Tag Archives: Andrej Babiš

The Russian plan to blow up a Czech ammunition depot may have been directed from Budapest

The 2014 Czech explosion scandal is rapidly expanding. Yesterday, demonstrations were held in front of the Russian Embassy in Prague over the alleged Russian involvement in the explosions at an ammunition depot in Vrbětice in 2014. Soon after, the government announced its hope for support and solidarity on the part of the European Union and its NATO allies. Thus, as Szabad Európa remarked yesterday, “the Czech spy scandal has become an EU-wide issue.”

My first piece on the affair ended by wondering whether Hungary would join Slovakia and Poland in supporting the Czech Republic, as requested by the government of Viktor Orbán’s friend Andrej Babiš. In vain does one look for any sign of a Hungarian response to the Czech call on the Orbán government’s website, but the Polish government placed the following announcement on their own: “We, the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrád Group, condemn all activities aimed at threatening the security of sovereign states and its citizens. We stand ready to further strengthen our resilience against subversive actions at both the national level and together with our NATO allies and within the EU. The Foreign Ministers of Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary express solidarity with recent steps taken by our close partner, ally, and neighbor, Czechia.”

According to Paraméter, a Hungarian-language Slovak internet news site, it was Slovak Foreign Minister Ivan Korčok who initiated the V4’s joint declaration. Admittedly, it is somewhat worrisome that the alleged perpetrator of the action is not mentioned by name. But the very fact that Hungary signed this short document is a step in the right direction.

If the Hungarian government failed to reveal its solidarity with steps taken against Russia on its website, what did they say to their domestic audience about this affair? On April 19, after a lengthy description of Hungarian complaints about Ukraine’s unfair treatment of its Hungarian minority, Péter Szijjártó said that “Hungary expressed its solidarity with Poland over the arrest of the leader of the Polish national community in Belarus and with the Czech Republic over its diplomatic conflict with Russia.” He added that “Hungary knows exactly what it is like when the rights of a national community are violated, as the Hungarians of Transcarpathia are also confronted with such an attitude.” Thus, the statement of solidarity with the Czech Republic became subordinate to a declaration of support for Poland as it responded to an act against its ethnic minority in Belarus. Russian criminal activities abroad merited only a few words and were reduced to a “diplomatic conflict.” It is true that MTI summarized the content of the document, but Magyar Nemzet simply said that the Polish, Hungarian, and Slovak foreign ministers “condemn all activities that threaten the security of sovereign states and their inhabitants.”

Expelling 18 Russian diplomats from the Czech Republic was a very strong response to the revelations of Russian involvement in the explosions. Past experience suggested that the “aggrieved” partner would “outdo” the original slight. And indeed, in no time, 20 Czech diplomats had to leave Moscow within 24 hours. That meant that the Czech Embassy would be left practically unattended. Perhaps because of the Russian response, Prime Minister Babiš tried to appease the Russians by saying that “Russia did not attack the Czech Republic but the goods of a Bulgarian arms dealer who was probably selling these arms to parties fighting Russia.” Opposition politicians, however, were not in the mood to mollify the Russians, and thus Babiš was forced to retreat.

Bulgarian-Russian affairs are not in the best of shape either. In March, Bulgaria expelled two Russian diplomats accused of spying after Bulgarian prosecutors indicted six people, including current and former military intelligence officers, for spying for Russia. According to Bulgarian authorities, the spy network passed classified information to the Russian embassy in Sofia about Bulgaria, NATO, and the European Union. Given the already strained relations between the two countries, it is not surprising that Ekatrina Zahavieva, Bulgaria’s foreign minister, expressed full solidarity with the Czech Republic against the violation of its national sovereignty by Russia. This was pretty much expected considering that the ammunition stored in Vrbětice belonged to a Bulgarian arms dealer whom the Russian agents subsequently tried to poison in order to prevent the shipment of arms and ammunition to Ukraine. Zahavieva also expressed “full solidarity with Ukraine over Russia’s dangerous escalation of tension at its borders in recent weeks, [which] is absolutely unacceptable.” Long gone is the traditional friendship between Bulgaria and Russia.

