In the last few months, I have spent a few hours every day reading newspaper articles that appeared during the 1988-1990 period in order to gain a better understanding of the political developments of that time. In addition, I rarely miss Sándor Szénási’s excellent “Freedom, comrades,” a weekly interview series broadcast on Fridays on Klub Rádió. Lately, I also discovered a podcast series on Index called “Kibeszélő” (Going public), which just published a revealing interview with Zsuzsanna Szelényi, one of the two women in Fidesz’s 22-member parliamentary delegation, about how the party, already by 1991, had become a closed organization completely dominated by László Kövér and Viktor Orbán.
As background for my examination of the period, I badly needed to refresh my memory by reading or rather rereading a basic textbook, and therefore I turned to Zoltán Ripp’s monumental Rendszerváltás Magyarországon 1987-1990 (Political transition in Hungary; 2006). I also profited from reading a book I hadn’t encountered before, a series of interviews by Sándor Szilágyi titled A Hétfői Szabadegyetem és a III/III (Free university on Mondays and the secret service). I reread Sándor Révész’s Antall József távolról, 1932-1993 (József Antall from afar; 1994) and went back to Kata Beke’s 1993 book Jézusmária, győztünk! (Good God, we won!).
This long list shouldn’t frighten anyone off because I have no intention of analyzing the material I found in these books. Instead, I would like to call attention to a few lines that I found especially telling.
The first is Kádár’s reaction to the early signs of oppositional groups to the regime. At the July 1, 1986 meeting of the Politburo he compared the situation to the conditions before the 1956 “counterrevolution.” The party was aware of the two epicenters of the opposition forces, the “national radicals” and the “democratic opposition.” With some simplification, the first group was made up of writers described as “népiesek” (populists), who were preoccupied with national issues. The second group was composed of intellectuals who were called the “urbanites,” whose interests were more universal and liberal. Kádár correctly identified the “nationalist” group, although not so radical as the democratic opposition, as much more dangerous because “it can count on the widest societal support” (Ripp, pp. 43-44). Looking at the present political situation, Kádár’s assessment was spot on.
As for the radical nationalist group, let me quote Dénes Csengey, whose early death elevated him to one of the great heroes of the Hungarian right. He expressed the early MDF’s concern about the dangers of western modernization, which might create a different subordination of the nation (Ripp, p. 310). Thus, there is nothing new about Viktor Orbán’s insistence on sovereignty; it was already part and parcel of the ideology of the late twentieth-century Hungarian right, whose members gathered in the tent of Sándor Lezsák, a minor Hungarian poet of the “populist” literary tradition, in September 1987 to form Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF).
Today, this fear of globalization, the stress on national values and the dangers of foreign influences in general are still hallmarks of the deep-seated right-wing worldview, which dates back to the 1930s. György Dalos, a Hungarian writer who nowadays lives in Berlin, found the populist writers despicable because in the late 1930s and early 40s most of them turned to the extreme right, praising Hitler and Nazism, while after 1956 they managed to form a good working relationship with the Kádár regime (Szilágyi, pp. 71-72). In fact, during 1989-1990 the MDF leaders were quite ready to form a coalition with the reform wing of the Hungarian communist party.
Some populist writers questioned the wisdom and viability of introducing democracy to Hungary. Csurka, already in 1989, expressed his doubts about the advisability of “slavishly adopting western democracy” after 40 years of a one-party political system just because “some journalists claim that it is the best political system in the world” (Révész, p. 130).
“Ma ünnepeljük a magyar zászló és címer napját” – Fejér Megyei Hírlap
Kata Beke, a high school teacher and author, who for a few months served as political undersecretary in the ministry of education and culture in the Antall government, wrote these lines in 1993: “The Hungarian nation can’t be usurped. Because it belongs to all of us. This is our natural state…. One doesn’t have a tricolor on one’s lapel every day because it makes the act meaningless. Those who see a conflict between being a Hungarian and a European or between the national and the universal are wrong.” She, of course, had MDF in mind. She also had a few words to say about those “youthful heroes of 1956 who became octogenarians full of hate” and who behave as if “the plebeian revolution was fought by playboys from Buda and not by workers and university students, the majority of whom came from peasant and working-class families.” She had contempt for those who “arrogantly call our martyrs — Imre Nagy, Pál Maléter, and the others — reform communists” (Beke, pp. 119-120).
