Tag Archives: Magyar Demokrata Fórum

Conservative awakening in Hungary

About a year and a half ago I created a folder devoted to “internal divisions” within Fidesz. At that time there were a few signs of differences of opinion among the top Fidesz leaders, which to me signaled the possibility of a chink in the armor of this monolithic party. I was wrong. In no time Lázár, Kövér, Balog, and some others buried the hatchet–if there ever was such a thing as a hatchet in the first place.

This time there can be no question. An internal opposition has emerged, comprised of politicians who had once occupied important positions in Viktor Orbán’s governments. Even earlier, one had the distinct feeling that people like Foreign Minister János Martonyi, who served Viktor Orbán faithfully for eight years, István Stumpf, who served as Minister of the Prime Minister’s Office between 1998 and 2002 and since July 2010 as a Fidesz-appointed member of the Constitutional Court, and Tibor Navracsics, former head of the Fidesz parliamentary delegation (2006-2010), minister of justice and administration, deputy prime minister (2010-2014), who was “exiled to Brussels” in November 2014 to become European commissioner in charge of education, culture, and youth, disapproved of Viktor Orbán’s growing shift to the right, his foreign policy, and his illiberalism. But there was little or no public display of their dissatisfaction. It now looks as if their concerns have become grave enough to overcome their reluctance to turn against the regime they so faithfully supported earlier.

About two weeks ago János Martonyi and István Stumpf delivered lectures at a conference organized by the Hungarian Business Leaders Forum, where  Martonyi took issue with Viktor Orbán’s attachment to “ethnic homogeneity.” In February of this year Viktor Orbán, in a lecture delivered at the Hungarian Chamber of Commerce, had talked quite openly about “safeguarding the ethnic homogeneity” of the country. Later, during his last trip to Poland, at the joint press conference with Prime Minister Beata Szydło, he repeated his vision for Europe and for Hungary that included references to ethnic homogeneity. Martonyi said he couldn’t reconcile Orbán’s concept of ethnically homogeneous nation states with the fact that three or four million Hungarians live outside the country’s present borders. Martonyi is right. Orbán’s ideological struggles with the European Union led him to an irreconcilable contradiction on this issue.

István Stump was even more outspoken. He criticized the limits the Orbán government placed on the competence of the constitutional court. He was specifically talking about the suspension of the court’s competency over economic matters, which he called “an open wound on the body of Hungarian constitutionalism.” He also complained about the practice of retroactive legislation, which “in the long run, eliminates the maneuverability of future governments.”

Then there is Tibor Navracsics, who said that “the Soros Plan is not part of the European Commission’s agenda.” That upset Zsolt Semjén, KDNP deputy prime minister, mightily. In a radio interview he declared that Tibor Navracsics, as a European commissioner, knows that “his colleagues, his surroundings, people as well as organizations, are not only in the hands of George Soros, but also in his pocket.” Semjén accused Navracsics of disloyalty and called on him to decide where his real allegiance lies: with his own country or with the international community. Navracsics didn’t seem to be intimidated and called Semjén’s reaction “hysteria” which leads to wrong political decisions. Semjén’s attacks on Navracsics, however, continue unabated. Only today one could read that Navracsics’s denial of the Soros Plan is being used by the opposition “as a knife in the back of the government.”

One of the harshest critics of the Orbán government is Géza Jeszenszky, minister of foreign affairs in the government of József Antall (1990-1994), who during the first Orbán government (1998-2002) continued his political activities as ambassador to the United States. In 2011 he was named ambassador to Norway and Iceland. In October 2014 he resigned because he disagreed with the government’s attack on the Norway Fund, which achieved nothing and ruined the relations between Norway and Hungary for some time. Jeszenszky is no friend of George Soros who, in his opinion, was “an unfair adversary of the Antall government,” but he finds the anti-Soros campaign “shameful.” He believes that Orbán’s “aggressive” foreign policy is wrong and his pro-Russian orientation dangerous. He gives many interviews in which he doesn’t hide his true feelings about the Orbán government. He even expressed his willingness to help the opposition parties with his advice and support. Naturally, Jeszenszky’s criticisms couldn’t be left unanswered. Tamás Deutsch, a Fidesz member of the European Parliament, described Jeszenszky as being “in a state of political dementia.” Magyar Idők was brief and to the point: “Whoever is (was) Géza Jeszenszky, he should be ashamed of himself.”

