Tag Archives: Fidesz

What’s behind Momentum? Banal clichés

At the end of February and the beginning of March, I spent a considerable amount of time on Momentum, the new political movement that, with a successful signature drive, managed to force the government to scrap its pet project of holding the 2024 Olympic Games in Budapest. I was enthusiastic about this group of young men and women, who struck me as an intelligent lot. What I found especially attractive was that the members of this civic group realized that they could best effect political change by becoming part of the political process. They announced early on their desire to form a political party.

Admittedly, I was worried about their categorical announcement that they would refuse to cooperate with the “political elite,” whom they obviously despised. It was equally worrisome that the chairman of Momentum, András Fekete-Győr, didn’t seem to make a clear distinction between the political system prior to 2010 and the one after. As if this young firebrand wanted to throw out the totality of political change that has taken place since 1989. He talked about instituting an entirely new political system once his party is in power. This statement unfortunately reminded me of Viktor Orbán’s promise in 2010 that his “revolution in the ballot boxes” was the beginning of true democracy in Hungary.

Because Momentum worked so assiduously on collecting signatures for a referendum on hosting the Olympics, the leaders of the movement had little time to give interviews and to share their political ideas with the public. Since then, the chairman of the new party, called Momentum Mozgalom (MoMo), has been giving interviews galore. From these interviews a sad fact emerges: András Fekete-Győr hasn’t got a clue about politics. If he faithfully represents the goals and platform of MoMo, we can forget about this new political formation and the 140 people who apparently make up the party at the moment.

The interview tsunami began on March 6 with Györgyi Szöllösi of “Hungary Live” on Hír TV. In the course of the interview Fekete-Győr triumphantly announced that Momentum is planning to win the election single-handed in a year’s time. Mind you, a few days earlier he admitted that 2018 was too early a date and announced that his party would concentrate on the 2022 election. No probing questions about the feasibility of such an improbable feat could shake Fekete-Győr’s self-confidence. They will be ready to form a government as a result of their impressive electoral victory. The reporter reminded him of an earlier remark: “We haven’t lost our minds and think that we alone can replace the present government.” So, what happened? asked the reporter. Fekete-Győr simply denied that he had ever said such a thing.

From here he moved to even shakier ground when he said that “the Hungarian Left doesn’t have a positive vision of the nation (nemzetkép).” As we know, this is the favorite accusation of Fidesz against the opposition. Therefore, it was inevitable that the reporter would want to know more about Fekete-Győr’s interpretation of “nemzetkép.” Within seconds it became patently obvious that Fekete-Győr had no idea what he was talking about. Eventually he came up with a totally meaningless answer: in his opinion, it means “political peace.” Let’s not even try to interpret this brilliant observation.

Well, that was bad enough, but a day later another interview, which appeared in 24.hu, prompted uniformly negative responses from responsible opposition commentators. First, let’s see what we can learn about Fekete-Győr’s political past from this interview. First, he most likely voted for Fidesz in 2010 when he was 21 years old. “What made Fidesz attractive for me was the fact that it had several convincing characters like Viktor Orbán, Tibor Navracsics, János Lázár, and János Áder.” Let’s not comment on Fekete-Győr’s choice of convincing politicians. Instead, I will be charitable and chalk up his strange taste to his youth. He still thinks, however, that “Orbán is a helluva talented politician who can speak the language of the common man about his coherent worldview.” He supports Orbán in his efforts to keep the refugees out, but it should be done “not so aggressively.” He also approves of the centralization of public education, “but KLIK is not a good answer.”

Otherwise, throughout the interview Fekete-Győr was so arrogant that the reporters eventually asked him: “What feeds this arrogance with which you reject the approach of all the opposition forces, be they Ferenc Gyurcsány or Tibor Szanyi?” Then came the answer: “We are not as arrogant with everybody—if you can call it arrogance—but I have no idea what the hell Ferenc Gyurcsány is still doing in politics. It would be high time for him to get lost.”

It took only a few hours for journalists to comment on this interview. One of the first was my favorite Árpád W. Tóta, who is both astute and witty. He began his opinion piece, titled “Moment, bitte,” with “Neither Right nor Left? And the Left not national enough? Please, tell me something really new.” Yes, we are grateful for not having the Olympic Games in 2024, but “gratefulness is not a blank check or a free ride.” In the rest of the essay Tóta accuses of Fekete-Győr of being utterly devoid of any serious vision and  contends that what he is trying to sell is at best a collection of banal clichés. Tóta is certain that if Fekete-Győr had to explain what a “positive national vision” is, which is missing on the Left but exists on the Right, he would be at a loss. As we could see from his Hír TV interview, Tóta was correct. The self-confident leader of MoMo failed. He couldn’t mutter out an intelligent sentence on the topic because, as Tóta rightly observes, the “concept” is an empty phrase, something Hungarians call a “lózung.” Tóta also visited MoMo’s website where he found the party’s “program” on education and healthcare, which they call their “vision.” There is nothing wrong with the direction, but the program is full of clichés that have been more intelligently developed and more fully proposed over the last three years by several parties on the Left.

Another devastating critique came from László Bartus of Amerikai Népszava, who called attention to some of the most objectionable statements in Fekete-Győr’s interview. I think Bartus is right when he criticizes the young politician’s admiration of Orbán’s ability to speak the language of the common people, which is mere populist drivel. Moreover, Hitler and Mussolini also knew how to speak the language of the people. How can he call Orbán’s illiberal, far-right, anti-Western pseudo philosophy a “worldview,” asks the editor-in-chief of Amerikai Népszava. Bartus finds Fekete-Győr so objectionable that he even defends Ferenc Gyurcsány against his ill-tempered attacks, and Gyurcsány is not exactly Bartus’s favorite. After all, as the reporters reminded him, the electorate decides who stays in politics and for how long, not Fekete-Győr. Anyone who wants politicians to pack up and clear out of public life is not a democrat, says Bartus. Moreover, he continues, “this helluva talented politician who is currently robbing the country blind is not Ferenc Gyurcsány. It was not Gyurcsány who abolished the constitution but Orbán.”