There is no question that Slovakia will stand by the Czechs. As Foreign Minister Korčok put it, “we will decide in such a way that there is no doubt where the Slovak Republic stands” on that issue. At the same time, he saw “an opportunity to develop a clear position within the V4 on the situation in which the Czech Republic has found itself.”

International opposition to Russian aggression and the brazen activities of the GRU, the foreign military intelligence agency of the Russian Armed Forces, in Great Britain and countries of the European Union will make it difficult for the Orbán government to stand by Vladimir Putin’s Russia. This is especially the case since in the last few hours further details emerged, thanks to the joint work of Bell¿ngcat, Respekt, The Insider, and Der Spiegel, which puts Budapest at the center of a six-man Russian operation.

Map provided by Bell¿ngcat

The operation was apparently organized and directed by two highly placed operatives, Alexey Kapinos and Evgeniy Kalinin, who under their own names but with diplomatic passports landed in Budapest, allegedly carrying mail to the Russian Embassy. Kalinin is assumed to have been supervising agents Anatoliy Chepiga and Alexander Mishkin. It was these two who most likely masterminded the attack in the Czech Republic.

The investigation is far from finished; more revelations are promised.

April 20, 2021

Will Hungary stand by the Czech Republic against Russia?

An international bombshell exploded yesterday in Prague when Prime Minister Andrej Babiš announced the expulsion of 18 Russian diplomats from the country “on well-founded suspicions that Russian intelligence agents were involved in explosions at an ammunition depot in Vrbětice in October and December 2014.” He claimed to have “clear evidence,” collected by the Czech intelligence and security services, that the Russian group, known as Unit 29155, had been involved in the explosions.

It was this group that was implicated in the attempted assassination of Sergei Skripal, a former Russian spy, and his daughter Yulia. British authorities eventually identified the two Russian agents as Anatoliy Chepiga and Alexander Mishkin, who also appear to be responsible for the two explosions in the Czech Republic.

Within minutes of the announcement, a chill reminiscent of the Cold War years settled on the already frosty relations between the West and Russia. For good measure, the Czech minister of industry announced that “it is very unlikely that Russia’s Rosatom will take part in building a new nuclear power plant in the Czech Republic as concerns of Russian intelligence activities are growing.”

Russian Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Maria Zakharova said in an interview that“Western partners sought to override the importance and topicality of information released by both Russia and Belarus about not simply a plot but an actual plan of a constitutional coup,” referring to recent news of the Russian arrest of two men who were allegedly preparing to overthrow the Belarus government and kill President Alexander Lukashenko. The Russians accused the Czech government of total subservience to American interests. It was further stated that “this hostile move was the continuation of a series of anti-Russian actions undertaken by the Czech Republic in recent years. It’s hard not to see the American influence in the country.”

Babiš immediately got in touch with Charles Michel, president of the European Council, and Jan Hamáček, acting foreign minister, tweeted that the issue will be discussed at a meeting of EU foreign ministers tomorrow. Babiš asked for the solidarity of his allies. The United States, Great Britain, and Poland have already assured Prague of their support. A NATO official told Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty that “we support our NATO ally, the Czech Republic, as it tackles and investigates Russia’s malign activities on its territory.”

The Czech weekly Respekt published a long article on the Russian agents allegedly responsible for the explosions and claimed that the attack was carried out “to stop a shipment of weapons to Ukraine.” The Czech police are certain that, although the two men entered the territory of the Czech Republic under aliases, they were actually the same Anatoliy Chepiga and Alexander Mishkin who wanted to kill Sergei Skripal in Salisbury, England on March 4, 2018.

Arms dealers can visit the depot in Vrbětice as long as they state their purpose ahead of time in an e-mail. The e-mail the two Russians submitted, however, was “stripped of all metadata,” so it was impossible to determine where it was sent from. They entered the Czech Republic under one set of aliases and introduced themselves under another.

