The road to Washington by way of Kiev. The Pompeo-Szijjártó meeting, May 30, 2018

Although this post will be about U.S.-Hungarian relations, I will have to say a few words about Ukrainian-Hungarian relations because the two are intertwined.

Yesterday Hungarian Foreign Minister Szijjártó met with the newly appointed U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. It was a brief encounter, lasting only 30 minutes, but from the Hungarian point of view a momentous one given the frosty relations between U.S. administrations and Viktor Orbán’s governments over the years. Something went very wrong in 2001, right after the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center, when István Csurka, chairman of an openly anti-Semitic party and a member of parliament, delivered a speech in which he blamed the United States for what happened.

Orbán was in the chamber at the time and said nothing. Washington hasn’t forgotten the incident, and Orbán has been a persona non grata in the White House ever since. Orbán hoped that with the inauguration of Donald Trump all that was going to change and that his early support of Trump’s candidacy would endear him to the new president. More than a year has gone by, and Orbán’s dream of visiting the White House remains unfulfilled. Moreover, relations between the two countries haven’t become noticeably warmer. The Orbán government’s sustained and intense anti-Ukrainian foreign policy did, however, prompt face-to-face discussions between high-level representatives of the United States and Hungary.

Viktor Orbán jumped on the Russian, anti-Ukrainian bandwagon after Vladimir Putin’s annexation of Crimea in April 2014. He joined Russia in attacking Ukrainian minority policies, he claimed that Ukraine was a danger to Europe, and he expressed his belief that Ukraine will never be a democracy. A few months later Hungary stopped supplying gas to Ukraine. Putin’s Russia was appreciative. Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, at the Munich Security Conference in February 2015, spent an inordinate amount of time on the grievances of the Hungarian minority in Ukraine and the territorial autonomy they should receive.

Hungary had been at odds with the Ukrainian government for years, but in September 2017 it escalated into an open feud. The proximate cause was the introduction of a new law on education that was to apply to all schools, including schools for minority students. According to the proposed bill, beyond a certain grade level all subjects would have to be taught in Ukrainian, with the possible exception of literature and history, which could be taught in the mother tongue of the students. It was this law that gave Hungary the opportunity to conduct an openly anti-Ukrainian foreign policy.

It was in December 2017 that Hungary had its first opportunity to isolate Ukraine when it vetoed a planned meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Joint Commission, a decision-making body responsible for developing relations between NATO and Ukraine. This veto was followed by another in February. Hungary demonstrated that, as a member of the European Union and NATO, it would use all the power at its disposal to veto every attempt by Ukraine to move closer to the West. As I said at the time, “there is no need to beat around the bush. In this Ukrainian-Hungarian conflict, the Orbán government is acting as a stooge of Putin’s Russia.”

The Ukrainian-Hungarian feud finally brought about higher-level contact between Washington and Budapest. Other NATO members, including the United States, became concerned over the rigid, antagonistic stance of the Hungarian government toward Ukraine. Finally, the United States decided to act. In January Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó was invited to Washington to have a chat with Wess Mitchell, Assistant Secretary of State in charge of European and Eurasian Affairs. Although Szijjártó said nothing about the meeting afterward, it turned out that the American diplomat had offered his services as a mediator between Hungary and Ukraine to solve the Ukrainian crisis at NATO headquarters. About three weeks later, Mitchell traveled to Paris, where he had a meeting with Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin and Péter Szijjártó.

The Orbán government may well have calculated that its veto of Ukraine’s participation in NATO-related events would induce the United States to reconsider its relations with Hungary while it could, at the same time, continue its warm relationship with Moscow. Perhaps Orbán hoped that a quick volte face on the Ukrainian issue would open the doors of the White House, improve U.S.-Hungarian relations, and foster beneficial ties between two heads of state who think very much alike. But Orbán’s strategy, if this was indeed his strategy, worked only to a point.

It is hard to tell what the Hungarian government expected from the meeting between Péter Szijjártó and Mike Pompeo, but the strong language that awaited the Hungarian foreign minister most likely surprised him. He certainly didn’t share it with the public after the meeting. On the other hand, Heather Nauert, spokesperson of the State Department, released a summary of the conversation.

Secretary Michael Pompeo met with Hungarian Foreign Minister Peter Szijjarto in Washington on Wednesday. The two discussed areas of mutual interest and opportunities for our countries to increase cooperation. The Secretary underscored the importance of maintaining a vibrant civil society. The Secretary also emphasized the urgent need to help Ukraine in the face of Russian aggression, including the importance of facilitating and supporting Ukraine’s engagement with NATO, and the need to counter Russian malign influence in Central Europe. Both sides agreed that Europe should diversify its sources of energy and discussed increasing U.S. investment in Hungary. The Secretary and Foreign Minister committed to concluding a Defense Cooperation Agreement in the days ahead.

Péter Szijjártó and Mike Pompeo in Washington (May 30, 2018)

Pompeo might be new on the job, but he was well briefed and didn’t mince words. From the summary we don’t know whether Pompeo talked about the far too close relations between Russia and Hungary, but I assume he did in the course of the discussion about the “malign influence” of Russia. The reference to an over-reliance on Russian energy might have led to a brief discussion of the nuclear power plant Russia is building in Paks. It was especially heartwarming that Pompeo didn’t forget about the plight of the Hungarian NGOs. I should add that Wess Mitchell, who visited Budapest a week ago, most likely in connection with the Ukrainian-Hungarian negotiations and Szijjártó’s meeting with the secretary of state, took advantage of the opportunity to meet with the representatives of Hungarian civic society. Moreover, we know from Tódor Gárdos of Human Rights Watch that the U.S. government, through the embassy in Budapest, has kept in touch with the beleaguered associates of the various human rights groups.

As far as Ukrainian-Hungarian relations are concerned, the Orbán government all of a sudden found its way to constructive negotiations. Hungary now seems to be satisfied that the Ukrainian education law will not become effective before 2023 and that private schools will be exempt. Isn’t it easy to negotiate if there is the will and, of course, some diplomatic pressure? Of course, whether Hungary follows through and reaches a binding understanding with Ukraine that is satisfactory to the West remains an open question.

May 31, 2018