Tag Archives: Tibor Ibolya

Letting the fox guard the henhouse: Hungarian prosecutors undermine justice

The thread that connects today’s topics is the state of the Hungarian legal system. As it stands, Hungary has a thoroughly corrupt prosecutorial system and a judiciary that at times shows itself to be truly independent despite considerable pressure from the executive branch. All three topics I’m addressing today are in one way or the other connected to these two branches of the legal system.

Let me start with a surprising verdict handed down today by the Budapest Court of Justice. Altus Zrt., Ferenc Gyurcsány’s company, sued Viktor Orbán because in May 2015 Orbán claimed that Altus is a bogus company created for the sole purpose of generating revenue from the European Union to finance Gyurcsány’s party, the Demokratikus Koalíció. Altus is actually managed by Gyurcsány’s wife, Klára Dobrev, an economist and law professor who teaches banking and financial law. The firm received, in an open bid process, a large contract from the European Union to evaluate the use of subsidies by member states and to suggest solutions for their more effective use. Given the political atmosphere in Hungary, Altus, regardless of the quality of its associates, can’t get jobs in the country and must offer its consulting services abroad.

Altus decided to sue Viktor Orbán for slander. Today the Budapest Court of Justice declared that Viktor Orbán’s claim was false and ordered the prime minister to refrain in the future from similar libelous statements. He will have to pay Altus 270,000 forints for court costs. And finally, and this is the one that must hurt Orbán the most, he has to openly express his regret for ever having made such a statement. I don’t know who that brave judge was, but the verdict is simply breathtaking. No one remembers such a verdict against a sitting Hungarian prime minister. Of course, this decision is not final. I’m sure it will be appealed.

Viktor Orbán must be livid. Fidesz immediately released a statement which, in total disregard of the verdict of the court, declared that “even a blind man can see that Ferenc Gyurcsány is financed from Brussels.” Fidesz’s spokesman quickly segued into Péter Medgyessy’s business transaction with Alstom, the French company that provided cars for the new Budapest metro line, the M4. “On the left only the companies and the size of the bribes change, the essence remains. Both Gyurcsány and the other socialist prime minister [meaning Medgyessy] conducted business through their wives. We are looking forward to Gyurcsány’s answer about how much money he received from the bribe of Alstom because, after all, it was during his premiership that the Alstom contract was signed.” Well, it is time for Gyurcsány, who a few years back swore that he would sue anybody who falsely accuses him of anything, to start proceedings again, this time against Fidesz.

That takes us back to the Medgyessy case, which I already mentioned in a post. Since then ten articles dealing with Medgyessy’s involvement with Alstom have appeared in Magyar Idők. The government obviously finds the case extremely useful politically. But how did Magyar Idők get hold of the story in the first place? The articles that appeared in the government paper are based on detailed information, including individual bank transactions. It is unlikely that the source of the information is the Medgyessy couple’s bank. We mustn’t forget that in the last couple of years the Hungarian prosecutor’s office has been investigating Alstom’s possibly illegal activities in Hungary in connection with the metro cars. So it is highly probable that Magyar Idők, just like its predecessor Magyar Nemzet, received the documents directly from the prosecutor’s office, headed by Péter Polt, chief prosecutor of Hungary and an old friend and protector of the prime minister. And this is a crime.

Marianna Polt-Palásthy

Marianna Polt-Palásthy

One cannot overemphasize the importance of Polt to Orbán’s system. It is no exaggeration to say that without Polt, or someone as crooked and loyal as he is, Orbán’s mafia state would have collapsed a long time ago. He is the one who stands between Viktor Orbán and justice and ultimately jail. So, it’s no wonder that Polt receives special treatment. A few months ago we heard that TEK, Orbán’s private bodyguard, will also guard this precious man, who is not entitled to such protection by law. And a few days ago, thanks to the documents released by the Hungarian National Bank’s foundations, we learned that Polt’s wife, Marianna Polt-Palásthy, personnel director of the bank, is also the chair of the board of Pallas Athéné Domus Scientiae, a member of the board of Pallas Athéné Domus Mentis, and a member of the Kecskeméti Duális Oktatás Zrt. She was hired by György Matolcsy in 2013, originally with a salary of 2.3 million a month, but by now she makes five million. Matolcsy’s salary was just raised to five million. So, while the chairman of the bank was making only two million, the director of the personnel department made five million. I wonder why. (Oh, those wives….) We also mustn’t forget about the extra remuneration for her jobs on the foundations’ boards.

