Tag Archives: Viktor Orbán

Beware, the refugees are coming!

A couple of days ago a brief article appeared in Magyar Nemzet, which surely surprised those who happened upon it. The Hungarian government has surreptitiously accepted a fair number of refugees for settlement in Hungary this year. While the drumbeat against the Soros Plan and migrants is continuous and unrelenting, behind the backs of the misled people the government has accepted far more “migrants” so far this year than in 2016. While in 2016 the Hungarian government received over 25,000 applicants, this year their number shrank to fewer than 3,000. Yet, according to the Office of Immigration and Refugee Affairs (BMH), the number of people receiving asylum has more than doubled.

Here are a couple of terms we must be familiar with before we can make sense of the statistics. My source is an extremely useful pamphlet the Hungarian Helsinki Committee published in English, called “Asylum in Hungary.” I assume this is one of those publications the Hungarian government accuses the Helsinki Committee of putting out to encourage immigration and promote the Soros Plan. In fact, it is a guide to help arrivals find their way through the complicated Hungarian bureaucracy. There are three different forms of protection a refugee can get in Hungary. (1) Refugee status (menekült) is for people with a “well-founded fear” of torture, inhuman treatment, slavery, physical or sexual violence, or very serious discrimination. (2) Subsidiary protection status (oltalmazott) is for people who are at a real risk of suffering any of the following: the death penalty, torture, degrading treatment, or serious threat to a civilian’s life. (3) Tolerated status (befogadott) is a protection status based on a more general (not individualized) risk of harm in the country of origin.

According to the statistics, the Hungarian authorities’ favorite refugee status seems to be the “tolerated” one. In 2016 271 people were allowed to stay in Hungary under this rubric. This year their numbers will most likely be close to 1,000 because so far 866 such permissions have been granted. The number of those who have received subsidiary protection is also up. In 2016 only 7 people were granted such status while this year the number was 73. On the other hand, the Hungarian authorities are extremely reluctant to grant bona fide refugee status. In fact, this year fewer such permissions were granted (89) than in 2016 (154). What is the reason for this reluctance? According to the Helsinki Committee, the real difference is that those with subsidiary protection status are not allowed to have their spouses, children, or parents join them at a later date.

Source: Magyar Nemzet / Photo: László Beliczay

The refugee camps in Hungary are now practically empty. Last year there were more than 1,000 refugees in camps, while right now there are no more than 400. The reason for the small number of migrants waiting for a decision on their applications is that “the majority of the asylum seekers without waiting for the decision leave the country.” It is therefore difficult to understand why the ministry of interior still steadfastly recruits “border hunters.”

The only party that seemed to perk up after reading the Magyar Nemzet article was Jobbik. Péter Jakab, the party’s spokesman, released a communiqué in which he complained about the duplicity of Fidesz which, on the one hand, frightens people with the migrants and, on the other, allows them into the country. It is bad enough that Viktor Orbán through “settlement bonds” has allowed 20,000 people so far into the country, but “even 1,000 poor people” have been permitted to come to Hungary just this year. Jobbik, as far as the issue of immigration is concerned, holds even more draconian views than Fidesz. From this and other statements it is clear that if it depended on Jobbik, not one Middle Easterner or African would ever set foot in Hungary.

There is another piece of news that is connected to the Hungarian government’s quiet acceptance of a fair number of refugees, obviously in the hope of appeasing “the bureaucrats in Brussels.” This is an interview with Lívia Járóka, a Fidesz member of the European Parliament who was just elected one of the vice-presidents of the body. Járóka is part Roma on her father’s side. She has a Ph.D. in social anthropology from the University College of London. She became a member of the European Parliament in 2004, but it seems that she was dropped from the Fidesz list in 2014. However, she was just chosen to replace Mrs. Pelcz, Ildikó Gáll and also inherited her position as vice-president.

Járóka gave a fairly lengthy interview to Magyar Idők on the occasion of her election to the vice-presidency, an interview that is full of statements that would be unexpected from a Fidesz member of the European Parliament. First of all, she refused to engage in any anti-migrant talk. The reporter from Magyar Idők tried to elicit from Járóka a condemnation of the European Union’s refugee policy, but she avoided going down that path. Instead, she emphasized the necessity of their integration. “We would like it if they [the refugees] would understand that we find it important that, after a rapid and effective integration, armed with European knowledge, they would be able to return to their own homelands.” Well, well. This is a message we haven’t heard before. Integration? Until now we have heard from the highest levels of the Hungarian government that integration between Muslims and non-Muslims is impossible. Their cultures are so different that one ought not even attempt it. Moreover, the argument continues, these people don’t want to integrate. They want to live the same lives they led in Afghanistan, Iraq, or Syria.