A day after the 24.hu interview came another interview, this time with Antónia Mészáros of ATV. A somewhat chastened Fekete-Győr tried to explain away his ill-tempered and inappropriate comments about the former prime minister. Mészáros, who is known for her sharp intellect and insistent interviewing style, was all sweetness and light. She handled the chairman of MoMo with kindness. I guess she knew that Fekete-Győr didn’t need her help to make himself ridiculous. Perhaps he didn’t realize it, but as a commentator said, “tonight Antónia Mészáros had Fekete-Győr for supper, and once she was full she leaned back and smiled. Her prey didn’t even realize that he was almost completely consumed.”

March 11, 2017

Mária Vásárhelyi: George Soros’s foundation in Hungary

It was in July 1988 that my youngest child was born at the First Gynecological Clinic with serious respiratory and visual problems. When I visited her in the unit where premature babies were being cared for, on the incubator in which she was lying was a sign: “this instrument is a gift of the Soros Foundation.” The doctors explained that previously the hospital didn’t have such up-to-date equipment despite the fact that the greatest danger for premature babies is possible blindness as a result of too much pressure being applied in the neonatal ventilator. This new machine, on the other hand, constantly measures and regulates the air pressure. Possibly it was this machine that saved my daughter’s eyesight. Before and after my child, hundreds of premature babies began their fragile lives on this ventilator. They all had the same chance: the premature child of the poverty-stricken Roma, the worker from Csepel, the party functionary, or the street vendor who had his own business. These families had not the foggiest idea that their newborns could become healthy children thanks to the support of the George Soros Foundation.

Today, when the name of George Soros together with the concepts of an open society and liberalism have become dirty words and when newly formed civic organizations are eager to announce that they are in no way supported by the satanic billionaire, it is worthwhile recalling in what ways George Soros helped Hungarian society before the regime change and after. Because it is unfair that when George Soros’s name is being mentioned in connection with his activities in Hungary, even those who try to defend him recall only the support he gave to the members of the opposition to the Kádár regime, including Viktor Orbán and other Fidesz politicians. I don’t think that Orbán and his associates owe Soros any gratitude for the scholarships they received. The Soros Foundation helped the members of the opposition because their goals aligned with the objectives of the Soros Foundation: democratizing  Hungary and building the institutional structure of an open society. Neither George Soros nor the board members of the Soros Foundation expected any gratitude for the support given. Moreover, it is particularly unfair that in connection with Soros, pro or con, only those scholarship recipients are mentioned who later became well-known politicians when the activities of the Foundation from the very beginning were much more diverse. The assistance given to organizations and members of the democratic opposition was insignificant in comparison to the amount of money spent on public education, medical science, and educational institutions in addition to cultural and scientific life.

Over two decades (1984-2004) the Soros Foundation spent 150 million dollars (worth today at least 100 billion forints) on the development of the rule of law and civic society, the convergence of disadvantaged groups, Roma integration, education, healthcare, public education, science, and the arts. During those twenty years 40,000 of 90,000 applicants received assistance based on the evaluation of 500 associates of the Foundation and as many outside experts.

During the first five years of its existence, the Foundation supported authors, educators, researchers, and projects deemed worthwhile with grants totaling 3 million dollars (approximately 3 billion forints today). As George Soros said in an interview, “we didn’t pay people for what they had done, we only helped them attain what they wanted to accomplish.” Half of the annual 3 billion forints was given in dollars, the other half in forints. Most of this money was spent not on scholarships but on Hungarian healthcare and educational facilities.

Between 1984 and 1988 the Foundation spent 800 million forints for business management training, 800 million forints for copy machines, 600 million forints for medical equipment, 800 million forints for English language training for high school students and their teachers, 500 million forints for video equipment for educational and scientific institutions, 200 million forints for the propagation of Hungarian culture abroad, 180 million forints for audio libraries for the blind, and 270 million for Hungarian scholars to attend foreign conferences. And these are just a few items that couldn’t have become a reality without financial assistance. For example, in 1987 175 English teachers and English-major college and high school students could study in the United States. In the same year, the Foundation spent 1.5 million dollars on the purchase of medicine available only outside Hungary. The Foundation had a key role to play in the blossoming of Hungarian periodical literature (which by the way has since been destroyed by the present government) by assisting publications regardless of their ideological affiliation. It assisted scores of publications from Beszélő, a famous samizdat publication in the Kádár era, to Vigilia, a Catholic publication. It also assisted specialized colleges attached to universities where talented students received extracurricular instruction by financing the organization of discussion forums, enabling them to invite guest lecturers for their lecture series and so on.

At the same time the Foundation never made a secret of the fact that its primary objective was the support of cultural and communal pursuits that would be the basis of a future civic society that would promote the country’s democratic development. These objectives are antithetical to all dictatorial, autocratic powers, including the current Hungarian government.

The five-ten per semester scholarships that were awarded, although they fit into the Foundation’s philosophy, amounted to a very small portion of the amount spent by the Foundation. They were given primarily to people who, as the enemies of the dictatorship, couldn’t travel abroad and who, for the most part, lived in deprivation and insecurity, being unable to get a job. These foreign scholarships provided them time for peaceful work, for self-improvement and information gathering, in addition to a few months of existential security. Naturally these scholarships created the most political conflict because they widened the opposition’s room for maneuverability and limited the totalitarian power’s pressure on the opposition.

The assistance given to members and organizations of the opposition irritated the functionaries of the dictatorship just as today it irritates the representatives of the illiberal state. But at least the functionaries of the dictatorship had enough sense to realize that “the Soros Foundation’s activities are in a sector where our possibilities have always been limited and which in the future will be even more so…. If we don’t allow the Foundation to function, its termination would create a gap that would produce unmet needs. Creative research possibilities of interesting people would come to naught,” wrote János Knopp, a ministry of interior police officer, in his report to the “Agit-Prop” Department of MSZMP’s Politburo in September 1987.

In 1989—as a result of the political changes—the structure of the assistance itself changed. U.S. law forbids the financing of political parties, and consequently the Foundation’s primary task became the strengthening of the civic underpinnings of the newly-born political parties. In that year, over and above the three million dollar annual budget, Soros provided another million for assistance to democratic organizations and communities in this transitional period. Civic bases of both left- and right-leaning parties received an equal amount of assistance. The person in charge of this particular project was László Sólyom, who led the right-of-center Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF) at the negotiations that resulted in regime change. With this program, the Foundation helped bring to life hundreds of self-governing communities and civic groups. Parallel with this project another one million dollars was spent on a program to provide foreign currency for small businessmen to purchase necessary equipment. (At that time the Hungarian forint was not convertible.)

