Tag Archives: Gábor Kubatov

Fidesz and the criminal underworld

Yesterday we learned from Medián’s fascinating poll on corruption that a fair number of Hungarians think of their government as a criminal organization and the country they live in as a mafia state. They are not imagining things. Not only is the Orbán government corrupt. We also have convincing evidence that certain members of Fidesz and the government had dealings with figures in the criminal underworld.

Earlier I wrote about Antal Rogán, who during his tenure as mayor of District V of Budapest may have engaged in an illegal transaction with Tamás Portik, a convicted murderer. Rogán’s name also cropped up in connection with the investigation of László Vizoviczki, another shady character who might be responsible for several deaths from drug overdoses at his nightclubs.

That Rogán had dealings with Vizoviczki is not surprising. After all, Vizoviczki owned or rented several nightclubs in District V. Rogán most likely also knew Portik since Portik’s wife/girlfriend had financial dealings with the District through the purchase of a piece of real estate.

But evidence has surfaced indicating that Antal Rogán was not the only Fidesz politician with ties to the Budapest underworld. In a letter written to the prosecutor’s office in April of 2013, in which he outlined a possible plea agreement, Vizoviczki indicated that he had extensive dealings with other important Fidesz politicians.

Vizoviczki’s implicit threat–make a deal or I’ll spill the beans–was not idle. Jobbik’s N1TV, a well-informed internet site which earlier discovered Vizoviczki’s letter to the prosecutors, yesterday made another discovery. According to the story, on February 12, 2013, the police searched Vizoviczki’s four-story mansion in Buda. Among the items found was a 10-page letter addressed to “Gábor.” Gábor turned out to be Gábor Kubatov, currently one of the three deputy chairmen of Fidesz. In it, Vizoviczki asked Kubatov to use his good offices with the prosecutors and the police to get him released from jail and placed under house arrest for the duration of his trial. As Vizoviczki reminded Kubatov, he deserves assistance in exchange “for his support in the campaign (Reform Plan).” The content of this letter is known only from the very short description written by the policeman who took an inventory of the confiscated items because the prosecutors found the letter so insignificant that they didn’t include it in the material that was sent over to the court. On May 30, 2013, Vizoviczki was released from jail.

On the basis of this very brief summary of the letter I think it’s fair to assume that Vizoviczki was a generous supporter of the Fidesz campaign in 2010, which may be one reason that his case, which is still dragging on, hasn’t been vigorously investigated. Neither the police nor the prosecution seems to be eager to go after Vizoviczki. The police are most likely trying to bury the case because high-ranking police officers were allegedly in his pay. And, as we now suspect on the basis of Vizoviczki’s letter to Kubatov, Fidesz is probably also beholden to him.

The emergence of this short summary of the letter must have come as a shock to Kubatov because in the last 24 hours he hasn’t been able to come up with a coherent story about the background of the letter. His answer at a press conference yesterday about his acquaintance with Vizoviczki was fairly light-hearted. “Of course, I know him. I’m a politician and it is my business to meet people,” he answered to a question from Index’s journalist. A few hours later he realized that his flippant answer might not have been appropriate. In the second iteration, he tried to minimize his contacts with Vizoviczki. Kubatov claimed to the pro-government Magyar Idők that they had met only twice, once at the 110th anniversary of the kindergarten they both attended and once when Vizoviczki approached him about his plans to invest in sports, specifically in Fradi, Kubatov’s football club. Kubatov was not interested. Otherwise, according to Kubatov, on that occasion they talked about the terrible tragedy at the West-Balkan disco where several people died because of overcrowding and the subsequent stampede. Kubatov and Vizoviczki discussed safety measures that should be introduced in discos to prevent such tragedies in the future.

How well did these two men know each other? I suspect much better than Kubatov now lets on. On the photograph taken at the anniversary celebration of their kindergarten in April 2012 the two men are sitting next to one another. Admittedly, this doesn’t prove anything since the crowd seems to have divided itself largely along gender lines and more women than men attended the gathering. So even if they were perfect strangers they may well have ended up sitting beside one another. But my hunch is that they were no strangers.


The whole story is suspicious, starting with the fact that the prosecutors didn’t include Vizoviczki’s letter to Kubatov in the material they passed on to the court. This cannot be a coincidence, especially in view of the close relationship between the prosecutor’s office and Fidesz. The prosecutors, realizing the damaging material in that letter, hoped that the document would never surface, as indeed it still hasn’t.

