Tag Archives: Nándor Csepreghy

Viktor Orbán is losing his cool

Trump’s uncontrolled outbursts seem to be contagious. While in the past Viktor Orbán showed considerable restraint when giving interviews or answering opposition members of parliament, in the last couple of weeks he has given vent to his frustration and anger.

Friday, during his regular morning radio interview, he lashed out against the European Commission, repeating himself, calling the legal opinion released by the European Commission an object of derision, a document that one cannot discuss without laughing. If Hungary accepted this document, it would become the laughing stock of Europe. He went on and on. Then yesterday, he accused Ákos Hadházy (LMP), who has spent years fighting the endemic corruption of the Orbán regime, of corruption himself. Pressured by the European Commission and by Hadházy’s dogged pursuit of his government’s systemic corruption, Orbán no longer seems capable of exercising self-control.

I have been following Ákos Hadházy’s political career ever since he first appeared on the national scene. He reported on a local corruption case in Szekszárd, a small town, where he was a Fidesz member of the city council. Since then, Hadházy, now co-chair of LMP, has focused on uncovering corruption cases. Just the other day, he said in an interview that he had held more than 80 “corruption infos.” Once a week he stands in front of the cameras and reports on yet another horrendous case. Each of these cases involves millions if not billions of forints. Hadházy estimates that in the last seven years the “Fidesz clientele” stole about three trillion forints of the subsidies Hungary received from the European Union. In his assessment, all work performed is at least 30% overpriced.

Lately, Hadházy has been working on two cases, both involving healthcare. The first one was a program that was supposed to set up “mentor houses” for premature babies and their parents in Szeged, Kecskemét, and Gyula. A foundation was established for the purpose, called “I Arrived Early Foundation,” which received 1.2 billion forints from the European Union. Since it was such a large project, Hadházy asked for details. It turned out that less than half of the money was allocated to the program itself. The rest was designated for the maintenance of the foundation. Money was spent on most likely overpriced rentals, legal advice, laptops, telephones, several printers, and very high salaries for the “coordinators,” while the 40 mentors received only about 50,000 forints a month.

It turned out that two other very similar projects received about half the amount that “I Arrived Early Foundation” got, and they managed quite well. Mind you, they didn’t pay 50 million forints for “legal advice.” In fact, they got along just fine without it. While a methodology study cost the “I Arrived Early Foundation” 50 million, the other foundation managed to get one for 8 million.

Hadházy stirred up a hornet’s nest by investigating this particular foundation. János Lázár’s wife is one of the board members of the foundation, and Hadházy suspected that the unusually generous financial support given to the foundation was not entirely independent of Mrs. Lázár’s presence there. Soon after the “corruption info” in which Hadházy announced the foundation’s suspicious expenditures, he found himself in the crosshairs of Zoltán Balog’s ministry, which awarded the money to the foundation, and the Office of the Prime Minister, headed by János Lázár. Nándor Csepreghy, Lázár’s deputy, assisted by the government paper, Magyar Idők, led the attack. Magyar Idők published several articles accusing Hadházy of being a heartless man who compared these premature babies to newborn puppies. Hadházy, who is a vet in private life, did in fact compare the weights of some of these babies to newborn puppies, and he was quite accurate. A newborn puppy is about 500 grams, just like the smallest premature baby. Csepreghy, in defense of his boss, called Hadházy an “ignorant scoundrel.” Lázár at one point offered his wife’s retirement from the foundation, but as far as I know nothing of the sort happened. Naturally, the foundation explained away all of its expenses.

The second case was even more clear cut. The National Healthcare Services Center (Állami Egészségügyi Ellátó Központ/ÁEEK) issued a tender for several ventilators. General Electric and three Hungarian firms submitted bids. The Hungarian firms were actually just wholesalers, and their bids were a great deal higher than General Electric’s. The three Hungarian firms offered to sell the ventilators for a price between 1.7 and 1.9 billion forints as opposed to GE’s offer of 1 billion forints. ÁEEK tailored the tender in such a way that only one bidder could win the tender. Predictably, GE lost the bid, but the company decided not to take the decision lying down. The American firm turned to the Public Procurement Authority (Közbeszerzési Döntőbizottság), which ruled in GE’s favor. ÁEEK had to pay 50 million forints. Bence Rétvári, undersecretary in the ministry of human resources, subsequently denied that the procurement was rigged.

Ákos Hadházy addressing Viktor Orbán in Parliament / Source: ATV

The GE affair was the topic of Ákos Hadházy’s weekly corruption info. János Lázár seemed to agree with Hadházy that those who were involved in the case must be investigated. So, emboldened by Lázár’s reaction, Hadházy brought up the case in parliament yesterday when Viktor Orbán by house rules had to be present and was obliged to answer questions. Hadházy asked the prime minister who was right: János Lázár or Bence Rétvári. Orbán flew off the handle. He accused Hadházy of lobbying for GE. “A representative stands up in the Hungarian Parliament lobbying for a company. How much money did you receive for this? How dare you? How dare you lobby for a company in the Hungarian Parliament during an ongoing public procurement? Especially, on behalf of a foreign company. Now, I have been sitting here for many years, but I have not seen a case more corrupt than this, shame on you!” He also ordered an “investigation” of Hadházy right on the spot.