After the formation of the first freely elected parliament, the assistance structure of the Foundation was once again altered. Although in the 1980s George Soros didn’t want charitable programs to be a major part of the work of the Foundation, after the change of regime, facing rapidly sharpening social tension after the mass impoverishment and marginalization of millions, the focus increasingly shifted to public education, healthcare, unresolved social problems, and Roma integration.

The first large social project was the distribution of free milk to school children, starting in 1991. Every needy child, initially only in Budapest, received at least one glass of milk and a fresh bun daily. The founder insisted, however, that other sponsors and individuals, like better-off parents, should also help with the project. This outside sponsorship not only fizzled out after a few months, but the project was under fire from the right, which accused the project of serving only to popularize Budapest’s liberal leadership. It was also a sad lesson that “in many schools the teachers didn’t want to cooperate, or if they did, they didn’t want to do the work without extra pay, and therefore the delivered milk and baked goods remained undistributed.” A couple of years later the project was revived, and by 1993 134,000 children across the country received a regular free breakfast at school. The history of the milk project says a lot about the attitude of right-wing parties and the majority of the middle class toward those who live in dire poverty. It is not a coincidence that the project, later taken over by the government, was eliminated recently by the Orbán government, surely in the spirit of Christian charity.

The two important projects in the period between 1993 and 2000 were raising the quality of education and Roma integration. During this period the Foundation spent at least 15 billion forints in today’s terms on integration programs. At the beginning the Foundation concentrated on Roma organization projects, which were intended to promote self-governance, the preservation of Roma culture, and a decrease in inequality. Over the years, however, the emphasis shifted to the education of Roma students. During this period 1,691 Roma teachers and students received scholarships within the Teacher-Student Program, 1,212 received rewards for outstanding scholarship, 1,286 Roma families received financial help to continue their children’s education after the compulsory eight grades, and more than 3,000 Roma college students received scholarships from the Foundation.

Another 15 billion forints was spent between 1994 and 2004 on the development of Hungarian higher education. Assistance was extended to college students as well as professors for study abroad, and a considerable amount of money was spent on the development of innovative teaching methods, the creation of alternative schools, assistance to disadvantaged and disabled children, and a number of other projects aiming at the modernization of education.

Deciding whether the amount of money George Soros spent supporting Hungary’s democratic transformation, the strengthening of its civic society, culture, science, arts and education was a lot or a little depends on your viewpoint. If we compare it to Soros’s total wealth or to the amount of money the government spends on these areas in toto, it wasn’t much. But if we compare it to the amount of money the government spends individually on these areas or if we consider that the amount of money Soros spent on Hungarian society would make Soros one of the ten richest men in the country, then it is a lot. If we keep in mind that in Hungary—where the culture of giving, solidarity, and philanthropy even considering the country’s economic development is very low—no other single individual contributed as generously as George Soros did in the last 100 years, then we can surely state that this was more than a lot. We should add that the Foundation’s finances were totally transparent, and during its existence not a shadow of corruption ever fell on it. It can be said that the Soros Foundation, currently under the crossfire of political attacks, was both in its philosophy and its activities an exemplary institution, serving modernization and social solidarity.

It is not only immoral and distasteful of Viktor Orbán and his oligarchs to incite the hate campaign against George Soros because many of them were recipients of the Foundation’s grants but because—over and above hate’s destructive force—to the best of my knowledge up to now none of them gave a penny for the common good and the well-being of Hungary from their own money grabbed from the public purse. We know only too well how government politicians and their family members amassed immense wealth and how János Lázár declared that “mothers with girls should realize that their children can be a very good match” for some eligible young man in twenty years’ time. But I have never heard them say that they would have supported a child who lived in deep poverty in order to make his life a bit easier in the future.

Sometime in the 1990s the brother of George Soros, Paul, who is also one of the richest Americans, said in a documentary film that he gives money only to countries that were hit by epidemics and/or natural disasters. To attain political goals—however noble they may be—he never extends help because sooner or later they take a different turn and become weapons against the donor. At that time I listened to these words with some incomprehension, but by now I have a much better idea what he meant.

March 5, 2017

Metro 4: The largest case of Hungarian fraud and corruption

Now that the complete OLAF report is available online, we can all settle down and try to read 103 pages of dense prose detailing “irregularities, fraud, corruption, and misappropriation of EU funds.” A five-member OLAF group began their investigation in January 2012 after the Court of Auditors and the Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy of the European Commission contacted OLAF, asking the office to scrutinize the case. During the investigation, the OLAF staff got in touch with only the City of Budapest and Péter Medgyessy, prime minister of Hungary between 2002 and 2004, whose consulting firm worked for Alstom Transport S.A., one of the firms accused of wrongdoing.

The total cost of the project was €1,747,313,606, of which €696,490,000 came from the Cohesion Fund. According to OLAF’s calculation, “the financial impact on the Cohesion Fund is €227,881,690.”

The release of OLAF’s final report put an end to the political game Fidesz and the Orbán government had been playing with the document. János Lázár, head of the prime minister’s office, and his deputy, the honey-tongued Nándor Csepreghy, did their best to get as much political mileage from the affair as possible. Lázár intimated that an international socialist-liberal conspiracy was behind the corruption that occurred at the Metro 4 project. On another occasion, he claimed to have filed charges against Gábor Demszky, mayor of Budapest between 1990 and 2010, Csaba Horváth, deputy mayor between 2006 and 2009, and János Atkári, an adviser to Demszky. Csepreghy must have known that none of these people was mentioned in the document, but in a long interview at 888.hu he intimated that even Ferenc Gyurcsány, prime minister between 2004 and 2009, may have shared responsibility for the misappropriation of funds. A few days later he claimed that other politicians might also be implicated.

All this is just political fluff. What we know from the OLAF report is that the City of Budapest signed a contract in 2004 with Budapesti Közlekedési Vállalat (BKV), the city-owned transit authority, which was commissioned to implement the project. Most likely that was a major mistake, which led to a lot of difficulties later. Any project, especially such a large one as the construction of a metro, needs a general contractor who oversees the project. BKV’s staff was not equipped to coordinate the work, which led to innumerable hiccups during construction.