In any case, I’m not the only person who finds the prosecutors’ handling of this important letter more than strange. Today MSZP called on Péter Polt to explain why the prosecutor’s office ignored the letter written by Vizoviczki to Kubatov. It’s easy to predict what the answer will be. The same as when the prosecutors were supposed to investigate Tamás Portik’s testimony about the bribe he allegedly handed to Antal Rogán. The prosecutors announced a couple of days ago that they see no reason to investigate Portik’s allegation. Charges were dropped.

July 29, 2016

It’s hard to get away from football when discussing Hungarian politics

I picked a few topics today that on the surface don’t have much to do with one another, but by the end I trust we will see a common theme. Yes, I know, the title has already given it away.

First of all, we have a public opinion poll by the newly established ZRI (Závecz Research Institute). Tibor Závecz used to be a member of the Ipsos team, but Ipsos stopped doing political polling. Závecz therefore formed ZRI as a kind of successor to Ipsos. The poll, taken between July 10 and 17, doesn’t reveal any dramatic changes in political trends, but the responses to some of the questions ZRI posed may offer opposition party leaders a strategic compass for the 2018 election.

I will spend little time on the actual numbers. In the sample as a whole, Fidesz gained three percentage points, from 24% to 27%, in the last month. This gain, according to Závecz, is most likely due to the intensification of the anti-migrant campaign and the initial success of the national football team at the European Football Championship. All the other parties moved up or down by about a couple of percentage points. However, the weakening of Jobbik over the last few months can by now be described as a trend. In April Jobbik’s share was 15%, in May 14%, in June 12%, and this month 11%. It looks as if Gábor Vona’s new strategy is not exactly a success among the radical elements. Apparently, the losses are especially noticeable among members of the younger generation and in the countryside where the party was extremely strong. As is usually the case in Hungarian polls, the largest group among the respondents, 36%, could not name a party for which they would vote today.

Among those respondents who said they would definitely vote if the election were held today, 49% said they would vote for Fidesz. Yet in the sample as a whole, 43% would like to see a change of government in 2018 and only 32% would like to see this government continue. The problem is that those who would be happy to see the Orbán government go are extremely passive. Only 16% of them would even bother to vote. The task of the democratic opposition, and it is a daunting task, must therefore be to motivate some of those people whose current attitude is, as Tibor Závecz aptly described it, “I want you to vote and get rid of this government for me.” Leaders of the democratic opposition will have to figure out a way to get these dissatisfied masses to the polls since 43% translates into more than 3 million votes.

Fidesz may have benefited in this survey from the performance of the Hungarian national football team, but Hungarian soccer is an unlikely long-term prop for the party. It’s enough to look at the miserable performance of FTC (Fradi) against Partizani Tirana in the Champion’s League qualifiers. The Albanians beat the Hungarian team 3-1. The Hungarian players were so bad that the coach actually apologized, and the fans demanded the resignation of Gábor Kubatov, Fidesz’s campaign wizard and the chairman of FTC. Fewer than 9,000 spectators showed up for the game, played in the brand new Groupama Arena with a capacity of almost 24,000. The game was a reality check. Hungarian football, despite the flash in the pan in France, cannot compete internationally with any hope of success, despite generous financial support from the Orbán government. FTC received close to 1.5 billion forints from the government just this year, and the new stadium cost almost 16 billion forints.

And now let’s move to Felcsút and the findings of Direkt36, “a non-profit investigative journalism center with the mission to expose wrongdoings and abuse of power through fair but tough reporting.” Direct36 works with 444.hu, which yesterday published some details of the Orbán family’s land holdings in Felcsút. The details of the story are not entirely new. In 2013 the late Krisztina Ferenczi reported on how Viktor Orbán, at the very end of 2006, made offers to several homeowners in Felcsút to purchase parts of their large backyards. These parcels of land now serve as the VIP parking area for the Pancho Arena. So, Ferenczi concluded, Orbán already had well developed plans for a large arena at a time when he had just lost his second election in a row. He was waiting for the moment when he would be prime minister and could build his hobby arena from taxpayer money.

