Tag Archives: Fidesz

The latest opinion polls on the chances of the opposition parties

First, before getting into the polls, a short “public service announcement.” Arcanum Adatbázis Kft. will hold an “open day” tomorrow (October 13). Arcanum has been digitalizing an enormous number of documents, periodicals, newspapers, and books over the past few years. A certain amount of their digitalized material is available at no cost, including such gems as Maria Theresa’s 1767 Urbarium, which genealogy buffs will find especially useful, but for full access you must pay a monthly fee. If you visit Arcanum’s table of contents (https://adtplus.arcanum.hu/hu/) you will find an amazing amount of material. So I urge everybody to make a quick trip today and look around. Tomorrow everybody will be able to browse Arcanum’s rich depository of material.

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Two new polls have been published recently. The first was conducted by Publicus Research, which was specifically interested in voters’ reaction to László Botka’s withdrawal as MSZP’s candidate for the post of prime minister. To my surprise, 43% of the respondents didn’t think that Botka’s disappearance from the scene made an appreciable difference in the electoral chances of the parties on the left. My surprise was based on the following considerations. First, those who disapproved of Botka’s handling of the negotiations with the other left-opposition parties should think that his retirement would enhance the likelihood of a united front, which, at least in theory, should boost the chances of the socialist-liberal side. On the other hand, those who saw in Botka a strong leader who could give a face to a unified opposition should be disappointed and consider the chances of the opposition diminished. Yet, it mattered not whether the respondent was a Fidesz, a Jobbik, or an MSZP voter; they all agreed that Botka’s presence in the campaign was neither here nor there. I think this outcome is a sad commentary on Botka’s eight-month non-campaign.

The amazing finding is that, despite the fact that 66% of the respondents thought that Botka’s withdrawal from the race shows the chaos that exists among the left-opposition parties, 44% still think that with hard work and readiness to compromise the left-opposition could win, as opposed to 49% who think that, no matter what, they couldn’t win. Moreover, over 60% said that Botka’s resignation was not too late; there is, they believe, still time to find a suitable and successful replacement.

As for the likelihood of victory over Fidesz at the next election, the respondents were divided, depending on party preference. Over 83% of Fidesz voters are convinced that their party will easily win next year, while MSZP voters are even more sure (89%) that there will be a change of government in 2018. Interestingly enough, Jobbik voters are much more cautious in their predictions. The majority (58%) are optimistic, but there is a large minority (42%) who fear that Fidesz will remain in power.

When Publicus Research asked the respondents about their willingness to vote for the left-opposition, there were only a couple of surprises. Clearly, Fidesz supporters are not contemplating voting for such an opposition group. However, it was somewhat of a shock that 53% of Jobbik voters would be willing to vote for the left-opposition. I suspect that the question wasn’t clear enough: “How likely would you be to vote for a left-wing joint force (együttműködés) at the 2018 election?” There is only one situation in which such a decision would make sense: if a Jobbik voter was confronted with a situation in which no Jobbik candidate was on the ballot in his electoral district.

Otherwise, Publicus, along with many other pollsters, maintains that the majority (56%) of the electorate would like to see a change of government. Over 90% of MSZP, DK, LMP, Párbeszéd, Együtt, and Jobbik voters want Viktor Orbán and his minions to be replaced, and what is encouraging is that 56% of undecided voters want the same. Considering the consensus view that undecided voters hold the key to electoral success, that level of desire for a change of government must be heartening to the opposition.

The second poll, by Medián, was released today. The data was gathered in the second half of September, before the withdrawal of László Botka. The goal was to find answers to the question of the electorate’s desire for collaboration among the opposition parties. This time only possible voters for opposition parties took part in the survey. Here again there are some surprises. Perhaps the most intriguing result is that 33% of anti-Fidesz voters claim that they prefer each party to run alone. This, given the present electoral system, would be suicidal for the opposition parties, and again I’m not sure whether the respondents really understood the question properly. They may have thought of separate party lists, especially since there was an alternative that talked about a common list that included all the opposition parties minus Jobbik. The other surprise is the relatively large number (33%) of those who want complete cooperation, which would include Jobbik. When Medián broke the answers down by party preferences, it turned out that 43% of MSZP, almost 50% of DK voters, and 34% of the undecided ones are willing to include Jobbik in a joint venture against Fidesz. Obviously, the desire to get rid of Orbán and his corrupt and undemocratic government overrides any other consideration. Although the leadership of LMP has been championing for years to face the election on its own, the party’s voters are not entirely convinced. LMP voters are almost evenly split on the issue.