Finally, let me quote a few lines from the last chapter of Révész’s biography of Antall. “József Antall wanted and knew how to lead, but what he wanted to lead didn’t exist. It doesn’t exist. Neither the nation, nor the class, neither the fight nor the party…. No liberal party can exist with an illiberal membership. The MDF that Antall constructed in his head didn’t exist” (Révész, p. 215). What existed and still exists is what Révész called the Lakitelek MDF, a collection of far-right nationalistic writers and politicians whose chief enemy wasn’t communism. Rather, what they most resisted was liberalism and western modernization. It was that group that Viktor Orbán led to victory after he decided that democracy and freedom had less appeal to Hungarians than good old-fashioned nationalism and political extremism.
Tnx for the glimpses in the recent past. Seems the developments in Hu followed the general rule of continuity, ie. the national psyche put its stamp on the new Hu or “the more it changes, the more it remains the same” as the French say.
One note re:
“there is nothing new about Viktor Orbán’s insistence on sovereignty..”
Orbàn started as a liberal and modern and adopted this element only later in his political career. After the 1994 election crash (Fid 5% of vote afair) Orbàn pulled on a conservative costume, but there were no “independence” slogans at all. His first such was “there’s life outside the EU too” uttered in 1999 as PM, realizing that the EU membership comes with some rules which will restrict his budding dictatorial impulses. With the expansion of his formal and real powers after 2010 the contradiction grew and so did the “independence” cry. All current dictators decry the criticism of their oppression as infringement on the national independence, eg. just yesterday Lukashenka claimed foreign powers organized the protests.
It is not “rule of continuity” It is an adaptation to realities. In Hungary and region, the rush to join Western Europe led to some unfortunate unintended consequences, starting with shock therapy in the 1990’s. That period wiped out domestic capital that could have been salvaged with some investments, along with the unsalvageable that had to be allowed to fail. The end result is a region that is overly dependent on foreign capital three decades later, which leads to excessive net profit extraction, since it is mostly a one-way trend. EU rules on competition further damaged chances for the region to see a rise of domestic capital. The political trends we are seeing in Hungary, and other countries in the region is a response to what is now seen as a failed path. They need to change path if they are to escape the middle income trap, thus society is re-adapting. On top of it, the rise of Neo-Marxism in the Western World, leading to a path towards ethno-cultural suicide as is the case with Western Europe, as well as the mess we are witnessing in the US, with the coutry’s history attacked, small businesses shattered by riots public safety… Read more »
„It is not “rule of continuity” It is an adaptation to realities. In Hungary and region, the rush to join Western Europe led to some unfortunate unintended consequences, starting with shock therapy in the 1990’s.“ I consider this to be a lie that right-wing radicals like to tell. There was no hurry Hungary joined the EU in 2004. „That period wiped out domestic capital that could have been salvaged with some investments, along with the unsalvageable that had to be allowed to fail.“ This is a pure invention that Nazis like to make. „The end result is a region that is overly dependent on foreign capital three decades later, which leads to excessive net profit extraction, since it is mostly a one-way trend.“ Above all, Orban wanted this as much as with the Forex loans, which also grew on Orban’s crap. I pay comparatively more taxes like BMW or VW because I don’t get any tax advantages. „EU rules on competition further damaged chances for the region to see a rise of domestic capital.“ Freely invented. „The political trends we are seeing in Hungary, and other countries in the region is a response to what is now seen as a… Read more »
Zoli
From Cuckoo Land. These myths for dummies or damaged souls full of venom have been debunked time and again, but hateful little fascist societies/circles keep spinning them.
The corrupt and dumb Orbàn crowd on the other hand is very real, mercilessly robbing the nation and destroying its structure and potential, as most indicators show.
Debunked? Please do share!!! What are the facts that did this “debunking”?
Facts supporting my claim: Former communist part of EU has among the lowest concentrations of Fortune 500 companies/GDP on this planet.