Throughout the project the Hungarian media, especially the online site Index, reported many suspicious cases of overspending. But these cases were actually small potatoes, like too many consulting firms and lawyers making millions for very little work. Although several such cases are described in the final report, the bulk of the money OLAF would now like to be returned came from serious irregularities during the acquisition of tenders by huge corporations.

According to OLAF, 96% of the “irregularities” occurred in contracts signed by six large firms: Siemens AG, the largest manufacturing and electronics company in Europe; Swietelsky, an Austrian construction company from Linz; Strabag, the largest construction company in Austria, based in Villach; a Hungarian company called Hídépítő Zrt., which as its name indicates builds bridges and roads; the BAMCO consortium (Vinci CGP, Strabag, Hídépítő Zrt); and Alstom, the French multinational company operating worldwide in rail transport, including the manufacture of metro trains.

I left Alstom to last because it was in regard to Alstom that OLAF got in touch with Péter Medgyessy, who received €600,000 in 2007-2008 from Alstom for two years of consulting. This payment occurred after Alstom had won the tender with apparently the worst offer. Medgyessy naturally claims that his consulting firm had nothing to do with the Alstom case, adding that it is a well-known fact that his relationship with Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány and the liberal SZDSZ leadership of the City of Budapest was strained. What his relationship with Gyurcsány had to do with BKV deciding to purchase overpriced Alstom cars is beyond me. I have no idea whether in a court of law Medgyessy would be found innocent or not, but in ethical terms his behavior was highly suspect.

Siemens, the German company which was in charge of electrical works, received 31.7 billion forints (€102,303,730) for the job. Since OLAF claims that Siemens most likely received inside information during the bidding process, the European Union wants the Hungarian government to pay back the whole amount. The same is true of Alstom’s 22.9 billion forint (€73,892,769) tender. BAMCO also won the tender in an irregular manner, and therefore the European Union demands the return of 8 billion forints (€25,817,360). The EU also demands 7.6 billion forints (€24,523,364) from Swietelsky, which was responsible for the interior of the metro stations. Strabag-Hídépítő, in charge of structural work on the station at Baross Square, received 3.7 billion forints for its work but because of procurement irregularities 2.5 billion forints (€8,067,751) should be returned.

Another politician who, although not mentioned by name, was most likely involved in the metro case is László Puch, former financial director of MSZP, whose company Media Magnet Kft. just purchased the ailing Népszava and Vasárnapi Hírek. Media Magnet, according to the OLAF report, received 331 million forints (€1,068,110) from Siemens for advertising. The report notes that “this company was in charge of the campaign of the political party which was in a decision-making position in the case of Metro 4.” In 2010 Index reported that BKV ordered all sorts of superfluous studies from Media Magnet on such things as, for example, the state of the cable television market. There is a strong suspicion that some of this money ended up in MSZP’s coffers.

The biggest culprits will most likely be found among the representatives of the named companies and those BKV officials who were in contact with them. There’s no question that the guilty parties should be punished, but judging from the outcomes of earlier corruption cases I have my doubts that we will ever hear about all the dirt that OLAF unearthed. I’m also pretty sure that Fidesz will try its darndest to drag high-level politicians into the morass around BKV.

I see that Gábor Demszky will be represented by György Magyar, one of the “star lawyers” in the country. On February 3 Magyar announced on ATV that Demszky had signed only three contracts during the many years of construction. One was the contract between the city and the government in which the parties agreed that 79% of the construction cost would be borne by the government and the rest by the City of Budapest. The second contract dealt with a loan the City had to obtain for the project. The third was the contract that gave full authority to BKV for the implementation of the project.

Fidesz naturally wants to have a parliamentary investigation into the case, which will lead to further accusations on both sides. If Hungary had a decent prosecutor’s office and an independent chief prosecutor, it should undertake a speedy, thorough, unbiased investigation of the case. Unfortunately, this is the last thing we can hope for under the present circumstances.

February 6, 2017

Momentum’s anti-Olympics drive is already a success

A day after I wrote a post on the anti-Olympics drive there was an encounter at one of the collecting stations which, to my mind, starkly illustrates the attitudinal differences between those young people who established a new political movement called Momentum and the older generation of MSZP politicians.

Tibor Szanyi, an MSZP member of the European Parliament, decided to reap some political benefit by appearing on a news clip as he is signing the referendum petition. Apparently, he informed the Momentum activists of his intentions. When he showed up, cameraman and all, András Fekete-Győr, the president of Momentum, appeared and gave Szanyi a piece of his mind about the do-nothing attitude of Szanyi’s party. Party politicians come here for a media opportunity instead of going out and helping to collect signatures. Szanyi was visibly embarrassed and acted like a little boy who had just been scolded by his father. Once he had recovered from the shock, however, he decided to strike back. In a totally unnecessary retort Szanyi went so far as to compare the leaders of Momentum to Fidesz in their “manipulation of the news.” And he called them “asphalt hamsters,” whatever this term means. Not the best beginning for cooperation between professional politicians and the civil activists. I share Fekete-Győr’s anger when I see MSZP’s total inability (and unwillingness) to engage the population on any level save through TV and radio interviews.

Momentum activists are conducting a campaign that so far has been very successful, especially if one compares it to earlier abortive attempts by parties and individuals. In less than two weeks the Momentum activists, with the help of LMP, collected over 80,000 of the requisite 138,000 signatures. Yesterday László Sólyom, the former president of the country, signed the petition, as was reported by some readers of Index who spotted him.

Source: Pesti Srácok / Photo Péter Gyula Horváth

The conservative József Eötvös Group organized a discussion on the economic effects of holding the 2024 Olympics in Hungary. The main speaker was a “sport economist” who is in favor of the project, yet even he had to admit that if the Olympic Games were held in Budapest, they most likely would not be profitable. In fact, from his speech it became clear that the estimates of PricewaterhouseCoopers are unrealistic because the figures they presented cover only the “organizational costs.” The cost of the actual investments, like buildings, the Olympic village, stadiums, and infrastructure, are not included in the overall cost because, the eager organizers claim, these investment projects would have had to be built anyway and, in any case, they were already included in future plans.