What’s going on? Of course, the first thought that comes to mind is that Viktor Orbán is up to his old tricks. Playing the migrant card in Hungary but behind the scenes in the European Union showing his reasonable side. He could, for example, go to Antonio Tajani, EPP president of the European Parliament, and tell him that, although only 3,000 or so asylum seekers came to Hungary, the country has already allowed almost 1,000 to settle and the new Fidesz EPP vice-president talks about “rapid and effective integration.” Surely, he will say, there must be some misunderstanding on that score. I can well imagine such an exchange during his recent visit with Tajani. Of course, it is also possible that Járóka, judging from her ethnic background as well as her professional interests, has a more sophisticated understanding of the issue and finds it difficult to accept the kind of reasoning the absolutely loyal “parrot commando” bombards the Hungarian public with.

November 20, 2017

Financing of Hungarian sports: court rules it must be transparent

Even small victories can lift anti-Orbán hearts nowadays in Hungary. Thanks to the recent decision of the Kúria, Hungary’s highest judicial body, Viktor Orbán was rendered a defeat that must have hit him hard. At risk is what he considers to be one of his greatest achievements, the Felcsút Football Academy.

Transparency International spent a considerable amount of time and energy investigating the government’s lavish support of sports and came to the conclusion that the sports financing system the Orbán government established is rotten to the core. In the course of its investigation Transparency International also ascertained that the “absolute winner of the whole system is the village of Felcsút and its football club.” Felcsút has become the symbol of everything that is wrong in Viktor Orbán’s Hungary. It is a village of 2,000 people with one of the most lavish football stadiums, which can seat 4,500. The club uses all sorts of tricks to entice people to attend the club’s games, usually to no avail. The stadium is practically empty most of the time. In fact, according to those in the know, Hungarian football is dead, and the incredible amount of money that was poured into the game was an utter waste. Hungary’s FIFA standing is the same as it was before.

Over the years people have tried to find out how much money was being spent on sports, mostly football. But the system is intentionally complicated in order to hide the exact amount that comes from two main sources: direct grants allocated for sports in the budget and something called Társasági Adókedvezmény/TAO (Corporation Tax Allowance), introduced in 2011. Corporations can get a tax break if they support one or more of five sports: football, handball, basketball, water polo, and ice hockey. Money allocated to support sports is considered to be part of the tax owed. Thus, all money that is donated to these sports is a direct loss to the central budget. Since 2011, according to the latest estimate, 330 billion forints of corporate tax money was diverted to sports organizations. Or, put another, more shocking way, in the last six years the Hungarian state has given up one out of every nine forints in tax revenue.

From this money 128 billion went to football clubs and 86 billion for handball, while the rest was shared by basketball, water polo, and hockey. Viktor Orbán has been insisting for years that TAO is not public money and therefore no one has the right to learn about the sponsors, the recipients, and the amount of the money donated.

Interest in Hungarian football–Debrecen Stadium, which can seat 20,000. Cost €40 million

Transparency International, being convinced that the tax allowance is public money, asked the ministry of human resources for their allocation figures, which was denied. Transparency at that point sued the ministry. In the first instance, Transparency lost the case. The decision was based on tax secrecy. In addition, the judge didn’t consider the requested data to be of public interest. On appeal, however, the decision was reversed. Tax secrecy as a reason for denying access to the information was discarded, and the court ruled that the TAO monies are, after all, considered to be public funds. The ministry then turned to the Kúria, and on October 25, 2017 the decision of the appellate court was upheld.

Concurrently with Transparency International’s suit against the ministry of human resources, Demokratikus Koalíció (DK) sued Viktor Orbán’s Academy in Felcsút for the release of all contracts for jobs that were financed by TAO money. Felcsút apparently received about 14 billion TAO forints in the last six years. In July 2016 the Székesfehérvár Court ruled in DK’s favor, but Felcsút Academy had no intention of obliging and appealed. In February 2017 the Budapest Appellate Court also ruled in DK’s favor, but for a different reason from the Székesfehérvár Court. While the lower court considered TAO to be public money, the appellate court based its verdict on the non-profit status of Felcsút Academy. Felcsút Academy was obliged to turn over all documents relating to TAO funds within 15 days. Felcsút Academy again appealed the verdict, and thus the case ended up in the Kúria for a final decision. On November 15 the Kúria ruled that Felcsút must provide details of how they spent the enormous amounts of “public” money. The verdict could have been predicted because a month earlier, in connection with the Transparency International case, the Kúria had already declared TAO funds to be a public resource.

Index described the verdict as “the final and humiliating defeat of Orbán’s football academy.” János Lázár’s reaction a day later amply showed what kind of a country Hungary has become in the last six or seven years. During Lázár’s usual press conference on Thursday, when asked his opinion of the Kúria’s decision, he said: “There is a judge in this country who is very angry with Hungary’s government and Fidesz. His name is András Baka. Because of his changed official status, he has been greatly offended, and for some strange reason all TAO cases end up on his desk. I wouldn’t want to suppose that any bias would have influenced the judge, who on numerous occasions publicly criticized Fidesz and the government.”