csaladi focibusiness

Anita Vorák of Direct36 in the 444.hu article shows that Orbán didn’t fill out the financial statements he submitted to parliament properly. Of course, in comparison to other corruption cases, this “little oversight” is really a small item. But from the way the story of the purchase of these strips of land unfolds, one has the distinct impression that something is very fishy. First of all, it is not at all clear what the connection is between Viktor Orbán’s own holdings and those of the Felcsúti Utánpótlás Neveléséért Alapítvány, a foundation behind the Ferenc Puskás Academy which was established by Viktor Orbán with an initial capital of 150,000 forints. For example, not only Viktor Orbán but also Anikó Lévai, his wife, and Győző Orbán, his father, gave the foundation free use of the land they had purchased for 50 years. The non-profit foundation’s founder has no legal, formal connection with its creation, the Academy. But it’s curious that the founder of the foundation and his family members “lend” land to the foundation, land that will be used by the Academy.

I was astonished to read that the foundation has 110 employees. This is a large tax-free business funded almost exclusively by the state for the pleasure of the founder of the organization. And the wealth of the Academy and therefore of the foundation keeps growing. I really wonder what will happen to this whole edifice when Orbán is no longer prime minister and the flow of money from government coffers comes to an end. Because I assume that the next administration will have the good sense to stop funding this monster and will instead investigate this so-called foundation, what Krisztina Ferenczi called “the Felcsút family football business.”

July 22, 2016

Viktor Orbán’s letters to the Hungarian people: An expensive habit

After the citizens of  Esztergom voted Tamás Meggyes, the long-standing Fidesz mayor of the city (1999-2010), out of office, the Fidesz-majority city council brought the normal functioning of city hall to a virtual standstill. Starting with preventing Éva Tétényi, the new mayor, from occupying her office, they did everything under the sun to paralyze the governance of the city. Articles appearing in the media often called attention to the fate of the city that had the temerity to drop a Fidesz official who also serves in the Hungarian parliament. They predicted that if by some miracle Fidesz loses the next elections this is the fate that will befall the new government.

Less attention was paid to the city of Pécs which had held a municipal by-election a year and a half earlier. Pécs was unlucky with its MSZP mayors. One died as the result of a car crash and his successor died of cancer shortly after he took office. Thus in May 2009, a year before the national election in which Fidesz-KDNP won a two-thirds majority, a Fidesz candidate, Zsolt Páva, decisively beat MSZP’s Katalin Szili, who was at the time the speaker of  parliament.

More attention should have been paid to this by-election in Pécs. With hindsight we can see that the city was in many ways Fidesz’s laboratory for its national election campaign. Moreover, once the new Fidesz mayor occupied his office, his political strategies also foreshadowed what was to come after the party’s landslide victory in 2010.

It was in Pécs that Gábor Kubatov, the party’s campaign manager, put into practice what American advisers taught him about grass root campaigning. The lists his activists compiled became infamous when his bragging about his knowledge of all the “communists” in Pécs became public. But once Fidesz found out that this new campaign style worked splendidly on a small scale, the party decided to apply it nationally.

I’m almost certain that during his first days in office every step Páva took was dictated from above. Otherwise, it seems unimaginable that the mayor of a city of less than 200,000 would on his own initiative forcibly oust a foreign company from the city (and hence the country as well). I think we can say with some degree of confidence that Viktor Orbán had already formulated his plan to nationalize utility companies. What strengthens this hypothesis is that shortly after the expulsion of the French company in Pécs, János Lázár, then still mayor of Hódmezővásárhely, population 40,000, uttered similar threats. Lázár’s threats never went any further, most likely because of the very strong reaction of French president Nicolas Sarkozy to the assault on French companies.

At any event, immediately after he was ensconced in his office Páva began writing letters to the citizens of the city, asking their opinions on various matters. They were supposed to register their views and send back their answers. At the time I thought that this was a very clever way of engaging the citizenry. Not that I thought the answers had much significance or effect, but I considered it a clever political move.

One of Viktor Orbán thirteen letters

One of Viktor Orbán thirteen letters

It seems to me that the barrage of letters with which the new Fidesz mayor in Pécs surprised his voters was again a test. If these letters had a positive impact, perhaps the practice could be adopted once Viktor Orbán became prime minister of Hungary. And indeed, the Pécs experiment worked. At the regular municipal elections the once solidly socialist city switched sides. Fidesz gained an overwhelming  majority on the city council and naturally Páva was reelected.

