Tag Archives: László Lengyel

László Lengyel, the “kingmaker”

On Saturday afternoon Ferenc Gyurcsány delivered his thirteenth speech on the state of the country, which was broadcast on both ATV and HírTV. Hungarian speakers can watch the 40-minute speech on ATV’s website. It was a forceful attack on Viktor Orbán and his government in which he compared Orbán to István Csurka, the extreme right leader of MIÉP, an anti-Semitic party which, after a spectacular rise in the second half of the 1990s, disappeared for good, to be replaced by Gábor Vona’s Jobbik. He also talked about the poverty of the “working poor” and blamed the present government for the growing poverty of many Hungarians, adding that, in his opinion, a person for whom the wounds of Trianon are more painful than the sufferings of Hungarians who are hungry and cold is not a patriot.

If Gyurcsány had confined himself to these themes, not too many people would have been overly excited about the former prime minister’s speech. But he continued with a juicy revelation. He accused László Botka, MSZP’s candidate for the premiership, of conducting, with the assistance of a non-politician “kingmaker,” negotiations to exclude him and his party from a future electoral alliance of left-of-center parties. Such behavior can put an end to DK’s cooperation with the other socialist-liberal parties, he warned. Well, that sort of news is definitely something both the media and the public love. Indeed, soon enough a host of articles appeared about the speech and its content.

The name of the “kingmaker” didn’t remain secret for long. The spokesman of the Demokratikus Koalíció, Zsolt Gréczy, made it public on Facebook. The “kingmaker” was László Lengyel, a political scientist and economist who is a regular participant in political discussions, where he shows great mastery of both domestic and foreign affairs.

Soon enough it was determined that the meeting to which Gyurcsány alluded did indeed take place. What was more difficult to find out was what actually transpired at the meeting from which the leaders of MSZP, Párbeszéd, Együtt, and even LMP and László Botka wanted Gyurcsány and his party to be excluded. Although everybody involved has since given interviews, they have carefully avoided providing straight answers to any and all questions touching on the content of the discussions. After listening to all these interviews, I had the distinct feeling that Gyurcsány’s information was correct. The meeting was about getting rid of Gyurcsány while holding on to DK voters.

László Lengyel / Source: Népszabadság / Photo: János M. Schmidt

How did Gyurcsány and the leadership of the Demokratikus Koalíció find out about the meeting in the first place? Lengyel seems to have been foolish enough to approach Péter Niedermüller, DK member of the European Parliament, and invite him for a cup of coffee. There he told Niedermüller about what was afoot and extended an invitation to him to attend the meeting. Niedermüller refused and informed DK’s executive board of Lengyel’s scheme.

Eventually Niedermüller told his side of the story. He interpreted the conversation over coffee as “an attempt to exclude DK and its chairman from cooperation among left-of-center parties without losing DK’s voters.” Such “half-truths, secrecy, and mendacity are incompatible with my conscience,” Niedermüller announced. The main occupation of far too many opposition leaders is “branding those fellow politicians with whom they don’t agree.” By such behavior they only strengthen the prime minister and his regime.

László Lengyel admits that he did have a conversation with Niedermüller but denies everything the DK politician said about their meeting. He practically called Niedermüller a liar who was “dragged into this idiocy,” I guess by Gyurcsány. He expressed his regret that Niedermüller “got himself involved with such bad company.”

During the many interviews Lengyel gave in the last couple of days it became clear that he was the one who convinced László Botka to announce his interest in becoming a candidate to head the united democratic opposition. It is a well-known fact that Lengyel passionately hates Ferenc Gyurcsány. In one of his interviews he freely admitted that he swore in 2006 that he would never sit down at the same table with Ferenc Gyurcsány. And he is not exaggerating. I had personal experience with Lengyel’s uncompromising hatred of the former prime minister. Lengyel used to be a frequent contributor to Galamus, an excellent internet site–unfortunately by now defunct due to a lack of funds–that carried mostly opinion pieces. Both Péter Niedermüller and I were among the founding members. One day Zsófia Mihancsik, our editor, invited Gyurcsány to write an article for Galamus. As soon as the article appeared, Lengyel cut all ties with Galamus. He no longer cared about either the quality or the mission of the site.

The three authors on the left who wrote opinion pieces on the incident are split on the issue. Péter S. Földi and György Adorján condemn those democratic politicians who try to make deals behind the backs of others. It is only TGM, who specializes in contrary opinions on practically everything, who thinks that Lengyel is a private individual and as such has the right to meet with anyone he wants. Moreover, he looks upon Gyurcsány’s indignation as “an attack against intellectuals,” an act that foreshadows hard times to come. I’m not quite sure what TGM has in mind.

All these attempts, especially by the two tiny parties Együtt and Párbeszéd, to get rid of Gyurcsány are not just a waste of time but incredibly harmful. DK voters are devoted to the head of their party. They are not going to abandon him and flock to a left-of-center group that excludes their leader. And no election can be won without Gyurcsány and DK. All these meetings are really “much ado about nothing,” with the terrible side effect of shaking the little confidence left-wing voters still have in the opposition. The poll the smaller parties cite to bolster their claim about Gyurcsány’s standing with the voters is fallacious, as I pointed out earlier in one of my posts. Most Hungarians who would vote for a left political conglomerate don’t care one way or the other about the makeup of the joint party list. As for the undecided voters, only half of them feel strongly about the person of Gyurcsány.