And one more story about the Hungarian prosecutor’s office. It has something to do with the Quaestor scandal about which I wrote a year ago. The Quaestor affair is often described as Hungary’s Madoff case, except that here it is likely that the Orbán government itself was involved. Several ministries invested in Csaba Tarsoly’s pyramid scheme, and to the very last minute before the company collapsed Tarsoly was hoping for, and expecting, a government bailout. In brief, a thorough investigation of Csaba Tarsoly’s fraud case is not to the advantage of the Orbán government. And that takes us to our next story.

The victim's of Tarsoly's pyramid game The sign reads: "Orbán get lost and take your cronies along"

The victims of Tarsoly’s pyramid game
The sign reads: “Orbán get lost and take your cronies along”

It is becoming an everyday occurrence that the prosecution’s cases are so poorly prepared that cases that seem very strong even to outsiders are lost time and again. One of the worst offenders is Budapest Chief Prosecutor Tibor Ibolya who, contrary to his family name, is anything but a “violet.” In fact, he has gotten into all sorts of trouble with the courts and judges for speaking in ways the judges found unacceptable. In the Quaestor case Ibolya’s office dumped thousands of documents, absolutely unsorted, into the lap of the judge, not even indicating which documents supported what charge. Among the documents the judges found music, private documents, and photos that had nothing to do with the case. The court sent the whole mess back, asking Ibolya’s office to put their case together in a proper manner because what the court received was useless. Thus far Ibolya refuses to oblige. But the court isn’t budging either. If there is no action by May 31, the whole case against Tarsoly will be dropped. The suspicion is that this is exactly what the prosecutor’s office, with the active encouragement of the Orbán government, wants.

And one final word. It is Péter Polt’s office that is supposed to investigate the legality of the establishment of the Hungarian National Bank’s foundations even as his wife is deeply involved in and profits from the whole illegal scheme.

April 29, 2016

No rest for the weary: A busy summer in Hungarian politics

During the summer everything slows down. Soon members of parliament will leave for their summer holidays. Certain programs on KlubRádió will suspend broadcasting for the next two or three months, and ATV has only skeleton programming. One would think that political life must be really boring in Hungary. Nothing to discuss or analyse. But the funny thing is that there are so many topics worth thinking about or investigating that I simply cannot keep up with them. At the same time I don’t want to ignore them, so I decided to cover two topics today.

The Biszku case

You may recall that sometime at the end of May the Budapest appellate court ruled that the verdict of the court of first instance, which had sentenced Béla Biszku, János Kádár’s first minister of the interior, to a three-year prison term, was null and void. The fault lay with both the Budapest Prosecutor’s Office, which prepared the case, and the lower court judge who most likely felt pressured to produce quick results. Even Ádám Gellért, the young lawyer who was responsible for Biszku’s indictment, had to admit that the case the prosecutors came up with was unspeakably poorly prepared. The appellate judge had only two options: either to throw the case out or to acquit Biszku.

The reaction of the Budapest chief prosecutor, Tibor Ibolya, was not that of a “shrinking violet,” as his family name would indicate. (I saw him in action once with Olga Kálmán and in fact recommended viewing this interview in one of my earlier posts.) In his frustration and anger, he accused Biszku’s defense lawyer of “making a clown with cap and bells out of the court, which, instead of objecting, assisted him.”

The chief prosecutor of Budapest is not the only one who is upset. Ádám Gellért is also frustrated. At a conference held today, he offered a dangerous suggestion: a law should be enacted that would transform political responsibility into a criminal act under certain circumstances. A right-wing historian, Tibor Zinner (Veritas Institute), went even further. He wouldn’t mind having a law that would allow the sentencing of people already dead.

Since Biszku is 94 years old, by the time the prosecutors, judges, legal scholars, and historians decide what can be done with high-ranking communist politicians who may be responsible for the deaths of people after the uprising of 1956, he will most likely be dead.