And so Prime Minister Viktor Orbán began his “correspondence with the Hungarian people.” His first letter was sent out in September 2010 followed by eleven or twelve more since, to the tune of 3.4 billion forints (taking the total number of letters to be twelve) according to an estimate by Index.  Népszava calculated on the basis of thirteen letters that 4.4 billion forints were spent on the letters themselves in addition to the cost of their accompanying ad campaigns. They estimated that about 5 billion forints were spent on Viktor Orbán’s penchant for “direct communication with the people.” The journalists of Népszava also figured out what kinds of  sorely needed goods and services this sum could have purchased. For example, 900 ambulances or the salaries of 350,000 people employed in the public works program.

In the beginning some of the more naive souls actually sent back their answers, and the government proudly announced the success of their solicitation. But as time went by fewer and fewer letters were returned. The overwhelming majority ended up in the garbage. On at least one occasion one of the trade unions organized a campaign to collect the letters and sell them for recycling, giving the proceeds to charity.

One of these letters was sent to inhabitants of towns with populations of fewer than 5,000. It explained to them in what manner and to what extent the central government would finance these smaller boroughs. Here it seems that the soothing explanations actually presaged drastic cuts. Just the other day Róbert Molnár, mayor of Kübekháza (population 1,600), received 3,480 forints for the month of July. This is not a typo. Kübekháza needs about 5 million forints a month just to meet its critical expenses. The electric bill alone is about 40,000 a month. Róbert Molnár with the full support of the town council sent the 3,480 forints back to the government. They found the sum insulting. And Molnár is a Fidesz politician who in fact was a member of parliament between 1998 and 2002. Naturally he made quite a splash since he made sure that the media outlets were informed.

The latest missive was a thank you note straight from Viktor Orbán to those who allegedly signed one of the two million petitions Fidesz received in support of  lowering utility prices. A nice gesture, one could say. But it seems that among those being thanked, according to more and more Hungarians who are speaking out, were family members long dead. One becomes a bit suspicious. Suspicious about Fidesz’s lists in general, about the number two million, and about the whole phony pen pal game.

Football hooligans as Fidesz’s police force

This morning I decided to write more about the “interesting coincidence” that Ferenc Szabó (Feri the Blond), who was convicted for murder and spent ten years in jail, is employed by the Ferencvárosi Futball Club. This fan club is headed by Gábor Kubatov, Fidesz party manager, who is now in the process of organizing a party militia “to defend” Fidesz from future aggressors.  Feri the Blond and some of his ilk already showed up at the Fidesz party headquarters ready to remove the “aggressors,” if necessary by force.

Ready for a fight: Ferencváros Újpest, March 10, 2013 / fradimob.hu

Ready for a fight: Ferencváros – Újpest, March 10, 2013 / fradimob.hu

As I was gathering material for today’s post I discovered that “the game of the year”–as a Fradi fan called it–was scheduled to take place this afternoon. It is a “derby” between Ferencváros and Újpest, whose fans are deadly enemies of one another. For those of you who are unfamiliar with the term, any match between teams from the same city is called a derby. As I just learned, Ferencváros won, but even before the game started the fans of Újpest attacked the police with stones and broken glass. In turn, a couple of people were arrested for hidden weapons and firecrackers.

This, however, is most likely not the end of the story. Because, as one of the Fradi hooligans told a reporter, “they hunt the enemy.” They plot their route to the stadium in order to avoid the police and to attack the fans of the other team. It doesn’t seem to matter whether they win or lose; the important thing is to have a fight. There is so much aggression in them that they literally want to kill members of the other side. One of the “leaders” of the fans was quite frank: “We are different from others because of the immeasurable hatred in our blood.” The interviews on the following video provide a glimpse into the mindset of these people:

But let’s get back to Ferenc Szabó (Feri the Blond) and Gábor Kubatov. What is the connection over and above the fact that Kubatov is now the boss at Ferencváros and Szabó, the coordinator between the Fradi Security and Kubatov? After all, appointing a murderer to be part of the Fradi security forces would have been far too daring. According to rumors Szabó is getting a better than average salary of 400,000 a month. In June 2012 an article appeared on fradimob.hu in which the author called Szabó “Kubatov’s favorite murderer.” Szabó and Kubatov were soul mates in the notorious Section #2 of the Ferencváros Stadium where the worst hooligans gathered and from where they usually attacked the players, the coaches, or the police. Another member of the group was György Szilágyi (Sziszi), who today is a Jobbik member of parliament. It was this Section #2 that Viktor Orbán decided to visit only a few days before the same hooligans attacked the public television station on September 18, 2006.