Meanwhile, more and more former politicians and professionals who used to work for the Antall and earlier Fidesz governments are ready to join the efforts of the opposition to dislodge the present government. Tamás Mellár, a conservative economist at the University of Pécs who used to work for the Fidesz think tank Századvég, announced his intention to run as an independent candidate for parliament if all the opposition parties would support him. Given the disastrous Fidesz administration in the city, I have no doubt that Mellár could easily win one of the two parliamentary seats from Pécs.

Some of the disenchanted conservatives: Attila Chikán, László Sólyom, and Péter Ákos Bod / Source: Magyar Nemzet

Péter Ákos Bod, minister of industry and trade in the Antall government (1990-1991) and later chairman of the Hungarian National Bank (1991-1994), has been a severe critic of the Orbán government for a couple of years. By now he is openly talking about the need to remove Viktor Orbán from power because he fears economic disaster if the present government prevails. In order to appreciate the significance of Bod’s present stance, one should keep in mind that in 2006, when Viktor Orbán was desperate because he realized that his party might lose the election again, he offered the post of prime minister to Bod between the first and second rounds of election in the hope of reversing the trend. So, Bod’s presence at an LMP event where Bernadett Szél announced the party’s cooperation with a small, right-of-center party called Új Kezdet (New beginning) established by György Gémesi, mayor of Gödöllő since 1994, is significant. It shows Bod’s total disillusionment with Viktor Orbán and his regime. György Gémesi’s decision to work together with LMP is also noteworthy. Gémesi was once an important MDF leader.

Analysts have been saying for years that the Orbán regime cannot be removed only by the left-of-center parties. Disappointed Fidesz voters who most likely would never vote for MSZP or DK must have their place in the sun. The awakening of these conservatives might be the harbinger of a new, truly right-of-center political formation that could help stop those far-right forces that Fidesz let loose on the country.

October 25, 2017

Sándor Lezsák’s fiefdom in Lakitelek came to an abrupt end

Yesterday several by-elections were held, with mixed results. Here I will concentrate on the election held in Lakitelek, a large village about 30 km from Kecskemét.

Before 1987 few people had ever heard of Lakitelek. But in September 1987 Sándor Lezsák, a minor poet, offered the backyard of his house in the village for the first gathering of anti-communist forces. There they established the Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF). The vast majority of the people who attended this meeting belonged to the Hungarian equivalent of the German Völkisch or the Russian narodnik movement.

Sándor Lezsák, a typical representative of the narodnik (népies) Hungarian literary tradition, has since drifted far to the right. By 2004 he was expelled from MDF, along with some other like-minded politicians. In no time they joined Fidesz as members of a political group they named Nemzeti Fórum.

Lezsák is a great supporter of Turanism, a nationalistic ideology that believes that the Hungarian people migrated from the steppes of Central Asia. A couple of years ago he was the honorary president of Kurultaj, a tribal meeting of Turanian people. A private initiative five or six years ago, this annual event is now sponsored by the Hungarian government and aided by generous grants.

The Hungarian narodniks were always keen on educating talented peasant boys and girls. After 1945 they established so-called people’s colleges, which were forced to close after the 1948 communist takeover. A few years ago Lezsák and his wife established a foundation and began building a people’s college (népfőiskola) of their own. On four hectares the Lezsáks have been erecting an ambitious complex, naturally with generous government grants. In 2015 the Orbán government gave the Lakitelek Népfőiskola 2.3 billion forints. In 2014 the income of the college was 445.7 million, of which 343 million came from the ministry of human resources.

