Tag Archives: Fidesz

Mission accomplished: Jobbik’s hard-hitting billboards will be removed

On June 14, 2016, a united opposition prevented the adoption of a proposal intended to re-regulate the use of posters and billboards by political parties. The bill, among other things, included the stipulation that if the provider of advertising surfaces sells spaces at a price lower than the current market value, such an action would be considered to be hidden and forbidden party financing. Since a portion of the bill dealt with party financing, in order to pass, the bill needed a two-thirds majority of the members present.

The proposal was submitted in response to thousands of Jobbik billboards carrying the message that while ordinary citizens work, the members of the political elite and their friendly oligarchs steal the country blind. Viktor Orbán’s fury over the posters was only reinforced when he learned that Jobbik had rented the advertising surfaces from one of Lajos Simicska’s business ventures, Mahír, for practically peanuts. Simicska would like nothing more than to get rid of his former friend turned enemy Viktor Orbán at the next national election in the spring of 2018, and he was prepared to be generous to Jobbik in its anti-Fidesz billboard campaign.

The government party was two persons short of the magic two-thirds majority, and therefore it was imperative that all the members of the Fidesz and KDNP delegations showed up. Even György Rubovszky of KDNP, who died a week later, attended the session. The hope was that either a few opposition members would be absent or that the politically diverse opposition would not be well disciplined. But everyone was there with the exception of Lajos Oláh of DK, who was on his way to the hospital with kidney stones. And every member of the opposition voted against the bill. So Fidesz was left with only one absentee, which wasn’t enough. The bill failed to be enacted.

Within hours, however, the government party announced that the bill would be resubmitted. The president of the parliament called for an extraordinary session, where the only item on the agenda was the poster law nicknamed by its co-sponsor Lajos Kósa “Lex Csicska.” Csicska is a person who in jail or in a reformatory is forced to serve others. In this case, the “csicska” is Jobbik, the party which, they claim, is simply an instrument of Simicska’s design against Viktor Orbán and his government.

Since the session was not a scheduled one, the hope again was that many opposition members would be unable to attend. At the same time, just to be sure, Fidesz politicians began negotiations with several opposition parties and members, hoping to get partners to push through this bill that Viktor Orbán found so important. A few days ago I devoted a post to MSZP’s decision to submit a proposal of their own, which was not a hit with the other parties and which was eventually torpedoed by László Botka, the party’s candidate for the premiership. Thus, it looked as if there was no chance for Lex Csicska to be adopted. Moreover, on the day of the extraordinary session (Friday, June 22) Viktor Orbán was supposed to be in Brussels. And György Rubovszky died on June 21, a day before the crucial vote. Yet Viktor Orbán announced that he has no plans to return because “his boss,” i.e. the leader of the Fidesz parliamentary delegation, doesn’t think that his presence is necessary. It was at this point that I became mighty suspicious that the legal wizards of Fidesz had found some clever work-around solution.

And indeed, late on Thursday evening, when Orbán was already in Brussels, the public learned that Fidesz will not resubmit the original law which had been voted down a week earlier. Rather, members of parliament will have to vote on amendments to a 2016 law on the defense of community image (településkép), which required only a simple majority to pass. In Hungary the central government lays down the parameters of what towns can and cannot do in burnishing their images. The original law dealt with advertisements, posters, billboards but only commercial ones, advertising everything from beer to toothpaste. Expanding this law to give municipalities the authority to restrict party advertising is, according to most legal scholars, unconstitutional because the Hungarian Constitution specifically states that “the detailed rules for the operation and management of political parties shall be laid down in a cardinal Act.”

Gergely Gulyás, Fidesz’s wunderkind, enjoying the fruits of his labor

But that wasn’t the only trick Fidesz employed. Gergely Gulyás, deputy speaker of parliament responsible for legislation, breaking house rules, introduced MSZP’s proposal, which was never officially submitted for consideration, as an amendment, putting MSZP in the uncomfortable position that their members had to vote against their own “amendment.” The vote was 123 in favor and 68 against. Fidesz-KDNP parliamentarians knew ahead of time what was coming, so of their 130 members only 123 showed up. On the other hand, all 68 members of the opposition parties and the independents were present and voted against the bill.

Although legal scholars believe that the Constitutional Court should find this law unconstitutional, they admit that, given the composition of the 15-member body, the judges may just rubber stamp it. Zoltán Fleck, professor of sociology of law at ELTE’s law school, with a certain sadness remarked that he wasn’t really surprised to hear about this latest Fidesz ploy because in Hungary “the rule of law has long been officially terminated.” György Magyar, Simicska’s lawyer and civil activist, also tore the law apart on his blog.

An amusing story connected to the passage of this bill shows the cynicism of most of those Fidesz members of parliament who serve as voting robots. Máriusz Révész (Fidesz), under pressure from a journalist of 24.hu about the strange transformation of a law that requires a two-thirds majority into one that needs only a simple majority, got mighty confused. After a lot of prevarication, he blurted out: “obviously this time it is not happening according to the law.” So, he basically confirmed the opposition’s criticism that Fidesz acted illegally. It is not something the Fidesz leadership easily forgives. This afternoon Index, which reported on the 24.hu story, received a letter from Révész in which he tried to convince them that he wasn’t talking about the law itself but about illicit party financing.

Albert Gazda of Magyar Nemzet wrote an opinion piece titled “The cowardly Fidesz.” As the title suggests, Gazda looks upon this latest Fidesz trick, which he considers primitive even by the party’s own low moral and intellectual standards, as a sign of weakness. “Here is the first spectacular and hard-hitting campaign and Fidesz is running around like a chicken with its head cut off.” Gazda also believes that Fidesz is not only cowardly but also fearful. “But fear eats away the soul, takes away strength, and destroys faith.”

I’m not at all sure that Gazda is right. Instead, I would suggest that these posters got under Orbán’s skin in a big way because he found them politically damaging. He had only one goal: the posters must be taken down immediately. Therefore, I believe, he didn’t particularly care in what manner this bill became law. He most likely knows that the law is unconstitutional, but in the short run he simply doesn’t care. Even if the Constitutional Court finds the law unconstitutional, that decision may take months while the billboards will have to be removed immediately. Orbán wanted to stop the political hemorrhaging right now.