Hadházy doesn’t seem to be intimidated. He will sue Orbán for slander. Otherwise, he wrote a defiant note on his Facebook page in which he pointed out that Orbán, with his outburst, “kicked a three-meter self-goal” by calling attention to the fact that they want to steal billions from the “dying hospitals.” He said that Orbán’s claim of “an ongoing public procurement” is a lie since the Public Procurement Authority already closed the case. Otherwise, he is looking for the day when Orbán will have to apologize to him. Well, in his place I wouldn’t hold my breath.

October 10, 2017

Metro 4: The largest case of Hungarian fraud and corruption

Now that the complete OLAF report is available online, we can all settle down and try to read 103 pages of dense prose detailing “irregularities, fraud, corruption, and misappropriation of EU funds.” A five-member OLAF group began their investigation in January 2012 after the Court of Auditors and the Directorate General for Regional and Urban Policy of the European Commission contacted OLAF, asking the office to scrutinize the case. During the investigation, the OLAF staff got in touch with only the City of Budapest and Péter Medgyessy, prime minister of Hungary between 2002 and 2004, whose consulting firm worked for Alstom Transport S.A., one of the firms accused of wrongdoing.

The total cost of the project was €1,747,313,606, of which €696,490,000 came from the Cohesion Fund. According to OLAF’s calculation, “the financial impact on the Cohesion Fund is €227,881,690.”

The release of OLAF’s final report put an end to the political game Fidesz and the Orbán government had been playing with the document. János Lázár, head of the prime minister’s office, and his deputy, the honey-tongued Nándor Csepreghy, did their best to get as much political mileage from the affair as possible. Lázár intimated that an international socialist-liberal conspiracy was behind the corruption that occurred at the Metro 4 project. On another occasion, he claimed to have filed charges against Gábor Demszky, mayor of Budapest between 1990 and 2010, Csaba Horváth, deputy mayor between 2006 and 2009, and János Atkári, an adviser to Demszky. Csepreghy must have known that none of these people was mentioned in the document, but in a long interview at 888.hu he intimated that even Ferenc Gyurcsány, prime minister between 2004 and 2009, may have shared responsibility for the misappropriation of funds. A few days later he claimed that other politicians might also be implicated.

All this is just political fluff. What we know from the OLAF report is that the City of Budapest signed a contract in 2004 with Budapesti Közlekedési Vállalat (BKV), the city-owned transit authority, which was commissioned to implement the project. Most likely that was a major mistake, which led to a lot of difficulties later. Any project, especially such a large one as the construction of a metro, needs a general contractor who oversees the project. BKV’s staff was not equipped to coordinate the work, which led to innumerable hiccups during construction.

Throughout the project the Hungarian media, especially the online site Index, reported many suspicious cases of overspending. But these cases were actually small potatoes, like too many consulting firms and lawyers making millions for very little work. Although several such cases are described in the final report, the bulk of the money OLAF would now like to be returned came from serious irregularities during the acquisition of tenders by huge corporations.

According to OLAF, 96% of the “irregularities” occurred in contracts signed by six large firms: Siemens AG, the largest manufacturing and electronics company in Europe; Swietelsky, an Austrian construction company from Linz; Strabag, the largest construction company in Austria, based in Villach; a Hungarian company called Hídépítő Zrt., which as its name indicates builds bridges and roads; the BAMCO consortium (Vinci CGP, Strabag, Hídépítő Zrt); and Alstom, the French multinational company operating worldwide in rail transport, including the manufacture of metro trains.

I left Alstom to last because it was in regard to Alstom that OLAF got in touch with Péter Medgyessy, who received €600,000 in 2007-2008 from Alstom for two years of consulting. This payment occurred after Alstom had won the tender with apparently the worst offer. Medgyessy naturally claims that his consulting firm had nothing to do with the Alstom case, adding that it is a well-known fact that his relationship with Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány and the liberal SZDSZ leadership of the City of Budapest was strained. What his relationship with Gyurcsány had to do with BKV deciding to purchase overpriced Alstom cars is beyond me. I have no idea whether in a court of law Medgyessy would be found innocent or not, but in ethical terms his behavior was highly suspect.

Siemens, the German company which was in charge of electrical works, received 31.7 billion forints (€102,303,730) for the job. Since OLAF claims that Siemens most likely received inside information during the bidding process, the European Union wants the Hungarian government to pay back the whole amount. The same is true of Alstom’s 22.9 billion forint (€73,892,769) tender. BAMCO also won the tender in an irregular manner, and therefore the European Union demands the return of 8 billion forints (€25,817,360). The EU also demands 7.6 billion forints (€24,523,364) from Swietelsky, which was responsible for the interior of the metro stations. Strabag-Hídépítő, in charge of structural work on the station at Baross Square, received 3.7 billion forints for its work but because of procurement irregularities 2.5 billion forints (€8,067,751) should be returned.