As you can see from the plans, Lakitelek is Lezsák’s Felcsút. When the campus is completed, the college will have a swimming pool, tennis courts, a guest house, café, restaurant, print shop (with a separate building for its publications), gallery, mini golf course, chapel, horse stable, “national statue park,” and, rounding things out in appropriate fashion, yurtas. Classes in Azeri, Bashkir, Belarus, Georgian, Kazakh, Kirgiz, Tatar, Turkmen, Uyghur, and Uzbek are already offered. How much the students will learn in 32 hours of instruction I have no idea, but I have my doubts about the usefulness of Lezsák’s educational methods.

Plans for Sándor Lezsák's very own people's college in Lakitelek

Plans for Sándor Lezsák’s very own people’s college in Lakitelek

Lezsák has been running the show in Lakitelek ever since 1990. In fact, the local internet site is called Lakitelek Lezsák-falva, meaning “the village of Lezsák” where nothing happens without his say so. In the past, the majority of the town council and the mayor were all members of Lezsák’s Nemzeti Fórum, a party with a status similar to that of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Party. It has eight members in parliament within the Fidesz parliamentary caucus. In 2014, however, an unheard-of event took place. A Nemzeti Fórum candidate for mayor lost the election to an independent, Mrs. Anita Kiss-Zoboki. Her margin was slight. Moreover, in the town council Fidesz-NF members remained in the majority. Although Kiss-Zoboki was most accommodating, Lezsák and his men refused to work with her. In fact, when the new mayor asked for an appointment with the great man, he refused to meet with her for six solid months. The situation in Lakitelek began to resemble the one that developed in Esztergom after 2010 when its independent mayor ended up with a totally uncooperative city council with a Fidesz majority. Just like in Esztergom, the Fidesz-NF majority refused to work with the new mayor until, at the end of January, the Fidesz-NF deputy mayor suggested the dissolution of the council and new elections. He sure made a mistake.

First of all, this time 61% of eligible voters cast ballots, as opposed to 45% in 2014. In the October 2014 election Anita Kiss-Zoboki got 867 votes as opposed to her opponent’s 795, a difference of 72 votes. Yesterday she received 1,377 votes; her Fidesz-NF opponent, 827. In the six-member council formed in 2014 there were four Fidesz-NF affiliated members and only two independents. Today all six council members are independents belonging to Kiss-Zoboki’s team. That’s called a rout.

The village is described as politically divided, and therefore articles in local papers that appeared before the election predicted a close contest. The Fidesz-NF leadership in town seemed to be worried because apparently the party’s local supporters distributed phony leaflets trying to tie the independent candidate to Ferenc Gyurcsány. On the leaflets one could see a picture of Anita Kiss-Zoboki with the colors of DK in the background. The ads claimed that if she wins the election the whole town will be full of migrants and same-sex marriages will be allowed.

According to Hírösvény, an internet news site serving Kecskemét and environs, such a huge win was totally unexpected because other left-leaning opposition parties are not at all represented in Lakitelek. Clearly, the people of Lakitelek had had enough of the local politicos acting like medieval barons. The people also realized that voting for a non-Fidesz mayor but allowing a Fidesz-ruled council doesn’t work. The result is a non-functioning local government. And so, while the people of Lakitelek were at it, they got rid of the whole bunch.

May 9, 2016

Viktor Orbán punishes his adversaries

It is dangerous to cross Viktor Orbán. Sooner or later he will get you, if necessary with the help of crooked judges. Here I will tell the story of three people whom Viktor Orbán has been hard at work trying to ruin. One of his foes was acquired only a few months ago when his old friend, Lajos Simicska, turned against him. The other two are Ferenc Gyurcsány and Ibolya Dávid, who have been on Orbán’s black list since at least 2005. These two did something that in Orbán’s book was unforgivable: they were responsible for his failure to win the 2006 national election.