So, what are your supporting facts? Please lay it on the table!
Well (or rather not …) the money (billions of €) is concentrated in the hands of Fideszniks like Mészáros – anything to say on that, zoli?
Hungary’s capital is mostly in the hands of foreign entities, that is what I have to say on that!!! Domestic capital accumulation has been poor in Hungary and in region as a whole. It is a regional problem, due to EU effect on post-communist transition.
BS zoli BS
Of course no real answer from zolidiot – how much does Mészáros pay you?
HUNDREDS of studies and articles + last 30 years of history made it perfectly clear – uncompetitive industries, lack of capital and know how, outdated/dilapidated infrastructure.
Examples abound:
– The manufacturing cos “spontaneously privatized” by Hu managers went bust, or vegetate. How many made it? List them.
– The Hu pharma cos bought by western ones were retooled, retrained, integrated and prospered.
– After 10 years of Orbàn’s new “nemzeti capitalists” gorging themselves at the public trough they are still there. How many of these stand on their own?
And what is this BS re “concentration of Forbes/GDP ?§@f! Remember how Ceausescu did without foreign capital. You damaged souls never learn, even from the last war.
Never said foreign capital is bad. Don’t need to build a straw man, just so you can have a point. But when the profit extraction is a one-way street, it is an impediment to reaching high income status. And no it is not “BS”. It is an indication of the lack of domestic capital in the region, which should not be the case 30 years after communism collapsed. It is the case due to Western predatory behavior after 1990, as well as leadership in the region taking the bait on certain policies in the aftermath of communism’s collapse.
Try making some honest points. What you tried to do here is BS, even if it flies in the echo chamber around here. Anything flies around here as long as it is ideologically correct.
Zolidiot, any comment on this?
Do you have an idea where O1G’s son, Mészáros etc are taking the money they made cheating Hungarians?
Are you also a part ?
https://english.atlatszo.hu/2020/08/04/company-owned-by-orbans-son-in-law-made-a-billion-forint-on-taking-care-of-permits-for-stalling-hotel-construction-project/
Zoli
I made a mistake to answer seriously to this nonsense.
You ARE saying that foreign capital is bad: capital in foreign hands, “profit extraction …one way street…impediment …shouldn’t be …predatory behavior..”
The purpose of investment is to make profit, balancing high and sustained, capisi? The mafia you favor isn’t investing or developing, they are just robbing and ripping eg. Orbàn ripped off 23 bil HUF from the Màtra Power charade, his son in law 12 bil from the lightening affair, Simicska’s companies had to declare 28% profit on average at the time.
In the mean time the highest wages in Hu are paid by the western cos and those workplaces are consistently voted the best ones in Hu.
I think your essential arquement is correct i.e the Hungarian right has nothing “new under the sun”. Hence the continued glorification and support for the failed Horthy regime by the Fidesz/Orban regime.
„nothing new under the sun“ I read it like “All Quiet on the Western Front”
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_Quiet_on_the_Western_Front
Some scribblers here think Eva is naive … she writes a text that can be understood in many ways. She is educated … others just fart.
To put it mildly, it is rather depressing that 75 years after the horrors of WW2 so many ordinary people have no recollection and understanding of history. Even more depressing that too many of the world leaders are more akin to the worst dictators of past history, leaders that embedded themselves in power from which it seem impossible to remove. ‘Democracy’ has became just a word without meaning, and tyranny by political actors, some who should be in asylum and others in prison, dictate the new world order. Whatever good technological advancements brought about is used against the general population it should have served instead. The Trumps, Putins, Lukashenkos, Johnsons, Orbans and their kinship rule the world in the past decades, and those leaders who seemingly accepted as ‘normal’, like Merkel and Macron, are caving in to those blackmailing dictators. For most common people all over the world hope to live in a just world is fading away day by day, and instead we became the pawns in hands of morons like Trump and his NRA supporters, like Orban, who hasn’t got a grain of morality, and the list is endless. And nothing showed the incompetence of the current political… Read more »
For me the fear of “Marxist Globalism” as one of our trolls used to claim in every comment hundreds of times is a sure sign of fascism!
