.

Aladár’s son, Gyula Schöpflin, György’s father, was also a writer and translator who as a student joined the illegal communist party and spent some time in jail. Therefore, not surprisingly, he became part of the communist establishment after 1945. First, he worked at the Hungarian Radio and, after the communist takeover in 1948, he was appointed Hungarian ambassador to Stockholm, Oslo, and Copenhagen. But then came 1949 and the show trial of László Rajk when he turned his back on the communist regime and moved to Great Britain with his family in 1950. György was 11 years old at the time.

And with this background György Schöpflin became a Fidesz lackey, lacquering over the regime’s boorishness in Brussels with his impeccable British pronunciation and demeanor. He is the British-educated gentleman who lends an elegant touch to the less than distinguished group of people Orbán sent to Brussels. Every time he is interviewed on some issue that reflects badly on the regime he serves, he is honey-tongued and appears on the surface so very reasonable, but in the end he always manages to defend all the rotten stuff that oozes out of the Orbán regime. I’m afraid that the person who said that he brings shame to the Schöpflin name is right. He squandered the name of his family and whatever reputation he himself had as a scholar.

August 23, 2016

Furious denial of any wrongdoing and rejection of a European solution to the refugee crisis

I would like to continue with yesterday’s theme for at least two reasons. One is that the report of Human Rights Watch on the brutal treatment of refugees along the Serb-Hungarian border has been confirmed by Nick Thorpe, Budapest correspondent of BBC, who paid a visit to two camps at Horgos and Kelebia where the conditions are, he said, appalling. Apparently, the Hungarian authorities could easily handle the registration of 100 people a day instead of the 15 they do now, so it is obvious that the aim is to slow the process to discourage people from crossing into the European Union through Hungary. A physician from Doctors Without Borders also confirmed “cases of intentional trauma that can be related to excessive use of force.” And Thorpe reported cases where refugees were already as far as 25 km from Budapest and yet were forcibly moved back to beyond the fence hundreds of kilometers away.

As for some of the most brutal acts of violence, they may have been committed by far-right members of paramilitary organizations patrolling the border on their own. This is speculation because the activity of such groups along the border is not officially acknowledged. And yet, although the Serb-Hungarian border is 175 km long, it is hard to believe that if such groups do indeed patrol the border and beat up refugees who cross illegally, officials are unaware of this fact.

The second reason for continuing this theme is that today the parliamentary undersecretary of the Ministry of Interior, Károly Konrát, denied any and all wrongdoing. Human Rights Watch’s accusations are baseless. In fact, Hungary should be praised for its vigorous defense of the borders of the European Union. As for the humane treatment of migrants, again Hungary can only be praised. The government spends 140,000 forints a month on each refugee, more than the average Hungarian worker makes. Refugees receive three meals a day, a hygienic package, and medical treatment and medicine if needed. Of more than 17,000 illegal migrants, only eight filed complaints, and all eight cases turned out to be bogus.

As for the refugees whom Hungary doesn’t want, according to Nick Thorpe “the unofficial leader of the camp” at the border is a 25-year-old Afghan doctor who negotiates with the Hungarian Office of Immigration and Nationality. Then there is the 23-year-old Syrian refugee who, after spending five days in a Hungarian jail, is now studying computer programming in Berlin in a program called ReDi. But it seems that the Hungarian government finds the idea of admitting desirable immigrants “inhumane and contrary to the European ideal.” János Lázár, for example, described such a practice as a “market place for human beings” where each country picks the “desirable” ones. He fears that Germany and other western countries will pick the best, leaving “the rejects” for the East Europeans.

As expected, the Hungarian government is both denouncing and falsifying the European Commission’s proposed reform of the asylum system, released yesterday. In the interest of truth, I think I should summarize its main points.