What’s happening with the Hungarian Gripens?

During the first Orbán government (1998-2002), under mysterious circumstances, Viktor Orbán went against the advice of his military advisers and acquired 16 Gripen fighter planes. The cabinet had been expecting an announcement that Hungary would purchase F16 planes from the United States. Instead, out of the blue, Orbán announced that he had decided on the Swedish Gripens. The decision was suspicious at the time, but it became even more so after we learned that the Saab Group, manufacturer of the Gripens, was quite generous when it came to “convincing” its customers. I wrote about the Gripen scandal at least three times: in August 2007, March 2009, and September 2012.

Now we have a Gripen scandal of a different nature. On May 19, one of the 16 fighter planes was totally destroyed while taking part in an exercise in the Czech Republic. The Hungarian public has learned nothing since about the cause of the accident. The Hungarian planes are leased because the country’s finances didn’t allow for an outright purchase. The original arrangement was that after a certain period Hungary would be able to take full possession of the fleet. But eventually it became clear that the country couldn’t even keep up with its monthly payments. In any event, the plane, which is a total loss, is probably a further strain on the Hungarian military budget. The financial situation of the military is so bad that, as Magyar Nemzet sarcastically remarked, although the planes have been in Hungary for nine years, “they didn’t manage to buy a single bomb for them.”

And then, less than a month later, another accident happened, this time in Kecskemét, the Hungarian airbase. The plane is not totaled, only damaged, but the pilot who had to catapult from the plane, just like a colleague in the Czech Republic, injured his spine. This time, it looks as if the accident was due to technical difficulties. Something is very wrong with either the Gripens or the Hungarian airmen and servicemen, or both.

After the accident in Kecskemét

After the accident in Kecskemét

Imre Szekeres (MSZP), minister of defense between 2006 and 2010, commented on these accidents on Facebook. According to him, perhaps the biggest problem is the lack of flying time. Szekeres suspects that there is not enough money for fuel. The pilot of the plane that was damaged in Kecskemét had eight hours in the air this year. Moreover, apparently it is not known how many planes are actually flyable. Two are definitely not, but there was a third plane that was returning from Sweden where its pilot had received flying instruction. It never reached the Kecskemét base but had to force land in Košice/Kassa. No one knows in what shape that plane is.

The Hungarian Air Force, with its inexperienced pilots and its ailing planes, will soon be responsible for the defense of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Beginning in August, it will be spending four months on a Lithuanian airbase. Since these countries don’t have air defense capabilities, other NATO countries protect them on a rotating basis. We can only pray that no one decides to attack any of these countries between August and November.

The Quaestor story is becoming less transparent despite the release of documents

It was four days ago that I wrote an article titled “A Crime in Search of a More Coherent Cover-up.” Well, the Orbán government is still searching and the story, instead of becoming more coherent, is getting more confusing. It’s hard to know whether the government is intentionally obfuscating the issue or whether it simply can’t concoct a halfway believable plot in which nobody in the government is at fault. The prime minister, we have been told, misremembered. It seems that the buck didn’t stop with him after all. But at the same time he doesn’t want to implicate any of his colleagues. That wouldn’t be good for business.

Meanwhile the police twiddled their thumbs, presumably waiting for instructions from above. Although Quaestor collapsed on March 9 and rumor had it that Csaba Tarsoly, its CEO, was a flight risk, they did nothing until March 26. Finally, two days ago, they arrested Tarsoly.

The chief prosecutor of Budapest, Tibor Ibolya, tried to explain away the delay by saying that “he did not want to prejudice the case” by acting hastily. In order to bolster this claim he had the temerity to quote the guidelines of the European Court of Justice. It is hard to tell whether Ibolya is just incompetent or, more likely, an eager accomplice of the Orbán government like his boss, Péter Polt. To get a sense of the man, I recommend Olga Kálmán’s interview with him on Egyenes beszéd (Straight talk).

QuaestorAlthough we heard earlier that Csaba Tarsoly, CEO of Quaestor, had officially announced the firm’s bankruptcy, the revised account is that no such notification to the authorities ever took place. Tarsoly simply told the National Bank that the company had collapsed; he didn’t file any bankruptcy papers. As a result, Tarsoly and his associates had plenty of time to get rid of evidence, hide assets, and do all sorts of things that would obscure their allegedly illegal activities.