Finally, let me lighten your day with a Jobbik stunt concerning the government’s campaign against George Soros. I think I wrote earlier that Bernadett Szél asked for a copy of the Soros Plan, which naturally the government was unable to provide. Jobbik did better than that. It filed charges against George Soros with Károly Papp, the chief of police. The charges are: (1) preparation for a violent change of the constitutional order, (2) conspiracy against the constitutional order, (3) destruction, (4) treason, and (5) rebellion. As support for the charges they cited claims by Bence Tuzson, undersecretary responsible for communication, György Bakondi, chief adviser on domestic security, János Halász, Fidesz spokesman, Szilárd Németh, deputy chairman of the parliamentary committee on security, András Aradszki, who called Soros Satan, Gyula Budai, Fidesz member of parliament, Zoltán Kovács, government spokesman, and Csaba Fodor, managing director of Nézőpont, a Fidesz political think tank. Ádám Mirkóczki, Jobbik spokesman, said that if Soros is guilty of all the things Fidesz and government spokesmen accuse him of, he should be arrested and charged. I’m sure that Károly Papp will not find the Jobbik antic funny.

October 12, 2017

Viktor Orbán in Hanoi

Viktor Orbán, accompanied by his wife and a 98-member delegation, visited Vietnam and Singapore between September 22 and 27. Here I will concentrate on the trip to Vietnam.

We know that Orbán is a great admirer of the authoritarian regime of the People’s Action Party in Singapore, which has won every election since the introduction of self-government. The regime is known for its low level of press freedom and restrictions on civil liberties and political rights. So, the affinity Orbán feels toward the city state is genuine. In fact, he alluded to the similarities of the Singaporean and Hungarian political systems in his press conference held after his meeting with Prime Minister Li Hsien Loong. But in Singapore Orbán could only ask the rich businessmen of the Lion City to come and invest in Hungary.

The situation is different in Vietnam, where Hungary would like to sell and invest. This is a far more interesting topic, as far as I’m concerned. Also, I was lucky enough to happen upon a long, detailed description of the trip in an English-language Vietnamese source, which contained information the Hungarian government failed to share with the Hungarian public.

In connection with the Vietnamese trip, the Hungarian media has been preoccupied with two topics. First, the luxury VIP charter plane that the Hungarian delegation used and, second, the construction of a 500-bed hospital for cancer patients in Can Tho, the fourth largest city in Vietnam, with an interest-free Hungarian loan of $60 million. The first was greeted by the public as an unnecessary luxury; the second, with outrage.

After the discovery that the plane used by the Hungarian delegation was an Airbus A340 VIP with 100 lie-flat seats, the non-governmental media took every opportunity to show the luxurious interior of the aircraft. Zoom.hu even provided a brief video of the interior, including the restroom. Of course, the public wanted to know how much this cost the taxpayers, but the figures are not available. Journalists did learn from Bertalan Havasi, press secretary of the prime minister, that the plane was not leased. Rather, the seats were individually purchased. Businessmen who accompany Viktor Orbán and government ministers normally buy their own tickets. This time only four ministers traveled to Hanoi and Singapore, but it is unlikely that the rest of the seats were occupied by paying Hungarian businessmen because from a Vietnamese source I learned that “more than 40 businessmen” accompanied the prime minister and the four cabinet members. That probably means that a lot of lower-ranking members of the government traveled on that plane.

Once the excitement subsided over the luxury plane, people started focusing on the construction of the hospital in Can Tho, a project that, given the state of Hungarian healthcare, elicited some four-letter words from a normally more sanguine blogger, a cancer victim, who told his sad story of what he had to go through in order to receive prompt medical attention in Budapest.

Actually, the story of the Vietnamese hospital is quite curious. Orbán announced the construction of the hospital as a brand new agreement between the two countries, but the truth is that it has been on the back burner for exactly eight years. On September 25, 2009, Prime Minister Gordon Bajnai signed an identical agreement with Prime Minister Nguen Tan Dung during the latter’s visit to Budapest. It was also an interest-free $60 million loan, to be paid back in 18 years. In return, Hungarian businessmen would be the general contractors of the project.

A few months after the agreement was signed, elections were held in Hungary and Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz won. It was during the second Orbán government (2010-2014) that bidding on the project began, a process that was not exactly transparent. As 24.hu found out, the tender, despite its size and international significance, was announced only on the website of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Békés County. Only two companies applied. Five years ago the winners, a consortium of Novotrading Medical Kft. and KÉSZ Group, won the tender. The latter advertises itself as “one of Hungary’s largest construction companies,” which “built the Nation’s Main Square.” Novotrading Kft. is a bit more mysterious since it is registered as a wholesaler of pharmaceuticals and medical products.

But something went very wrong. KÉSZ Group might have done a decent enough job on the reconstruction of Kossuth tér, but building a hospital in Can Tho was a very different cup of tea. The city is situated in the Mekong Delta, and it is built on marshy land full of canals. It has even a “floating market” that can be approached only by boat. Structures must be built on piles. Apparently because of a faulty calculation, the strength of the piles was misjudged. Even before the construction began, the mistake was discovered and the tender was cancelled. Although the Vietnamese were still interested, the Orbán government abandoned the project.