Although there is nothing wrong with outsiders giving advice to politicians, it should be positive, constructive counsel, not counsel that would further split the already fractured Hungarian opposition.

February 7, 2017

“What shall I call you?”* The political system of Viktor Orbán

You may recall that a few days ago I published a lecture of Gábor Demszky, former mayor of Budapest, delivered in the Library of Congress. After the text of the lecture I described an exchange between Anna Stumpf, political attaché of the Hungarian Embassy in Washington, and Gábor Demszky. Stumpf, the daughter of Viktor Orbán’s right hand man during his first administration and today a member of the Constitutional Court, took exception to Demszky’s description of the dire situation of the media in Hungary today when he claimed that in some ways it is less free than it was in the Kádár regime’s last few years. She exclaimed: “You are not serious!” Gábor Demszky’s answer was, “Yes, I’m serious. I lived in it.” Within a couple of days this footnote to Hungarian Spectrum‘s coverage of the lecture made the rounds in the Hungarian media. It made a splash even in the liberal press because the Hungarian opposition doesn’t quite know what to call Viktor Orbán’s political system. Moreover, they are reluctant to describe the “System of National Cooperation” as a regime that is perhaps worse than the “soft dictatorship” of János Kádár. Bálint Magyar and his coauthors from many disciplines describe Viktor Orbán as the Godfather, the leadership of Fidesz and their friends and relatives as mafia, and the political structure as a “mafia state.” The book this group of political scientists, philosophers, economists, and sociologists published became a bestseller in Hungary since it appeared a few weeks ago, and references to the “Hungarian Octopus,” the title of the book, appear frequently in the written and electronic media. Yet some people are not entirely satisfied with the description. There are a few people, especially those who publish mostly in German, who consider Orbán’s system “fascism” pure and simple.  Magdolna Marsovszky is one of the chief proponents of this theory. Only today she commented on an article in the German-language blogPusztaranger, which dealt with a conference organized by the Heinrich Böll Foundation. One of the guests was Attila Vidnyánszky, the new director of the Hungarian National Theater. What Vidnyánszky said at the conference led Pusztaranger to call this new National Theater a “faschistiches Erlösungtheater,” that is, a fascist redemption theater.

A telling pictorial description of the political system of Viktor Orbán. A combination of old socialist and nationalistic sybols

A telling pictorial description of the political system of Viktor Orbán. A combination of old socialist and nationalistic symbols / www.deviant.com

A few days ago Ágnes Heller described the present situation in Hungary as “Bonapartism,” which is defined as “a political movement associated chiefly with authoritarian rule usually by a military leader ostensibly supported by a popular mandate.” When pressed, she elaborated by saying that Bonapartism is at its core striving and acquiring power for its own sake. Moreover, such a system, according to her, cannot come to a resting place, a consolidated state of affairs because the very essence of Bonapartism is the continual striving toward greater and greater power and glory. Such a quest, however, must eventually fail. Society cannot be maintained in a constant state of ideological, national, and social warfare. Others, like János Kornai, agree that Orbán’s system is a dead end but, as he wittily said, one can live on a dead end street for a very long time. A society can live under such circumstances for perhaps decades. That was certainly the case with the Soviet Union. Not a pleasant prospect for those people who believe that Hungary’s future lies with the West, which entails a break with its authoritarian and communist past. It is becoming increasingly obvious that the main outline of Viktor Orbán’s devilish plans for his “revolution” were in the making most likely years before the 2010 electoral victory. László Lengyel, a political commentator and economist, thinks that Orbán and his closest collaborators had a completely defined plan for the political edifice they intended to build way before 2010 because as soon as the first session of parliament gathered, the plan for the System of National Cooperation (Nemzeti Együttműködés Rendszere or NER) was ready for immediate implementation. And commentators are starting to realize that Orbán’s regime is more than populism. The word “dictatorship” is an increasingly common description. There are just too many signs that Orbán’s world bears a suspicious resemblance to the communist times when one had to fear the authorities. Comparisons are made to the Rákosi regime instead of to the milder Kádár era. By the late Kádár period people’s property, for instance, was left alone. One didn’t have to worry that one day some official would arrive and take away one’s car or apartment. But nowadays private property is not at all safe. If the government decides to take away the livelihood of thousands of slot machine owners, it can do it from one day to the next. Or steal millions in savings. It can do it with impunity. Often the goods taken away are passed on to others who are favored by Viktor Orbán and his friends because they are on the right side, the national side. Again, the charge is that a complete change in ownership structure is being contemplated and slowly achieved. Here again the point of comparison is the Rákosi regime. But at least then the state didn’t turn around and sell the confiscated property to its own clients. Then it was done for ideological reasons. And then comes the soul searching. What did we do wrong in 1989-1990? At first, the participants were certain that their peaceful political and economic transition was ideal; it was certainly judged to be the best in the region by outside observers. A lot of people still cling to that belief. But, others argue, perhaps the introduction of a great number of cardinal laws, which need a two-thirds majority to pass, was a mistake. Ágnes Heller charges, not without reason, that the Budapest intellectuals who made up the democratic opposition really didn’t know the people of the country they lived in. Others rightly point out that the democratic education of the population, especially of the youth, was completely neglected. On the other hand, one cannot accuse Viktor Orbán of not knowing his people. He knows them only too well, and this is the key to his success. But more about this tomorrow. —— *I borrowed the title from one of the best known poems of Sándor Petőfi (1823-1849). The original and its English translation can be found here.