The overall procedure will be shortened and streamlined, and decisions will be made in a maximum of six months. Asylum seekers will be guaranteed the right to a personal interview as well as free legal assistance and representation during the administrative procedure. A guardian will be assigned to unaccompanied minors. New obligations to cooperate with the authorities will be introduced. All asylum seekers must have the same protection regardless of the member state in which they make their applications. In order to achieve this harmonization, the member states will be obliged to take into account guidance coming from the European Agency for Asylum. As bruxinfo.hu, a Hungarian internet site reporting on the affairs of the EU, pointed out, there is no talk here of compulsory quotas or punishment for non-compliance. Each year member states would announce the number of refugees they could accommodate. They would receive 10,000 euros for each refugee accepted.

rejection

So, let’s see how this was translated into Orbanite Hungarian by János Lázár this afternoon at his regular Government Info. In his reading, according to Dimitris Avramopoulos’s suggestion “Hungary would have to undertake the complete integration of immigrants forcibly brought into the country.” This is a preposterous idea, which “goes beyond the notion of compulsory settlement quotas.” While he was at it, he reminded his audience that the European Parliament accepted a proposal that would include heavy financial penalties if refugees were not accepted. Moreover, George Soros’s scheme of imposing extra taxes and/or other financial punishment on countries that refuse to participate in the program is “still on the table of the European Commission.” Lázár is referring to Soros’s speech, discussed here earlier.

Lázár is convinced that the “leftist delegations” of the European Parliament, together with the European Commission, work daily on their settlement schemes and keep coming up with new suggestions. That is why there is a need for the quota referendum, to be held on October 2. Lázár finds it impossible to believe that the European Commission will simply ignore the results of “direct democracy.” The referendum, instead of decreasing European integration, will actually strengthen it. It will be “a stabilizing factor.” Unfortunately, he didn’t elaborate on this claim. I would have been curious to see how our maverick Fidesz double-talker could possibly make his case.

Lázár, in talking about fines, repeated a piece of disinformation that the Hungarian government has spread far and wide in the last few days. Fidesz accused MSZP, DK, and LMP members of the European Parliament of voting in favor of a motion to fine states that refuse to participate in the migrant quota scheme. In fact, the report the European Parliament adopted says only that “a European approach is needed based on solidarity and a just distribution of the burden to resolve the migration and refugee crisis.” And, as it turned out, not only “leftist” members but also the vast majority of the European People’s Party, to which Fidesz belongs, voted for it.

You may recall János Lázár’s statement last week that he wouldn’t vote for Hungarian membership in the European Union today because of its migration policies. Of course, he said, this is his “personal opinion,” but a high government official, especially the man who is in charge of the disbursement of billions of euros received from the European Union, should not publicly share a “personal opinion.” Today he followed up, saying that “we didn’t secede from the Soviet Union in order to become a member of another union, but we left the Soviet Union so at least we can be independent and sovereign.”

Well, I don’t want to sound like a schoolmarm, but Hungary was never part of the Soviet Union. That, of course, is the least of the difficulties here. Hungarians desperately wanted to belong to the European Union, and at a referendum well over 80% of them voted for membership. Today, 75% still want to remain in the Union. With their vote at that referendum the Hungarian people authorized their government to give up some of the country’s independence and sovereignty. If Lázár, the second most important man in the Orbán government, insists on full independence and sovereignty, he should discuss it with his boss, and they should start making preparations for a Hungxit. And, while they’re at it, for their retirement from politics.

July 14, 2016

George Soros before the European Parliament and the Hungarian government’s reaction

Every time George Soros makes a public statement, which he does frequently, the Hungarian political right launches a frenzied attack against him. Interestingly, the Hungarian media didn’t spend much time on an article that appeared in The New York Review of Books (April 9, 2016). In it he explained that European Commission Vice President Frans Timmermans had invited an open debate on the refugee crisis, to which he was responding in his article. The solution, according to Soros, is “at least €30 billion ($34 billion) a year [which] will be needed for the EU to carry out a comprehensive plan.” He suggested that “Europe has the financial and economic capacity to raise €30 billion a year, [which] is less than one-quarter of one percent of the EU’s combined annual GDP of €14.9 trillion, and less than one-half of one percent of total spending by its twenty-eight member governments.”

Soros, however, realized that some members would vehemently object, especially Germany. So, instead, he offered all sorts of financial arrangements that would yield the necessary money without triggering the opposition of Germany and others. The task is urgent because “the refugee crisis poses an existential threat to Europe.”