Whether Hungarian construction companies are today better equipped to deal with the special project of building a large hospital on piles in the Mekong Delta I have no idea, but the Vietnamese are still enthusiastic about the project, especially since Hungary, in addition to the $60 million, promised a further loan of $300 million, which may be increased in the future.

And finally, a few tidbits that Viktor Orbán and his entourage failed to pass on to the Hungarian people. First, Viktor Orbán’s trip was an important event in Hanoi. At least this is the impression I got from the very enthusiastic description of the visit by vietnamnet.vn. Orbán was received by the president, the president of the national assembly, the prime minister, and the general secretary of the Vietnamese Communist Party, Nguyen Phu Trong. He is the most powerful person in Vietnam since, in addition to being the general secretary of the party, he is also the secretary of the Central Military Commission and the de facto head of the Politburo.

General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong receives Viktor Orbán / Source: vietnamnet.vn

Thanks to a Vietnamese news site, we know that Nguyen Phu Trong gave him “a warm welcome” and thanked him for “the Hungarian people’s valuable and efficient assistance to Vietnam’s liberation cause and nation building.” The party secretary “showed his support for stepping up the ties between the two governments and the ruling parties.” He also “spoke highly of the recent signing of a memorandum of understanding on cooperation between the two ruling parties and expressed his hope for furthering the ties with the Communist Party of Vietnam and heightening the bilateral relations in the coming time.” Well, well. What a surprise. Viktor Orbán is signing a memorandum of understanding between Fidesz and the Vietnamese Communist Party. The man whose government tried to banish the red star from Heineken’s logo and forced the issue of the red star all the way to the European Court of Human Rights, where his government roundly lost the case. Or, the man who insists that he rebuilt the train between Felcsút and Alcsútdoboz just because “the communists destroyed it.” President Barack Obama received Nguyen Phu Trong in the Oval Office in 2015, but surely he didn’t sign any “memorandum of understanding” with the general party secretary of Vietnam. Hungary’s prime minister didn’t have any such compunctions.

Orbán is at home with the extreme left as well as the extreme right. His sympathies for the extreme right were most likely demonstrated in a message he posted on his Facebook page while still in Hanoi: “Budapest gratulál // Budapest gratuliert!” TASS, the Russian news agency, was so intrigued by this “laconic” message that it devoted a whole article to it. As they wrote, “Viktor Orbán mysteriously congratulated Germany on the last elections to the Bundestag. It remains unknown whom Orbán was congratulating: German Chancellor Angela Merkel … or the right-populist party Alternative for Germany.” I believe that TASS had an idea what the right answer was. So do I.

September 28, 2017

Dilemmas in current Hungarian politics

On the surface it was no more than a storm in a teacup: András Gerő, historian of the Habsburg Monarchy, wrote an angry letter to a somewhat secretive organization called Szeretem Magyarországot Klub/SZMK (I love Hungary Club) because the club members gave their blessing to an invitation to Jobbik Chairman Gábor Vona to meet with the membership. What the club members were especially interested in was Jobbik’s racist and anti-Semitic past and its present change of heart.

András Gerő is not a member of the club, but he normally gets invitations to the monthly gatherings because of his earlier appearance before the group as an invited guest. Still, he decided to write a sharply-worded letter to the club in which he expressed his disapproval of the decision. In the letter he admitted that Jobbik is “a legitimate parliamentary force,” but he argued that SZMK, with this invitation, legitimizes Jobbik and its chairman. The former is a political legitimization; the latter, intellectual and moral. Moreover, SZMK’s claim that by listening to Vona the members could gain new and useful information is idle. What one can hear about Jobbik in the media is quite enough to form an opinion of this party.

Gerő often ends up in the midst of controversies of his own making. A few years ago he divided the historical community by accusing Ignác Romsics of anti-Semitism, which most observers found unwarranted. His siding with Mária Schmidt against Mazsihisz and other Jewish organizations in the altercation over the House of Fate didn’t raise Gerő’s stature in my eyes. His relationship with the Fidesz government is also hazy because he is the director of the Habsburg Historical Institute, a one-man organization (plus a secretary) with a very elegant office. The institute’s continued existence depends on the goodwill of the Orbán government. It was because of this connection that Jobbik accused Gerő of serving Viktor Orbán’s interests in trying to blacken the name of Jobbik.

I doubt that Gerő acted as an agent of Fidesz, trying to torpedo Vona’s appearance before the members of SZMK. But Fidesz certainly loved Gerő’s attack on Jobbik’s chairman since Viktor Orbán’s real enemy at the moment is Gábor Vona. First of all, although Jobbik’s move to the center has weakened the party somewhat, it still has a large following. Jobbik today is the second largest party in Hungary. Moreover, there are signs that Jobbik has acquired a powerful patron with deep pockets in the person of Lajos Simicska, who seems ready to spend a considerable amount of money to get rid of Viktor Orbán. Simicska not only helps Jobbik financially. He also shares with its leadership the large repository of his “dirty tricks” that made Fidesz into the powerful organization that it is today. Jobbik’s move to the center especially frightens Orbán because he worries that his whole political edifice might crumble if Jobbik and the left-of-center forces decide to cooperate in some manner.