June 24, 2017

László Botka has taken things into his own hands in MSZP

Yesterday I ended my post saying that, because only a few hours had passed since MSZP submitted its own proposal for a new bill that would regulate political advertising, I was unable to gauge the reaction of the other smaller parties on the left. I suspected that their reception of MSZP’s very questionable political move was not going to be favorably viewed. A couple of hours later, I had the chance to listen to a television interview with Csaba Molnár, one of the deputy chairmen of the Demokratikus Koalíció (DK), who promised that the party leadership would take a good look at MSZP’s proposal but hinted that one has to be very careful when negotiating with Fidesz. The government party’s surprising readiness to negotiate was suspicious.

By this morning it became clear that no opposition party was ready to discuss the MSZP proposal. If the socialists go ahead with it, it will be a private deal between Fidesz and MSZP. But no opposition party can afford the stigma of making a deal with the devil. Only “political illiterates” could come up with such an idea unless, as many people suspect, certain members of the MSZP leadership are ready to cozy up to Fidesz for one nefarious reason or another. In this particular case, I think “political illiterates” were at work.

MSZP’s candidate for the premiership, László Botka, had been left in total darkness about the leadership’s decision to submit a “poster bill” of their own. That such a thing can happen gives you an idea of the chaos and confusion that must exist in the Hungarian socialist party. The most important officeholders in MSZP must have approved the proposal and its submission for consideration because it was Gyula Molnár, party chairman, and Bertalan Tóth, leader of MSZP’s parliamentary delegation, who announced the move at a joint press conference on Friday. Fidesz-KDNP jumped at the opportunity and secretly indicated they were game. When Jobbik got the wind of the pending deal, János Volner, Jobbik parliamentary leader, made it public.

Bertalan Tóth and Gyula Molnár at a press conference

It was at this point that Botka decided to intervene. He explained that any negotiations and any joint action, like voting with Fidesz, would discredit the party and himself personally since he had stressed on several occasions that any collaboration with Fidesz was out of the question. He apparently argued that if an election advertising bill were to pass, MSZP might be in a better position vis-à-vis Jobbik as far as political advertisement is concerned, i.e., both parties would receive the same rate from the providers of advertising surfaces. But MSZP “would lose its character as an opposition party.” Jobbik would be Fidesz’s primary opponent at the next election.

Today MSZP also created a new body called the “national election committee” (Országos Választási Bizottság/OVB), which will be in charge of the election campaign. According to Index, OVB will consist of five people: László Botka; Gyula Molnár, party chairman; József Tóbiás, campaign manager; György Kerényi, director of communications; and Bálint Ruff, Botka’s political adviser. I suspect that readers of Hungarian Spectrum may not be familiar with the names of György Kerényi and Bálint Ruff. Kerényi is a highly respected journalist who worked for Magyar Narancs, Tilos Rádió, and Roma Sajtóközpont and was one of the founders of vs.hu. He was known for his independence, and therefore his colleagues were greatly surprised that he accepted a party position. His decision was based on his conviction that MSZP is the only party that has a chance to unseat Viktor Orbán, who in his opinion must go. And he must personally do everything he can to make that happen. As for Bálint Ruff, he is a young man, a law school graduate, who is a managing partner of Invisible Hand Coaching and Consulting.

Most likely not independently from the blunder committed by the party leadership behind Botka’s back, the composition of OVB changed significantly in the last two days. Index reported on June 18 that Botka had named József Tóbiás’s campaign manager, who in turn named Zsolt Molnár, campaign manager in 2014, Ferenc Baja, a really old socialist politician who served in high positions both in the party and in the socialist-liberal governments between 1994 and 2010, and Bertalan Tóth, the most important man in the party’s parliamentary group, to the body. These three people have since disappeared from OVB, and I suspect that Gyula Molnár remained only because he is, after all, chairman of the party. Keep in mind that it was Molnár and Tóth who came forth with the announcement of an independent MSZP proposal for the “poster law.” In fact, we have evidence that Tóth’s removal is connected to this political miscalculation. István Nyakó, MSZP’s spokesman, said at today’s press conference that Bertalan Tóth represented the interests of the party to the best of his knowledge in negotiating with the other parties concerning the “poster law,” but with the appearance of Botka a “new political calendar” has begun. I wonder how long Tóth will remain the leader of the Fidesz caucus in parliament. As for Zsolt Molnár, he is a controversial character who has been the subject of long-standing criticism for his cozy relations with Fidesz politicians. As for Baja, perhaps Botka objected to his very high positions in the party for almost twenty years when Botka didn’t want to have anyone associated with the campaign who had had “substantial responsibility” for the political situation in which Fidesz could win a two-thirds majority in 2010. I might add that I for one don’t share Botka’s assessment of the guilt of the socialist-liberal governments for the overwhelming victory of Fidesz in 2010, but Ferenc Baja was never one of my favorites.

In addition, Botka tightened the reins on communication and finance. Without the knowledge of Kerényi, no MSZP politician can issue any statement or express any opinion different from the official one. I must say that this decision has been long overdue. MSZP is a notoriously undisciplined party where party leaders regularly contradict one another and voice their personal opinions about accepted party policies in public. István Nyakó, MSZP’s spokesman, also said that anyone who in any way collaborates with Fidesz will be expelled from the party.

Indeed, MSZP is shaping up to be a different party. Perhaps in the long run this botched-up political move will have a beneficial effect on MSZP. This incident might have prompted Botka to take a more active role in the everyday running of party affairs which, if he makes good decisions, might improve the party’s acceptance by the public. At the same time, if those socialist politicians who are the most visible public representatives of MSZP are not better able to convey the party’s messages and if the party leadership is unable to mobilize its supporters, no amount of firmness, tenacity, and determination on the part of László Botka can revive the Hungarian socialist party.

June 20, 2017

What’s MSZP up to? Other opposition parties are suspicious

On April Fool’s Day thousands of stark black-and-white billboards appeared all over the country. The message they carried was simple: ordinary citizens work while the political elite and their friendly oligarchs steal the country blind. Jobbik, the party that ran this billboard campaign, hit Fidesz where it hurt. An infuriated Viktor Orbán wanted the billboards gone as soon as possible. In the beginning Fidesz activists were sent to remove or deface them, but, given the number of billboards Jobbik scattered all over the country, a better solution had to be found. In such cases Fidesz’s usual response is to create a new, targeted law.