Another politician who, although not mentioned by name, was most likely involved in the metro case is László Puch, former financial director of MSZP, whose company Media Magnet Kft. just purchased the ailing Népszava and Vasárnapi Hírek. Media Magnet, according to the OLAF report, received 331 million forints (€1,068,110) from Siemens for advertising. The report notes that “this company was in charge of the campaign of the political party which was in a decision-making position in the case of Metro 4.” In 2010 Index reported that BKV ordered all sorts of superfluous studies from Media Magnet on such things as, for example, the state of the cable television market. There is a strong suspicion that some of this money ended up in MSZP’s coffers.

The biggest culprits will most likely be found among the representatives of the named companies and those BKV officials who were in contact with them. There’s no question that the guilty parties should be punished, but judging from the outcomes of earlier corruption cases I have my doubts that we will ever hear about all the dirt that OLAF unearthed. I’m also pretty sure that Fidesz will try its darndest to drag high-level politicians into the morass around BKV.

I see that Gábor Demszky will be represented by György Magyar, one of the “star lawyers” in the country. On February 3 Magyar announced on ATV that Demszky had signed only three contracts during the many years of construction. One was the contract between the city and the government in which the parties agreed that 79% of the construction cost would be borne by the government and the rest by the City of Budapest. The second contract dealt with a loan the City had to obtain for the project. The third was the contract that gave full authority to BKV for the implementation of the project.

Fidesz naturally wants to have a parliamentary investigation into the case, which will lead to further accusations on both sides. If Hungary had a decent prosecutor’s office and an independent chief prosecutor, it should undertake a speedy, thorough, unbiased investigation of the case. Unfortunately, this is the last thing we can hope for under the present circumstances.

February 6, 2017

The perils of being an opposition politician in Hungary

I don’t know whether I will be able to make a coherent story out of the mess the Orbán government most likely has purposefully created regarding the report of the European Commission’s European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) on irregularities—fraud and possible corruption—in connection with the construction of Budapest’s fourth metro line (M4). The report covered the period between 2006 and 2015.

Although the Hungarian government received the OLAF report—or its English-language summary, the Hungarian public heard about it only from the English-language news site Politico. It didn’t take long before the Fidesz government and the Fidesz-led City of Budapest, on the one hand, and the politicians of the socialist-liberal government of the pre-2010 period, on the other, were at each other’s throats. The government claimed that practically all the financial wrongdoings were committed before 2010 while the opposition politicians accused the Orbán government of making political hay out of the case while refusing to make the report public. The administration claimed that it has no authority to release OLAF’s findings.

Most likely because of the holiday season at the end of the year, for about a month not much happened. Then, on January 16, János Lázár officially announced that he will file a complaint against Gábor Demszky (SZDSZ), mayor of Budapest between 1990 and 2010, Csaba Horváth (MSZP), deputy mayor between 2006 and 2009, and János Atkári, a highly respected economist who for many years served as Gábor Demszky’s financial adviser. That announcement started an avalanche of often conflicting articles in the Hungarian media.

A day after Lázár’s announcement, his deputy Nándor Csepreghy gave a detailed press conference dealing with the Metro4 corruption case. The government found MTI’s report of that press conference so important that it was immediately translated into English. We learned from Csepreghy that the Fidesz government had had its own suspicions of fraud surrounding the project even before. The OLAF report only confirmed these suspicions.

Csepreghy disclosed a few relevant facts that might help our understanding of the case. For example, he revealed that the investigators of OLAF conducted interviews with 50 individuals, “including the competent executives and managers” of the Budapest Transit Authority (BKV) and the City of Budapest. In addition, Csepreghy named a few companies that had been involved in the construction of the metro line as possible culprits. He also gave the initials of certain individuals heading large public and private companies. Finally, he said that “there are dozens of actors mentioned in the report who were politicians, were associated with the realm of politics, or operated as semi-public actors.” Finally, he told the press that the “government’s legal advisers are currently looking into the possibility of disclosing the OLAF report to the public in its entirety, to which the Government is fully committed.”

Nándor Csepreghy at the press conference / Photo: Tamás Kovács (MTI)

Although the government filed a complaint against Demszky, Horváth, and Atkári, they weren’t among the individuals Csepreghy referred to by their initials. A Magyar Idők editorial found Demszky’s absence from the list especially regrettable. The former mayor will get off scot-free because “according to rumors, his name doesn’t appear to be in the report.” Only the CEOs of large companies will be prosecuted. But what will happen if they reveal “the name of the chief coordinator”? In brief, the journalist responsible for this editorial accuses Gábor Demszky of being the head of a conspiracy to commit fraud.

Meanwhile Hungarian members of the European Parliament decided to look into the question of whether the Hungarian government told the truth when it claimed that it needed the approval of OLAF to release the report and that it was waiting for OLAF’s response to its request. All three opposition MEPs–Csaba Molnár (DK), Benedek Jávor (Párbeszéd), and István Ujhelyi (MSZP)–asked the head of OLAF, Giovanni Kessler, about OLAF’s position. All three claimed that, according to the information they received, it was up to the Hungarian government whether to release the document or not. Since there is a controversy over the meaning of the information received, I will rely on Ujhelyi’s statement, which includes the original English-language letter he received from OLAF. Here is the crucial passage:

In response to your question, since the OLAF final report has now reached its intended recipients, the Office is not in a position to decide on the possible release of the report. Such a decision belongs in the first place to the national authorities to which the report was addressed. It is for these authorities to assess the impact of a possible release of the report and to ensure compliance with the relevant legal obligations on judicial secrecy, data protection and procedural rights, including the right of access to file.