When it comes to the coverage of Jobbik in the Fidesz media, the emphasis is on the extremism of Jobbik. Magyar Idők published several articles on Gerő’s letter in which it embraced the historian’s opinion that “Jobbik is the political putrefier of Hungarian society.” Magyar Idők’s editorial on the subject carried the title: “Gábor Vona bowed before the Left.” Gerő, who enjoys being in the center of these controversies, in one of his television appearances called SZMK’s invitation to Vona “political racism.”

What transpired at this contentious meeting? It is difficult to get too much information about SZMK’s gatherings. We know that it is an elite club where the recommended yearly dues are 120,000 forints (approximately $450). Members and participants are asked to be discrete, and therefore the club functions pretty much without any public mention. Last year Károly Gerendai, the founder of SZMK and the brains behind the Sziget Festival, which is one of the largest music and cultural festivals in Europe, did talk to Magyar Nemzet. There he gave some details about the membership and about the illustrious visitors who had appeared before them in the past few years, but otherwise little is known about the club’s activities. ATV got in touch with a few members, some of whom admitted that a long debate preceded Vona’s invitation. But, they said, at the end the decision was reached that “Gábor Vona is one of the most remarkable figures today in Hungarian politics who has been moving away from his earlier right radical position. We know his past, but he has a place in this club because we have many questions we would like to get answers to.” Moreover, “Gábor Vona and his party are a factor in Hungarian politics,” one of the participants said.

Magyar Idők’s editorial recalled that in 2011 Gergely Karácsony, then still a member of LMP, suggested a temporary strategic alliance among all the opposition parties, including Jobbik, which could easily defeat Fidesz and gain a two-thirds majority. After a few months of “housecleaning” and a new more proportionate electoral law, the parliament could be dissolved and new elections could be held. This strategy has been in the air ever since. Miklós Haraszti, without suggesting a temporary alliance with Jobbik, is also thinking along the same lines: to force Fidesz in some way to accept a new electoral law. Lajos Bokros, when he talks about the magic 500 days which would be enough to get rid of the most objectionable pieces of Fidesz legislation, after which new elections could be held, is also proposing a variation of the same theme. And this is exactly what Viktor Orbán is worried about because, if that materializes, if Vona were able to convince the socialist-liberal parties that he is no longer the man they had known for years, Fidesz’s chances of winning the election, at least as things stand right now, would be nil.

Moreover, there are a lot of ordinary citizens who consider Orbán’s removal so important that they believe a temporary alliance with Jobbik is still preferable to perhaps decades of Orbán’s fascistoid one-party system. Ferenc Gyurcsány talked about this more than a year ago. After seeing that, at a couple of by-elections, citizens were ready to maximize their votes by voting for the candidate most likely to win and ignoring party affiliations, he wondered whether left-right cooperation might materialize. As he put it, “I wouldn’t have any enthusiasm for it, but I can no longer rule out the possibility of the opposition parties’ joining forces in the interest of getting rid of the present government. This regime might have a very strange end.”

At present no one contemplates such a joint action involving Jobbik. In fact, Gyurcsány’s party is one of the loudest in excluding any such possibility. On the other hand, apparently Vona told his SZMK audience that “Jobbik is ready to cooperate with anyone against Fidesz and specifically mentioned LMP as a possible ally.” Mandiner, a right-wing publication, noted that Vona and his audience especially saw eye to eye when it came to the person of Viktor Orbán. As the paper’s source claimed, “the audience and the party chairman outdid each other in their invectives against Orbán.”

Jobbik joined the other parties when it came to the “national minimum” on healthcare, and today the Közös Ország Mozgalom announced that they had received assurances from Dóra Duró, a Jobbik MP, that the party will take a look at the electoral law in its final form and will make a decision as to whether they are ready to support it. No one can see into the future, but there are signs of left and right pulling in the same direction.

September 25, 2017

Will Rosatom have its own airfield in Pécs?

A short while ago I devoted a post to the financial collapse of the City of Pécs, which, after many years as an MSZP stronghold, chose Zsolt Páva as its Fidesz mayor in October 2009. Within weeks it became evident that Viktor Orbán, in anticipation of his electoral victory, was using the city as a political laboratory. It was in Pécs that the new Fidesz leadership tried out the practice of “citywide consultations.” Páva sent questionnaires to the inhabitants, asking them questions to which the answer could only be “yes.” One of his most expensive moves, most likely at the urging of Fidesz, was the forcible takeover of the French share of the water company, which years later cost the city three billion forints in a legal settlement. The city’s attempt to take over the famed Zsolnay porcelain factory ended in failure due to the determination of the Syrian-Hungarian-Swiss owner. This was also a costly affair for Pécs because, in the course of the machinations to ruin Zsolnay, the city set up a rival company called Ledina Kerámia and enticed 150 Zsolnay employees to join the phantom firm. The city had to pay the wages of 150 workers for no work whatsoever.