This is exactly what happened here. On April 27 Lajos Kósa, leader of the Fidesz parliamentary delegation, and János Halász, undersecretary for culture in the ministry of human resources, submitted a proposal to re-regulate the use of posters and billboards. The bill included the stipulation that if the provider of advertising surfaces sells spaces at a price lower than the “current market value,” such an action would be considered to be hidden and forbidden party financing. This regulation would be applicable at times outside of the three months officially designated as the “campaign period.” Owners of poster surfaces must turn in a price list to the State Account Office and will be obliged to make their prices available on their websites.

In addition, and much more worrisome, a government decree signed by Viktor Orbán stipulated that starting on June 1, 2017, local government permission would be needed to place new advertising spots anywhere. The decree also introduced other new regulations. For example, the size of the billboards would have to be reduced from 12m2 to 9m2 and the frame size changed from 14m2 to 11m2. An additional burden on the companies. Much worse, the appendix to the decree stipulated that in the future one will be able to advertise only on properties owned by the state or the municipality. As it stands now, 90% of the advertising surfaces are in private hands and only 10% belong to the municipalities. This decree turns the billboard market upside down and will institute a state monopoly over political advertising.

There was only one problem. Certain parts of the Kósa-Halász bill needed a two-thirds majority, and Fidesz at the moment is short by two votes. Fidesz couldn’t convince any member of the opposition to vote for the bill. The opposition, both right and left, found it unacceptable. And although one of the DK members of parliament had such a serious attack of kidney stones that he had to be taken to the hospital and missed the vote, Fidesz still came up one short. As you can see on this photo, Orbán was anything but happy. Nonetheless, it was decided to resubmit the proposal this Friday at an extraordinary session of parliament.

Zsolt Semjén, Viktor Orbán, and János Lázár after the voting was over Magyar Nemzet / Attila Béres

At the center of this billboard controversy is Lajos Simicska, Orbán’s former friend and business partner. Simicska, in addition to owning Közgép, a construction company that once had a virtual monopoly on government infrastructure contracts, also owns several other businesses, including Mahir Cityposter and Publimont, which rent out billboard spaces and advertising kiosks. Jobbik’s billboards and posters appeared on spaces owned by these two companies. It was suspected from the beginning that Simicska, who broke with Orbán and Fidesz about two years ago, provided space for the Jobbik posters at a cut rate, but until very recently Jobbik refused to divulge the cost. So, in addition to the Kósa-Halász bill and Orbán’s decree, NAV, the Hungarian equivalent of the Internal Revenue Service, paid a visit to Mahir’s headquarters. They had the right to check all financial transactions between January 1 and April 30. They were specifically looking for financial transactions connected to the Jobbik posters.

When the price Jobbik paid Simicska’s firm was finally made public last week, it was obvious that “Simicska had sold the surfaces at a ridiculously low price,” as Népszava pointed out. Simicska, who until recently was the “financial genius” behind Fidesz’s coffers, used to favor Fidesz by charging very little for advertising posters. Now he was doing the same for Jobbik.

And so, if Fidesz’s bill were to fail again, because of Jobbik’s special relation with Lajos Simicska, the real winner would be the far-right but lately somewhat mellowed Jobbik. MSZP swung into action. They dusted off an old proposal that they had earlier submitted to parliament, which they now presented as an alternative to the Fidesz proposal. It would, just like the Kósa-Halász bill, forbid political advertising except during the campaign period by parties, municipalities, and the government, but, in addition, it would specifically forbid advertising by CÖF, the government-financed so-called civic organization, and Fidelitas, Fidesz’s youth organization.

With MSZP’s move Fidesz-KDNP was presented with an easy path to victory. Fidesz is “still studying” the matter, but it finds many aspects of the MSZP bill acceptable. Jobbik naturally is not game, and it looks as if LMP is also holding to its original position. According to LMP’s spokesman, unity must be maintained against this bill, which would only help Fidesz. However, as we all know, if MSZP is ready to sit down and negotiate, there will be no problem on Friday. And in that case, Jobbik will have been outfoxed. Not surprisingly, Jobbik politicians are crying foul. János Völner, head of Jobbik’s parliamentary delegation, described MSZP’s move as one of the most obvious and brutal political pacts since 1990. He claims that the poster market was the only one where there was parity among the parties. MSZP with this move contributes to Viktor Orbán’s media dominance.

Alfahír, Jobbik’s online news site, illustrates the mood in the party. The article reporting on MSZP’s offer begins this way: “June 19, 2017. Please don’t forget this date. Today is the birthday of the Orbán regime’s Patriotic Popular Front. Today what we had suspected for years has become official: MSZP became the prostitute of Fidesz.” The Patriotic Popular Front (Hazafias Népfront) was created in 1954 and was dismantled in 1990. It was supposed to be a body representative of the whole society.

Too little time has passed since the MSZP proposal to be able to gauge the reaction of the other smaller parties on the left. I suspect that, similarly to LMP, they will not be thrilled with MSZP’s special deal with the government party. They will be most likely strengthened in their suspicion that MSZP is not playing a fair game and that somehow it has a secret understanding with Fidesz. I wouldn’t go that far, but MSZP’s leadership is not known for its boldness and clear-cut positions. How MSZP voters will react to this unexpected move no one can tell yet, but somehow I don’t think that it will be popular among MSZP voters, most of whom, I suspect, wouldn’t want to have anything to do with Viktor Orbán and his party.

June 19, 2017

Justice in Orbán’s Hungary: The Ahmed H. case

As I was looking through my old posts to see my coverage of Ahmed H.’s trial for terrorism, which took place in 2016, I found to my astonishment that I hadn’t even mentioned the name of this Syrian man who received ten years for allegedly committing terrorism at the Serbian-Hungarian border. I have often been told that over the years the posts of Hungarian Spectrum can more or less serve as a timeline of Hungarian politics. I’m trying to cover all the important events, but, as is clear from this example, I don’t always succeed.

The omission is especially egregious because Ahmed’s alleged terrorism case was one of the pretexts for the government’s attempt to introduce a new category of emergencies that could be declared in the event of a “situation created by a terrorist threat.” Ahmed’s arrest and the subsequent charge of terrorism against him were followed by an unprecedented hate campaign against migrants. This Syrian man from Cyprus, where he has been living legally for the last ten years, became a symbol for all those vicious terrorists who want to overrun Hungary. The only problem with the Hungarian government’s plan was that the terrorism case against Ahmed H. was mighty weak.

