Tag Archives: Jürgen Roth

Does (government?) fiction portend trouble for Pintér?

Don’t expect anything even remotely resembling a coherent post today. I’m covering what is likely a fabricated allegation on the off chance that it, or a spin-off of it, morphs into something significant.

Pesti Srácok was the first internet news site to break the story, which spread like wildfire online. In it we learned that “a dreaded character of night life was sent to discredit Sándor Pintér.” A former national security officer gone rogue, Róbert Jakubinyi, wanted to use György Tanyi, who was arrested in 2012 for having allegedly attempted murder in 1996, to carry out a character assassination of the minister of interior. Tanyi is currently under house arrest.

The story was incredibly muddled. Jakubinyi allegedly paid a visit to Tanyi’s lawyer, trying to get her to cooperate with him in his attempt to have compromising documents about Minister of Interior Sándor Pintér smuggled out of the country. He wanted her to convince Tanyi to violate his house arrest and leave the country, taking along the compromising documents, which, by the way, the police claims were fake. But not even threats and a 20 million forint bribe changed her mind.

György Tanyi was a suspect in a 1996 case involving a driver at a trotting course. I wrote at some length about the case in October 2013. He and his two brothers were never even accused of the crime because a police investigation determined that although the bullets were fired from a gun similar in caliber and make to a gun owned by the brothers, they were not fired from the Tanyi brothers’ weapon. The suspicion has lingered ever since that Sándor Pintér, chief of the national police force at the time, was in some way involved. There was talk that Pintér was the one who replaced the Tanyi brothers’ gun to save their skins. It didn’t help Pintér’s case that he first denied having been on the scene, which later proved to be wrong. Whatever the real facts, it is strange that Tanyi was arrested only 16 years later.

Pesti Srácok also reported that the intelligence community suspects that foreign agents or foreign services are behind Jakubinyi’s undertaking. He is also accused of gathering information on important Fidesz politicians, especially on Viktor Orbán. For example, he wanted to learn whether Orbán reported to the internal security forces while studying in Great Britain at the end of 1989. Pesti Srácok seemed to know that Jakubinyi was passing on information about Fidesz to MSZP politicians during the 2010 election campaign.

Pesti Srácok and subsequently other government media outlets, like Magyar Idők and 888.hu, related this cockeyed story as fact. Válasz, on the other hand, a conservative but by and large pro-government publication, couldn’t quite swallow what on the face of it seemed to be sheer nonsense. The Válasz reporter who covered the story found it incredible. Some obvious questions presented themselves off the bat. Why was it necessary to use a fugitive from justice to smuggle out fake documents? Why was it necessary to physically cross borders with these documents when, in our digital world, the task could be accomplished with a few clicks on a laptop? Válasz found the story “strongly reminiscent of the 1950s.” What is behind this whole thing? the journalist asked. Is it possible that the government expects some revealing article from abroad on Pintér’s corruption and wants to prepare the ground for it?

With each passing day the government media further embellished the story. Magyar Idők reported on March 18 that there was a likelihood that “the character assassination of government members may continue and the prime minister himself might also be a target.” The National Defense Service (Nemzeti Védelmi Szolgálat) gathered enough evidence for the Buda Central District Court (Budai Központi Kerületi Bíróság/BKKB) to order Jakubinyi’s pre-trial detention.

From this Magyar Idők article we learned something that may shed light on the rationale for this story. In justifying its pre-trial detention of Tanyi, BKKB stated that “the investigation began only a month ago, and it required a very broad investigative effort.” Let me remind everybody that Átlátszó published key passages from Jürgen Roth’s Schmutzige Demokratie, in which Dietmar Clodo described Semion Mogilevich’s alleged bribery of both Sándor Pintér and Viktor Orbán. I would find it very strange if the current case against Jakubinyi had nothing to do with Roth’s Clodo story. I covered the story on February 5, 2017. Antónia Rádi of Átlátszó, who initially broke the story in 2013, also wrote an article titled “Do the Mafiosos attack or defend the minister of justice?” It is a very complicated story, but Rádi seems to be convinced that, even though Jakubinyi is currently sitting in jail, he is in cahoots with Pintér. He is being used, willingly or unwillingly, to deflect attention away from Pintér’s difficulties as a result of the Clodo testimony.

Magyar Idők reported today that Sándor Pintér is expecting ever more attacks from abroad because of Hungary’s “consistent and decisive action against migrants.” The other source of attack is domestic. The police under the supervision of the minister of interior are doing such a splendid job of eliminating criminals that certain criminal elements decided to strike back.

Well, that’s it. Is this story a preemptive strike? Does the government expect Pintér to come under closer scrutiny? I have no idea. We’ll have to wait to see what develops.

March 20, 2017

Does Putin have something on Orbán? Suspicion lingers

Just as House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi wants to know what the Russians have on Donald Trump, many Hungarians would like to know what Vladimir Putin has on Viktor Orbán. A couple of days ago a Russian journalist, Anastasia Kirilenko, published a lengthy article for The Insider, which is actually a Russian-language site, titled “Suitcase from Solntsevo: Does Putin have a video-kompromat of the Hungarian leader?” Kirilenko’s story takes us back to the 1990s when Budapest was a hotbed of Russian mafia bosses and other shady characters from all over the world.