So far Viktor Orbán is putting on a good face about Momentum’s NOlimpia drive. Only yesterday ATV learned from Fidesz sources that he believes that, even if there is a referendum, supporters of the Games will be in the great majority. As one self-assured Fidesz leader told ATV, “for the time being we are just sitting and smiling. We are not afraid.”

Well, perhaps Fidesz leaders spoke too early because today a new Medián poll was released. It shows that Fidesz’s assumptions about a pro-Olympic public in Budapest are based on faulty data. This is what happens when polling questions are being manipulated to achieve the desired results. While all the earlier polls showed little support for the Games, the one conducted by a pro-Olympic group found overwhelming support for holding the Olympics in Hungary.

Yes, there is every reason to believe that if a referendum were held, the anti-Olympics folks would be in the majority. According to Medián, 68% of the people don’t support holding the games in Budapest because it would cost too much and the money should be used for “more useful” things. Only 26% think that, “regardless of the cost,” the Olympic Games would strengthen “the bond that connects members of the nation and national pride.” Nine percent of those polled had already signed the petition, and 33% said they are planning to do so even if the number of signatures collected is multiples of those required. Sixty percent of them support the idea of holding a referendum on the question. If a referendum were held today, 54% of the Budapest voters would opt for withdrawing the Hungarian Olympic Committee’s application. Among those who are certain they would vote at such a referendum, the percentage is even higher, 59%.

The same Fidesz informant who told ATV that they were not worried one bit about Momentum’s campaign added that, even if the young activists succeed, there is always the weapon of a government counter-campaign in favor of the games. Of course, this is exactly what would happen. But I’m not at all sure in light of what I am reading about the politics of the International Olympic Committee (IOC) whether it would be worth the effort. I have very little knowledge of the inner workings of the IOC, but according to rumors, the committee “might break with established practice by naming the host-cities of both the 2024 and 2028 Summer Games when it gathers in Peru in September.” The reason for such a decision is that, despite the reforms introduced to lower the cost and make hosting the games more attractive, very few cities have applied, and those which had shown an initial interest later changed their minds, like Rome or, after a referendum, Hamburg. Currently, both Paris and Los Angeles are vying for the 2024 games; in fact, Paris is so adamant that at one point the French sports leaders announced that it is either 2024 or nothing. Perhaps, the officials of IOC figure, they could convince one of the two to accept the later date. In that case, Budapest’s chances are close to nil.

The news of the referendum drive in Budapest certainly reached the headquarters of IOC and may have strengthened their resolve to name the host countries for both the 2024 and 2028 games in September. As a sports reporter for insidethegames.biz writes, such a decision would be wise “since it emerged that Budapest, the outsider in what is currently a three-horse race, would not launch its international promotion campaign at the beginning of this month as planned, due to a resurgence of the referendum calls that seem to have been lingering in the background almost from day one.” The author further speculates that IOC’s decision would be made easier “if a handy referendum put a spanner in Budapest’s works.”

So, even though Fidesz leaders might be smiling and feeling very sure of themselves, the Hungarian Olympic Committee (MOB) is a great deal more cautious. Moreover, the very fact that an anti-Olympic drive began in Budapest has already damaged Hungary’s chances. Medián’s poll results will not help the Hungarian cause either. If the inhabitants of both Paris and Los Angeles are so gung-ho, the IOC will think twice before awarding the Games to a city where two-thirds of the population don’t want them.

Momentum’s political success is already palpable. That’s why I can’t understand why the two largest opposition parties on the left didn’t rush to support its initiative. NOlimpia is obviously a popular cause and promotes political action. I think that MSZP and DK made a mistake.

February 1, 2017

Sebastian Gorka’s road from Budapest to the White House

A few hours ago Sebastian Gorka triumphantly announced on Twitter: “Well the radio silence is over. Congrats to those who guessed! Honored to be Deputy Assistant to the President of the United States,” most likely on the National Security Council. Faithful followers of Fox News may be familiar with his name since Gorka has been a frequent guest as an expert on Islamic terror. He is one of those people who are convinced that the Western world is at war with Islam, a war that could have been won if the president of the United States had been serious about the mission, as Barack Obama obviously wasn’t. Trump, however, “sees that this is an actual war that he wants to win.” It was this theme that Gorka developed in his 2016 book Defeating Jihad: A Winnable War. Gorka is also a regular contributor to Breitbart News and a protégé of Steve Bannon, Donald Trump’s chief strategist, or, as GQ magazine called him, “our president.”

Sebastian Gorka with Donald Trump

Sebastian Gorka’s name is not exactly a household word in the United States, but in Hungary it has a more familiar ring. In the years after 9/11 Sebestyén Gorka, as he was known in Hungary, was a national security analyst who, according to some less than charitable TV viewers, was usually wrong.

Gorka was born in Great Britain in 1970, the son of Hungarian refugees Zsuzsa and Pál Gorka. The father, according to Sebastian, was sentenced to life in the 1950s and was freed in October 1956. A few years ago Pál Gorka, who moved back to Hungary after 1990, wrote a book about his experiences before and during the revolution.

The young Gorka received a B.A. in philosophy and theology from the University of London and, upon graduation, joined the British Territorial Army reserves, serving in the Intelligence Corps. In 1992 he followed his parents to Hungary, where his meager military training and intelligence experience were sufficient to land him a job in the Ministry of Defense. There he worked on international security issues and Hungary’s future accession to NATO. Gorka spent five years in the ministry, during which time he also earned a master’s degree from Corvinus University in international relations and diplomacy. Later he received his Ph.D. from the same institution.

Anyone who’s interested in the career of Sebastian Gorka should consult his Wikipedia entry which, I suspect, he wrote himself. There is no need to repeat all that information. Instead I will concentrate on his time in Hungary.

Hundreds of articles have appeared in the Hungarian media in the last few days about Gorka’s fabulous career. He and his family left Hungary for the United States only nine years ago, and yet he will be an important adviser to the president of the United States. These articles note that he was also an adviser to Viktor Orbán. Some of the better informed pieces report that he eventually became disillusioned with Orbán and established a party, Új Demokratikus Koalíció. Interestingly, in his many resumés one finds not a word about his position as adviser to Viktor Orbán, which is odd since one would think that it might be a plus for his political ambitions.