Even if I missed covering the original trial, I can now make up for it, at least in part, by reporting on the ruling of the appellate court on June 15 and by recalling some of the events that led to the news that Ahmed has a second chance to receive a fair trial. The appellate court found the work of the court of first instance so flawed that the whole case must be retried–and not, as the judge made clear, by the same panel of judges.

Representatives of such civic organizations as Amnesty International and Migszol, a group formed at the time of the refugee crisis in Hungary in the summer of 2015, have been calling Ahmed H.’s trial a “conceptual show trial.” Looking through the available documents, one thing is sure. The Orbán government very much wanted to find someone guilty of terrorism. It needed such a verdict for its anti-migrant drive. Ahmed seemed to fit the bill. He had a bullhorn and was talking to the crowd in several languages, including English. He allegedly incited the crowd to violence, repeatedly threatened the security forces, and then joined the disturbances that took place on September 16, 2015. He was also charged with illegally crossing the border. On November 30 Ahmed H. was sentenced to a 10-year prison term.

The trial was a mockery of judicial fairness. The judge refused to hear the testimony of more than 20 defense witnesses and ignored the fact that the prosecution’s main witness, a police officer, was not certain of the accused’s identity. It was true that Ahmed threw a couple of items during the melee, but there was no proof that he hit anyone. He claimed that he tried to calm the people. But even if he was guilty of all the crimes he was accused of, did Ahmed H. deserve 10 years? Gauri van Gulik, deputy director of Amnesty International for Europe, said that “to sentence Ahmed to 10 years in prison for a terrorist act is absurd.”

The spokesman for Fidesz expressed the party’s delight after the initial verdict was announced. He repeated the slogan on the billboards: “every migrant must learn that, once in the country, he must honor the laws of Hungary.” But those outside the circle of Fidesz and its followers were stunned. The United States asked the Hungarian government to conduct a transparent investigation of the incidents at the border that would include an independent civic organization. The government should review Ahmed’s case. As far as the United States is concerned, it will follow the case’s future handling, the statement promised. It didn’t take long for the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade to respond, telling the United States that criticizing the work of the court may be allowed in the United States but not in Hungary. Moreover, in Hungary it is not the civic organizations that decide on the guilt or innocence of people but the courts. The ministry spokesman ended his harangue by saying that “we can promise one thing: Hungary will never demand an explanation of U.S. court decisions on terrorists attacking American policemen.”

A week before Ahmed H.’s case was to be continued at the Szeged Appellate Court, the Hungarian media reported that Péter Bárándy, one of the best lawyers in Hungary who was minister of justice between 2002 and 2004 in the Medgyessy government, was going to be Ahmed’s defense lawyer. (There is some indirect evidence that Bárándy had been working on the case since at least March.)

Ahmed H. has had four lawyers, including Bárándy. First, he had a court-appointed lawyer. Then a local Szeged lawyer took over who, according to a member of Migszol, “during the trial sat quietly and wasted not one word in defense of his client.” Two weeks before the end of the trial he quit. The accused got another court-appointed lawyer who apparently did at least try to defend his client, unfortunately without much success.

The news of Péter Bárándy’s appearance as the lawyer for the defense was not exactly welcome news in government circles, but it did give Fidesz leaders an opportunity to connect “terrorism” with its alleged supporters, the Hungarian liberals and socialists. In fact, Gyula Budai, the man who in 2010 was entrusted by Viktor Orbán to bring all socialist and liberal “criminals” to justice, gave a press conference in which he charged that the Soros organizations, Brussels, and the socialists are working hand in hand to free Ahmed H. and therefore “they support terrorism.” He used strong words like “while Europe is terrified of terrorism, Brussels is openly supporting it.” He wanted to know “who is paying the lawyer” and called on MSZP to give an account.

Péter Bárándy in the courtroom

At the trial the prosecutor mostly praised the excellent decision that had been reached in the lower court. But he found the sentence of 10 years, the minimum for those accused of terrorism, insufficient and asked the court for 17.5 years instead. It was then Bárándy’s turn, who pointed out that he found 205 serious mistakes in the proceedings of the lower court. Here, of course, I cannot recount all of them. But I think a couple of examples will give a good idea of the kind of justice that was meted out to Ahmed H. A key charge against him was that he was the leader of the crowd that was throwing rocks against the police. A video, however, showed that the rock throwing had been going on for at least 45 minutes before Ahmed got hold of the bullhorn. In addition, the judge ignored the existence of a video taken by a policewoman which, as opposed to other videos, also contained sound and it doesn’t support Ahmed’s alleged incitement of the crowd. On the contrary, he can be heard saying to the fellow refugees “please, wait, stay here,” “please advise,” “we speak English, we don’t want an Arabic interpreter, we are asking for someone who speaks English.” And finally he told the refugees in Arabic, “no, wait, go back, please go back.” The verdict also claimed that Ahmed gave the police two hours to open the border. How did the police know this? He held up two fingers. But this can also mean “victory.” Finally, he was found guilty of illegally crossing the border, but even that judgment was wrong because Ahmed had free access to all EU countries, including Hungary. At the most, Ahmed was guilty of a misdemeanor (szabálysértés).

Ahmed H. with his back toward us is trying to calm the crowd / Source: police.hu

After the appellate court sent the case back to the lower court for a retrial, Zsolt Bayer wrote an opinion piece in Magyar Idők titled “H. Bárándy and Ahmed Péter.” Bayer may seem to have gotten a little mixed up. I assume you get the gist of what he wants to tell us. It was a relief to read close to the end of the article that “we are not going to incarcerate the judge [of the appellate court] or H. Bárándy.” That’s awfully charitable.

Let’s end this post on a lighter note. The management of state television M1 channel most likely was certain that the Ahmed H.’s verdict would not be reversed or annulled. Perhaps he will even get 17.5 years as the prosecution demanded. They decided to send a camera crew to the trial along with their legal experts who were supposed to give live commentary. For three solid hours one could watch the trial. Once the decision was handed down, however, M1 ended the live broadcast in a great hurry. No further commentary necessary.

The reaction of the top Fidesz leadership has been as expected–a complete denial of any possibility that the original verdict could be flawed and a charge that the socialists, the civic organizations, Brussels, and everybody else under the sun are working together to open the borders and let in all those migrants who are in Bayer’s words members of “the terrible mob of Mordor, the Third World.”