O1G, Erdougan, Trump, BoJo want “freedom from external influences” so they can realise their crazy ideas – often connected with some special form of religion which appeals to the uneducated, uninformed, xenophobes, homophobes (add your favourite phobia here …) average joes which give them around 50% of the votes even in a democratic election.
It doesn’t really matter what the opposition is doing – too many people still believe that cr*p!
Re: ‘that crap’ We have to think ‘revolutionary’ Orban is making sure of that. A ‘party‘ once again seems to be the only message now. Looking back at ‘89 things perked up as there would be a vision and purposeful movement toward democratic government. Reflection on past, present and future would occur with people communicating on rights, grievances and plans for the country. But the luster on that has been eaten away. Perhaps at that time the country could have caught its breath and breathe a bit without having its mouths stuffed up. But today that Fidesz ‘revolution’ under Orban looks more like a ‘Magyar Restoration’. It’s like bringing back all the corpses of a detestable past and giving them life from times that resonate deeply in certain minds. It’s a wonder that ‘Freedom By God’s Blessing Restored’ hasn’t been sewn on to the tricolor. That was the line of Cromwell’s Protectorate revolutionary dictatorship which really was more a ‘restoration’ of things past than a revolution taking down everything before it. The Orban Way: restoring a country to the tried and true of a past where reality is construed and manufactured as to what it is supposed to be. The… Read more »
OT – Corona in Hungary
Yesterday’s main message from OV’s pandemic team, check it at https://koronavirus.gov.hu/cikkek/legfontosabb-vedekezes-most-az-hogy-akinek-tunetei-vannak-ne-menjen-kozossegbe
What truly flabbergasted me is, that there’s only common general knowledge repeated about the spreading of the Corona virus, BUT not one letter about testing!
Which is the most important action one should take when having one or more symptoms. Meanwhile OV’s team is claiming doing a lot of tests, but for ordinary people getting tested seems not easy…
Can’t match these two together for both being true…
My wife just read on 444 that in Veszprem people came together for a sign from the pope – and now they have several covid cases.
„came together for a sign from the pope – and now they have several covid cases.“ Nanü they’ve already deposed God, and how did the Pope do that?
Sex and drugs, money and power, greed and envy – the party goes on and on.
Love that cartoon. Thank you. Like most great humor, it is funny and sad!
” Kádár correctly identified the “nationalist” group… as much more dangerous because “it can count on the widest societal support”…. It was that group that Viktor Orbán led to victory after he decided that democracy and freedom had less appeal to Hungarians than good old-fashioned nationalism and political extremism.”
“Democracy is the theory that the common people know what they want, and deserve to get it good and hard.” H.L. Mencken
Totally forgot:
Today is George Soros’s 90th Birthday.
Congratulations, György!
If only there were more people like you in the world …
Eva that was one of your better posts over the many years I have been reading this blog. I am definitely now interested in reading Zoltán Ripp’s historical overview of the transition to capitalism in Hungary.
I do think it would be interesting for your readers to examine the mistakes made in the west by promoting a more rapid economic transition process in Hungary and other countries that had socialized economies and were controlled by Communist political parties. The promotion of a version of the Chicago school’s shock therapy in my opinion also plays a roll in the assent of the right in Hungary. In fact Putin has obsessively discussed this as a justification for his own nationalism.
I think Elisabeth Schimpfössl, who is a lecturer in sociology and policy at Aston University makes a powerful argument in her book “Rich Russians: From Oligarchs to Bourgeoisie“ (Oxford University Press 2018) discusses the intersection of the shock therapy treatment and reality of the Putin state that now exists. Those lessons can be applied to the evolution of the Orban Mafia state too.
Thanks for the book ref. Followed up because of the intriguing situation. Always interesting to know what the ‘rich’ do all day.
From Aug 31 ‘18 Guardian review:
Nonetheless, her wide-eyed interview technique scores notable successes in other ways. When the children of rich Russians claim to have achieved their success in fashion (or whatever) by their own efforts, Schimpfössl skewers them. Similarly, when the very wealthy claim to be patriotic, she pours her disdain into a paragraph that distils the very essence of Putinism: “Patriotism on the part of the moneyed class clearly ends when it comes to the matters of educating their children, acquiring second homes, and determining where to park their money’.