These two financial ventures by themselves have been very costly, but they were only a small fraction of the enormous debt Zsolt Páva and the city council amassed in the last seven years. According to a new website called Szabad Pécs (Free Pécs), the city owes 7.5 billion forints, which apparently the national government will take over. That’s not all, however. There are several municipal-owned firms that are in the red to the tune of 10 billion forints. This is an enormous amount of money ($29 million) for a city of about 170,000 inhabitants with not much of a tax base. Viktor Orbán, while visiting the city at the end of August for the 650th anniversary of the founding of Hungary’s first university, established in Pécs, asserted that the city’s leadership got itself into this mess and they will have to pay for it.

I don’t think anyone knew at the time just what Orbán meant, but a few days ago local investigative journalists working for Szabad Pécs learned that the government is not planning to bail Pécs out without some kind of compensation. A week ago rumors began circulating in town that the city-owned Pécs-Pogány International Airport will be taken over by the government, which will in turn write off 2.8 billion forints of the city’s debt. On the face of it, such a government purchase wouldn’t be profitable. The number of passengers, which was over 6,000 in 2009, by 2014 had shrunk to 2,500. But the deal might actually be quite lucrative for the Orbán government because the airport will likely be leased to Rosatom, the Russian company that will build the Paks II Nuclear Power Plant. The distance between Paks and Pécs is almost 80 km, but the four-lane M-6 highway is sparsely traveled. Moreover, Mohács along the Danube is only 40 minutes from Pécs. Material could easily reach Paks via Mohács.

Pécs-Pogány International Airport

A few days after the appearance of Szabad Pécs’s article, a Russian delegation led by Alexey Likhachev, the CEO of Rosatom, visited the Pécs airport. He and his fellow Russians were accompanied by members of TEK, Hungary’s Counter Terrorism Center. The delegation first visited Paks. From there they traveled to Pécs to take a look at the airfield. The journalists of Szabad Pécs were on hand and took several photos. I may add that none of the local “government” news outlets said a word about either the government’s takeover of certain municipal assets in Pécs or the possible leasing of the Pécs airport to Rosatom.

The private plane of Alexey Likhachev, CEO of Rosatom, at the Pécs Airport

Despite the visit of Rosatom’s CEO to Pécs, János Lázár denied any knowledge of a deal that might exist between Rosatom and the Hungarian government. As he said, “this topic was not discussed at the cabinet meeting. We did talk about the situation in Pécs, but nothing was said about the exchange of property. As far as the airport is concerned, I read about it in the media.” Of course, the lack of discussion of the matter at a cabinet meeting doesn’t necessarily mean that such negotiations didn’t take place. But Lázár, as usual, went further. He claimed that “if that is important to Rosatom, it has to talk to the municipality. The government has no information, no knowledge of such negotiations. They didn’t approach us with such a proposal.”

Well, as far as we know, the CEO of Rosatom didn’t visit Pécs to talk to the city fathers about leasing the Pécs-Pogány Airport. Moreover, as far as the journalists of Szabad Pécs know, the transfer of certain properties to the government is still on the table.

Today Attila Babos, the local journalist at Szabad Pécs, was invited to publish a longer article in Magyar Nemzet on the possible Rosatom takeover of the Pécs Airport. He claims that it is also likely that, in addition to the airport, the government will take over two city-owned companies: Pétáv Kft., the local district-heating company, and Tettye Forrásház Zrt., the city water company. The latter is the company the city established to take over the functions of the water company operated and partially owned by the French Suez Company. The city promised lower rates, which didn’t materialize, but at least the company is now profitable. Pétáv Kft. is also in the black. But, given the size of the debt, the fear in town is that several other pieces of property might end up in government hands. No one knows whether the city will have any say in what properties it is willing to part with.

Not surprisingly, Fidesz’s name is mud in Pécs. Páva and his coterie of Fidesz politicians, including the two Fidesz members of parliament representing the city, are blamed for the present state of affairs. As Attila Babos said in his article, “not even within Fidesz does anyone seriously think that the government parties [Fidesz-KDNP] can possible win in the city in the spring of 2018.” Still, Viktor Orbán cannot leave the city in the lurch. At the same time, the government feels that it has to make “the city pay” in order to show that such irresponsible behavior cannot be tolerated.

Finally, a few words about Szabad Pécs. On March 22 several internet news sites reported that three former employees of Dunántúli Napló who lost their jobs when Lőrinc Mészáros bought the last eight of the 109 regional papers not yet in government hands, including Dunántúli Napló which has been in continuous existence since 1946, decided to start an online paper, concentrating on Pécs and Baranya County. Without them we would know next to nothing about Rosatom’s interest in the Pécs airport or the quick visit of Alexey Likhachev. That tells us a lot about the state of the Hungarian media outside of Budapest.