June 18, 2017

“An important accomplishment”: Two most likely innocent men were convicted in the Sukoró case

Over the years I have written many posts on the infamous Sukoró case. In 2008, during the second Gyurcsány government, a group of American, Israeli, German, and Hungarian businessmen were hoping to build a tourist center, including hotels, restaurants, a water entertainment center, a golf course, and a casino, on a 70-hectare spot at Lake Velence, which was the property of the state at the time. Joav Blum, one of the investors, made a proposition to the Hungarian government. He would exchange his 183-hectare orchard in the county of Pest for this barren land. The government welcomed the project because the investors figured that about 3,500 employees would be needed to run the complex. Ferenc Gyurcsány called upon the office that handled state properties (Magyar Nemzeti Vagyonkezelő/MNV). If all was in order, the swap could take place. After getting several appraisals, the office found the land swap fair.

From the start Fidesz organized a campaign against the project. Initially, it seemed that Viktor Orbán was simply planning to put the Sukoró project on hold for a while and, once Fidesz wins the election in 2010, his government could then boast about an investment project larger than the Kecskemét Mercedes factory. But, as time went by, Orbán realized that Sukoró might be the perfect case to send his arch-rival Ferenc Gyurcsány to jail. By late 2010, plans were underway to begin the witch hunt. The two top officials of MNV, Miklós Tátrai and Zsolt Császy, were arrested.

As early as April 2011 I wrote a post which bore the title “Show trials under way?” At that time Tátrai and Császy had just been released from jail. Császy gave an interview to Népszabadság and had a talk with Olga Kálmán on ATV. He said that the prosecutors’ primary aim was to break them so they would render false testimony against Ferenc Gyurcsány.

Prosecutors follow a simple formula in cases involving the sale of state or municipal properties. MNV or a local government hires several assessors, who come up with a reasonable price. Then years later the prosecutor’s office asks its own assessor, who offers a grossly inflated figure. The case is closed as far as the prosecutor’s office is concerned. This is exactly what happened in the case of Sukoró.

The infamous trial began in Szolnok in January 2013. The two men were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms. According to Császy, the prosecutor’s office picked the Szolnok Court because they were pretty certain that they could win their case there. They were right. In fact, Császy claims that the judge either denied defense motions or rejected them without reason. The court didn’t allow the testimony of the judicial expert the defense asked to testify. The judge took into account the testimony of witnesses who could be questioned only by the prosecution, not the defense. The court falsified testimony. The judge questioned witnesses without the accused or their lawyers being present. Even with all of this, the case was not strong enough to convict Tátrai and Császy so, Császy claims, the judge invented stories and made his decision based on these falsehoods.

The appellate court rendered its decision in Szeged in October 2016. It gave a long, detailed critique of the Szolnok judge’s shoddy work. The judge declared that not only were Tátrai and Császy not guilty but that no crime had been committed. Of course, the prosecutors appealed to the Kúria, which today reversed the appellate court’s decision.

The scene of the final verdict

Of course, Fidesz is delighted. The party published a statement in which they “welcomed the decision of the Kúria in the case of the Sukoró land swap” because “the proper place for criminals is in prison.” According to the statement, “the government of Gyurcsány and the socialists was the most corrupt” in modern Hungarian history. János Lázár, during his “government info,” also praised the Kúria’s decision. He described the verdict as “an important accomplishment” and continued: “For the time being only two people have been convicted, but in my opinion Ferenc Gyurcsány is responsible legally. After all, he conducted the negotiations. It is clear from this verdict how the socialists handle public money.” To talk about the incredible corruption of the socialist-liberal government takes gall from people who run a “mafia state” known for its corruption throughout the world.

Perhaps the most stomach-turning announcement came from LMP’s co-chair Ákos Hadházy, who announced that “Ferenc Gyurcsány must bear the political consequences of this verdict.” Where was he in the past seven years when most people realized that this “conceptual trial,” as Hungarians call show trials, was a charade all along? LMP’s political moves never cease to amaze me.

László Varju, deputy-chairman of DK, announced at a press conference that once DK is in a government position, it would like to see the prosecutors who created the show trial and Tünde Handó, head of the National Judicial Office (Országos Bírósági Hivatal), in jail. Handó was the one who assigned the case to Mrs. Sólyomvári née Mária Csendes in Szolnok. Varju charged that “Fidesz created the Sukoró case in order to incarcerate Ferenc Gyurcsány, and the only sin of Miklós Tátrai and Zsolt Császy was that they refused to commit perjury.”

Gyurcsány himself wrote the following on Facebook: “They are innocent. I know because I’m familiar with the case and the procedure. The investigative prosecutors and the judges who convicted them are the guilty ones. But one day a new era will come. There will be a new government. Then we will free them, and they will be granted full financial and moral reparations. We will take action with all legitimate means against those who participated in this nefarious process. Those who have served Orbán’s regime should not count on our understanding. They ruined people, families, lives because they were cowards, opportunists, or just plain corrupt. There will be no revenge. Only at last there will be a fair judiciary. You locked up my honorable colleagues because you couldn’t find a way to imprison me. I will never forget it. Never.”

June 8, 2017

The Metamorphosis of Sebastian Gorka

Perhaps today is the best time to republish my second article on Sebastian Gorka, which originally appeared in LobeLog on March 31. Gorka just had quite a row with Chris Cuomo on CNN’s “New Day,” which made a splash on the internet. The topic of the dispute was Donald Trump’s latest tweets announcing that the courts can call his immigration executive order “whatever they want,” but it’s definitely a “TRAVEL BAN!” You can decide whether Cuomo cornered Sebastian Gorka, as The Week claimed, by watching the video at the end of this post.

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As for my article, I would like to express my gratitude to Steve N., a long-time reader of Hungarian Spectrum, without whom I wouldn’t have been able to discover the curious omission of three paragraphs from the Hungarian translation of Pál Gorka’s memoirs, which were originally published in English. These are the only texts in the whole book that deal with the attitude of Gorka’s father toward Jewish Hungarians in 1944. Sebastian Gorka refers to these encounters in his interviews as proof of the Gorka family’s long-standing sympathy for Jews and Jewish causes. So, getting hold of the book was important, but I couldn’t locate it anywhere in the larger libraries in the United States. Eventually it became evident that the book is available only in Budapest. So, I asked Steve for help. He got hold of the Hungarian version and told me that there was not a word about Jews in the book. I was suspicious and asked him to do me a second favor and go to another library where the English version was located. It was Steve who discovered the curious omission and uploaded the appropriate pages in both the English and the Hungarian versions. They can be found here. I’m grateful for his selfless assistance.

