Following up on some current issues

I am covering three topics today, all follow-ups to earlier unfinished threads. The first continues the case of László Rovó, the government-appointed rector of the University of Szeged. Rovó, after returning from a ski trip in Southern Tyrol, didn’t quarantine himself as he was supposed to but instead showed up in the operating room. A couple of days later, he was diagnosed with COVID-19. Once the case became known, MOK, the Hungarian Medical Association, began an investigation of the case, which started with the Szeged chapter of MOK and concluded in Győr because of conflict of interest issues. A few months later, the original investigator of the case, Professor Szatmár Horváth, a professor at the university, was fired, allegedly for incompetence and unworthy behavior.

It seems that this disgraceful affair did have some adverse consequences, unfortunately not for Rector Rovó but for the University of Szeged’s medical school. For several years, the medical school at the University of Nebraska had a fruitful cooperation with the Szeged medical establishment. The contact person between the two universities was Károly Mirnics, a Hungarian-American professor of psychiatry, biochemistry, molecular biology, and pharmacology, who over the years welcomed several young Hungarian researchers in his laboratory. He also taught at the University of Szeged as a guest lecturer.

Upon hearing the story, he wrote a letter of resignation to the department head of the University of Szeged’s psychiatric clinic. Here are the main points of his letter. “(1) A powerful academic leader breaks the national rules for his pleasure, lies about it, gets COVID-19 and endangers patients by operating on them while potentially COVID-19 positive; (2) an ethics committee chair, who should investigate his alleged transgressions, is abruptly fired by the powerful leader who allegedly broke the rules.” Under the circumstances, “with a heavy heart,” the professor from Nebraska announced the discontinuation of all ties to the University of Szeged.

The second topic about which I would like to say a few words is the latest public opinion polling on the standing of Hungarian political parties. Yesterday, we were discussing the loss of popular support of the Slovak and Czech governments because of the severity of the “second wave” of the pandemic. Both Igor Matovič and Andrej Babiš were overly confident of their ability to handle the medical emergency and, by now, both politicians have lost the trust of their people. As a result, their parties, OĽaNO and ANO 2011, which in the early spring showed some modest gains, began losing support. At this point, I suggested that a similar development might take place in Hungary, given the chaotic handling of the pandemic by the government and the population’s decreasing trust in the veracity of Viktor Orbán and his regime.

We now have an answer to this question thanks to Závecz Research Institute’s poll, released today. The Hungarian medical situation is very similar to that in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but since the governments of Babiš and Matovič are coalition governments, as opposed to the rock solid two-thirds parliamentary majority of Fidesz, the Hungarian party, unlike the other two, is not threatened with collapse any time soon.

Fidesz, like OĽaNO and ANO 2011, gained five percentage points between March and August, but since then it has lost four percentage points. Among committed voters, Fidesz still leads with 49% against DK’s 17%, Jobbik and Momentum each at 10%, MSZP at 6%, and Mi Hazánk, LMP, Two-Tailed Dog, and Párbeszéd each at 2%.

After the by-election in Borsod County, I found it significant that the common, less-than-ideal opposition candidate won in Tiszaújváros, the largest town in the district. Even in smaller Szerencs, the hometown of Zsófia Koncz, the two candidates shared the votes in about equal measure. Závecz’s poll confirms the loss of Fidesz support not just in Budapest but also in provincial towns. Fidesz’s loss in these cities is substantial, eight percentage points. On the other hand, villages are still Fidesz strongholds. Fidesz’s loss among university graduates is huge, 16 percentage points, followed by high school graduates with a 6 percentage point decline. The number of Fidesz supporters with a grade eight education has grown by 7 percentage points. Among respondents under the age of 40, Fidesz’s popularity is at an all-time low, only 25%. However, I doubt that the Hungarian football hooligans will march out and engage in a violent demonstration against the government as happened in Bratislava and Prague, because the football-loving prime minister, ignoring the pandemic, hasn’t closed the football stadiums. Just this weekend there will be three NBI games in Budapest. No reason to riot.

Source: Financial Times

And finally, a few days ago we contemplated the possible ramifications of a Biden-Harris victory on U.S.-Hungarian relations. Yesterday, a fascinating report written by Senator Bob Menendez, the ranking member of the committee on foreign relations, appeared, titled “The Cost of Trump’s Foreign Policy: Damage and Consequences for U.S. and Global Security.” Menendez, hoping to be the next chairman of this powerful committee, is a fierce critic of the Orbán regime. The 73-page report has 52 references to Hungary and 36 to Viktor Orbán.

Hungary is described as a threat to NATO and democratic principles, a free press, and democracy. In fact, Menendez devotes a whole subchapter to the country, titled “Hungary: Embraced in the White House.” Most of this subchapter is devoted to Hungary’s “Eastern Opening,” where the senator writes about “the movement of Russian money into Hungary, intelligence sharing, increasing commercial ties and a decision to move the Moscow-based International Investment Bank to Budapest.” A roughly equal amount of space is devoted to Hungarian-Chinese relations and the Chinese-built railroad between Budapest and Belgrade. I must say that it is a very professional summary of U.S. foreign policy under President Trump, with more than 350 lengthy footnotes.

At the end of the pamphlet, Menendez summarizes his recommendations, among which we find: “Autocratic leaders should be put on notice that the United States will hold them accountable for violation of human rights and efforts to repress their citizens” and “Effectively competing against Russia and China should be one of the United States’ central foreign policy goals.” If Menendez has his way, the White House and the Democrat-led committee on foreign relations will give the Orbán regime a very hard time.

October 22, 2020