The way the Czech police have reconstructed the story, the Russian aim, with the explosions, was to prevent Czech ammunition from being delivered to a Bulgarian arms dealer, who was supplying arms to the Ukrainian army fighting Russian forces. To completely stop the flow of weapons from Bulgaria to Ukraine, the arms dealer was supposed to be killed by a third Russian agent operating under the alias of Sergey Fedotov. As Bell¿ngcat, a British investigative journalism website that specializes in fact-checking and open-sourced intelligence, uncovered, Fedotov arrived in Bulgaria on April 24, 2015, with a return flight to Moscow scheduled for April 30th. However, he showed up at Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport on April 28th, where he bought a last-minute ticket back to Moscow. Earlier that day, Emilian Gebrev, an arms dealer, was hospitalized after collapsing at a reception. Eventually, he recovered, but a month later “Fedotov” was back in Bulgaria and Gebrev fell ill again. The Ukrainian internet site Unian agrees with the hypothesis of the Czech police that the attempts on Gebrev’s life were related to his supplying defense-related equipment to Ukraine.

How did the Fidesz propaganda machine handle this rather delicate matter? MTI sent four reports from Prague and Warsaw, which were incoherent, perhaps because of the editing that is routinely done in Budapest. Origo so far has published three articles on the topic, two of which were about the Russian response. Demokrata was surprisingly candid, admitting that Babiš asked for solidarity among the allies of the Czech Republic, which naturally includes Hungary. It also reported on Warsaw’s support for Prague. Pesti Srácok even went so far as to talk about the likelihood of Rosatom’s exclusion from the tender for the Dukovany Power Plant. The article, bypassing MTI, went to the original source and quoted Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Industry and Trade Karel Havlíček, who called attention to “the risks of inviting Russian and Chinese companies, which have been highlighted by Czech intelligence services. Any such act, if proven, must clearly have consequences.” Magyar Nemzet simply stated that 18 Russian diplomats had been expelled because, “according to the Czech authorities, they worked for the Russian secret service.”

I can imagine the anxiety that must have gripped the Hungarian Foreign Ministry and the Prime Minister’s Office in the face of a situation that cannot end in a truly satisfactory manner from the Hungarian point of view. What  would satisfy both the Czechs and the Poles (as well as the Americans), on the one hand, and Russia on the other? Perhaps Viktor Orbán, who looks upon himself as an exceptionally talented diplomat, will find some miraculous way of getting out of this mess. Or perhaps the time has arrived when Orbán will have to show his cards. He either declares his allegiance and support of his allies or he sides with Russia’s 80,000 soldiers amassed at the eastern border with Ukraine and in Crimea.

April 18, 2021

Viktor Orbán in defiance of the European Union

Today I’m going to cover three interconnected issues, all of them touching on relations between the European Union and Hungary.

The first topic is the EU’s financial assistance, or, if you ask Viktor Orbán, the lack thereof when it comes to Hungary’s plight in the face of a deadly pandemic. In 2020, we often heard the prime minister, during his regular Friday morning interviews, moan that Hungary, totally abandoned, could get help only from China and the Turkic Council. In his words, “our home is here, but assistance doesn’t come from within.” Indeed, soon enough Foreign Minister Péter Szijjártó embarked on a wild goose chase in search of very expensive and, as it turned out, unnecessary Chinese ventilators and masks of questionable quality.

Although lately the complaints against the tight-fistedness of Brussels have stopped, the Orbán government still wasn’t advertising how much money the European Commission made available to Hungary to handle the ill effects of COVID-19. Today, however, István Ujhelyi, an MSZP member of the European Parliament, added up just how many billions of euros the Hungarian government got from the EU. Admittedly, these items were not new allocations; they either were monies that didn’t have to be paid back in the current year or grants that had been freed from their original designations, which had been strictly enforced earlier. According to the European Commission, in this way Hungary received 5.6 billion euros last year. In addition, Hungary obtained a €504 million loan from the “Support to mitigate Unemployment Risks in an Emergency” (SURE) fund, which can provide financial assistance up to €100 billion to member states. This money can be spent on supplements to or replacements of wages and on health care expenses. In addition, Hungary received €26.5 million from the Union’s Solidarity Fund, which was set up to respond to major natural disasters. But, given the pandemic, it could now be used to address medical emergencies.