September 21, 2017

Viktor Orbán: Christian Europe in danger

Once a year the Keresztény Értelmiségiek Szövetsége/KÉSZ (Association of Christian Professionals), an alleged NGO, holds its congress. The fact that since 2011 the event has been held in the chamber of the former Upper House (Főrendiház) says a lot about the independence of the organization.

Until very recently KÉSZ was a purely Catholic affair. It was established in 1989 by a Catholic priest and professor of theology who served as its president until his death in 1996. In that year another Catholic priest and a great admirer of Viktor Orbán, Zoltán Osztie, took over. He served until 2016. At that point the presidency was assumed by a Greek Catholic priest and canonist, I guess in an attempt to appear a bit more ecumenical.

The close connection between KÉSZ and Fidesz was obvious even from the few references Viktor Orbán brought up about the organization’s past. He specifically noted KÉSZ’s assistance in setting up thousands of “civic cells” that Fidesz used to widen the base of the party after the 2002 defeat. Then, in 2009, KÉSZ joined the notorious Civil Összefogás Fórum (CÖF), a phony NGO financed in all sorts of devious ways by the Orbán government. KÉSZ also gives assistance to the government when it comes to its nationality policy outside the country’s borders. For example, KÉSZ has signed joint declarations of intent with the Keresztény Értelmiségi Kör (Christian Professional Club) in Serbia where the Hungarian political elite is an important supporter of the current government. KÉSZ’s website provides no details about its financial resources, but it has a publication called “Jel” (Sign) which looks quite professional, it finances books, and it organizes conferences.

At the KÉSZ congress held on September 16 Viktor Orbán delivered a lengthy lecture on the state of the world. His two most important statements, both made at the end of the speech, were that (1) “the Germans, the Austrians, and the arrogant western media” began a “smear campaign” against his country which was “centrally ordered, centrally controlled, centrally engineered against Hungary—out of vengeance because [Hungary] closed the Balkan route used by the migrants” and (2) if the European leaders are unable to find a path to coexistence between immigrant and non-immigrant countries “the tension that exists between them now will be even more intensified, which may lead to a greater chasm or even a fatal break in the history of the European continent.” Both of these claims are rather frightening.

The attentive audience / Source: Index / Photo János Bődey

Although these are the two statements I chose as the weightiest, there were some other noteworthy claims. One was that “the goal of today’s anti-Christian program” is the importation of non-Christian elements, which in turn will weaken Christianity in Europe to such an extent that it will actually die out. Before Orbán spoke, Cardinal Péter Erdő had delivered a speech in which he talked about the strong roots of Christianity in Europe. Picking up on this theme, Orbán accused “the anti-Christian European program” of planning “to change the subsoil” so that “the roots of Christianity, no matter how thick and strong they are, cannot take hold, and thus the giant tree simply falls over.” Again, Orbán sees a malicious design or at least tries to convince his audience that there is such a design–that European politicians are contemplating the Islamization of Europe and the death of Christianity on the continent.

Orbán also set forth a religious elaboration of his theme that “We want a Hungarian Hungary and a European Europe.” He added: “But this is possible only if we take upon ourselves the task of creating a Christian Hungary within a Christian Europe.” This qualifying sentence is a new motif in Orbán’s political vocabulary. He is certain that under his leadership Hungary will remain a Christian country, but he is not so sure about Europe. “The ideology of the immigrant countries is international liberalism,” while in the case of the non-immigrant countries “the guiding principle is … sovereignty and Christian social teaching. The adoption of Western European liberalism by the people of Central Europe would simply mean suicide. Or to be more precise it would be a suicidal ideology for the countries of Central Europe” because it would result in their becoming immigrant countries. Obviously, liberalism in any shape or form should be banished from Central Europe. I wonder what the Czechs and the Slovaks would think of this demand.

Finally, here is something that Orbán uttered elsewhere, but I think it belongs here. In his speech to the members of the Fidesz parliamentary delegation he apparently noted with great satisfaction that “in the last six years, on the left-right scale, a thoroughgoing shift has occurred toward the right.” I’m afraid he is correct.

September 19, 2017

George Soros, the omnipotent bogeyman: the focus of Fidesz’s electoral campaign

Fidesz’s framework for its electoral strategy is slowly taking shape. There seem to be two interconnected strands. One propaganda offensive suggests that outside forces are fomenting a revolutionary uprising against the Orbán government. The second concentrates on the “Soros Plan” that is being executed by the European Union. Fidesz’s task in the next few months is to uncover the conspiracy which is brewing against the government and at the same time to save the country from the dreadful fate that awaits it as a result of the European Union’s evil plans. Of course, George Soros is behind both the attempt to physically remove Viktor Orbán’s government and the potential flood of illegal migrants forced upon the country by the European Union. If Fidesz doesn’t win, disaster awaits the Hungarian people. The stakes are as high as they were in 1990. It is a matter of life or death. Everything that was achieved will be lost if Hungarians make the wrong choice.