Gorka established and was the executive director of a conservative think tank, the Institute for Transitional Democracy and International Security, in Budapest. By 2006 he decided to chart his own political course. In September of that year he gave an interview to Magyar Nemzet in which he explained why he was running against the Fidesz candidate for the mayoralty of Piliscsaba, a picturesque village in the Budapest metropolitan area where he and his family lived. A few days later he talked to someone from the New Telegraphic Agency who complained about the red-and-white-striped “Árpád” flags favored by Magyar Gárda. Gorka explained to him that the flag-wavers “are a soft target, because how do you prove you’re not a fascist?” And, he continued, “if you say that eight centuries of history can be eradicated by 19 months of fascist distortion of symbols, you’re losing historical perspective.” Gorka was a bit off; Ferenc Szálasi’s Arrow Cross regime lasted only about four months.

In January 2007 he and three others established a right-wing party. After Viktor Orbán lost the election in 2006 a lot of people within his own party came to believe that Fidesz cannot win an election as long as Orbán is at the helm. Gorka was one of the “insurgents.” He identified three groups within the party. One was the Orbán-Simicska line. The other was a group led by István Stumpf, head of the prime minister’s office during the first Orbán government, and Mária Schmidt, director of the House of Terror and today the court historian of Viktor Orbán. The third group was led by Zoltán Pokorni which, according to Gorka, was the weakest of the three. It was under these circumstances that Gorka wanted to establish a party in opposition to Fidesz. He added that he was hoping that some Fidesz leaders would join him. He specifically mentioned János Áder, today president of Hungary.

Jobbik, which had just started to become an important factor in the country’s domestic politics, sent an observer to the press conference that set out the goals of the new party. He came away with the feeling that the ideology of the Új Demokratikus Koalíció was confused. The leaders of the party counted on the right-wing followers of Mária Schmidt, the left-winger followers of Gyula Horn, and the “völkisch-national-socialists” of Katalin Szili. No wonder that Gorka’s attempt to establish this new party was a total flop. Most likely it was his political failure that prompted him to leave Hungary and not, as he later claimed, “the chaos created by Gyurcsány.”

The last time Gorka gave an interview to a Hungarian newspaper was in September 2016. The reporter of Magyar Nemzet asked his opinion of Viktor Orbán’s Russian policy, and he was anything but complimentary. He harshly criticized Putin’s policies and found Orbán’s balancing act between NATO and Moscow to be both dangerous and unsustainable. Orbán, he said, will have to decide between the West and the East. Given Gorka’s family background, it makes sense that he would be no fan of Russia or Putin, the former KGB agent.

Hungary might think that it is gaining influence in Washington by having Sebastian Gorka in such a prominent position. But given his low opinion of Orbán, whom he considered already in 2006 unfit to lead the country, the Hungarian prime minister might not get the kind of reception from Trump that he expects.

January 31, 2017

The political credo of László Botka, MSZP’s candidate for prime minister

The original article by László Botka, titled “Az igazságos Magyarországért,” appeared in 160 Óra on January 21, 2017. Thanks to the staff of The Budapest Sentinelit was translated into English and published today. I am grateful to the Sentinel‘s editors for permission to make the translation available to the readers of Hungarian Spectrum.

♦ ♦ ♦

The Hungarian left has not been in such a storm battered state during the entire existence of the third republic, yet Hungary has never needed the left as much as it does now.

Viktor Orbán, in power since 2010, has thrust a country that served in the 1990s as a model for democracy in Eastern Central Europe into autocracy. Any democratic political force that defeats Orbán must return to constitutional democracy and the rule of law. However, the Orbán regime has not only dismantled the rule of law and democracy, but also spread a concept of society that is deeply unjust, runs counter to the basic interests of Hungarian people, and which all true left-wing forces must fight against.

The crisis of the left wing is not only a domestic issue. The rapid advance of national populism means progressive political forces around the world have found themselves on the defensive. Talk in recent years has been about nothing else: from the refugee crisis, via Brexit, to the US presidential election. Populists promised those parts of society that have been left behind, or are just holding on, that they can once again enjoy a secure livelihood – through the repression of other groups. Migrants, the homeless, the unemployed, the “undeserving” poor, ethnic minorities, intellectuals who express solidarity with them, and civic activists are all marked down as enemies of the nation. Hungary is at the forefront of all this: here the breakthrough for national populism came in 2010 with Orbán’s “ballot box revolution”.

Photo: Péter Komka

The left is now charged with a historic task: we must put a stop to this far-right national populism, and make our own vision of society attractive once again. Populists cannot solve the crisis that exists on many levels; they only make the problem worse. A populist is like a dentist who does not dare to tell a patient with toothache what the real cause of the problem is. Instead of treating it, he prescribes painkillers. The patient may well get temporary relief, but in reality his condition is getting ever worse. The left will not get anywhere with false remedies. We must be honest, because lying to a patient is dishonorable, the effects of a painkiller are only temporary, and the problem will only return in a more serious form. The Hungarian left must present a vision of a future Hungary that we would all like to live in, somewhere we can live well.

In this piece – which will be followed by more over the coming weeks – I have undertaken to present a vision of how our homeland could become a more just country. By aiming for this goal, the left could finally haul itself out of its deep crisis. We need a politics of equality that is far removed from that practiced by the left-wing in recent years and one that is diametrically opposed to Orbán’s vision of Hungary.

Orbán dreams of a “work-based” authoritarian state in which government representatives have the last word on every issue, even when they are wrong – one where the powers that be promise a well-functioning and developed economy can be built by ending democratic debate. Some observers of Orbán’s system say the prime minister’s aim is to set up an eastern European Singapore, where Orbán could lead the country for decades as father of the nation, and hurriedly join the developed world by cutting back on political debate. To put it more simply, Orbán is offering prosperity and security in exchange for freedom and democracy.