It is hard to fathom why the Orbán government again resorted to lying instead of appealing to the possible legal problems that could stem from the release of the report. Since then, Attila Péterfalvi, president of the National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information, personally asked István Tarlós, who by now has a copy of the document, not to make the OLAF report public. It looks as if Péterfalvi, before making this request, consulted with János Lázár of the Prime Minister’s Office and Péter Polt, the chief prosecutor, who are both against the release. Although there might be compelling legal reasons not to allow the publication of the OLAF report, given the reputation of Péter Polt’s prosecutor’s office one cannot help being skeptical about the real reasons for the secrecy.

Over the weekend Gábor Demszky gave an interview to Vasárnapi Hírek in which he detailed his position on the case. Demszky said that, according to the rules of the Council of Europe and the European Parliament, OLAF must give anyone mentioned in their investigative reports the opportunity to respond. Since no one contacted Demszky, Horváth or Atkári, it is probably safe to assume that they are not the subjects of the investigation. Even so, the Orbán government filed complaints against them. Demszky also said that because OLAF conducted its investigation between 2012 and 2016, “most of their information came from the offices of the Fidesz government.” OLAF, Demszky added, most likely accepted the information in good faith because its investigators don’t expect these offices to be swayed by political pressure.

I might add that one has to be very careful when assessing the veracity of witness testimony. We know from other politically motivated trials that witnesses often give false testimony. The most infamous was that of Zsolt Balogh, head of BKV. In order to save himself months of pre-trial custody, he invented the story that Miklós Hagyó (MSZP), one of the deputy mayors, demanded 40 million forints, to be delivered in a Nokia box.

The opposition parties are truly worried about the prospect of years of investigation by politically motivated Hungarian prosecutors. Even though in the past most defendants were eventually exonerated, they remained in limbo for years and their careers were ruined. We must also keep in mind that although OLAF has filed scores of such reports on cases involving fraudulent procurement practices, only four guilty verdicts have been handed down in the last almost seven years. Some cases, like that involving Orbán’s son-in-law, were unceremoniously dropped. The prosecutors’ sudden interest in this case indicates to me that they think they can use it to do damage to the opposition, one way or another. Evidence of culpability has never been the litmus test for deciding which cases to pursue.

January 30, 2017

An EU prosecutor’s office would be a heavy blow to Viktor Orbán

I don’t think that anyone familiar with the Hungarian situation can doubt the economic ramifications of the institutionalized corruption of the Orbán regime. It retards growth and competitiveness and distorts the market economy.

A significant source for this institutionalized stealing is the EU’s convergence funds. Across the EU approximately 50 billion euros in funds distributed to member states is lost to fraud. The problem is especially acute in the former Soviet satellite countries: Bulgaria, Romania, and Hungary. The European Commission’s European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) gathers evidence of financial misconduct and prepares hundreds of judicial recommendations, but the prosecution rate is only about 30%.

If you think that this rate is pitifully low, you should take a look at the Hungarian situation. In 2015 OLAF investigated 17 suspicious cases, of which 14 were deemed serious enough for the organization to suggest that financial penalties be paid by the Hungarian government. As far as I could ascertain, in no case did the Hungarian prosecutors move a finger.

Yet hardly a day goes by without news of corruption. Ákos Hadházy, co-chair of LMP who has done the most to unearth corruption, asked Péter Polt, the chief prosecutor, to reveal the number of cases prosecuted since 2011. The answer was staggering. In only four cases did prosecutors bring charges. In monetary terms, in comparison to the billions most likely stolen, the sums involved were peanuts. According to their findings, the financial loss to the European Union was only 286 million forints, or 917,030 euros. Even though every day Hungary receives about two billion forints in EU convergence funds. Several notorious cases, like the street lighting business of Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s son-in-law, were simply dropped.

For the EU, setting up a new organization–the European Public Prosecutor’s Office or EPPO–to investigate the fraudulent misuse of EU funds and inter-state or so-called carousel fraud is becoming an urgent task. In December I devoted a post to the subject, in which I reported first the reluctance and later the refusal of the Hungarian government to accept such a supranational body. We heard the old refrain: “the sovereignty of Hungarian prosecution might be undermined.” Moreover, goes the argument, since the Hungarian chief prosecutor is appointed by parliament, there might also be a constitutional problem. The latter excuse is truly laughable: almost never does the need for an amendment to the constitution cause any problem for the Orbán government.

Knowing the government’s heavy reliance on the good offices of the chief prosecutor in fraud cases, it was inevitable that Hungary would fight tooth and nail against EPPO. In the last couple of days the issue emerged again after an informal meeting of the justice ministers in Malta. Seventeen countries indicated they would participate in so-called “enhanced cooperation,” which is a procedure whereby a minimum of nine EU countries are allowed to establish advanced integration or cooperation within EU structures without the other EU countries being involved. Five countries, among them Hungary and Poland, opted out.