On June 30 Soros delivered a speech to the European Parliament in Brussels, which was a revised version of the ideas he had spelled out in his New York Review of Books article. The result of the British referendum had a shocking effect on Soros who, upon hearing of the calamitous vote for Brexit, was certain that the disintegration of the European Union was “practically inevitable.” And since, in his opinion, “the refugee crisis … played a crucial role” in the British decision, the EU must act in one way or the other to raise money to solve the crisis and at the same time save the European Union.

I believe he is wrong in thinking that the refugee crisis per se had a substantial influence on the outcome of the referendum. In fact, a quick poll conducted after June 23 showed that “the question of sovereignty was the determining factor for the majority that voted for exit from the European Union.” Unlimited immigration from EU countries was also an important consideration.

George Soros in the European Parliament. Left of him Péter Niedermüller, DK EP MP

George Soros in the European Parliament. To his left, Péter Niedermüller, DK EP MP / Photo: European Parliament

But Soros’s linkage of the refugee crisis and Brexit strengthened his argument that the refugee crisis must be solved as soon as possible. In his fairly lengthy speech he talked about the necessity of “profound restructuring” and “fundamental reform of the EU.” He lashed out at “the orthodoxy of the German policymakers,” specifically Angela Merkel, who “ignored the pull factor” created by her initial acceptance of the refugees. Soros also severely criticized her for “her ill-fated deal with Erdoğan” and for her “imposed quotas that many member states opposed and [that] required refugees to take up residence in countries where they were not welcome.”

One would think that Viktor Orbán would have been happy to find an ally in George Soros, but it seems that there is nothing Soros can say or do that would please the Hungarian governing coalition. In fact, they launched a new campaign against him after he addressed the European Parliament. The reason for the government outcry was three sentences he uttered in the course of outlining ways in which the EU could raise the requisite €30 billion yearly. He said,“Finally, I come to the legacy expenditures that have crippled the EU budget. Two items stand out: cohesion policy, with 32% of expenditures, and agriculture with 38%. These will need to be sharply reduced in the next budget cycle starting in 2021.”

The first Hungarian politician to respond to Soros’s suggestion was György Hölvényi, KDNP member of the European People’s Party, followed by György Schöpflin, Fidesz EP member, who accused Soros of trying to make money on his financial advice to the European Union. Magyar Hírlap announced the news of Soros’s speech with this headline: “There are already signs of Soros’s latest speculations.” Naturally, János Lázár also had a few words to say about Soros’s speech in Brussels. He described him as someone who “presents himself as the voluntary savior of Europe” and who “wants to implement wholesale immigration.” Soros has no mandate from the European voters to offer any kinds of proposals, and it is not at all clear who invited him to the European Parliament. An editorial in Magyar Idők portrayed Soros as an emissary of the Clintons: “the face of Washington shows a striking similarity to that of George Soros.” The author added that if Hillary Clinton wins the election, this unfortunate situation will remain in place. Soros’s disapproval of compulsory quotas was dismissed as nothing more than a queen’s gambit.

The spokesman of Fidesz-KDNP on the issue was István Hollik, a member of parliament who was practically unknown until recently. He expressed the governing party’s strong objections to all of Soros’s suggestions, especially cutting back the cohesion funds and the agricultural subsidies “in the interest of the immigrants.” Fidesz-KDNP “expressly calls on the European Union to reject the proposals of the financial Forex speculator.” Naturally, Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó also commented on Soros’s “totally astonishing ideas.”

None of the Hungarian politicians, or for that matter commentators, spent any time on Soros’s other suggestions, some of which merit consideration. They were fixated on the two items–cohesion funds and agricultural subsidies–that would really hurt the Hungarian government and its coterie of oligarchs. Can you imagine the plight of those who are the beneficiaries of the money pouring in from the European Union? And what will happen to the new landed gentry who purchased agricultural property for the express purpose of getting free money for every hectare from Brussels? Indeed, that would be a calamity.

And then there was the reaction of László Csizmadia, president of Civil Összefogás Fórum (CÖF), a phony NGO most likely financed by the government. In his scenario Hillary Clinton sent her number one scout to the European Union to test her future policies and their reception. Behind global capitalism there is “the financial hidden power,” without which no one can overthrow a political system. Soros has been banned in many countries, and Csizmadia knows that “some kind of Hungarian measure is under consideration that would be similar to a ban.” I do hope that Csizmadia’s information is only a figment of his imagination.