Hungary cannot accept this deal for two reasons. First of all, because this promise is a lie. Hungary will not be the next Singapore. There is not and never will be an Orbán miracle. Instead of building a developing, authoritarian Singapore, there has been a Putinization of the country, where the promise of prosperity only applies to those favored by Orbán. For the rest there is only poverty, hopelessness and abjection – and restricted freedom. We are talking about a system where, according to the Ministry of Human Resources, capable members of society are carrying Hungary “on their shoulders” while disadvantaged people such as the disabled and the Roma are merely a burden. That is, in its own dishonest way, the government is dividing society into those who “pull their weight” and the “carried”. Yet this “carrying on the shoulders” is another lie, because the government long ago abandoned the disadvantaged to their own problems and difficulties. Society under Fidesz is a cast system in which everyone has their own place and fate. Helping the lower casts is in no way an aim of the Orbán state. This cast system is held together by the power principle. Since 2010, Fidesz has built a new feudalism, and with this it keeps Hungary on the margins of the Western world.

Orbán believes in a labor market where workers are diligent producers and desire nothing but a secure place on the production line. This is the opposite of where the developed world is heading. The knowledge-based economies of the modern world can only take off with the work of creative people. The only route to creating a prosperous, dynamic economy is one where the education system sends students brimming with imagination and creativity out onto the path. It is significant that the education budget as a proportion of GDP has sunk to tragic depths under the Orbán regime. A new left-wing government must set out the goal of transforming Hungary into an innovative, knowledge-based economy by markedly increasing funding for, and radically raising, the level of education.

Equally significant is the fact that Orbán has come up with just one idea to tackle unemployment: workfare. But is not difficult to see that no start-up entrepreneurs are going to emerge from among those on public work schemes. Moreover, it is unfortunately clear that there is no path from the prison of workfare to a real job. Orbán’s work-based state is, for hundreds of thousands of people, nothing but a dead end.

Instead of the Orbán state, where social groups are set against one another and divided into winners and losers, we need a state that actively intervenes to help people achieve their goals and, where necessary, ensure a high level of leverage for this recovery. Hungary can only be successful if an ”only the fittest survive” mentality is replaced with one of “we are all in the same boat”.

It is not only because authoritarianism does not lead to prosperity that we must say no to Orbán’s system. Authoritarianism is unacceptable in and of itself. Orbán’s cast system is unjust to its core and its authoritarianism unacceptable. As one of the 20th century’s most influential egalitarian thinkers, John Rawls, put it: justice is more important than any other parameter for evaluating societies. Equally important is Rawls’ view that freedom, equality and prosperity are indispensable building blocks for a just society, so one cannot sacrifice basic human rights in the interests of material prosperity. Therefore, we cannot choose the route of authoritarianism, because there is a better and more moral path: that of freedom and prosperity. Prosperity for the large majority of society – as the example of Scandinavian society shows – can and should be ensured when freedom and prosperity reinforce one another.

From 2018, the next left-wing government must build a successful and prosperous Hungary on a foundation of justice. To further this aim, I offer a vision of a successful left-wing state based on the ideal of equality for all as an alternative to Orbán’s authoritarian state. The three pillars of egalitarian politics are equality of opportunity, relative equality of wealth, and the principle of equal citizenship.

The ideal of equality of opportunity, a cornerstone of all western democracies since the Second World War is nothing other than the rejection of a cast system. The strong conviction is that social advancement cannot depend on others, only our own talents and endeavors, irrespective of whether we come from a rich or a poor family.

The idea of equality of opportunity cannot be reconciled with Fidesz’s politics. Under Orbán’s regime, the wealthy elite spend millions so their children can study in private schools or in Switzerland. For the poorer parts of society, an uncompetitive or downright segregated school is the first, and often the last, station.

With regard to this basic principle, the left should not shy away from self-criticism. The “third way” social democracy of the 1990s and 2000s – for which former Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány was the standard bearer in Hungary – moved too far from the idea of equal opportunity. The third-way “New Labor” party that will forever be associated with the names of British prime ministers Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, and its successors, gave up on material equality and placed equality of opportunity as the exclusive guiding principle. The third way soon turned hollow: it became clear that it had been naive to think that equality of opportunity alone was enough. Even if it had succeeded in ensuring social mobility in education and the world of work, material inequality and social division would not have disappeared. The left believed, and its followers believed, that modernization would create no losers, only winners. The principle of equality of opportunity promised that everyone could find a place in knowledge industry based on high skill levels, but this remained an illusion. The fate of those left out of the modern knowledge economy became ever more hopeless. Nationalist, chauvinist and populist forces picked up on this, and disappointment gave them a way to reach the people.

Photo: Zoltán Balogh

Nor can a society of equals develop when half of the country is mobile, well trained and wealthy and the other is tied to the land, unskilled and owns nothing. We cannot describe such a country as just. Inequality of wealth today is tomorrow’s inequality of opportunity. This situation in Hungary in this regard is serious. A report by Tárki in 2016 showed that 44% of the population owns no property, and 60% are incapable of adopting a middle class way of life. The most absurd thing about all this is that it we find ourselves at this point under the leadership of a government that continually invokes the name of the middle classes.

Despite Fidesz’s chief economic ideologue saying that criticism of wealth disparities arises purely from jealousy, certain social risks can really only be averted by combating economic inequalities. Research has shown that a raft of new problems arise when wealth inequality gets out of control. In societies with high social inequality, life expectancy is shorter, education is of lower quality, social mobility is restricted, and there is a higher rate of mental illness, drug addiction and crime. Hungarians’ terrible state of health and its catastrophic results in the PISA survey are grimly related to the enrichment of Lőrinc Mészáros.

So the promise of equality of opportunity is not enough to improve the lot of the half of Hungarians that have been left behind. We must also strive for relative wealth equality – this is the second fundamental principle of egalitarian left-wing politics. Instead of sports stadiums and the enrichment of the “national” oligarchy, resources must be spent on citizens. Partly in the form of quality education, partly through social security packages that reduce the lack of food and adequate housing, and risks arising from illness of the loss of a job.

Besides all this there is a third pillar to equality that is less often mentioned: the principle of equal citizenship. In a society based on equal citizenship, the prime minister has to wait in line at the baker’s, the post office or the doctor’s surgery just like anyone else. This notion of equality must become the most important guiding principle for the Hungarian left.