Now we should know why culture and ‘arts’ have become a big thing now where there is a ‘changing of the guard’ in those areas in Magyarorszag. It will be a wonder to see what the generations after the current one do with their ‘found’ money in a country gone full nationalist. Being ‘silver-spooned’ by an elite that feels they need to go ‘mainstream’ certainly will continue entitlement. And while others write Constitutions and coerce it through monopoly others will just stay in their serfdom.
“I do think it would be interesting for your readers to examine the mistakes made in the west by promoting a more rapid economic transition process in Hungary and other countries ”
There is some sort of continuity but it is far weaker, far less important than what Eva thinks.
You can see this phenomenon in the West as well in the last 5-10 years. It is not that the western right-wing parties have come now with anything new. They have the same message that they had in the early ’90s. But the circumstances have changed and this in turn have made an increasingly larger number of (previously ‘deaf’) people to pay attention to the message of these parties.
‘ In fact Putin has obsessively discussed this as a justification for his own nationalism.’
Yes, Russia had gone through all the phases with an amazing intensity and speed. By the late ’90s they had enough of social and economic liberalism. Hungary got burnt out by the mid 2000s.
….and Trump won in 2016 running basically on the same message/platform as Pat Buchanan in the early ’90s.
Buchanan was too early. But by 2016 the consequences of globalization (deindustrialization/outsourcing the American manufacturing, jobs and technology to Asia/China) and of mass immigration (cheap labor, social-cultural conflict, etc) hit hard, they became all too apparent. Buchanan has been prescient but that is of no use in politics since people/voters at large are slow to catch.
Fascinating piece,
The detail is intriguing as Eva has shown.
Unfortunately, the transition was flawed and has carried forward the Hungarian way of life. The endemic Kadarist corruption has been carried forward to this day. Until Hungarians learn the need for accountability in public life they will not progress. The stumbling efforts made by Dr Antal in his three years have turned out to result in little other than the permanent enrichment of Kadarist apparatchiks. I know Eva that you don’t like this.
“endemic Kadarist corruption”
could it not just be “endemic Hungarian corruption” during whoever’s regime?
and the current corruption under OV as the all-time Hungarian record…
Aida
It’s not a matter of liking yours statement, it’s simply wrong.
– The economies of the communist block kept slipping behind for decades and there was no easy way catching up, eg. Czechs and Slovenes tried a slower transition but got the same overall results, Poland did about the same as Hu even faster with about the same results. No miracles, even for the Huns.
– Corruption was primarily political and on higher levels, but nobody got rich there, the use of a villa was the top (acquisition of such property was made possible after 1989 afaik). Now the under 40 yo. son in law was given 20 such villas at least, as Ferenc noted, it’s a record in even well corrupt Hu.
My post said nothing about economics. Its principal point is about the continuing absence of accountability in Hungarian public life. It has enabled the cream of Kadarist apparatchiks to retain what they gained and profit from the largely fraudulent and mostly bogus privatisation process post 1990.
Unfortunately the rather obvious and self evident point does not resonate with our friends here. It is right to be indignant about Orbanist corruption, but it is undermined by its selectivity. Endemic corruption going back to the Kadar regime is met with a deafening silence save for Eva’s brave but, unfortunately, misplaced attempts to contradict it.
I write about ten years, orthonym but then I was pressured to write something else by e-mail East German Nazis. Since then I wrote under a nom de plume. “unfortunately, misplaced attempts to contradict it.” Can you explain that or is that just a fart?
However I don’t understand a word of this. Ovika summed it up,right. Alas that summary or my clumsy attempts to make the same point fall on deaf ears here.
I would appreciate it if Eva gave us the benefit of her thoughts,
Aida
Still wrong. See my comment to Ovi below and feel free to give examples of what did ” the cream of Kadarist apparatchiks” obtained or retained before the Antal gov. I’m breaking the deafening silence here.
Observer look at mine of 3.34 on 14/8.
You can watch on YouTube a patronising piece by party loyal court jester Dezso Keller on his visit to Paris. At the time ordinary Joe was allowed to travel to the West once every three years. It is clear from the piece that for court jester Keller this was at least an annual outing.