July 5, 2016

Bálint Magyar’s latest book: Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary

At last Bálint Magyar’s groundbreaking book, A magyar maffiaállam anatómiája, published last year by Noran Libro, has been translated into English with the title Post-Communist Mafia State: The Case of Hungary. The publisher is the Central European University Press, and the book is available for pre-order through Amazon. The official release date is March 31. (Clicking on the thumbnail image of the book cover to the left will take you directly to Amazon.)

Bálint Magyar developed the concept of the post-communist mafia state 15 years ago when in an article he first called attention to the “organized over-world” as opposed to the “underworld” we are familiar with. The article appeared on February 22, 2001, during the last year of the first Orbán government, in Magyar Hírlap, then still a liberal daily. It elicited considerable interest, and Magyar followed it up with several lectures that further elucidated his theory.

Memories often fade with the passage of time, and many Hungarians who are interested in politics are convinced that the 1998-2002 period “wasn’t really all that bad,” especially in comparison to the situation today. But the sad truth is that the contours of the mafia state were already visible then, except very few people noticed it at the time. Admittedly, there was a fantastic HVG cover from December 1999 that portrayed the top Fidesz leaders in fedoras (sometimes called gangster hats) with the caption “team spirit.”

Meanwhile a lot has happened. Among other things, Magyar served as minister of education between 2002 and 2006 and was a member of parliament from 1990 until 2010. Since then he has had plenty of time to further develop his theory of the post-communist mafia state.

Magyar Balint2In the past I devoted several posts to Magyar’s theory. The first occasion was the appearance of a volume of essays edited by Bálint Magyar and Júlia Vásárhelyi titled Magyar Polip: A posztkommunista állam (Budapest: Noran Libro, 2013). The book became an instant bestseller. It had to be reprinted shortly after its appearance. Professor Charles Gati wrote in his review of the first volume that “after reading this book the West no longer can look at East-Central Europe the same as before.”

The following year a second edited volume appeared with new authors. Finally, last year a third volume was published. All books deal with the same general theme but analyze the impact of the mafia state on different aspects of society: the law, the economy, social policy, culture, banking, etc.

Bálint Magyar’s latest volume, Post-Communist Mafia State, of which he is the sole author, encapsulates his latest thoughts on the subject. The foreword to the book was written by Kim Lane Scheppele, who is well known to the readers of Hungarian Spectrum. She called Magyar’s volume “a very brave book” which is “an outreach to the audience beyond the borders and thus beyond the immediate control of the Orbán government. … The failure of a democratic state should be a cause for concern in the international community, especially when anti-liberalism is spreading and new autocrats are looking for models.”

Although the English edition has not yet reached bookstores, it looks as if in places where it counts the book has already created quite a stir. Bálint Magyar and Tamás Lattmann, a constitutional legal scholar, gave a summary of the book in Brussels. From an interview with Jozef Weidenholzer, deputy president of the Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, it seems that the book’s last chapter titled “Pyramid Schemes—the limits of the mafia state” made the greatest impact. In this chapter Magyar argues that the whole pyramid scheme can work only because the European Union is financing it. Weidenholzer, who being an Austrian most likely knows the Hungarian situation better than most of the other MEPs, was surprised after hearing the details of the Orbán system. He found Magyar’s theory of the mafia state convincing. He added that “it is time to say goodbye to emotional debates and instead we should look at the whole problem with a clear head…. We can’t accept the existence of a mafia state in Europe.”

The European Commission and Parliament have concentrated until now on the Charter of Basic Laws and the Copenhagen criteria. But this is the wrong approach, Weidenholzer said. One ought to concentrate on the economic side of the problem. States aspiring for membership promised the introduction of full-fledged capitalism, “but this corrupt system has nothing to do with the market economy.”

We will see whether Magyar’s compelling book will enlighten minds in Brussels and Washington. We can only hope so.

February 19, 2016

Poland at a crossroads?

After spending three days on domestic affairs, today I will concentrate on the Polish-Hungarian-European Union triangle, with a quick look at Putin’s Russia.