As far as I can see, this electoral strategy has been in the making for some time. A couple of months ago I wrote a post titled “What’s the new Fidesz game plan?” in which I outlined the first strand of this strategy, pointing out that starting in the early summer Fidesz politicians were talking about a coalition that will be forged by the Hungarian opposition and the Soros NGOs. They will organize disturbances on the streets of Budapest. “They will try to create an atmosphere filled with civil-war psychosis,” as László Kövér, president of parliament, put it in one of his speeches.

At this point, government politicians were unable to point the finger at specific “members of the Soros network” who will be responsible for these disturbances, but now they have begun to identify its members. Szilárd Németh named three civil activists: Márton Gulyás, who started the Közös Ország Mozgalom to change the current unfair electoral system; Árpád Schilling, a theater director and the founder of Krétakör Színház (Chalk Circle Theater); and Gábor Vágó, a former LMP member of parliament between 2010 and 2014. How did these three names surface?

Source: Index.hu

It all started with claims put forth by Antal Rogán, the propaganda minister, who at Fidesz’s Kötcse picnic in early September brought up the possibility of violence on the streets of Budapest organized by “foreign forces.” The opposition parties, usually slow on the uptake, were urged by analysts to call on Rogán. Charging that foreign forces are behind an attempt to overthrow the government is a serious matter. Surely, Rogán as a responsible member of the government must have proof of such interference. Zsolt Molnár, chairman of the parliamentary committee on national security, saw the light and called the committee together, asking Rogán to attend. The meeting took place two days ago. As could have been predicted, Rogán didn’t show up.

As we learned later, officials of the national security forces knew nothing about any mysterious forces behind the alleged revolutionary leaders who are contemplating the overthrow of the Orbán government. At least this is what the socialist chairman and the LMP and Jobbik members of the committee said.

On the other hand, the Fidesz vice chairman, Szilárd Németh, reported that “according to the Hungarian national security services, organizations and individuals financed from abroad pose a very serious risk” to the security of the country. He specifically mentioned Árpád Schilling and Márton Gulyás, who “openly talk about marching on the streets and organizing sit-down strikes if they cannot have their way.” Ádám Mirkóczki, a Jobbik member of the committee, said that “it seems that Szilárd Németh was attending a different meeting.”

This would not be the first time that Németh makes up stories to further Fidesz’s program. The next day government papers were full of Németh’s bogus story about “the serious risk subversive civilians pose.” On the same day Lajos Kósa, who was the leader of the Fidesz parliamentary delegation until today, gave an interview in which he specifically mentioned Gábor Vágó, “an opposition activist,” who allegedly called for illegal and aggressive acts against the government. While he was at it, he described certain opposition members of parliament as “the men of Soros.”

A day after Németh’s press conference Bernadett Szél, the LMP member of the committee, pressed charges against the Fidesz politician on the grounds that he revealed the identity of people whose names were mentioned in a closed session of the committee.

Since Németh’s falsification of what transpired at the committee meeting didn’t get much traction, the Fidesz propaganda machine came up with a new angle. Magyar Idők learned that the Független Diákparlament (Independent Student Parliament) is organizing a demonstration in support of Central European University. What follows is rather fuzzy. Apparently, Árpád Schilling, one of the people Németh referred to, is a supporter of this student movement. Therefore, concludes the paper, “it seems that the Soros network will start its fall disturbances on the backs of the students.”

As for the “Soros Plan,” the new name is a way of personifying the evil scheme of the European Union, which would threaten the future of Europe. The most important task is to fight against this plan by all possible means. The struggle against it will be the most important ingredient of the election campaign. Therefore, “the Fidesz parliamentary delegation is asking the government to hold a national consultation about the Soros Plan.” Holding such a national consultation is especially important since the European Court of Justice’s verdict “opened the door to the execution of the Soros Plan,” which includes the arrival of one million migrants every year from here on.

The anti-Soros campaign must have been deemed a resounding success, and therefore the decision was made to continue it. A lot of observers, including me, think that the Orbán government has gone too far already with its Soros-bashing, but obviously we are mistaken because I can’t imagine that Orbán would embark on another anti-Soros campaign without proper research on the effectiveness of his past efforts in that direction. In fact, it looks as if Orbán decided that fighting against George Soros’s alleged agenda will be his party’s key campaign theme, which he apparently outlined in a speech to the members of the parliamentary caucus in a three-day pow wow of the Fidesz MEPs and important party leaders. Hard to fathom and it sounds crazy, but unfortunately that’s Hungarian reality.

September 14, 2017

How far is Kötcse from Brussels? Very far

Fidesz public relations gurus discovered early in the game that a party needs certain fixed points or anchors in order to radiate an aura of continuity, steadiness, and stability. Once they hit upon the idea of spending a long weekend with young Hungarians in Romania, where they were supposed to discuss their common problems and hopes, they faithfully kept returning, year after year. Admittedly, over the last 28 years the youthful and perhaps even exciting exchange of ideas has become stale, and the event has been more or less reduced to some dull speeches by the same three or four party and government leaders to which mostly older retirees listen. But the event is still held and still creates expectations in the media.