Justice Minister László Trócsányi self-righteously announced after the meeting that the Hungarian government’s main concern with setting up an EU public prosecutor’s office is its fear of weakening such institutions as Eurojust and OLAF, neither of which has prosecutorial powers. The former is merely a coordinating body that is supposed to improve the handling of serious cross-border crimes by “stimulating” investigative and prosecutorial coordination among agencies of the member states. OLAF can only make recommendations. Trócsányi had the temerity to claim that “these institutions have achieved remarkable results.” In the statement given to MTI, the Hungarian news agency, Trócsányi left open one possibility: “In case they want to establish a European prosecutor’s office, it should be created on the foundation of Eurojust.” As far as Hungary is concerned, “regulating the competence of such a body should require a unanimous vote.” This is in contrast to other countries “who believe that its establishment is possible by a qualified majority.”

Péter Niedermüller, DK member of the European Parliament, somewhat optimistically predicted that “the establishment of EPPO can be delayed but cannot be prevented.” We do know that the EU is reassessing its convergence program, perhaps as a result of all the fraud. Commissioner Věra Jourová, who is in charge of the project, has already indicated that there might be a modification of the rules governing the assignment of EU convergence funds. In plain language, if a member state receives more funds than it contributes to the common purse, it will get less money in the future. The European Parliament can institute “ex ante conditionalities” that would allow for such modifications. That would be a heavy blow to Poland and Hungary, the largest beneficiaries of the convergence funds.

You may have been wondering why I haven’t written about OLAF’s report on its investigation into fraud in the Budapest Metro 4 project, which was reported by Politico at the end of December 2016. It has been heralded as one of the biggest fraud cases ever in the European Union. OLAF recommended the repayment of €228 million to the EC Department of Regional and Urban Policy and €55 million to the European Investment Bank.

Although in the last month the Hungarian media has been full of accusations and counter-accusations, no responsible reporting of the case is possible for the very simple reason that the Hungarian government refuses to make the OLAF document public. As long as we have no idea what is in the document and we have to rely on the interpretations of János Lázár and Nándor Csepreghy, the number one and two men of the Prime Minister’s Office, and Budapest Mayor István Tarlós, who has definite ideas on the subject but admits that he hasn’t seen the report itself, we cannot possibly pass judgment on the case.

The investigation covers the period between 2008 and 2014–that is, two years of the Gyurcsány-Bajnai government and four years of the Orbán administration. The only thing we can say is that it is unlikely that all the fraud took place before 2010 and nothing happened under the new government, which is what the Orbán government claims.

Under the present setup these OLAF reports can be an instrument for political games. The establishment of a supranational European Public Prosecutor’s Office would help prevent the kind of situation that currently exists in Hungary with the latest OLAF report.

January 29, 2017

Corruption in Hungary is a cooperative effort between government and business

Before I return to the continuing saga of the corruption scandal surrounding one of many EU-sponsored projects, I would like to call readers’ attention to a relatively new website, Hírvonal (http://hirvonal.hu/index.html), which in my estimation might be the best newsreader in Hungarian. Unlike other similar Hungarian websites, it is organized along the lines of Google News, but with many extra features that make it more user-friendly. Unlike with Hírkereső, here one can find all the articles on the same topic in one place, which is a great time saver. One can look for domestic, foreign, and economic news as well as separate items on culture, sports, science, literature, home, lifestyle, etc. And what is perhaps its best feature, it has an archives going back to May 1, the day that Hírvonal launched, where one can find all the top news items for any particular day.

And now back to the troubles of Roland Mengyi, the honorable member of the Hungarian parliament. As was expected, Attila Rajnai, the well-known investigative journalist, had more up his sleeve than he let on in his article published in the August 4 edition of 168 Óra. In that article he wrote about Roland Mengyi’s attempted bribery in connection with a 500 million forint grant for a network of social cooperatives, allegedly serving the downtrodden in one of the poorest regions in the country. If the participants had succeeded, practically the entire amount of the grant would have ended up in the hands of corrupt politicians and businessmen.

I summarized the case right after the appearance of the article. At that point there was no direct evidence of Roland Mengyi’s involvement. The transcripts of telephone conversations Rajnai got hold of spoke only about Mengyi in the third person, so Mengyi’s attorney, Barnabás Futó, the super lawyer of Fidesz leaders in trouble, could easily brush the whole affair aside as nothing more than malicious hearsay by two or three crooks from Tiszaújváros. But then came August 11, when Attila Rajnai published his second installment.

There is no longer any question about Roland Mengyi’s involvement in this criminal act. A conversation between Mengyi and one of the accused, who is called Dementor in the transcript, attests to Mengyi’s direct participation in the attempted embezzlement of EU funds. From this conversation it is clear that Mengyi has someone inside the ministry of human resources who is most likely not just his source of information but also part of the ring of conspirators. The conspirators included Mengyi as well as the firm Public Sector Consulting Kft. (KSC), whose employee, Szilvia B., came up with the proposal.