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The recent efforts to transform Sebastian Gorka from a far-right Hungarian politician into an anti-Nazi liberal fighting against anti-Semitism can be added to the growing catalogue of alternative facts brought to us by the Trump administration and its supporters. Gorka, deputy assistant to President Trump, spent almost half of his adult life in Hungary. He became a U.S. citizen only five years ago.

After Gorka announced his White House appointment on Twitter on January 30, a number of articles appeared online, including some of my own, which focused primarily on Gorka’s career in Hungary. I was especially interested in his political activities in 2006-2007 and his failure to receive national security clearance from the Hungarian authorities in 2002. But it was Eli Clifton’s widely circulated Lobelog article, “Why Is Trump Adviser Wearing Medal of Nazi Collaborators?,” that prompted journalists to start digging further into Gorka’s years in Hungary.

Clifton’s piece centered on a medallion Gorka wore at one of President Trump’s inaugural balls. The medallion is the symbol of membership in an order, Vitézi Rend, established by Miklós Horthy, governor of Hungary in the interwar period, for decorated World War I veterans. Although Jewish soldiers were not officially banned from membership, in practice, as Horthy later explained, “even the bravest and most decorated Jew [was] excluded” from the Vitézi Rend. Horthy went on to proudly announce that he had been “an anti-Semite throughout [his] life.”

Clifton ascertained that during and immediately after the war years the Vitézi Rend was on the State Department’s list of organizations under Nazi influence. This classification shouldn’t have surprised anyone: Hungary was an ally of Nazi Germany and thus on enemy footing with the United States. In a subsequent article, which also appeared in Lobelog, I shed more light on the history and political profile of the order. Neither Eli Clifton nor I, it should be stressed, ever called Gorka an anti-Semite.

Gorka and the Hungarian Far Right

Another series of articles on Gorka appeared in The Forward. The first, written by Lili Bayer, provided a detailed description of Gorka’s involvement with the far right during the turbulent days in the fall of 2006 when some far-right groups tried to topple the socialist-liberal government of Ferenc Gyurcsány (2004-2009). Her summary of the events is well documented. The second, by Bayer and Larry Cohler-Esses, offered credible testimony by two high officials of the Vitézi Rend that Sebastian Gorka, contrary to his denial, was a full-fledged member of the Order and that he wears its emblem not as a memento of his deceased father but in his own right. Neither the authors nor their sources accused Sebastian Gorka himself of anti-Semitism.

During his years in Hungary, Gorka’s political connections were all on the far-right fringe of the political spectrum. For instance, his problem in 2006 with Viktor Orbán, today the nationalist and proudly illiberal prime minister of Hungary, was that Orbán had shown himself incapable of bringing down the socialist-liberal government, a government that Gorka considered to be a continuation of communist rule and therefore illegitimate. During the disturbances that erupted in September 2006, he worked with the Hungarian National Committee, whose leaders called for an uprising against the socialist-liberal government. In fact, the man who announced the group’s intentions was Tamás Molnár, who, only a few months later in February 2007, joined Gorka in founding a new political party. Their party was intended to be “truly conservative” and to stand in opposition to Orbán’s Fidesz, which, the co-founders believed, had been corrupted by the world of politics. It is this man whom his friends and defenders are now transforming into a champion of liberal democracy and a steadfast soldier against anti-Semitism.

Before looking at the arguments of his defenders, let’s see what Sebastian Gorka himself had to say over time about his involvement with the Vitézi Order and far-right groups in Hungary. It was two days after the appearance of Eli Clifton’s article that Breitbart published a video interview with Gorka. In it, he explained that his father “was awarded a decoration for his resistance to a dictatorship,” which he now wears “in remembrance” of what his family went through. Note that in this early interview Gorka avoided any mention of his father’s membership in the Vitézi Rend. He did, however, make a claim that recurs in later accounts by others: Gorka’s family was a victim of the “takeover [of Hungary] by the Nazis” as well as of the communist dictatorship. It is true that German troops occupied Hungary on March 19, 1944. But it is most unlikely the Gorka family’s life changed in any significant way as a result of this troop movement. The occupation was a generally peaceful affair. The real victims were the Jews who were herded into boxcars and shipped to Auschwitz by two efficient, viciously anti-Semitic bureaucrats of the ministry of interior who both happened to be members of the Vitézi Rend.

The Rehabilitation of Sebastian Gorka

Shortly after the Breitbart video was aired, articles appeared on Gorka’s behalf by friends and acquaintances, like David Reaboi, who portrayed Gorka as a man who “has a decades-long record as an opponent of anti-Semitism, xenophobia and anti-American sentiment in Hungary and who fought to undermine elements on the political right—even going as far as helping launch a political party to push conservative voters away from anti-Semitic parties.” From the available material, which is abundant, there are no signs of such activities and intentions. On the contrary, as I pointed out earlier, Gorka’s abortive party, Új Demokrata Koalíció (New Democratic Coalition), was an attempt to challenge Viktor Orbán’s Fidesz party, not an effort to undermine anti-Semitic elements on the political right. Moreover, if Gorka was so preoccupied with the growing anti-Semitism in Hungary, which he allegedly tried to stop, why did he publish a series of 12 articles in the well-known anti-Semitic weekly, Magyar Demokrata? If he was such a democrat, why did he take part in the Magyar Nemzeti Bizottság (Hungarian National Committee), which wanted to foment an uprising in order to topple the legitimate government of the country? Why did he choose one of the leaders of this group as co-founder of his political party? Things don’t add up, I’m afraid.

It looks as if Gorka managed to convince not only his friends and acquaintances here of his family’s anti-fascist past and his own struggle against Hungarian anti-Semitism but also the staff of the White House. They came to believe that Gorka’s “family literally bears the scars of anti-fascist fights” and that it is therefore inconceivable that he could possibly be “a secret Nazi cultist.” His supporters ignore credible evidence that challenges their preconceived ideas about their hero. Testimony about Gorka’s own membership in the order is ignored, while his explanation for sporting the insignia of the order and using its honorific title as a sign of devotion to his father is accepted “as a plausible explanation.” Liel Leibovitz, one of Gorka’s champions, adds in his Tablet article: “you may find this kind of devotion to be overly doting or even creepy but if you’re honest, the story here is simple and in some ways touching.” It almost sounds as if deep down he himself has some doubts about the story’s veracity.