There is no question that Jarosław Kaczyński has been an excellent student of Viktor Orbán. The new Szydło government is copying the Orbán model step by step, just at an accelerated pace. While it took the slower-moving Orbán machinery two or three years to achieve its desired results, the eager Poles thought that a few months would suffice. It didn’t take long for Polish foreign minister Witold Waczczykowski to announce a change in the country’s foreign policy. The Szydło government will not follow its predecessor’s policy of acquiescence toward the European Union, he said. As a result of Polish belligerence, most commentators were certain that Brussels would act quickly and without hesitation. If the European Union opts to avoid a confrontation, the same thing will happen in Poland as happened in Hungary, where Orbán’s political system has solidified to the point that it may last for decades. Poland is too important a country to allow this to occur.

Cass Mudde of the University of Georgia wrote an article in the Huffington Post in which he suggested that “the success of PiS in Poland could turn out to be a poisoned chalice for Orbán” because of the possibility of EU sanctions not just against Poland but against Hungary as well.” As we know, however, Orbán made it clear on January 8 that “it’s not worth it for the European Union to rack its brains over any sanction against Poland because that would require full agreement. Never will Hungary support any sanction against Poland.”

A few days later Kim Lane Scheppele pointed out that a veto by Hungary could easily be neutralized. In an article that appeared on January 11 in politico.eu she sketched out a possible legal action that would take care of Viktor Orbán’s threat of a veto. Here is her scheme:

Sanctions require a unanimous vote of the European Council, minus the offending state, meaning Hungary does have a veto.

But Article 7 includes two separate parts: a warning system outlined in Article 7(1) and the sanctions mechanism of Article 7(2)-(3). The only way to keep the threat of sanctions on the table under Article 7(2) is for European institutions to act against both Poland and Hungary at the same time by invoking Article 7(1) first.

Those who were certain that this time the European Commission would not choose the road of appeasement as it did in the case of Hungary were correct. On January 13 the Commission launched a probe into policy changes in Poland that may clash with EU law. This is an unprecedented move with serious implications. For example, it could lead to the application of Article 7 of the Treaty of the European Union.

In the wake of the announcement of the probe, the Poles even copied Orbán, who took up the challenge and faced a very angry European Parliament in 2012. Prime Minister Beata Szydło announced that she would attend the debate on Poland in the European Parliament and defend her government’s right to make changes in the structure of the constitutional court and the media. Her speech was very East European in flavor. In addition to repeating several times that Poland is as much a part of the EU as the other 27 countries, she said that Brussels, instead of “rounding on Poland, ought to be looking to engage with a country with a troubled history and which had fought at great cost for its freedom.” These words could easily have been uttered by Viktor Orbán himself. It is still too early to know what the reaction to Szydło’s speech will be, but people in the know in Brussels are certain that “the stage is set for a ‘carnage’ in the European Parliament.”

Szydlo

Beata Szydło in the European Parliament, January 19, 2016

There have, however, been voices in the western media that have cautioned the European Commission in its handling of Poland. As early as January 13, the day the European Commission decided on a monitoring procedure against Warsaw, The New York Times came out with an editorial which claimed that “punishing Poland through sanctions would be counterproductive and even hypocritical, given the proliferation of like-minded parties across Europe,” the logic of which escapes me, I’m afraid.

What the editors of The New York Times think about Polish-EU relations is neither here nor there, but what Donald Tusk thinks is something else. After all, he is the president of the European Council who is supposed to represent the interests of the Union and not the country of his birth. But although Tusk is a political adversary of Kaczyński, he felt compelled to come to Poland’s rescue. His move was interpreted by The Financial Times as a break “with the rest of the EU’s leadership … by questioning Brussels’ decision to launch a formal review into whether Poland’s new media and judicial legislation violate the rule of law.” He declared that the EU can clarify the situation in Poland “by other methods, not necessarily triggering this procedure.” He didn’t elaborate what these other methods might be.

Meanwhile, in Hungary Viktor Orbán is most likely eagerly watching what’s going on in Brussels. Will the Poles be persuaded to abandon their revolutionary zeal under domestic and foreign pressure? There are signs that President Andrzej Duda (PiS) and other PiS officials began a campaign a few days ago to ease tensions between Poland and the European Commission. If they succeed, Viktor Orbán will not be a happy man because he is counting on the formation of a large eastern bloc of 90 million people as something of an alliance against the core countries in Western Europe. Naturally, such a bloc without Poland is worth nothing.