Let’s stop here for a moment and go back to 2011, when the Hungarian Supreme Court became the Kúria. The chief justice at the time was András Baka who, prior to his appointment in 2008, had been a judge at the European Court of Justice for Human Rights for 17 years. Although he was considered to be a conservative judge, he became worried about Viktor Orbán’s so-called judicial reforms. He objected, for example, to the forced early retirement of judges, which gave the government a free hand to fill about 300 positions that became vacant as a result of the new law on retirement. Orbán desperately wanted to get rid of Baka and eventually came up with a good excuse. Baka hadn’t been a judge in Hungary for five years. His 17 years with the European Court of Justice were not considered relevant. Baka turned to the European Court of Human Rights and eventually was awarded about 100,000 euros, which naturally the Hungarian government, or to be precise Hungarian taxpayers, had to cough up. Baka couldn’t return to his old post, which had been filled by someone else, but he was reinstated, I’m sure grudgingly, as one of the leading judges in the Kúria.

The Kúria’s answer to Lázár was brief and to the point. They will not comment on politicians’ statements concerning their activities, but the spokesman explained that the assignment of cases is determined a year ahead and given to judges according to their professional specialties.

Unfortunately, I’m not at all sure that this is the end of the story because János Lázár intimated at the press conference that it was time “to make order” as far as TAO is concerned. To make order to me means that they will most likely come up with some modification to the law that would prevent the public from learning where that incredible amount of money has gone.

November 17, 2017

Viktor Orbán: In praise of nationalism

According to Fidesz’s by-laws, the party must hold a congress every two years, where the designated delegates choose the chairman, his deputies, and several other key party leaders. Of the 1358 delegates present, not one had the guts to abstain or vote against Viktor Orbán, the only candidate for the post of chairman. Naturally, a long speech by the newly elected chairman followed, which was in large measure devoted to the glorification of nationalism and national virtues.

There are many definitions of nationalism, but I decided to use Ernest Gellner’s for the reason that Gellner, who was described as “one of the world’s most vigorous intellectuals” by Karl Popper, the idol of George Soros, came from the Central European region where the roots of Viktor Orbán’s nationalism were planted. Gellner, although born in Paris in 1925, grew up in the German-speaking Jewish community of Prague. He and his family were steeped in the ethos of the multi-cultural, multi-linguistic Austro-Hungarian Monarchy.

According to Gellner, “nationalism is primarily a political principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent.” National sentiment is the feeling of anger aroused by the violation of this principle. After outlining the different ways in which the nationalist principle can be violated, he continues: “there is one particular form of the violation of the nationalist principle to which nationalist sentiment is quite particularly sensitive: if the rulers of the political unit belong to a nation other than that of the majority of the ruled.” And “this can occur through the incorporation of the national territory in a larger empire.”

Hungary can be seen as suffering from this violation of the nationalist principle. According to the latest statistics, almost 1.9 million Hungarians live in Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, and Ukraine. Moreover, as Viktor Orbán so often reminds us, Brussels is the modern equivalent of Moscow or, when he ventures further back in history, Vienna. Therefore, if we accept Gellner’s schema, modern-day nationalism should fall on extremely fertile soil in Hungary. On the one hand, there is the pent-up resentment of Hungary’s “mutilation,” and on the other, the Orbán government’s misleading communications about the mechanisms of the European Union.

Orbán’s speech was long and full of self-praise, which can be dismissed as mere fluff not worth spending time and energy on. But his casuistry when it comes to justifying the superiority of the particular over the universal deserves a second look. The taste and outlook disseminated by powerful global firms and political organizations all over the world, which necessarily results in uniformity, is illusory. What is real is the people’s strong attachment to “their cultural identity,” and these people are “in the overwhelming majority” in Europe. It is only a matter of time before “we will win not only in Hungary but throughout Europe and even in the whole western world.” Doesn’t that sound familiar? But then it was the socialist system that was supposed to conquer the West.

Orbán’s nationalist vision is allegedly superior to the western view of the world, in whose center a kind of monster holds the stage, someone deprived of his culture and his national and sexual identity, who relies merely on his instincts. “Politics that discard the natural order of life have always led to barbarity independently from the erudition of its protagonists.” Here nationalist culture and civilization are posited against savagery, cruelty, brutishness, everything that the word “barbarity” conveys.