The principal of equal citizenship is breached by the emergence of a new cast of powerful and gracious ladies and gentlemen who do not share public spaces with the common people, do not breathe the same air. It is enough to think of the minister in charge of propaganda, who flies to parties by helicopter, or the chief government minister who shoots hundreds of pheasants while hunting with his partners, and who believes that everybody deserves their lot in life. Meanwhile, the system they put in place locks entire masses into poverty and the world of workfare. This is how Viktor Orbán and Fidesz have corrupted Hungary: in place of a nation of fellow citizens, we have become a nation of lords and lackeys. Politicians of the governing party no longer represent the interests of the people, citizens or the nation in the Parliament, merely the private goals of their separate “elite” cast. It cannot go on like this!

I see the most important task of the left as precisely that of recreating the conditions for equal citizenship. We must become worthy of representing the principles and practicing egalitarianism. We must put an end to the era of unprincipled compromise, climb-downs and putting up with things – our political actions must have a moral basis. Egalitarian politics is just, and suitable for lifting Hungary to the level of the developed Western world.

It follows from this that the next left-wing government must also conduct a principled foreign policy. Viktor Orbán swapped a western orientation based on solid moral principles for opportunistic friendships with dictators. We cannot give up the ideal of an open and free Europe in favor of a new Iron Curtain era. A European partnership built on shared ideals is the right policy, and one that serves Hungary’s interests. However much Viktor Orbán might deny it, we belong to the free world.

In my political career to date, I have used the means at my disposal to work for a free and just Hungary and the politics of equality. If I am given the opportunity by the citizens, this is what I would also like to do as prime minister of Hungary.

January 28, 2017

Viktor Orbán’s rubber bones? No, his master plan

I thought this morning that I would be original if I wrote about a favorite word of both the Hungarian media and the opposition. The word is “gumicsont,” a dog toy made out of solid rubber or sometimes nylon. “Gumicsont” is used as a metaphor for a communication device that is designed to distract the attention of the public from something much more important. Almost everything that happens in Hungarian political life is immediately labelled “gumicsont.”

It seems that I wasn’t the only to find all this talk about “gumicsont” irritating. Almost a year ago Péter Konok, a historian and political commentator, wrote an opinion piece on the subject in HVG. He, like me, thinks that the Orbán government’s constant barraging of the population with political bombshells are not distractions intended to divert attention from something else. No, Konok says, the Orbán government’s chicaneries are genuine because “they are like this.”

Moreover, says Konok, our views on what counts as political distraction depend largely on what we personally consider important. For example, those for whom having stores open on Sunday is important may well think that talk about the size of Antal Rogán’s apartment is trivial, a distraction. Some people were certain that Viktor Orbán’s shocking announcement about the reintroduction of capital punishment was a “gumicsont” to distract attention from the Quaestor scandal.

One could give numerous examples of this Hungarian habit of labeling an action as a kind of sleight of hand to divert public attention from something else. In Konok’s opinion, these so-called artificially created distractions are unfortunately reactions to very real problems. By dismissing them as merely rubber bones to chew on, the Hungarian public fails to acknowledge that the country is in big trouble and that Orbán’s regime is only a symptom of its woes.

I would go further. Almost all of the political strategies introduced by Fidesz and the Orbán government are carefully and methodically prepared ahead of time, having very specific aims in mind. The latest “gumicsont,” according to some journalists, is the attack on the NGOs. This recent “distraction” is allegedly intended to serve up a new enemy since the migrant issue is becoming old hat and has lost its appeal. Dead wrong, I’m afraid. It is, in fact, part and parcel of the same master plan that has been systematically pieced together ever since January 2015.

The Orbán government has been preparing the ground for this move for a very long time. George Soros has been the boogeyman in Fidesz circles at least since 2010. And as far as the NGOs are concerned, Viktor Orbán made it clear in the interview he gave to 888.hu last year that 2017 will be “the year of Soros,” that is, he will get rid of the NGOs one way or the other. A distraction? A rubber bone? Of course not. It is the next step in consolidating his power and bolstering the popularity of his government.

Some observers even called the “migrant question” a rubber bone, which is total nonsense. This was again a policy initiative that Orbán had carefully crafted with a very specific goal in mind. It was designed as a popularity booster which, as Orbán rightly predicted, couldn’t fail. Just as a reminder, Fidesz’s popularity between October 2014 and February 2015 had dropped by 14%.

Orbán is aware that despite all the propaganda, his government is not popular and that it is only the weakness of the splintered opposition that makes his position safe. So, he is ready with contingency plans, the latest being to incite xenophobic Hungarians to turn against organizations that receive money from abroad. Orbán’s advisers have already managed to make Soros’s name a hated household word. Only a couple of days ago Századvég, Fidesz’s think tank, released its findings, according to which “61% of Hungarians have a negative opinion of the businessman.” Eighty-eight percent of the population—on both the right and the left—consider the use of so-called “soft-power” a violation of Hungary’s sovereignty.

The attack on NGOs is a variation on the “migrant” theme. First came boosting xenophobia and simultaneously elevating nationalism. Now the government is impressing on the population that these NGOs are vehicles of foreign political influence and pressure on the Hungarian government, which is a “violation of national sovereignty.”

Another plan Orbán announced yesterday morning was his defiance of the European Union and his fight this time against any “economic interference” of Brussels in Hungary’s affairs. Every time Orbán announces a new fight against this or that, the normal reaction in Hungary is that the man cannot live without battling against someone. That’s his nature. But what if his duels are not merely the results of personal traits but part of a well-designed masterplan which we, the observers, fail to recognize? We naively consign them to the heap of policy “distractions,” claiming that they are just tricks to turn our attention away from healthcare, education, and general poverty. I think it is a big mistake to think in these terms. We must take everything he says with deadly seriousness. No rubber bones here.

Everything Orbán does is designed to ensure the popularity of his government and his own well-being. Since his talents don’t include an aptitude for good governance, he has to rely on the country’s alleged vulnerability as a crutch. The refugees’ arrival in Europe was a godsend to Orbán. The country, he argued, must be defended against the migrants, against Brussels, against George Soros’s “soft power.” I’m afraid that nationalistic Hungarians lap all this up, including even those who wish him straight to hell. As long as Orbán can harness this kind of nationalism, the Hungarian public will never be able to get rid of him. Unfortunately, I’m afraid, Hungarians don’t see the connection between their nationalistic attitudes toward alleged outside enemies and Viktor Orbán’s staying power.

January 14, 2017