The second topic is the Hungarian news on the Russian and Chinese vaccines via the Czech Republic. In case you missed it, Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš, accompanied by a medical delegation, visited Budapest on February 5. Later, they made a similar trip to Belgrade. Prior to the trip, the Czech government was inclined to follow Hungary’s example and stock up on Chinese and Russian vaccines. According to Botond Bőtös, a Hungarian journalist living in Prague, Babiš and his adviser, Roman Prymula, an epidemiologist, were inclined to follow the “Hungarian Way,” meaning using the Chinese and Russian vaccines without European approval. But after the trip was over, they changed their minds because it became obvious to them that neither Serbia nor Hungary was in possession of all the necessary documentation. The Czech delegation undertook the trip to determine how much information had been available before these two countries approved the use of the Sputnik-V and Sinopharm vaccines. Prymula concluded that “the Hungarians and the Serbs have some data but not enough for approval by the European Medicines Agency, which means that without these data the vaccines cannot be used.”

In the last few days, ordinary Hungarian citizens also concluded that not all is well with the documentation of the vaccines which arrived from Russia and China. Chief Medical Officer Cecília Müller said that “the documentation arrived yesterday together with the shipment” while a few hours later a member of the government contradicted her by claiming that the documentation had arrived already in December. In brief, there is total chaos in Budapest, which only reinforces people’s general reluctance to be inoculated and their worry about the Russian and Chinese vaccines in particular.

Members of the Czech government didn’t see eye to eye on the issue of adopting vaccines without the approval of the EMA. Babiš’s minister of health, Jan Blatný, didn’t even bother to accompany the prime minister to Budapest and Belgrade. He announced ahead of the trips that, as long as he is the minister of health, “no one in this country will be inoculated with a vaccine not approved by the EMA.” A comment like this coming from Prague, I think, highlights the difference between the political situations in the Czech Republic and in Hungary. I would like to see any member of the Orbán government have an opinion different from that of “the boss.” This time, even the Czech prime minister, who strikes me as an ally of Orbán, was not convinced of the wisdom of his Hungarian friend, at least according to Czech journalistic accounts. He remained quiet until February 11, when he returned from Serbia, at which point he announced that the Czech government has no intention of using either the Russian or the Chinese vaccine without the approval of the European Medicines Agency.

And for the final topic, here are a few comments about a new infringement procedure waiting for Hungary. You may recall that in June 2020 the European Court of Justice ruled against Hungary, which in 2017 had passed a law mandating that all NGOs which receive more than 7.2 million forints (about €20,000) from outside the country must register as “foreign-financed organizations.” On this occasion the European Commission had acted swiftly and had initiated an infringement procedure against the Hungarian government. When Budapest’s explanation was deemed unsatisfactory, the case ended up in the European Court of Justice, which last summer ruled that the limitation of financing from abroad is in violation of EU law. In response, Judit Varga made it clear that the Hungarian government had no intention of changing the objectionable Hungarian law.

Since then, six months have gone by without the Hungarian government getting rid of the objectionable law on the foreign financing of NGOs, and it seems that the European Commission has had enough. EUrologus, HVG’s EU sleuth, heard from an absolutely reliable source that an infringement procedure will be launched against Hungary in the very near future. However, there is nothing to be excited about because in the end, which most likely will be in another year, the case will probably be sent once again to the European Court of Justice where, if the ruling goes against Hungary, the Orbán government, that is the Hungarian people, may have to pay a stiff fine. Punkt.

EUrologus reminded us of other, earlier cases when the Hungarian government refused to follow the ruling of the Court: the treatment of the refugees and transit zones, Central European University, Gábor Iványi’s church, and now the NGOs. In all cases, Hungary simply ignored the ruling of the European Court of Justice. I assume it will do the same in this case as well.