Let’s return to Gellner for a moment. Quoting Kant, he asserts that “partiality, the tendency to make exceptions on one’s own behalf or one’s own case, is the central human weakness from which all others flow; and it infects national sentiment as it does all else.” Orbán’s nationalism has a large dose of that partiality. He is apt to describe Hungarians as being endowed with superior gifts and faculties. For example, Hungarians must thank their national culture for having the special talent to recognize truth and properly assess situations. In other words, their cultural background destined them to recognize the danger the refugee crisis poses for Europe while others, not having that necessary ingredient in their national culture, are, I guess, just too dense. He claims that “it is this spiritual force that makes us able to calmly contemplate those questions towering over Europe which frighten and deter others.” I’m sure that a great number of Hungarians will lap up all this nonsense.

Once he was confident that his followers were basking in Hungarian superiority, he moved on to the other prong of nationalism, at least as Gellner defined it. “It is a well-known fact that we Hungarians don’t like empires,” and “Hungarians don’t like it when imperial proconsuls want to determine the fate of the nation.” He went on at some length about the evil plans of this empire, but in the long laundry list there is one sentence that I find revealing. “The ‘Empire,’ in order to implement the Soros Plan, wants to get rid of all governments in Europe that represent national interests, including our own.” Although a few years ago Orbán accused Washington and Brussels of working toward his removal, lately he has by and large refrained from such allegations. Of course, it is possible that such an accusation is intended merely to tighten his hold over his followers by intimating that his very government is in danger, but I have the feeling that his fear might be genuine.

November 12, 2017

Hungarian refugees of 1956 and the current refugee crisis

I have been thinking about the topic of today’s post for a long time, but it was only in the last couple of days that the threads came together to form a unified whole. 444.hu published an article yesterday with the title “Viktor Orbán’s 100 lies,” which prompted me add one of my own about the Hungarian refugees of 1956. That particular Orbán lie has been bothering me for ages, but I had no time to search for the necessary statistical data to prove that, as usual, Viktor Orbán is either purposely lying or is simply ignorant. Today, however, I got my proof. Népszava published a detailed article about the Hungarian Statistical Office’s originally secret compilation of data on people who left the country after the October 1956 revolution. I should also note that the hysteria over the sighting of alleged migrants that erupted in a village provided an added impetus for me to make some observations about the “good Hungarian refugees” as opposed to the “evil migrants,” a contrast that is often drawn by Fidesz leaders as well as the general population. Finally, there are a couple of telling sentences in a new poll about “the Hungarian dream” that may have some relevance here.

So, let’s start with the lie that 444.hu didn’t include in its list. It was about two years ago that Viktor Orbán explained that keeping “migrants” within walled compounds guarded by police was the norm when the Hungarian refugees arrived in Austria. “What do you think? They were free to go anywhere? They were in camps for years until they were properly vetted.” This was essentially Orbán’s justification for creating closed camps for those refugees who arrived in Hungary, after a fence was erected to keep most of the refugees out. According to official Hungarian statistics, 193,748 people left the country between October 23 and the spring of 1957, most of them via Austria (174,057). What happened to these people? Did they stay in closed refugee camps, waiting for years? No. According to the statistics, by March 31, 1957 only 35,250 Hungarian refugees were still in Austria. The rest were moved within months to 35 different countries, which offered them food and shelter until they found jobs.

This was an enormous achievement in and of itself, but there were also many difficult cases that the authorities had to handle. For example, I just read parts of a book about the 20,000 unaccompanied minors who needed protection. Some of them were war orphans who had lived all of their lives in institutions and who had special needs. Many of these children eventually found their bearing in their adopted countries, but some drifted from country to country, or ended up in the French Legion or in Vietnam. Most of the unaccompanied minors, however, were just normal kids, many from white-collar families. Their host countries provided them, among other things, with free education. As we know, among the refugees coming from the Middle East there are many unaccompanied minors, whose arrival is viewed with suspicion. But if you think about it, in the Hungarian case 10% of the refugees were under the age of 18, so these youngsters’ presence in the current migration mix is not unusual.

A Hungarian refugee boy somewhere in Europe in 1957

The other common complaint about the mass of Middle Eastern refugees is the predominance of young men. They should have stayed and fought, the argument goes. What was situation in 1956? Two-thirds of the refugees were men. Not only that, but more than half of them were under the age of 25 and one third were relatively young (25-39 years old). Moreover, the largest category of men was of military age: 10.3% of all 20-year-olds and 9.3% of all 19-year-olds left the country. Although about half of the refugees were from Budapest, the number of men from the capital was especially high. More than 15% of 15- to 24-year-olds in Budapest left the country. Perhaps these statistics could give today’s Hungarians some food for thought, but naturally one cannot expect the officials to enlighten people about the nature of migratory movements.

In fact, any comparison of the Hungarian exodus in 1956 to the present situation is hotly denied. As if all Hungarian refugees were either skilled workers or highly educated intellectuals. No, it was a mixed crowd that included troubled children and common criminals who were let out of the jail. And, of course, many who settled into a comfortable middle-class existence or who achieved fame in their professional lives. I think that, by and large, the host countries  benefited from their initial investment.