Ibolya Dávid, leader of the Magyar Demokrata Fórum, became an enemy because of her refusal to run on the same ticket as Fidesz in 2006. She thus deprived Viktor Orbán of those extra votes that were necessary to form a Fidesz government under his premiership.

Gyurcsány’s “crime” was even greater. Orbán noticed early on that Gyurcsány was a talented politician who might be his political opponent one day. And indeed, in 2004 Gyurcsány became prime minister, which was bad enough. But when in the 2006 television debate Gyurcsány decisively beat him, Orbán’s dislike of the man turned into hatred. Orbán was humiliated, and never again was he willing to debate anyone at any time. I’m convinced that from this point on he began assiduously planning the ruination of Gyurcsány, which he has partially managed to achieve by his unrelenting character assassination of the former prime minister, from which he hasn’t been able to recover.

Orbán’s original plan most likely included sending Gyurcsány to jail, and it must have been a great source of frustration that he failed, at least thus far. But if he couldn’t incarcerate Gyurcsány, he could settle for second-best: jailing two officials of the government office that handled the sale of state properties, among them the one that involved a group of foreign businessmen who planned to build a huge casino and wellness complex at Lake Velence, the so-called Sukoro project. Today, in the culmination of a trial that resembled the show trials of the Stalinist period, the two officials were handed very stiff sentences. Miklós Tátrai, the CEO of the company, received four years, and Zsolt Császy, one of the department heads, received three and a half years. They will appeal the verdict.

Tonight, in an interview with ATV, Tátrai revealed that his lawyer had received an informal offer from one of the prosecutors: if Tátrai implicates Ferenc Gyurcsány, he will be acquitted. Since Gyurcsány in no way tried to influence their decision, he naturally refused even to contemplate the offer.

This was obviously a very important case for the Orbán government, and it was one of the first cases sent to a court outside of Budapest, in Szolnok. And the Budapest Appellate Court won’t rule on the case. The next round will be in Szeged. The case may end up in Strasbourg.

Ibolya Dávid, chairman of the right-of-center Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF), agreed to a coalition with Fidesz in 1998 and thus received the post of minister of justice in the first Orbán government. I might add that Fidesz, a macho party, makes no effort whatsoever to put women in leading positions either in the party or in the government. Dávid’s experience with Viktor Orbán and the Fidesz leadership between 1998 and 2006 must have been so negative that in 2006 MDF decided to brave the election on its own, despite the considerable pressure on them to support Viktor Orbán. To the great surprise of political commentators, Dávid’s moderate conservative party received  5.04% of the votes and could form a caucus with 11 members. If the MDF leadership had agreed to a joint ticket, Orbán could have formed a government with 107 members. The socialists (MSZP) and liberals (SZDSZ) won 103 seats.

From that point on, Orbán was out to get Ibolya Dávid and MDF. By 2010 he succeeded. MDF managed to get only 2.67% of the votes, and by now MDF is gone. The party was undermined from the inside. Fidesz offered all sorts of enticements, including financial rewards, to people in the MDF leadership who were ready to be secret agents of Fidesz and turn against Dávid. Unfortunately for Fidesz, as a side issue of another piece of Fidesz “dirty business,” which involved spying on the National Security Office, it came to light that Fidesz wanted to pay off a young MDF politician to run against Ibolya Dávid and thus split the party. This was in 2008. The court case has been dragging on ever since. Although Ibolya Dávid and Károly Herényi, the leader of the MDF caucus, were the victims, during the course of the trial they became the culprits. I wrote several articles on UD Zrt., the company Fidesz used to spy on the government, and how Fidesz turned the tables on the MDF leaders. After innumerable court appearances, today the judge decided to “reprimand” Dávid and Herényi, whatever that means. Surely, not even this kangaroo court could find them guilty. So they came up with something called “megróvás” (admonition/reprimand). Both the prosecution and the defense will appeal.