It is possible that a great deal more public money landed in the coffers of Quaestor than the 3.5 billion returned in the form of cash to the Magyar Nemzeti Kereskedőház (Hungarian National Trading House), which is under the jurisdiction of the ministry of foreign affairs and trade. Népszabadság received information that the ministry of agriculture lost millions, but the paper’s Fidesz sources said that its money was not at Quaestor. I, however, wouldn’t be at all surprised if this ministry also had money with Quaestor because of Tarsoly’s close business connections with Szilárd Kiss, the man accused not only of embezzlement but also of possible connections to the Russian Federal Security Service. Kiss was a special favorite of the minister of agriculture, Sándor Fazekas.

The Hungarian public was promised information about the extent of the loss of public funds by tomorrow. This will be a tricky document to put together.

By now the government seems to have realized that it has lost public confidence. Therefore in the last few days it released a number of documents to build a more believable story.

Among the documents the government released is the March 9th letter of Csaba Tarsoly to Viktor Orbán in which the Quaestor CEO asks for government help in saving his firm. He requested a 300 billion forint loan to protect 50,000 small investors, resulting in greater public trust in the Orbán government. The government even released Viktor Orbán’s answer as transmitted by his private secretary:

We gratefully acknowledge the receipt of your letter. The Prime Minister informed the minister of economics of its content. Mihály Varga will appoint a person to conduct the negotiations you suggest. He will most likely get in touch with you today.

It looks as if Hungary’s prime minister was prepared to make a deal with the man whom now he calls a crook.

One would assume, on the basis of these letters, that the man appointed by Mihály Varga actually had a conversation with Tarsoly on the evening of March 9th, which was unsuccessful. Therefore, Tarsoly had no choice but announce, albeit unofficially, the collapse of Quaestor to György Matolcsy, president of the Hungarian National Bank. Today, however, we learned that this sequence of events, however logical, is wrong.

VS.hu asked for additional information from the ministry of national economy, and it actually got what its reporter asked for. Yes, Mihály Varga did appoint Undersecretary Gábor Orbán (no relation to the prime minister), who met Tarsoly not on 9th but on the following day, March 10th. Apparently he didn’t like Tarsoly’s proposal. Undersecretary Orbán “found the plan unrealistic and unacceptable because it would have put the whole financial burden of restitution on the Hungarian government.” Another inexplicable twist in an already badly twisted story. What was the point of negotiation between Csaba Tarsoly and the Hungarian government a day after the unofficial announcement of Quaestor’s collapse? Why didn’t Tarsoly wait until he had a chance to talk to Gábor Orbán? Is it possible that Tarsoly was still hoping to make a deal, even after March 10th? That he viewed the collapse of Quaestor as remediable?

In this story of twists and turns, contradictions and memory lapses, Népszava noticed another oddity. While the prime minister office’s short e-mail to Csaba Tarsoly was written on March 9 at 17:24, Tarsoly’s letter to Orbán was logged in only on March 10th. Naturally, the Hungarian media immediately picked up this anomaly. Admittedly, it may be nothing more than the usual sloppiness that reigns in Hungarian government circles. It might happen, though it seems odd, that a letter would be received and answered before it was logged in. The official explanation is that the office of the prime minister receives an inordinate amount of mail and that the log-in process–all done by hand–is slow. Surely, even Viktor Orbán’s “plebeian government” could afford an electronic automatic scanner which would take care of all this in seconds.

What is much more difficult to explain is why the Tarsoly letter to Orbán, which Giró Szász proudly showed to Antónia Mészáros, a reporter for ATV, last Sunday, March 29, had no log-in information on it whatsoever. Which letter is authentic? The one the government released, with the log-in date of March 10, or the letter Giró Szász showed on March 29, which had never been logged in? I’m sure the government will say that the letter Giró Szász had was a copy of the letter the prime minister received, a copy made prior to its being logged in. But why, when it is in the throes of a scandal, doesn’t the government keep things tidy? It just raises new questions, arouses new suspicions.