This kind of fear is reflected in one of Zsolt Bayer’s articles titled “Lengyelek” (The Poles). After recalling all the humiliation and treachery Poland has suffered through her history at the hands of the western powers, especially the United States, Bayer doesn’t understand “Polish devotion to the United States.” Poland must choose. Either they follow Hungary’s example or they will end up with the same “base, unjust, unbearable and unacceptable harassment that Hungary had to suffer.” Poland must be careful, Bayer warns, because it is clear that the United States has been hard at work trying to persuade Poland to loosen its ties with the alliance system Viktor Orbán managed to create from the formerly ineffectual Visegrád4 group. If a 90-million strong Eastern Bloc materializes, it will be the center of a “normal” Europe as opposed to the “mentally deranged West.” So, a lot depends on Poland, a country that should be grateful to Hungary because of Hungary’s generosity toward her in her times of peril. “There is no war yet but the situation is very serious. We should not let them drive a wedge between us.”

After reading Bayer’s lines about the possibility of a war in Europe, one wonders about the psychological state of some of the Fidesz leaders who lately have been discussing ways of strengthening the military capabilities of the country. László Kövér went so far as to talk about “the catastrophe of abolishing compulsory military service” in 2004. Do they really think that war is going to break out in Europe sometime in the near future? Possibly.

Finally, a friendly warning to Poland. Putin is delighted with the growth of right-wing radicalism and the recent emphasis on the sovereignty of nation states within the European Union, as Vladislav Inozemtsev of The Moscow Times, points out. “The events in Europe are being seen with undisguised joy” in Russia. “The Kremlin supports and will support the ultra-right and ultra-left parties who seek to put Europeans back to their ‘private apartments.’” So, going along with Viktor Orbán will be useful to Poland’s archenemy, Russia. The leaders of PiS should think very seriously whether they want to play into the hands of Vladimir Putin or not. Yes, they do have a choice.

September 19, 2016

Viktor Orbán’s meeting with Jarosław Kaczyński

Yesterday afternoon vs.hu learned from several sources that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán will travel to Poland at the invitation of PiS, the country’s governing party. In terms of protocol it will be a private visit. At this point the word was that he will meet several “very important politicians.” From the scant information that has reached us since, however, it looks as if Orbán met only Jarosław Kaczyński, the party chairman. The meeting took place in Niedzica at the Polish-Slovak border, a town that belonged to Hungary prior to 1918. The meeting was long–six hours, including a lunch of the famous Polish delicacy zurek soup and trout.

Unfortunately, we know practically nothing about what transpired between the two men. The Polish opposition media’s guess is that Orbán was giving Kaczyński tips on how to make the constitutional court and the media serve the government’s interest. I, however, doubt that much time was spent on Polish domestic affairs since there are far too many international issues that demand the attention of the Polish and the Hungarian leadership.

Jarosław Kaczynski and Viktor Orbán in 2010

Jarosław Kaczyski and Viktor Orbán in 201

First and foremost, the two probably formulated a common policy response to David Cameron’s “new curbs on welfare payments for migrant workers.” Cameron is currently on the campaign trail to win support for his plan to limit in-work benefits for migrants. In his quest he seems to have the support of Germany, whose interior minister, Thomas de Maizière, thinks that Cameron’s “suggestions are not a matter of regulating migration but a matter of regulating welfare legislation.” Poland and Hungary, however, have an entirely different view of the matter. First of all, Hungarian officials greatly object to the word “migrant” in connection with their own nationals, who should be called either EU citizens or guest workers. “To consider Hungarians in Britain as migrants is painful to our ears,” Orbán complained in Brussels on December 18, 2015. I suspect that these two East European countries will eventually have to swallow Cameron’s bitter pill.