Meanwhile, the Orbán government’s anti-refugee propaganda is still going strong, and the results are disheartening. A couple of days ago panic broke out in the village of Kömlő in Heves County, which has a majority Roma population and a Roma mayor who seems to have a lot of common sense. An elderly inhabitant, who happened to be a non-Roma, claimed to have seen a couple of migrants, who actually turned out to be locals. Panic set in. People saw migrants everywhere. They allegedly saw them entering houses and stealing food off the table or out of the refrigerator. Total fear gripped the place. The village has four or five anti-Soros posters but, as the mayor explained, the locals have no idea who he is. It is not the posters that are responsible for the fear that exists in the village but “what they see on television. There is no real danger here, but still that is what the TV tells them all day long.” I wonder what would have happened in 1956 and 1957 if the Austrian government had launched a campaign against the refugees, claiming that they were all communists.

Finally, a fascinating poll was taken about the future Hungarians would like to see for themselves. This is not the time to discuss this poll in any detail, but the upshot of the survey is that “Hungarians would like to live about 800 km farther west, somewhere close to the Austrian-Swiss border, and live in the predictability and the social equality of the Kádár regime but with western standards of living.” This conclusion didn’t surprise me, but what grabbed my attention was a comment from one of the respondents: “We should reach Western Europe economically but not culturally.” Apparently, Hungarians dream about some “specific Hungarian road within the Union.” As Tamás Boros, one of the researchers who worked on the study, noted, they dream about “a rich and egalitarian but ethnically homogeneous country.” Hungarians have been chasing a “Hungarian road” in vain for almost one hundred years. The combination they are dreaming about is unattainable and most likely also undesirable.

November 4, 2017

“The struggling young couple”: István Tiborcz and Ráhel Orbán

I haven’t written anything about the financial affairs of the Orbán family lately, although news of the shady affairs of the father and brother of the prime minister crops up often enough. Today I’ll return to the financial affairs of Viktor Orbán’s son-in-law who, though barely 30 years old, has most likely already amassed a considerable fortune.

István Tiborcz’s first business venture ended rather abruptly when OLAF, the European Commission’s Anti-Fraud Office, announced that it was going to investigate his company, Elios, which had won tenders for the installment of LED lighting in scores of Hungarian cities. The lighting project was largely financed by the European Union. The Tiborcz-Orbán “family firm” realized that, in this instance, the brazen expropriation of EU funds would not be tolerated. So Tiborcz in a great hurry “sold” his firm to a businessman with very strong ties to Fidesz. Tiborcz then went into the real estate business. As he explained to Origo a few days ago, he, as a member of the prime minister’s family, is limited in the kinds of financial activities he can pursue. He claims that for the past two years he has been buying real estate only from private individuals, no state property.

All this sounds innocent enough, but if we take a closer look at Tiborcz’s business dealings it seems that the son-in-law may have received quite a bit of coaching from the master at hiding his wealth, the Hungarian prime minister himself. When Tiborcz established his first real estate firms, he hid behind two friends who were registered as the owners of TRA Real Estate Kft. and BDPST Zrt. By now these two companies own eight high-priced pieces of real estate, among them former aristocratic mansions and valuable commercial property in Budapest and elsewhere. Some of these properties were jointly owned by wealthy Turkish businessmen or sold to characters like Ghaith Pharaon, the now allegedly deceased Saudi businessman of dubious reputation. Tiborcz hid so well that, as far as the Hungarian media was concerned, his ownership of these companies couldn’t be ascertained. Until now.

To the surprise of those who have been trying to find out more about TRA and BDPST, István Tiborcz gave an interview to Origo, which is now owned by the son of György Matolcsy, Orbán’s right hand and president of the Hungarian National Bank. The title of the article is misleading when it claims that “We investigated: István Tiborcz is owner in the real-estate development company.” After reading the article, one can be absolutely certain that the journalists of Origo investigated nothing. For one reason or other, István Tiborcz went to the pro-government internet site to offer the information, which he had tried to hide at least since the summer of 2015.

People who have been following Tiborcz’s business ventures and his secretive behavior as far as his business affairs are concerned couldn’t figure out what got into him. Why did he feel compelled to open up suddenly? On October 30, the very same day the Tiborcz interview appeared, the internet edition of Heti Válasz  came out with an article from which one could learn that András Bódis of Válasz had been pursuing the case of BDPST’s ownership for some time, without much luck. The “CEO” of the company, a certain Judith Tóth, didn’t even bother to answer Bódis’s inquiries. In fact, Tiborcz was so reluctant to divulge his own involvement in the company that BDPST initially gave up the idea of a capital raise when the Registry Court (Cégbíróság) made it clear that it would not register the firm unless the ownership of the company was released. After some hesitation, Tiborcz decided that he needed the stamp of approval of the Registry Court and relented.