These guys were no ordinary football hooligans but members of the underworld: extortionists, blackmailers, drug dealers, and yes, murderers. Not all of them were so unfortunate as to be caught like Feri the Blond. Some of the murders took place in broad daylight in downtown Budapest and the perpetrators were never discovered. This is the world Feri the Blond is coming from.

In August 2012 an article appeared in HVG about another member of Section # 2 who ended up in the Fidesz government. He is Bánk Levente Boros, a “political scientist” at Miskolc University, who in his spare time was deputy chairman of the Ferencváros Szurkolók Szövetsége (Association of Ferencváros Fans). His advice doesn’t come cheap: 400,000 forints a month.

Members of these football fan clubs are getting more and more involved in politics. In Debrecen the members of the fan club of the local DVSC (Debreceni Vasutas Sport Club), better known as Loki, an abbreviated version of the word “locomotive,” entered the building of the university and insulted and intimidated the students. In Budapest at the Faculty of Arts of ELTE  the same thing happened. Skinheads decided to “defend” the government.  And now Kubatov is calling on his “favorite murderer” to police Fidesz and government buildings.

Several articles appeared on the subject from which I learned a lot. Perhaps the most informative on the connection between Fidesz and the underworld was the blog of “Csehszlovák Kém.” He is the blogger who first reported on the Israeli-Hungarian “friendly match” that eventually resulted in severe punishment of the Hungarian Football Association for not being able or not being willing to keep order among the fans in Hungarian stadiums. For the details see my post, “A friendly football match: Hungary-Israel 1-1.” Another article that appeared on the subject is by László Bartus in the Amerikai-Magyar Népszava (March 10, 2013).

Finally, Vera Lánczos in a piece on Galamus entitled “Báránybőrbe bújtatott farkasok” (Wolves in sheep’s clothing) approaches her subject from more of a political angle. She is convinced that Fidesz ordered the police to withdraw in order to avoid a situation similar to the events of 2006 when the police had to handle the unruly demonstrators. They wanted to show the world that “their” police are not brutal as allegedly the socialist police were. So, instead, they got the football hooligans to do the dirty work. But they had to pretend that these people were “volunteers” worried about the fate of their party. According to Lánczos, the original plan of the protesters was to stay in the courtyard overnight, but when the murderer and his friends arrived they decided to leave on their own because “they feared for their safety.” As it was, the employees of the party headquarters not only insulted the students but used force against them. See the description of an eyewitness quoted by Some1 in her comment of August 22, at 12:02.

Kubatov’s early connection with the hardcore Fradi fans lends credence to the possible connection between Fidesz and the Fradi football hooligans in the storming of the television station in September 2006. Perhaps one day we will know exactly what happened, but I must say that in light of these latest developments one has the feeling that Fidesz involvement is more than likely.

The significance of today’s demonstration in the Hungarian capital

This afternoon’s demonstration was impressive. At least in my opinion. Some people are disappointed that only 6,000 people showed up, but I don’t think that numbers are the most important consideration. Yesterday we didn’t even know who those handful of people were who occupied the courtyard of Fidesz’s party headquarters. A few hours later their numbers swelled to 1,000. Less than 24 hours later this unknown group managed to stage a demonstration in which thousands participated.

And this crowd, both yesterday and today, demanded “Constitution, Democracy and the Rule of Law.” These are exactly the kinds of values that European politicians cherish and that they demand from Viktor Orbán. The crowd was mixed: young, middle-aged, old, all mingled together, and there were a lot of sympathizers cheering them on. It is also significant that 110,000 people watched the live stream of the event.

Most likely Viktor Orbán thinks that because the numbers are still relatively small, eventually the whole movement will peter out. I predict that the trend will be just the reverse. Some of you already sensed a different mood on the streets today. In any case, it seems to me that Fidesz is preparing itself for the possibility, even if to some of them an unlikely possibility, of rising dissatisfaction. The party’s organizers and spin doctors are heading in the wrong direction, however, in devising ways to combat dissatisfaction.

Let’s start by recapping yesterday’s response to the demonstrators at the Fidesz headquarters. First, András Bencsik, one of the Peace March organizers, mobilized those Fidesz supporters who are hard-core “professional” demonstrators. Their primitive behavior, their obscenities, and their stupidity will turn more and more people against them. Videos abound on YouTube of these people’s unspeakable behavior. Moreover, they didn’t even realize that the students on the balcony were reading Fidesz’s party program from 1989.