In addition to hammering out a common policy regarding Polish and Hungarian immigrants in Great Britain, which Viktor Orbán can relate to David Cameron, who will arrive in Budapest for a short visit tomorrow, there might have been a second item: Hungary’s relations with Putin’s Russia. You may recall my post of February 19, 2015 titled “Polak, węgier—dwa bratanki / lengyel, magyar–két jó barát—not at the moment” in which I described how Hungarian diplomats tried to convince Kaczyński to meet Orbán, who visited Poland shortly after Putin’s visit to Budapest, but the chairman of PiS refused. The answer was that such a meeting was out of the question after Hungary’s flirtation with Russia, Poland’s archenemy. Kaczyński, who hasn’t met Orbán since, most likely wanted to clear the air and to hear directly from Orbán himself about his relationship with Putin.

The third topic may well have been Poland’s unexpected decision to honor the promise of the former government and take 4,500 refugees as part of the quota system. That decision seriously weakens the position of the other three Visegrád4 countries. Viktor Orbán looks upon the joint action of these four countries, standing together against Brussels, as one of his major achievements of late. Surely, he was counting on the new PiS government to abrogate the former government’s offer, especially since in November Beata Szydło, Poland’s new prime minister, made it clear that her government was not prepared to accept the quota system because of the changed circumstances that followed the Paris terrorist attacks. Well, it seems that the situation changed again. Yesterday it was announced that, after all, Poland will take the promised number of refugees. Mind you, only during the next two years and allowing only 150 of them at a time at certain intervals. However cautiously, Poland abandoned Viktor Orbán’s rigid stance on the issue of quotas. The change of heart most likely follows the harsh criticism coming from Brussels on the arch-conservative PiS government’s moves concerning the Constitutional Court and the media.

What moves of the Polish government do EU politicians find unacceptable? I’m relying here on the assessment of Dalibor Rohac of the American Enterprise Institute, not exactly a liberal stronghold in the United States. According to Rohac, “the law changes the status of Poland’s public broadcasters to ‘national cultural institutions’—like the National  Museum or the National Ballet—placing them under direct control of the government.” As for the Constitutional Court, shortly before the October election the Sejm elected five new constitutional court judges, but after the election PiS and President Andrzej Duda sought to reverse these appointments, notwithstanding a ruling by the Constitutional Court that confirmed that the election of the new judges was valid. Both the European Commission and the European Parliament reacted, calling these moves a clear violation of the EU constitution.

Vice-President Frans Timmermans sent two letters to the Polish government asking for clarification of the bill. At the same time Günther Oettinger, EU commissioner for digital economy, told the Frankfurter Allgemeine Sonntagszeitung that “many reasons exist for us to activate the ‘Rule of Law mechanism’ and to place Warsaw under monitoring.” Although Witold Waszczykowski, the new foreign minister, immediately summoned EU ambassadors to demand an explanation, perhaps cooler heads prevailed and the decision was made to retreat, at least partially.

Waszczykowsk’s introduction to the German media hasn’t been exactly a success. In an interview with Bild he accused the former right-of-center Polish government of following a Marxist model, which is “a new mix of cultures and races, introducing a world of cyclists and vegetarians who focus only on renewable energies and fight against any form of religion. This has nothing to do with traditional Polish values, which are awareness of history, patriotism, faith in God, and a normal family life between husband and wife.”

I should add that only yesterday Waszczykowski announced an entirely new Polish foreign policy, which sounds as if it will be built on confrontation with Brussels. “Our foreign policy cannot be part of the mainstream, we cannot simply abide by Brussels’ decisions,” he announced on Polish public radio. Polish foreign policy seems to be in flux. As long as Waszczykowski’s ideas prevail, one cannot be sure that Poland will be a cooperating member state of the European Union.

Commentators are trying to find an explanation for the drastically different reaction of the European Commission and Parliament to the Polish government’s attempts to imitate Orbán’s illiberal state. How fast the EU reacted in the Polish case and how sluggish it was when Orbán was dismantling Hungarian democracy bit by bit. Professor Kim Scheppele pointed out a fundamental difference between the two cases just yesterday. The two-thirds parliamentary majority enabled Fidesz to change the constitution, so it never violated its own fundamental law. Therefore “the EU was totally at a loss in figuring out how to handle a perfectly legal coup,” she told The Financial Times. The Polish case is different. The PiS government, not having a two-thirds majority, cannot attain the kind of absolute power Orbán managed to acquire. The combination of constitutional limitations as well as internal and external pressures will most likely have a restraining effect on the Szydło-Kaczyński government.