The story is not entirely new, but this is the first time that Viktor Orbán is named as the possible beneficiary of a suitcase full of illicit money from the most important man in the Russian mafia, the Ukrainian Semion Mogilevich, who lived in Budapest at the time. Mogilevich has been described by the FBI as “the most dangerous mobster in the world.” He has been accused of “weapons trafficking, contract murders, extortion, drug trafficking, and prostitution on an international scale.” After it looked as if he might get in trouble with the law in Hungary, he left for Russia where he lives in a suburb of Moscow called Solntsevo. Hence the title of Kirilenko’s article.

Another famous mafia chief and a friend of “Szeva bácsi” (Uncle Seva), as he was called by his friends in Budapest, was the German Dietmar Clodo, who in the 1980s was arrested for bank robbery at least twice in Germany. Eventually, he was also arrested in Hungary and received a ten-year sentence, which he was able to serve in Germany. He was released in 2011 and since then has been heading a security firm.

I wrote a post in 2013 about Mogilevich and Clodo in Budapest in which I looked into the role of Sándor Pintér, minister of interior, in the affairs of the Russian mafia bosses. There is good reason to believe that Clodo and Mogilevich were paying Pintér protection money. Several times a year large sums of money were sent by Mogilevich via Clodo to Pintér. But that’s not all. There is a good possibility that Pintér was aware of something about Orbán’s past that he was/is using against him. In 1998, at the time of the formation of the first Orbán government, the young prime minister insisted on naming Pintér minister of interior, an appointment that even his colleagues disapproved of. A former police chief as minister of interior? But Orbán insisted. In fact, Orbán is so attached to Pintér that he appointed him minister of interior in both the second and the third Orbán governments. The fellow must be the very best minister of interior in the whole world. People suspect that Pintér has a stranglehold on Orbán as a result of some earlier action by the prime minister of a sinister or perhaps even criminal nature. And this may have to do with Mogilevich and Clodo.

Jürgen Roth, a well-known German investigative journalist specializing in organized crime, especially in Eastern Europe, interviewed Clodo in June 2016 in Regensburg. Roth incorporated the written testimony of Clodo in his 2016 book, Schmutzige Demokratie: Ausgehölt—Ausgenutzt—Ausgelöscht? According to this document, Clodo was entrusted by Mogilevich to deliver sums of money to various officials, “among whom was Sándor Pintér.” In the spring of 1994, just before the national election, “Mogilevich’s interpreter brought [Clodo] a suitcase with approximately one million deutschmarks.” Clodo was told that the suitcase must be handed to the young man in Clodo’s study and that he was supposed to open the suitcase right there because behind the books was a hidden camera which recorded the exchange. But the young man was extremely reluctant to enter the house. As Clodo recalls in his written testimony, “this man didn’t want to come into my house. I told him, ‘Listen to me, I have that damned money in a suitcase. I don’t want to go out on the street with this suitcase. I don’t care. If you refuse to come in, I will give it back to Mr. Mogilevich. I don’t care.’ I wasn’t interested in who this man was. It was only after the elections that I understood that this young man was Viktor Orbán from Fidesz.”

Clodo told the same story to Antónia Rádi in 2013, who was then working for HVG. She published the story in HVG at the time but, after consulting with the magazine’s lawyers, decided to withhold the politician’s name. When the story, without mentioning Orbán’s name, came out, few people showed any interest in her story. It was only György Bolgár who decided to interview Rádai on his show on Klub Rádió. He correctly noted that if this story is true, whoever the politician is can’t feel safe. After all, that video might still be in the possession of Uncle Seva in Moscow.

So, let’s return to Mogilevich who, after the FBI, the Italian police, and the Swiss national security office were after him, fled to Moscow in 2003. Although the Russian authorities were fully aware of his criminal past, he was allowed to settle in Moscow in great comfort, apparently because of “his close relationship to Putin from the Leningrad days,” meaning the years prior to 1996 when Putin was working for the City of Saint Petersburg.

Anastasia Kirilenko points out that Orbán was fiercely anti-Russian until 2009, when he did an about-face and became a great friend of Vladimir Putin and Russia. What happened? Her answer is: “There is a good possibility that the reason for Orbán’s sudden pro-Russian attitude has something to with Semion Mogilevich’s arrest in Moscow for tax evasion and his subsequent clearance on all charges.”

Clodo, who was interviewed by The Insider, described Orbán today as Putin’s puppet. He is certain that, for his freedom, Mogilevich handed Putin the video-kompromat that showed Orbán receiving the suitcase full of money. Whatever the case, Orbán by now seems to fulfill all “orders” coming from Moscow. For example, Orbán went so far in 2015 as to agree to the refurbishing of a memorial which included a marble obelisk referring to the Soviet soldiers who died during the “Hungarian counterrevolution.”

Memorial to the victims of the 1956 “counterrevolution”

Of course, Clodo’s story about the Orbán incident may be the figment of his imagination, but there is a good likelihood that he is telling the truth about the kickbacks Pintér received from Mogilevich through Clodo. And we have to ask why Sándor Pintér has had a sinecure as minister of interior in all of the Orbán governments, spanning almost twenty years. One can’t help wondering about that, just as one must ponder the reasons for the unnatural sudden change of Orbán’s attitude toward Russia.

February 5, 2017