It is hard to fathom why Tiborcz felt compelled to give an interview. One reason may have been his fear that Válasz would come out with some juicy story about its efforts to discover more about Tiborcz and his firm. The other reason might have been that, simultaneously with the Válasz project, Átlátszó was digging into the young couple’s purchase of a luxurious eleven-room, three-story house with servant’s quarters and a swimming pool in the most expensive part of the Kútvölgy section of Buda. The listing price of the property was 360 million forints (about $1.35 million). Therefore, in addition to his admission that he is the majority owner (meghatározó tulajdonos) of BDPST, he casually mentioned that he bought a house as a business venture that is in such bad shape that it is practically falling apart. So, before he does anything with it, the house must be completely renovated.

The modest living room

I’m afraid that truthfulness is in short supply in the extended Orbán family. As Antónia Rádai of Átlátszó found out, the purchaser of the property was not BDPST but István Tiborcz. Therefore, it is unlikely that this luxury property was purchased for resale. As for the state of the house, which he described as “life threatening,” I have my doubts after taking a look at some pictures that appeared when the property was being advertised for sale. It is, however, apparently true that men are working furiously on the building, even through part of the recent long weekend. I suspect that it is still not up to the standards of the demanding young couple.

A bathroom in a house which is falling apart and needs immediate propping up

The interview was really touching. Tiborcz spoke about the struggling firm, which is still not quite profitable. Here and there they make money when they manage to sell a piece of property, but the road ahead them is long and the work is hard. This sob story naturally was spread far and wide by the government propaganda outlets. Of course, let’s not fool ourselves. The majority owner of a company that has yet to turn a profit doesn’t buy a house that costs over a million dollars. We don’t know the full story of Tiborcz’s investments, and I doubt that we ever will.

November 2, 2017

Viktor Orbán’s government: “The manifestation of God’s grace”

While the Catholic Church celebrates November 1, All Saints’ Day, Protestants this year are remembering October 31, when Martin Luther is said to have nailed his 95 theses challenging the Catholic Church to the door of Wittenberg’s All Saints’ Church five hundred years ago. Celebrations of the event abound, not just in Germany but everywhere that Protestantism has sprung up since.

Historical Hungary is the eastern bastion of Protestantism, so remembrances have taken place in Slovakia, Hungary, and the Transylvanian part of Romania. A committee was set up to stage a “national” celebratory gathering to commemorate the event in Budapest. As far as I could ascertain, only the Magyarországi Evangélikus Egyház (Hungarian Lutheran Church) and the Magyarországi Református Egyház (Hungarian Reformed Church) were involved. The Catholic prelates stayed away, unlike in Germany where both Lutheran and Catholic clergy participated in church services and celebrations and vowed to do more for the unity of Christianity, according to the Associated Press.

The event took place in the László Papp Budapest Sports Arena that can seat 12,500 people, but the organizers slightly overestimated the interest. Quite a few seats were empty. Mind you, attendance was not free. It cost 500 forints (about $1.50), though for that one also got a sandwich and an apple. Before Zoltán Balog and Viktor Orbán delivered their speeches, a Lutheran bishop gave an invocation and a Reformed bishop a full-fledged service, called “istentisztelet” (veneration of God) in Hungarian.

But let’s move on quickly to Viktor Orbán’s speech because, let’s face it, most of the people paid the 500 forints to hear him. As far as Orbán speeches go, it was short, but it raised quite a few eyebrows among those who find Orbán’s governing style increasingly intolerable. The sentence that created the greatest stir was the prime minister’s claim that it is no accident but an “expression of God’s mercy” that Hungary currently has a Christian government. Hungary Today, an English language internet news site that is financed through hidden channels by the Hungarian government, reported on the speech in the briefest possible manner, which might have something to do with the fact that there were some truly unacceptable statements in his text.

“Impetus for Renewal” / MTI / Photo: Zoltán Máthé

Orbán defined himself as a Calvinist prime minister and said he was asked by the church leaders to deliver a speech to this crowd solely because of his religion. But surely, at a “national” celebration of the Reformation the prime minister’s religion is irrelevant. He is there as the political leader of the country. Just as Angela Merkel was at the German celebration not as the daughter of a Lutheran minister but as the chancellor of Germany. Orbán continued the Calvinist theme by recalling that “exactly 99 years ago anti-Christian forces killed our pre-eminent Calvinist prime minister, István Tisza [1861-1918].” This statement is untrue. Tisza’s death had nothing to do with his Calvinism. His murderers didn’t kill him for his Christian religion but because they considered him responsible, rightly or wrongly, for four years of brutal war. But such minor details don’t bother Viktor Orbán.