They are supposed to be removed altogether

They are supposed to be removed altogether

And finally, we have the case of Lajos Simicska. In the last few months we have been witnessing Viktor Orbán’s efforts to ruin Simicska financially. Again, I wrote several posts on the subject. The latest is that István Tarlós, the mayor of Budapest, decided to break a long-term contract with one of Simicska’s firms–Mahir Cityposter. In 2006 Simicska’s firm acquired the right to provide the city with 761 large, cylindrical advertising surfaces. The contract was good for 25 years. According to the terms of the contract, Mahir was supposed to pay the city 15% of its profits or at least 45 million forints per year. Now, nine years later, the city fathers came to the conclusion that the deal was tilted in Cityposter’s favor and that if the city itself took over these advertising surfaces it would make between 73 and 125 million forints. Surely, this sudden discovery was inspired by Viktor Orbán’s anti-Simicska campaign.

I should point out that Simicska acquired these large cylinders back in 1994. Simicska, who at that point handled Fidesz’s finances, saw the importance of owning advertising surfaces in cities all over the country to give Fidesz advertisement opportunities at a lower price than that offered to the opposition parties. But that was a long time ago. The situation after the Simicska-Orbán falling out is entirely different.

In brief, don’t cross Viktor Orbán. He is a vindictive man who can now use even the Hungarian judicial system to ruin his adversaries. It is a sad day for Hungarian jurisprudence.

The factious Hungarian opposition

Yesterday by 11 a.m. it became clear that there was no chance of an electoral alliance between the socialists and the representatives of the Demokratikus Koalíció. Perhaps there never was because, although Attila Mesterházy only a few hours before this final meeting gave a 50-50 chance of reaching an understanding, I suspect that the decision had already been reached to reject the DK proposals.

Shortly before the meeting Mesterházy claimed that his party hadn’t formulated its position on Ferenc Gyurcsány’s participation in the campaign and his advocacy of a common party list. However, most of the DK demands eventually put forth had been known for at least a week, and I assume that the socialist leadership was fully aware that Gyurcsány’s person would be on the agenda in one way or the other.

As it turned out, DK had seven demands: (1) there should be joint MSZP-DK candidates; (2) the number of districts should be based on the principle of proportionality; (3) DK should receive nine districts, three of which should be winnable, three hopeless, and three uncertain; (4) on the list a DK candidate should occupy every eighth place, again on the basis of proportionality; (5) the person of the candidate should be decided by each party; (6) MSZP should receive the first and DK the second place on the list although if MSZP doesn’t accept this DK is ready to consider their counter-proposal;  (7) DK’s top place on the list should go to the chairman of DK. So, DK was not adamant about the second place but certainly wanted Gyurcsány to be on the best DK place whichever that would be.

MSZP wasn’t in a negotiating mood. Their demands reminded me of Austria-Hungary’s ultimatum to Serbia in 1914, which was formulated in such a way that the Monarchy knew that there was no way Serbia could accept it. MSZP offered four districts to DK, none of which was winnable. Instead of every eighth place on the list, MSZP was only willing to place a DK candidate in every twenty-fifth. According to electoral mathematics, the largest number of seats the opposition can win from the list is fifty, which would mean that only one or two DK candidates would receive mandates. In addition, DK couldn’t represent its own political ideas and would have to follow the MSZP-Együtt14 line. MSZP didn’t want anything to do with Gyurcsány and, when pressed, it turned out that they also didn’t want to see Ágnes Vadai, Csaba Molnár, or László Varju anywhere near the campaign. (In addition to Gyurcsány these three people represent DK in the Hungarian media.) MSZP would have veto power over any candidate put forth by DK but DK wouldn’t have the same veto power over the MSZP candidates. This was unacceptable to the DK negotiating team.