As opposed to the documentation of Sebastian Gorka’s involvement with far-right groups in 2006-2007, no evidence is offered for this brave anti-fascist struggle by the Gorka family. I’m sorry to say that the overwhelming majority of Hungarians showed total passivity during these terrible times. Nonetheless, for David P. Goldman, who denounced the “shameful slanders against Sebastian Gorka, friend of Israel,” Gorka’s father became “a hero of the anti-fascist and anti-Communist resistance in Hungary.” It should be noted that in 1944 Paul Gorka, the hero of the anti-fascist resistance, was all of 14 years old.

Most of the pieces written on behalf of Sebastian Gorka are rife with factual errors and questionable interpretations of history. In Joel B. Pollak’s piece published in Breitbart, for example, we are told that the Order was banned by the “Soviets” because it was “an anti-communist symbol.” No, it was banned because it was considered to be one of those “pro-Hitler and other fascist political, military, para-military and other organizations on Hungarian territory conducting propaganda hostile to the United Nations.” Moreover, in his eagerness to establish the Gorka family’s anti-fascist credentials, Pollak places it in the middle of “the Nazi siege of Budapest.” Nazi siege? It would have been wise to learn the facts. Shortly before the end of the war the city was encircled by the Red Army. On the mad order of Hitler, German and Hungarian soldiers tried to defend the Hungarian capital. After 50 days and with a death toll of almost 40,000, the city, including the Budapest ghetto, was liberated. Every year, right-wing groups, including the Historic Vitézi Rend, commemorate the “Day of Honor,” February 11, 1945, when German and Hungarian soldiers inside Budapest tried to break through the Soviet lines.

Alternative Facts at Work

Bruce Abramson and Jeff Ballabon are perhaps Gorka’s most vehement defenders, and the fiercest critics of people who hold views different from their own. In their first article, “Leftist Trump Critics Play Anti-Semitism Card,” they write: “The hatchet job against the Trump Administration continues. The most recent victim is Sebastian Gorka … The charge is—surprise!—anti-Semitism. The behavior of Jewish progressives leading the attack is shameful.” In fact, the two authors created a strawman because, as pointed out above, neither the Forward nor LobeLog—nor their sources—accused Gorka himself of anti-Semitism.

In their second article, Abramson and Ballabon claim that a bad Vitézi Order existed before 1945 but that the current one promotes “Hungarian freedom from Soviet domination.” This is, I’m afraid, wrong. Today’s members swear allegiance to the same moral code that was written in the 1930s and reissued recently. Yet, according to the two authors, the current Vitézi Rend is so sensitive to Jewish causes that, “as recently as September of 2016, the Order commemorated the anniversary of the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising, remembering the Nazis’ victims and honoring Hungarian soldiers who, despite their country being allied with the Germans, refused the Germans’ orders to put down the Uprising.” I was dumbfounded by this assertion. The writers seem to have gotten lost in the fog of war. They mixed up the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising of April-May 1943, in which 13,000 Jews were killed, with the Warsaw Uprising of August-September 1944, which was organized by the Polish resistance’s Home Army to liberate Warsaw from German occupation. It was the latter event’s anniversary that the Order commemorated. This mistake is symptomatic of the overreach of Gorka apologists in their efforts to create an alternative history of the Order as well as of the Gorka family.

Abramson and Ballabon’s third article, which appeared in the Jerusalem Post, gives their most complete account of Sebastian Gorka’s activities in Hungary. The authors claim that, once in Hungary, “Gorka chose his political affiliation consciously” when he became employed in the ministry of defense under the premiership of József Antall, Jr. But, according to his own father, the reason for Sebastian Gorka’s employment in the ministry was much more mundane. In his account, father and son paid a visit to the House of Parliament, where they bumped into Kálmán Kéri (1901-1994), a former high-ranking officer in the Hungarian Army and an old friend of Paul Gorka, who at the time was the oldest member of parliament. It was on his recommendation that Sebastian got a job in the ministry, which needed people with foreign language skills. Abramson and Ballabon, in a wild leap of logic, use Gorka’s employment as a civil servant in the Antall government as evidence of his attachment to the Jewish community. After all, József Antall, Sr. was recognized by Yad Vashem as one of the Righteous Among the Nations.

Although we know from the very best source, Miklós Horthy himself, that Jews were not allowed to be members of the Order during his time in office, Abrahamson and Ballabon simply cannot accept this fact. According to their account, for example, one alleged Jewish member happened to be “a friend of the Gorka family whose valuables the Gorkas hid from the Nazis. Those valuables included a medal of the Order of Vitéz.” The authors thus kill two birds with one stone here: the Order must have had Jewish members, regardless of what everybody says, and, moreover, Gorka’s grandparents hid the valuables of their Jewish friends. The apparent goal is to show the Gorka family’s long-standing commitment to the Jewish people.

Abrahamson and Ballabon criticize The Forward for neglecting to read Paul Gorka’s book titled Budapest Betrayed,  because there they would have found “several steps that he himself as an adolescent and his family had taken to help protect Jewish friends during the war.” Well, I managed to get hold of the book, both in its original English version published in Great Britain in 1986 and its Hungarian translation from 2002.

The stories that Abrahamson and Ballabon recount appear in a chapter describing Paul Gorka’s interrogation in 1950 in connection with his passing information to British intelligence. One of his interrogators, whom he suspected of being Jewish, “was quietly impressed by my stories and this could have been one of the reasons for his fairly civilized behaviour towards me.”  Under the circumstances, can these “stories” be taken at face value? I don’t know, but it is troubling that the four paragraphs dealing with Paul Gorka’s interaction with this interrogator and the stories he told him about protecting Jews during the Nazi occupation are curiously missing from the Hungarian translation of the book. The question is why. Perhaps Gorka’s defenders could offer “a plausible explanation.”

Finally, I should mention that the Hungarian government has already gotten in touch with Sebastian Gorka, whom the Orbán government is hoping to use as a direct line to the White House. I assume that the opinion piece published in defense of Gorka last month in The Hill by Tibor Navracsics, former deputy to Prime Minister Viktor Orbán (2010-2014) and currently European Union commissioner for education, culture, youth and sport, was meant as a preamble to future cooperation between the Budapest government and Sebastian Gorka. Navracsics in this article went out of his way to praise the man who was once an insistent critic of Viktor Orbán as an incompetent and ineffectual party leader. Navracsics even claimed that he had “watched with admiration as [Gorka] found a new home and rose so rapidly to the highest of policy positions,” which, considering Gorka’s relative obscurity before his appointment, is doubtful. In any case, Hungarian Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó already had a meeting with Gorka in Washington, and Gorka was present at the opening of the new Hungarian Embassy. We may be seeing the beginning of a beautiful friendship between Gorka, a former editor of Breitbart News, and Viktor Orbán, the illiberal prime minister of Hungary who is most often compared to Vladimir Putin, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and Marine Le Pen.