And this is the other bombshell in Rajnai’s second article on the Mengyi case. Public Sector Consulting Kft.’s majority owner is Sándor Holbok, who is described by the media as an “ősfideszes,” or “primordial member,” of the party. Before he began his business activities he was chief-of staff of and adviser to József Szájer, who at that time was an important member of the Fidesz leadership. Holbok has worked with practically all the important Fidesz leaders, including Zoltán Balog. From 2006 he has been working closely with Árpád Habony on campaign issues. A high Fidesz official described him as “a good guy who has been for the longest time one of our contacts between the leadership of the party and the business world.”

János Ádár, Mihály Farkas, László Kövér, Tamás Deutsch, and next to him on the right Sándor Holbok

János Ádár, Mihály Farkas, László Kövér, Tamás Deutsch, and next to him on the right, Sándor Holbok

Ákos Hadházy (LMP), who is the foremost expert by now on Fidesz corruption, claims that Public Sector Consulting Kft. is one of the firms specializing in what Hadházy describes as a racket by which an incredible amount of EU money finds its way into the pockets of project management companies. In a conversation with ATV he told the story of two cases in which Public Sector Consulting Kft. was involved. The municipality of Cece invited KSC and two other companies to bid to manage a program called “Let’s live healthy lives!” which would include screening tests, for which the village received 16 million forints from the European Union. KSC had the winning bid, at 16.2 million forints. Many hundreds of kilometers away the village of Lajoskomárom invited the same three companies to bid on exactly the same project. Again, the winner was KSC for the same amount of money. Neither KSC nor the other two companies had anything to do with the health sector. KSC won bids for all sorts of projects, for example, for water management programs and “human research” projects, whatever that means.

According to Hadházy, this racket works as follows. The ministry writes up a project for which there is no need whatsoever. This project is discussed with one of these project management companies, which then begins to “peddle” the project among those who would like to receive unexpected money for a project dreamed up by the ministry and the project management company. The municipalities are told that these companies will take care of everything, but they will have to get the job. Then comes an open tender, and it is obvious which company will win. Hadházy learned that corruption of this kind reaches as high as the level of undersecretaries, who tell their subordinates to turn a blind eye to these highly suspicious projects.

Although it is the ministry of human resources which is under scrutiny at the moment, Nándor Csepreghy, deputy minister of the prime minister’s office, ended up in the center of the affair for at least two reasons. One is that Szilvia B., the employee of KSC who is now in custody for her role in the Mengyi affair, boasted in one of the transcripts about her excellent relations with Csepreghy, whom she had just met at a party organized for their children. Second, Csepreghy is in charge, as Lázár’s deputy, of the disbursement of EU subsidies. Therefore, he, who unlike other Fidesz politicians is quite willing to give interviews even to opposition television and radio stations, has been talking in the last couple of days at some length about the case. Although he is circumspect in his answers to probing questions, he said yesterday morning on ATV’s Start program that KSC alone has been involved in at least 50-70 projects. Expressing his personal opinion, he announced that he will be “reassured only if the circle of writers of tenders and project managers … will be no more.” Csepreghy claims that during the 2007-2013 cycle these companies stole 1,500 billion forints (5.5 billion dollars). During the same conversation, Csepreghy tried to shift the blame for the incredible corruption that exists around the disbursement of EU funds to the former administrations. He blamed Gordon Bajnai and Klára Dobrev, Ferenc Gyurcsány’s wife. These two people were involved with EU funds, but way before the 2007-2013 cycle that Csepreghy was talking about.

I have no idea when the chief prosecutor will feel compelled to take up this case, but it will be difficult to ignore.

August 12, 2016

Explaining away EU action

I’m not naïve enough to think that politicians and government spokesmen tell the truth and nothing but the truth, but I don’t expect them to lie through their teeth either. In fact, it is very dangerous to resort to outright lies if you are in politics because the likelihood of being found out is pretty high, and in such cases the political fallout can be devastating. Just think of the fate of Richard Nixon. A skillful politician or spokesman would skirt the issue, reveal only a partial truth, or try to minimize the gravity of the situation. Members of the Hungarian government, however, aren’t skillful in this respect. By now, I think, more than half of those Hungarians who are at all interested in politics are convinced that they cannot believe a word they hear from the representatives of their government. Folksy Viktor Orbán doesn’t seem to take to heart the Hungarian proverb about a liar who can be caught more easily than a lame dog.

Indeed, the Orbán crew gets caught right and left but, unlike in other countries where there would be serious consequences of their dishonesty, in Hungary, “the country without consequences,” everything goes on its merry way. Lately, however, there have been too many scandals that need to be covered up, and therefore the job of lying has become increasingly complicated and intricate. Just in the last two days the Orbán government was found to have lied about two different issues. First, Nándor Csepreghy, undersecretary in charge of communication on economic development, lied about the reasons for the European Commission’s official suspension of 700 billion forints in grants designated for the regional development operational program. A day later it was discovered that the Orbán government was most likely aware of financial irregularities at the Quaestor Group already in 2011 and actually stopped an investigation of the firm. Today I will write about the suspension of the EU funds. Tomorrow I will turn to the Quaestor investigation.