We know perfectly well how the Kadar regime worked. Also that the regime change did not work as it should have. My simple point is that the first task should have been to hold the senior apparatchiks to account. It is a very simple task of tracking down the sources of wealth. Opportunity missed. When the Orban regime falls they will not be held to account and so on. A country truly without consequences.
We’ve discussed the concept of “lustration” here several times already and that it hasn’t really happened in Hungary.
In Germany everybody got the right to have a look at their Stasi files – and a friend who had coma to West germany in 1988 told me once how surprised he had been about what his “friends” had reported on him.
To several of them he sent copie – but of course got no answer …
But Hungarian politics is essentially a continuation of the Kadar system – says my wife. And she worked in the önkormanyzat as a lowly person – because she was never a party member …
Your wife is 100% right
“Corruption was primarily political and on higher levels”
Nope. Corruption was endemic, it was present at all levels and it was an essential social-lever. That’s how communism ‘functioned’ throughout the Eastern block (USSR included) in the last two decades of communism.
It was style of living, affecting everyone at all levels. And it was an integrated, pyramidal, system, indeed much resembling the, de facto, one party system erected by Orban,
I agree with that.
Ovi
In the Kàdar era the severe limitations of private property precluded significant material corruption, wealth accumulation. It was primarily trading favors, hence it was a petty one. How many got rich in Kàdàr times? Examples?
Orbàn’s “one party system” on the other hand is pumping public wealth into private pockets as fast as they can. It’s not only the staggering scale on the top, but it’s in every town and village with every project or business involving the state or a fidesznik businessman.
Yes, observer – but it might have been different between the Warsaw pact states. A “nice” example is the GDR:
Honecker ordered a special Range Rover for his hunting with lots of extras which must have cost several hundred thousand pounds. And the honchos had their own city where normal people could not enter with stores where you could everything cheap – from champagne to Levis jeans.
Did Hungary have anything similar?
Special shops, special hospitals, special holidays,”part udulo” at Balaton Akarattya, I sat on the grass once at Romai Part with an apparatchik friend and we went through his list of privileges. It was impressive.
There were restrictions on private wealth. However much of the privileges were converted post 1989. Acquisition of flats and houses stolen by the party from their owners and lived in by apparatchiks then sold to them for kopeks.
How did the apparently penniless apparatchiks find the price of state owned enterprises when corruptly privatised? How come they had access to loans and insider information and the rest got nothing whilst they grew rich overnight. Has Gyurcsány ever been required to explain how he became a wealthy man from penniless KISZ boss. Have any of the others? Gyurcsány had zero business experience.
US election arithmetic.
Suppose that in a “battleground” state, 1/3 of the certain voters are Republicans, 1/3 are Democrats and 1/3 are independents.
Suppose that all Republicans and 40% of the independents would vote for Trump, while all Democrats and 60% of the independents would vote for Biden.
Biden would thus receive 1/3 + 1/3*0.6 = 53.3.% of the vote and all of the electoral votes of this state.
But Republicans and Democrats show widely different preferences about voting by mail.
Suppose 80% of the Republicans, 60% of the independents and 40% of the Democrats would vote in person either early or on election day, the rest by mail (i.e. 40% of the vote would arrive by mail)
On election night Trump can declare victory, because he would receive
1/3*0.8+1/3*0.6*0.4 = 34.7%,
while Biden only
1/3*0.4+1/3*0.6*0.6 = 25.3% of the votes.
The mail-in ballots would be be counted only after election night, but they can be lost or delayed by the new Postmaster General and Mr Barr or the courts can stop their counting and declare Trump the winner.
The latest Wisconsin poll support this calculation:
https://law.marquette.edu/poll/
Election night result:
Trump: 57.8% = 10/6*34.7%,
Biden: 42.2%= 10/6*25.3%.
Final result:
Trump: 46.7%,
Biden: 53.3%.
That is why Trump speaks about fraud in advance and he will shout fraud after the election.
But this is not fraud, just basic arithmetic. The Democratic leadership should explain this to the public NOW to immunize them from virus Trump.