If you recall, MSZP in January was the prime proponent of joint action with all democratic parties and groups while Együtt 2014 was stepping back from close cooperation with MSZP. They were undoubtedly afraid that Attila Mesterházy was planning to seize the opportunity to lead the future coalition. E14 decided to postpone further negotiations in the hope of gathering more support. Precious months were wasted in what turned out to be a futile effort. So, came the compromise agreement of no common list but common candidates. Some politically savvy people consider the agreement a very good idea while others view it as a failure and an indication of weakness and discord.

Együtt 2014 with its 6% of the electorate came out the real winner with 31 districts. MSZP didn’t fare as well (75 districts), especially since it was the socialists’ burden to reach an understanding with the other smaller parties. Of the three parties only DK has measurable support. We are talking about 100,000-150,000 voters for DK while MSZP has about 1.2 million. If we look only at these numbers DK’s demands sound reasonable. The real aim of the opposition, however, is to convince the large block of undecided voters. We don’t know the party preferences of about 40% of the electorate. The opposition parties’ real goal is to attract this large group to their ranks.

And here the socialists and E14 are convinced that if they embrace Ferenc Gyurcsány and DK they will attract fewer people from the ranks of the undecided. József Tóbiás in an interview yesterday disclosed that the party had conducted a poll that was designed to measure the effect of cooperation between MSZP and DK. The poll revealed to the party leadership that they would lose more votes with Gyurcsány than they would gain. This finding lay behind their decision. If this poll correctly measures the effect of a joint MSZP-DK ticket, then MSZP’s decision was logical. Of course, we know how a wrongly formulated question can distort the results.

Naturally this poll reflects only the current situation. One doesn’t know how MSZP’s rather abrupt negative attitude toward the other parties and groups will affect MSZP’s standing or the electorate’s attitude toward DK. It is possible that they will consider MSZP too high-handed and uncompromising and DK an underdog. They may think that MSZP is not serious about unity, not resolute enough in its determination to unseat Viktor Orbán and Fidesz.

opinion pollOne could also ask MSZP whether the poll inquired about those possible voters who under no circumstances would vote for MSZP, because apparently they are also numerous. What about those who think of E14 as a party with no well defined political agenda? Only yesterday Szabolcs Kerék Bárczy, the last spokesman of Ibolya Dávid’s MDF, complained about Együtt 2014’s lack of political coherence. He pointed out that although E14’s avowed aim is to attract liberal conservatives, there is not one conservative in its ranks. Moreover, how can these people be attracted to a group whose members often applaud Orbán’s nationalization or who make statements against free markets and competition? Kerék Bárczy is thinking here of some people in the PM group with their decidedly leftist views of the world. Liberal conservatives, he says, will not vote for either E14 or MSZP. Because it looks as if MSZP is going to make a sharp turn to the left since some party leaders claim that MSZP’s failure stemmed from its move toward liberalism under Ferenc Gyurcsány’s chairmanship.

Kerék Bárczy doesn’t understand why MSZP nine months before the elections suddenly stiffened its attitude and refused to negotiate with anyone. He puts forward the question: what will happen if the poll numbers change as a result of these failed negotiations and a serious attempt by DK to attract more followers? What will E14 and MSZP do? Renegotiate their agreement? It will be difficult to change course without losing face.

The director of a new research institute on the history of the regime change in Hungary

Although I’m going to talk about a historical research institute today, this post is not really about history. Far from it. It is about politics. Dirty politics. About a government that wants to recast recent political events in the light of its own ideology. About the falsification of history, if you want.

What am I talking about? The Orbán government set up yet another research institute, this one under the direct control of the Office of the Prime Minister. Viktor Orbán himself chose its first director. The institute, with the cumbersome name Rendszerváltás Történetét Kutató Intézet és Archívum (Research Institute and Archives for the Study of the Regime Change), will have 20 associates and a budget of 360 million forints just for the next six months. According to some articles I read on the subject, there was only one application for the director’s position that was submitted according to specifications, that of Zoltán Bíró, a literary historian whose field of study is Endre Ady’s poetry.