That was just the warm-up. He claimed that “our lives and our work are determined by a higher force and power.” It was God’s decision to place the Hungarians in the Carpathian Basin just as it was God’s ordinance that he is the prime minister of Hungary today. One mustn’t see the existence of a Christian government leading Hungary today as the “caprice of fate” but as “the manifestation of God’s grace.” He doubled down on this theme by saying that “we consider it a privilege that in this renewal [of the country] Providence has used us, our churches, the government and the free community of Hungarian citizens in the whole Carpathian Basin as instruments [of His will].” He added that Hungary will be a country “where all forms of work, from street sweeping to governing the country, serve the glory of God.” What can one say?

The final thought of the speech is perhaps the hardest to interpret. Orbán was talking about the unification of the nation across borders, which is a very difficult undertaking. But “the Biblical force that five hundred years ago received an overwhelming impetus entrusts us with one more task,” which seems to be “the ultimate and great unification of the nation.” What this ultimate and great unification means exactly, it is difficult to say. It might be a spiritual union of Hungarian souls, but I still don’t know what do with “the recognition of truth which frees us,” which is supposedly necessary for the accomplishment of this task. I really wonder whether he himself knows what he is talking about.

Hungarian newspaper articles more or less came to the same conclusions I did, except that they didn’t even try to solve the puzzle of “the ultimate and great unification of the nation.” But György Gábor, a philosopher of religion who is always enlightening and often amusing, commented on Orbán’s “laughable ignorance” in matters of religion. Orbán described his government not only as Christian but also as “hitvalló,” literally “professor of faith.” The problem is that in Hungarian “hitvalló” means “confessor,” which originally meant someone venerated as a saint, Christian martyrs, people who were known for their moral perfection or who lived an ascetic life. Gábor added: “So, imagine now for a moment the pure and moral members of the government who are beyond reproach.” And, of course, there is the additional problem that “confessor” is a strictly Catholic title associated with sainthood.

I think it might be instructive to read what Angela Merkel had to say on this day. She stressed the importance of tolerance toward the wide variety of beliefs. “Those who embrace plurality must exercise tolerance—that is the historical experience of our continent,” she said. “Tolerance is the basis for peaceful togetherness in Europe.” This is exactly what Viktor Orbán rejects. Instead, he asks for “assistance in the form of prayers from [his] Protestant and, naturally, Catholic brethren” for his work for a Christian and Hungarian Hungary.

November 1, 2017

Jobbik’s Krisztina Morvai: A portrait

I promised a post on Krisztina Morvai, one of Jobbik’s three members in the European Parliament. Her name came up a few days ago when she gave a lengthy interview to Magyar Idők in which she spoke so fervently against the Soros Plan that she received the greatest compliment possible from Fidesz’s very own Zsolt Bayer. In his opinion, the golden words of Morvai could have come from Viktor Orbán himself.

So, let’s take a look at the career of this woman, who was born in Budapest only a few days after Viktor Orbán in 1963. On paper, she has had a sterling career. After attending one of the best high schools in Budapest, she received a law degree cum laude from ELTE. She joined the faculty of her alma mater where she still teaches. In 1989 she got a scholarship to study at King’s College, where she earned a master of law degree. During the 1993-1994 academic year she taught law at the University of Wisconsin as a Fulbright scholar. Her main interest is criminal law, dealing with victims’ rights, child abuse, sexual exploitation, discrimination, and domestic violence.

Between 2003 and 2006 she was a member of the Women’s Anti-discrimination Committee of the United Nations where she took a very pro-Palestine position and called attention to what she called the “inhumane living conditions” of Palestinian women, which was followed by an official complaint by the Israeli government. In 2006 the Hungarian government refused to endorse her for another four years. What followed was truly disgraceful. She wrote to all the national missions to the UN, accusing her own government of giving in to Israeli pressure in nominating not her but Andrea Pető, whom she called “a well-known Zionist,” which was a lie. The affair is well summarized in an English-language article in HVG from August 2006. She became filled with hatred toward Ferenc Gyurcsány, whose government withheld its endorsement. After her return to Hungary she participated in all the anti-government demonstrations and was one of the founders of the Civil Jogász Bizottság (Civic Legal Committee), which was subsequently used to discredit the Gyurcsány government’s handling of the disturbances that took place during the fall of 2006.

Krisztina Morvai / MTI / Photo: Bea Kallos

As she kept moving to the right and was an outspoken anti-Semite, Jobbik found her to be a choice addition to the party’s followers. She didn’t actually join the party, but she headed Jobbik’s list for the 2009 European parliamentary elections. In addition, she became Jobbik’s candidate for the post of president in 2010.

By 2009, her reputation had plummeted in better circles. In November of that year The Guardian called her a “neo-fascist MEP.” It turned out that she was one of the invitees to a conference organized by the Palestinian Return Center, but several politicians who were scheduled to speak at the conference protested and the organizers withdrew their invitation to her. Because, as the director of the group said, “She is one of Europe’s leading neo-fascists … and Jobbik is a revolting party.”