Then came the second mistake. Gábor Kubatov, Fidesz party manager who in his spare time is the president of the board of the Ferencváros Football Club, called on some heavies from the ranks of the Fradi football hooligans who tried to remove the protesters by force. It turned out that one of the hooligans spent ten years in jail  for murder.

And what is Kubatov planning now? He is trying to mobilize the faithful by painting a picture of the imminent danger facing the government and the party. He sent a letter to party members in which he outlined the “damage” and “physical abuse” allegedly committed by the protesters. According to Kubatov, the demonstrators “attacked” the building, “tried to break into it,” but thanks to the the staff ‘s “firmness of purpose” they were thwarted in their attempt. “Meanwhile they broke into smithereens whatever was in their way” (törtek-zúztak) and “maltreated the employees of the party headquarters.” (Don’t try to find any logic here because if they didn’t manage to get into the building how could they have smashed things into smithereens or maltreated the employees who were inside?)

In the future, Kubatov maintains, the employees of the offices of Fidesz must be ready to defend, peacefully of course, their buildings. He called on Fidesz members who are ready to come to the rescue of Fidesz buildings to sign up at riadolanc@fidesz.hu. (“Riadó” means “alert” and “lánc” “chain”.) These people should be ready on an hour’s notice to be “on the scene of aggression.”

Some people on the Internet compare Fidesz’s hard core defenders to either the Sturmabteilung (Storm troopers/SA) or the Workers’ Militia of the Kádár regime. The blogger who compares Kubatov’s defense force to the SA quotes the appropriate passages from the Hungarian edition of Wikipedia, which describes the chief function of the SA  as defending the national socialist party’s meetings from attacks by the opposition.

Kubatov’s guards reminded Vastagbőr (Thick Skin) of Kádár’s Workers’ Militia whose duty was “the defense of the socialist achievements of the Hungarian People’s Republic.” Each workplace, including collective farms and offices, had a number of volunteers who were supposed to defend the buildings and the employees inside.

Now let’s see what the pro-Fidesz media is up to. Magyar Nemzet published a detailed article about today’s events. The author of the article called the organizers “members of the Bajnai Guard” but otherwise gave a fairly objective report on the demonstration. Heti Válasz claimed that “several  activists with a loudspeaker surrounded and insulted the camera man and Boglárka Bartus, a reporter for HírTV.” Maybe, maybe not.

And let’s see how Zsolt Bayer sees the situation. Fidesz supporters, however sadly, must realize that from here on there will be first weekly and later daily demonstrations. He calls the members of civic groups “the children of Saul Alinsky,” a well-known American community organizer and writer. What is so bad about following in the footsteps of Alinsky, who after all worked for the improvement of living conditions in poor communities across North America? Only Bayer knows. But he claims that he is “too lazy, too tired, and too skeptical to loathe” Alinsky’s offspring. Perhaps one could talk to them if there was anything to talk about. But there isn’t. “At least we should force ourselves to be patient because they will be coming and coming. First only a few dozen, but always. They will jump over the fence, climb into our headquarters, our houses, our dreams, our desires. We will smell their halitosis. And we will retreat and retreat because we can hardly bear it. And we would gladly trample down all of them. Let’s be honest with ourselves at least once. This is what we would like to do.” But they cannot do it because the other side is waiting for aggression on their part. Don’t fret. After the elections “they will disappear forever, but until then it will be very difficult.”

One final note on the road Fidesz traveled in the last twenty-five years. Once upon a time Viktor Orbán, László Kövér and their friends did exactly the same thing that today’s college students are doing. Protesting injustice, lack of democracy, lack of transparency, lack of dialogue between the rulers and the ruled. In the courtyard of Fidesz party headquarters the students found discarded campaign literature from 1989. They demanded democratic, ideology-free education and university autonomy. And, what I like perhaps best, they demanded “fear-free life.” With Viktor Orbán’s government fear returned.

I don’t think that László Kövér wants to remember his old self squatting on the ground with a poster hanging from his neck:

In a police state the policeman's salary is higher than that of a teacher. In a democratic country the opposite is true

In a police state the policeman’s salary is higher than that of a teacher. In a democratic country the opposite is true.

How would today’s Fidesz faithful greet the man above? Would they threaten to pour acid on his face? Most likely. What’s going on in Hungary today is really shameful.