Who is this man? Those who aren’t familiar with the cast of characters in the regime change or aren’t diligent readers of Magyar Hírlap or don’t watch Echo TV might never have heard his name. Zoltán Bíró likes to describe himself as “the first chairman of Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF).” Almost every article about him and his new institute describes him as such. Actually, the first chairman of MDF was József Antall, who was elected to the post in October 1989. Bíró was managing director of the party between March and October 1989.

He had another occasion to become well known in those years. In April 1988 he together with Mihály Bihari, later chief justice of the Constitutional Court, László Lengyel, economist and publicist, and Zoltán Király, a journalist, was expelled from MSZMP. The four told their sad tale in a book entitled Kizárt a párt (I was expelled from the party).

Bíró’s political views are of the far-right variety. He is also an expert on weaving elaborate conspiracy theories. He has a chip on his shoulder because after the appearance of József Antall he lost his bid for party leadership. He began circulating stories in which he intimated that perhaps József Antall “was sent by someone” and those someones might have been the communists who found in Antall a man with whom they could do business.

Contemporaries describe Bíró as a man who sowed the seeds of mistrust and later even hatred between the narodnik-populists (népi-nemzeti) and the urbanites, whom he liked to identify as Jewish intellectuals. According to Zoltán Ripp (Rendszerváltás Magyarországon, 1987-1990, 2006), Bíró accused them of disseminating false information about the gathering of men and women in Lakitelek, in the backyard of Sándor Lezsák, describing it as a meeting of anti-Semites. There were references to a New York Times article, but I couldn’t find it.

In any case, by 1991 Bíró left MDF and together with Imre Pozsgay, a high-level MSZMP politician, established the short-lived National Democratic Alliance. From the beginning it was clear that Bíró really didn’t want to dismantle the Hungarian communist party (MSZMP) but rather to forge an alliance between the “népi-nemzeti” members of MSZMP, like himself and Pozsgay, and the narodnik groups outside of the party that included such men as István Csurka, Sándor Lezsák, and Sándor Csoóri.

He remains a critic of the change of regime and the decision to work out the details of this new regime with all political forces, including the reform wing of MSZMP. Something went wrong, Bíró claims, and he thus rather forcefully rejects the whole period that resulted from that historic compromise.

Imre Pozsgay and Zoltán Bíró at the Convention of the National Democratic Allice, 1991 / MTI

Imre Pozsgay and Zoltán Bíró at the Convention of the National Democratic Alliance, 1991 / MTI

I suspect, therefore, that he and his colleagues in this new institute will reject the very idea of real regime change in 1990. He will most likely claim that the communists actually preserved their rule intact. I furthermore assume that this interpretation will meet with Viktor Orbán’s approval, since he often talked about the past twenty or so years as chaotic and ideologically confusing. The line between dictatorship and democracy was not clear. I’m sure he would like to have it in writing, the product of “serious” research by a “recognized” historical institute, that real regime change came only in 2010.

János Kenedi, a historian of this period and a member of the democratic opposition in the 1980s, summarized the task of the institute as “to show that Orbán’s view of the regime change is the correct one and that there was actually no regime change between 1987 and 1990.”

All that is bad enough, but according to Sándor Révész, Bíró is also no friend of western multi-party democracy. In his book entitled Saját utam (My own road), he makes that clear, expressing as well his hatred of liberals and liberalism. In 2009 in Magyar Hírlap he stated that Fidesz should even use “dictatorial instruments because one should honor and consider sacred the existence of the nation and not the doctrine of democracy and freedom.” So, concludes Révész, “the official history of the change of regime will be in the hands of someone who thinks that dictatorship is a suitable instrument in the service of the nation while democracy and freedom harms it.”

Another perfect appointment of Viktor Orbán. Another blow for historiographical integrity.