Her reputation in Israel also hit rock bottom, especially after she advised the “liberal-Bolshevik Zionists” to “start thinking about where to flee and where to hide.” Or, when she distinguished between “our kind” and “your kind” in a context where “your kind” could only be the Jews who, in her opinion, were ruining her country. “Our kind,” she insisted, will not allow the colonization of Hungary. The Guardian also got hold of a Morvai quotation from one of those numerous political discussion groups that existed before the advent of social media. The group consisted mostly of Fidesz supporters, but the “list-owner” let people join without checking their ideological preferences. So, I signed up and read the incredible conversations that took place there. One day I noticed that Morvai, a fairly frequent contributor, in an argument with an American Hungarian who happened to be Jewish, wrote about “so-called proud Hungarian Jews who should go back to playing with their tiny little circumcised tails” instead of doing this or that.

In February 2009 she wrote a letter to the Israeli ambassador to Hungary in which she objected to Israel’s offensive in the Gaza Strip, calling it a “mass murder” and genocide. She claimed that “the only way to talk to people like you is by assuming the style of Hamas. I wish all of you lice-infested, dirty murderers will receive Hamas’ ‘kisses.’”

She has been a member of the European Parliament ever since 2009, where she is pretty active. She records her activities on her blog as well as her Facebook page. She is also usually on hand in Hungary whenever the country’s far right is threatened in any way. The latest outrage was her behavior at the trial of György Budaházy, a right-wing extremist, who received a 13-year jail sentence for terrorism. The prosecutor apparently found the verdict too lenient, at which point Morvai, who was in the audience, got up and created a scene. When everybody was ordered out of the courtroom, she refused to leave. ELTE, where she is an associate professor, initiated an “ethical investigation.” The investigation ended in a slap on the wrist.

Liberal commentators object to Morvai’s presence on the faculty. Apparently, she has been on unpaid leave ever since 2009 when she became a member of the European Parliament, but she still gives lectures on the abuse of children, terror in the family, and similar subjects. According to students, “she is a superb lecturer” and her lectures are “exciting. The blogger “Mr. Flynn Rider,” however, thinks “this well-known extreme right-wing, anti-Semitic lecturer should have been kicked out a long time ago” from the law school.

As I said in my post titled “Do we know what Jobbik is all about?” Morvai gave a long interview in Magyar Idők which was welcomed by Zsolt Bayer, who wrote an opinion piece in the same issue. Morvai subsequently expressed her surprise about the splash this interview made because “for my Facebook community and visitors to my blog there was nothing new in this interview.” Clearly, Morvai is trying to downplay an important move on her part.

At the moment, Fidesz and Jobbik are at each other’s throats. A couple of weeks ago there was talk of the government’s likely plans to withdraw mandated financial support to the party on the basis of possible financial irregularities. Jobbik at the moment is Fidesz’s favorite whipping boy. The personal attacks on Gábor Vona are incessant and ugly. One reason is that Jobbik is just as harsh a critic of the Orbán government as the liberal-socialists parties are. For instance, Jobbik ironically insisted that the Hungarian police investigate George Soros if he is such a serious threat to national security.

It is in these circumstances that a Jobbik member of the European Union gives an interview in which she agrees with every move the Orbán government has made in the last two or three years. Moreover, the publication of that interview is accompanied by the simultaneous support and praise from one of the best known Fidesz journalists, Zsolt Bayer.

In the interview Morvai supports the government wholeheartedly. While her party criticizes Orbán over the lack of democracy, she finds the EU’s criticism of Hungary on that score unacceptable. She agrees with the argument that the Orbán government does its share in attending to the root causes of the problems in the Middle East by helping “our Christian brethren on the spot.” As for the Soros Plan, “the European migration policy is so absurd, unreasonable, and inhumane that there must be some evil, demonic plan behind it,” although she doesn’t know whether Soros is the #1 organizer or not.

What is Bayer’s supporting piece about? It is about Jobbik, which is no longer the party that deserves his admiration because “its chairman led his people to betrayal and sleaze.” But not Krisztina Morvai. She has remained what she has always been. That is a great relief to Bayer because he was afraid that Morvai, following Vona, had been lost. The very fact that she gave an interview “for us” is a mortal sin because Jobbik politicians refuse to “talk to us.” This interview could have been given by Viktor Orbán. “Krisztina Morvai has come home” or “actually it seems she has never left.”

A day later Magyar Idők was still on the subject of that interview. A journalist in an opinion piece wrote: “Unbelievable, people in Jobbik are not curious about the interview their party’s MEP gave to our newspaper.” Obviously, this Morvai interview is considered to be a major win in Fidesz’s political duel with Jobbik. And, of course, Morvai is not as innocent as she tries to portray herself.

October 31, 2017