Csepreghy has two degrees, one in communication and the other in public relations. He is articulate and even sounds intelligent. He also talks at quite a clip, which is a useful quality in someone who doesn’t always tell the truth. It can be tough to catch the discrepancies.

So, let’s see how Csepreghy explained the reason for the suspension of 700 billion forints to which Hungary was entitled in the regional development operational program. This particular sum was designated for innovation, purchase of machinery, and business infrastructure. Although the money comes from the EU budget allocated for the 2007-2014 period, regulations allow countries to receive and spend money to the end of 2015.

Csepreghy said that the dispute is only over “accounting practices.” The European Commission has an issue with the system of allocating funds that was devised in 2007 during the second Gyurcsány government when Gordon Bajnai was in charge of the EU monies coming to Hungary. Csepreghy further explained that it was in 2014 that the Commission decided to send auditors to Hungary, who “examined thousands of applications” and found the whole system faulty. It didn’t matter how fast Csepreghy tried to speak and how often he repeated that it was all Gyurcsány’s and Bajnai’s fault, those present couldn’t quite understand why the auditors came to check on the tenders only in November 2014 if the Commission had already been aware of the problem in 2010, as Csepreghy claimed. Yes, we know, the “Brussels bureaucrats” are slow, but that slow?

Csepreghy also somewhat carelessly mentioned that the European Commission specifically criticized the Hungarian government’s dissolution of the Nemzeti Fejlesztési Ügynökség (NFÜ/National Development Agency) established in 2007 under the Gyurcsány government. In January 2014 the office of the prime minister took over its duties. In fact, the EU in April 2014 temporarily suspended payments because of its dissatisfaction with the new arrangement.

It didn’t take long, only a few hours, before the document the Hungarian government received from Brussels was leaked. The Demokratikus Koalíció was among the recipients. László Varju, deputy chairman of the party, called a press conference at which he accused of Csepreghy of lying. According to Varju, all the cases mentioned in the document were decided after 2010. It was not the system the Commission criticized but the specific requirements stated in the tenders. They were formulated in such a way that for all intents and purposes only one company could fulfill all of them. So there was no competition. Moreover, the projects were grossly overpriced, on average by 46%.

444.hu also received a copy of the document and published a lengthy summary of it yesterday. Since then the full Hungarian language version of the document has been available online. Unfortunately it is not yet available in English.

So, here is the real story. The auditors came to Hungary in November and randomly chose not thousands but only 55 applications, out of which they found 16, or 29%, unacceptable. It would take too long to report on all the individual cases, so I chose two I found especially outrageous.

One involves Közgép, Lajos Simicska’s company, that won the tender to build a harbor on Csepel Island for 3.6 billion forints. The tender was written in such a way that only Közgép could compete. The government demanded several previous accomplishments that were totally unnecessary to accomplish the job. It wasn’t enough to show that a company had earlier built at least a 2,000 meter network of street lighting; it had to have been done on an “industrial site.” The same was true about a 5,000 m² basalt-concrete facing. The construction of a three kilometer asphalt road also had to be accomplished in an industrial setting. As if there were any difference between roads or lighting inside or outside of an industrial park. But the best was that, in order to get the job, the company had to have built at least 2,000 m. long railroad tracks. There were no railroads anywhere near the harbor. The fine in this case alone is 633 million forints.

The Csepel Harbor

The Csepel Harbor

Even more bizarre was the office furniture ordered for a government government office under the supervision of the ministry of administration and justice to the tune of 4.1 billion forints. What did an applicant have to show to be eligible to compete? The company had to have furnished an office where the project was worth at least 400 million forints. Since the office in question was an area for meeting clients, the company also had to have furnished such an office for 300 million forints. Among these jobs there had to be one with at least 50 workstations. The auditors rightly pointed out that the quality of the furniture to be supplied has nothing to do with the size of earlier orders. The requirements were such that a consortium of seven different companies had to be formed to fulfill all the requirements. The fine here is 1.6 billion forints.

Apparently since November the Hungarian government has been trying to explain the “discrepancies” away, but the Commission wasn’t moved. Once it became clear that the EU could not be persuaded that all was in order, János Lázár decided to be more humble than usual. He is now asking the Commission to help Hungary devise a better method for writing tender requirements. Well, he could start by being honest, but I guess that doesn’t occur to him right off the bat. Honesty, I’m afraid, cannot be learned by basically dishonest people.

The European Union has had enough: No money for a 110 billion project already underway

Not only does Quaestor’s collapse and the government’s involvement in this scandal weigh heavily on the third Orbán government. Viktor Orbán just heard officially that the European Union is refusing to finance a 30 km section of a new Hungarian superhighway, the M4, that would be 230 km long and would lead all the way to the Romanian border just north of Oradea/Nagyvárad. This is a first. And this time there is no possibility of any further negotiations. The project must either be abandoned or be built from purely Hungarian sources. Trying to resubmit the same project based on another, lower bid seems pretty hopeless since the European Union considers the whole project a “luxury item.”