June 5, 2017

A new declaration of war: Justice for Hungary!

I had no intention of writing about Trianon today. The truth is that I had completely forgotten about the “Day of National Unity” until I began skimming the Hungarian media’s headlines this morning. Some of these headlines piqued my curiosity and prompted me to read further. What I found astounded me.

I assume that most people even vaguely familiar with the history of modern-day Hungary know that the Treaty of Trianon was the peace treaty between the by then independent Kingdom of Hungary and the Allied and Associated Powers. It was signed somewhat belatedly on June 4, 1920, almost two years after the end of World War I. The demand for a day of remembrance originally came from Jobbik, but it was promptly adopted by the new Orbán government.

My decision to read an assortment of articles on Trianon turned out to be wise because I found some real gems among them. From the interpretations there emerges a fascinating sociological and psychological portrait of the Fidesz regime. It’s not pretty, but it may help us to understand the thinking of Viktor Orbán’s propaganda machine. In light of the official government announcement by János Lázár, this particular Day of National Unity may be a turning point in the Orbán government’s handling of the Trianon issue.

The first problem is the false historical background these far-right, nationalistic authors present in their writings. The general thesis is that Hungary was the blameless victim of those nationalities that Hungary’s rulers allowed to settle in Hungary at various times over history. In their interpretation, the nationalities in pre-1918 Hungary had extensive rights, and their continued national existence was in no way threatened. In fact, it was the cursed liberalism of the Hungarian political elite that was responsible for the growing number of non-Hungarians at the expense of Hungarians. This statement, by the way, is erroneous.

In almost all these writings journalists and politicians portray present-day Hungary not terribly differently from the “victim” that was being torn apart by hostile neighbors in 1918-1919. At least one of the commentators, György Pilhál of Magyar Idők, who labels the members of the Little Entente hyenas, considers Hungary’s present neighbors just as antagonistic toward Hungarians as their people were 100 years ago. Hungary is still being besieged and unfairly treated, just as in the past.

Moreover, Pilhál continues, cataloging Hungarian woes, before Trianon there was the Mongol devastation in 1241, the Battle of Mohács in 1524 which signaled the beginning of 150 years of Ottoman rule, and the surrender at Világos in 1849 after a lost war of independence. Pilhál ends this greatly distorted historical summary with the following remarkable words: “Do you want to flood this mutilated, blood-soaked remainder of the homeland with migrants? No, No, Never!” Thus, the migrant question today is being elevated to the level of the most significant dates in Hungarian history. Just as Hungarians had to face the Mongols, the Turks, and the hostile Austrians and Russians, now if they don’t stand fast they might end up being victims of the onslaught of migrants, which would be the equivalent of a second Trianon.

György Pilhál’s son Tamás, who works as a journalist for Pesti Srácok, also wrote an opinion piece that in some ways is even more interesting than his father’s. He also has some harsh words for members of the Little Entente, but in his eyes the real perpetrators were the allies. “The West, with capital letters, cut our hands and feet and threw us among to-this-day antagonistic neighbors that had been fattened by our body parts.” These new neighbors hate the Hungarians because they know that they were conceived in sin and received their territories as a result of unforgivable injustice. Therefore, they don’t feel secure within their own borders. They are not really robbers or thieves, “they are only fencers of stolen goods.” The real criminals obviously are the western powers. “The West is Trianon itself. They have never apologized, they have never tried to rectify their sins and lessen the damage.”

How can Hungary regain its former position as a mid-sized power in Europe? Just as the historian of the Trianon Museum suggested, Hungarians must “repopulate the Carpathian Basin.” Well, he used a more amorous, untranslatable expression “szeressük vissza Magyarországot!” which more or less means getting Hungary back by love-making. This is not a very different formulation from the one Szilárd Németh, Fidesz vice-chairman, uttered a while back, according to which the world belongs to the nation that populates it. So, the only way of getting back Hungary’s former glory is through “the modification of the national scale.” And the horizon is not the “mock borders” of Trianon but at least the confines of the Carpathian Basin.

The third piece is by István Stefka. His ideas might strike readers as outright bizarre, but he fervently believes everything he says. It was about a week ago that I saw him on a television program where three other journalists, including a conservative one, tried to convince him in vain that his theories are untenable. He too sees a second Trianon coming through the activities of George Soros, who is “the Béla Kun, György Lukács, Oszkár Jászi, and Mihály Károlyi combined, who with his civic organizations wants to ruin the country.” Hungary 27 years ago regained its sovereignty, but “now not with weapons, but with scheming, lies, ignominy, hard financial influence, and paying off internal enemies” Soros and like-minded people want to take away Hungary’s mastery over its own affairs. If the Hungarian socialists and left-liberals don’t stand by the people and follow Soros and Co., “they can no longer be considered part of the nation.” In that case, they are also working toward the destruction of Hungary.

Let me now turn to a more official source: the second most important man in the Orbán government, János Lázár. In a speech yesterday he sent the following message to Brussels: “It’s time for our neighbors and the leaders of Europe to acknowledge and adjust their policies accordingly: the Hungarian nation is the victim of Trianon and not its originator and perpetrator.” It is unacceptable that the only thing the leaders of the neighboring countries can say is that it’s time for the Hungarians to get over their old grievances. “The Hungarian nation should receive if not material at least moral reparations for the greatest injustice in world history.” He added that “we don’t want any change of the borders and especially not ethnic tension … new wars in Europe … but that doesn’t mean that we will tolerate the provocations, the repeated violations of our national sensibility for another 100 years. Yes, we can say even now: “Justice for Hungary!” which was the cry for revision after 1929.

I strongly suspect that these new words were not born in the heat of a fiery nationalistic speech. The Orbán government seems to have decided to open another front in its war against Europe, this time for a reinterpretation of the Treaty of Trianon. This is a serious turn of events that may not bode well for peace in the region.

June 4, 2017