The gathering at Băile Bálványos/Bálványosfűrdő has become a ritual, just as has Viktor Orbán’s annual February speech on “the state of the country.” The party leader/prime minister will deliver that speech, rain or shine, before an invited audience. The opposition papers will claim that Orbán’s speeches are becoming increasingly shallow, which is true. But the quality of the speech is of less importance than the fact that this past February was the nineteenth year that Viktor Orbán stood in front of all those flags and basked in the adoration of his audience. After the event, journalists usually ask people who are leaving the building about their impressions. They invariably find the message uplifting. Moreover, these people were personally invited to the speech, and one can tell that they found that invitation priceless.

Finally, there is the picnic at Kötcse with a history of 16 years. Every September select individuals are invited to attend the picnic where Viktor Orbán shares his visions and plans with his devoted supporters. An invitation to Kötcse is a true honor for several reasons. First, there is the aura of secrecy. The media is locked out, and participants are told not to share anything that happened there. Second, the invited guests are not passive observers as they are at the “state of the country” speech. Here they can ask questions and mingle with high party officials. They can feel part of the family, which must be a truly uplifting experience for many. The few attendees who said anything at all about the picnic emphasized their awe at receiving “the great honor” of an invitation.

What did we learn about this year’s gathering at Kötcse? Not much. I listened to an interview with Zsolt Jeszenszky, the wayward son of Géza Jeszenszky, former foreign minister and ambassador to the United States, who, unlike his father, is a great admirer of Viktor Orbán. According to him, Orbán’s speech lasted an hour and a half and was absolutely brilliant. Orbán’s knowledge of world affairs is phenomenal, but he is also thoroughly at home in the smallest details of domestic affairs. The man is simply amazing.

Otherwise, János Csontos wrote an opinion piece in Magyar Idők in which, somewhat obliquely, he let his readers in on some of the details of the gathering. First, he severely criticized those journalists who created “fake news” about the picnic when they had no first-hand knowledge. After a fairly lengthy introduction he allowed his readers to get a feel for the atmosphere of the gathering. In Csontos’s opinion, Kötcse is a place where “a mutual test takes place between the powers-that-be and the intelligentsia.” Orbán wants to know whether the “moonbow” is still with him, while the members of the intelligentsia want to know whether “Viktor Orbán is still in his right mind.” Csontos was happy to announce that there is nothing wrong on this front. Orbán is as sharp as always. As for the elite supporters, an odd sentence gives pause for thought. “There were times when the refined audience and the army of those with questions no longer wanted to hear the truth, the facts.” What does this mean? They didn’t quite believe Orbán’s worldview?

Orbán must have spent time on his future priorities: innovation, organization of the nation (nemzetszervezés), building up the army, and the demographic situation. Of these four, the one that worries me most is the “organization of the nation.” My problem, of course, is that I don’t have the foggiest idea what it could possibly mean, but at the same time I have the nagging feeling that whatever it is, it means something undemocratic and perhaps even sinister. Perhaps some kind of reorganization of society under state supervision. If that is the case, it reminds me of fascism.

HVG published a series of photos of the arriving guests under the title: “It is as far as Kötcse is from Brussels. Take a look at the elite of NER!” Well, first an explanation. There is a saying in Hungarian, “It is as far as Makó is from Jerusalem,” meaning very, very far. We are not sure of the origin of the saying, but most likely it has nothing to do with the city of Makó but perhaps refers to a medieval knight of the same name who never managed to get to Jerusalem. NER stands for “Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere,” i.e., the Orbán regime. HVG’s staff was obviously not impressed by what they saw.

And that takes me to an interview with Tamás Deutsch, one of the founders of Fidesz and currently a member of the European Parliament. He was among those featured in HVG‘s photo gallery. In his youth Deutsch was the darling of older women, who thought he was the cutest boy in all of Hungary. As you can see on the photo, he has lost his charm in the intervening years. The interview that appeared in Magyar Idők is a series of complaints about the West, where “the older member states consider themselves superior, more European than those who joined the Union in 2004 or after. They expropriated the representation of the so-called European values and they don’t understand or don’t even want to understand East-Central Europe.” Dutch Ambassador Gajus Scheltema’s criticism is typical of the widespread belief in the western part of Europe that “they are the sons and daughters of the developed West who can do anything in the wild east.”

Tamás Deutsch and László L. Simon, a poet

András Lánczi, political philosopher and Sebastian Gorka’s dissertation adviser

As for the differences that currently exist between East and West, Deutsch contends that the blame clearly falls on the West. “The politicians of the 15 member states thought that they were ready for the accession of the underdeveloped new members, but this was not the case. Therefore, the majority of the current problems derive from that fact. The new member states were much better prepared politically, psychologically, and socially.” What can one say? Blaming others while claiming superiority over them seems to be a favorite pastime in Hungary.

September 5, 2017