I would be hard pressed to recall all the dates that were mentioned in the press about the imminent beginning of work on the project. It was in 2003 that civil engineers and experts on transportation came up with a 15- and a 30-year plan which included two much-needed superhighways, M8 and M4, that would transverse the country from the Austrian border to Romania. The point was to avoid Budapest, which has for far too long been the epicenter of the Hungarian transportation system. By 2005 it looked as if both M8 and M4 would be built.

In December 2012 Index reported that work on the planned 30 km section of M4 between Abony and Fegyvernek would begin in 2013. At that time people familiar with the price structure of Hungarian highways predicted that it would cost “tens of billions of forints,” but by the end of 2014, when all the bids were in, the cost was 110 billion or almost 4 billion per kilometer. That is four times the price of similar road construction in Western Europe where wages are considerably higher. Such a blatantly overpriced project was too much for the European Union. Moreover, they suspected price fixing. But what is really devastating for the Hungarian government is that the EU didn’t just stop this particular section of M4 but refused to finance the entire 230 km of M4 during the 2014-20 budget period.

An unfulfilled dream: "M4's construction began at Abony / szolnoknaplo.hu

An unfulfilled dream: “M4’s construction began at Abony” / szolnoknaplo.hu

The European Union’s decision about the Abony-Fegyvernek section of M4 couldn’t have come as a surprise to the government. Although by January 2014 all necessary permits were obtained and therefore work could begin, the green light from Brussels wasn’t forthcoming. In December 444.hu learned that in general there are problems with the Hungarian projects waiting for approval in Brussels. “Among other reasons, the European Commission did not pay because the officials consider the prices submitted too high.”

Benedek Jávor (PM MEP) turned to OLAF (European Anti-Fraud Office) to initiate an investigation into the M4 highway project. He wanted to know whether there were any signs of corruption, specifically any possibility of kickbacks to parties by the five firms involved in the construction of the project. Colas USA and the Austrian Swietelsky were to build 13.4 km for 46.76 billion forints. Lajos Simicska’s Közgép together with another Hungarian company, Híd, was entrusted with a short 2.4 km section, but it had three bridges, including a new 756 meter-long bridge across the Tisza River. For this work they signed a contract for 32.5 billion. For the rest Strabag International was to receive 31.5 billion.

The Hungarian government was so eager to launch the project that in January they began construction, which means that about 30% of the project has already started. It is not at all clear what the government will do in light of the EU decision. After all, it is not the fault of the companies involved that the Hungarians decided to begin construction without the final okay of Brussels. If, however, price fixing can be proven, Nándor Csepreghy, assistant undersecretary in charge of communication on matters related to the European Union, said, the construction companies will be responsible to the Hungarian taxpayers for the loss of 110 billion forints.

Although the Hungarian government now echoes the EU and says that the construction costs are too high, back in 2013 when Benedek Jávor first began his investigation of the case neither Mrs. László Németh, then minister of national development, nor János Lázár found anything wrong with the winning bids. In fact, both insisted that they “were not irrationally high.” But now, suddenly they’re talking about price fixing. It is hard to escape the conclusion that Benedek Jávor’s suspicions about possible kickbacks to individuals and perhaps also to Fidesz’s coffers are well founded.

As far as I know, up to this point it was only Simicska’s Közgép that reacted to Csepreghy’s threat of passing the lost EU money on to the companies involved. Közgép published a statement in which they explained that it was Közgép that offered the lowest price in a proper bidding process and that their job was not simple road building but the construction of three bridges. The new Tisza bridge will require 8,500 tons of steel. In addition, two smaller bridges, on either side of the Tisza, must be built over wetlands. Közgép called attention to the fact that the January issue of the Official Gazette announced that the government would finance from domestic sources a road that “connects M5 with M4.”

Indeed, János Lázár only recently reiterated the “government’s long-standing desire to have at least a four-lane highway between M5 and Szolnok.” Apparently, it is for political reasons that the Orbán government wants to make this road a priority. It was in Szolnok last September that Viktor Orbán announced his ambitious plan for building four-lane highways that would connect each county seat to the larger superhighway system of the country. Moreover, he planned this expansion of the roads not from EU money but from domestic resources. Such a road would “bring spectacular economic development to the city,” said Ildikó Bene, a Fidesz member of parliament. Budapest could be reached from Szolnok in less than an hour, she promised.

As for the charge of cartel activities and price fixing, I’m not sure that this is the real reason for the extraordinarily high prices asked for the job. Colas-Swietelsky bid 3.49 billion/km and Strabag 2 billion/km. Közgép is a different story because their work consists mostly of building bridges. I’m almost sure, however, that officials demanded kickbacks. A conversation between Nándor Csepreghy and Egon Rónay of ATV on Friday morning supports this supposition. When Csepreghy went on and on about the cartel activities of the firms involved, Rónay asked him why Hungary had to wait for the European Union to suggest that price fixing might be behind the high prices. Why didn’t they investigate these suspiciously high prices themselves? Csepreghy refused to answer. He tried every which way to bypass the question until Rónay said, “Well, you just refuse to answer my question.” Probably a wise decision.