February 18, 2021

Following up on some current issues

I am covering three topics today, all follow-ups to earlier unfinished threads. The first continues the case of László Rovó, the government-appointed rector of the University of Szeged. Rovó, after returning from a ski trip in Southern Tyrol, didn’t quarantine himself as he was supposed to but instead showed up in the operating room. A couple of days later, he was diagnosed with COVID-19. Once the case became known, MOK, the Hungarian Medical Association, began an investigation of the case, which started with the Szeged chapter of MOK and concluded in Győr because of conflict of interest issues. A few months later, the original investigator of the case, Professor Szatmár Horváth, a professor at the university, was fired, allegedly for incompetence and unworthy behavior.

It seems that this disgraceful affair did have some adverse consequences, unfortunately not for Rector Rovó but for the University of Szeged’s medical school. For several years, the medical school at the University of Nebraska had a fruitful cooperation with the Szeged medical establishment. The contact person between the two universities was Károly Mirnics, a Hungarian-American professor of psychiatry, biochemistry, molecular biology, and pharmacology, who over the years welcomed several young Hungarian researchers in his laboratory. He also taught at the University of Szeged as a guest lecturer.

Upon hearing the story, he wrote a letter of resignation to the department head of the University of Szeged’s psychiatric clinic. Here are the main points of his letter. “(1) A powerful academic leader breaks the national rules for his pleasure, lies about it, gets COVID-19 and endangers patients by operating on them while potentially COVID-19 positive; (2) an ethics committee chair, who should investigate his alleged transgressions, is abruptly fired by the powerful leader who allegedly broke the rules.” Under the circumstances, “with a heavy heart,” the professor from Nebraska announced the discontinuation of all ties to the University of Szeged.

The second topic about which I would like to say a few words is the latest public opinion polling on the standing of Hungarian political parties. Yesterday, we were discussing the loss of popular support of the Slovak and Czech governments because of the severity of the “second wave” of the pandemic. Both Igor Matovič and Andrej Babiš were overly confident of their ability to handle the medical emergency and, by now, both politicians have lost the trust of their people. As a result, their parties, OĽaNO and ANO 2011, which in the early spring showed some modest gains, began losing support. At this point, I suggested that a similar development might take place in Hungary, given the chaotic handling of the pandemic by the government and the population’s decreasing trust in the veracity of Viktor Orbán and his regime.

We now have an answer to this question thanks to Závecz Research Institute’s poll, released today. The Hungarian medical situation is very similar to that in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, but since the governments of Babiš and Matovič are coalition governments, as opposed to the rock solid two-thirds parliamentary majority of Fidesz, the Hungarian party, unlike the other two, is not threatened with collapse any time soon.

Fidesz, like OĽaNO and ANO 2011, gained five percentage points between March and August, but since then it has lost four percentage points. Among committed voters, Fidesz still leads with 49% against DK’s 17%, Jobbik and Momentum each at 10%, MSZP at 6%, and Mi Hazánk, LMP, Two-Tailed Dog, and Párbeszéd each at 2%.

After the by-election in Borsod County, I found it significant that the common, less-than-ideal opposition candidate won in Tiszaújváros, the largest town in the district. Even in smaller Szerencs, the hometown of Zsófia Koncz, the two candidates shared the votes in about equal measure. Závecz’s poll confirms the loss of Fidesz support not just in Budapest but also in provincial towns. Fidesz’s loss in these cities is substantial, eight percentage points. On the other hand, villages are still Fidesz strongholds. Fidesz’s loss among university graduates is huge, 16 percentage points, followed by high school graduates with a 6 percentage point decline. The number of Fidesz supporters with a grade eight education has grown by 7 percentage points. Among respondents under the age of 40, Fidesz’s popularity is at an all-time low, only 25%. However, I doubt that the Hungarian football hooligans will march out and engage in a violent demonstration against the government as happened in Bratislava and Prague, because the football-loving prime minister, ignoring the pandemic, hasn’t closed the football stadiums. Just this weekend there will be three NBI games in Budapest. No reason to riot.

Source: Financial Times

And finally, a few days ago we contemplated the possible ramifications of a Biden-Harris victory on U.S.-Hungarian relations. Yesterday, a fascinating report written by Senator Bob Menendez, the ranking member of the committee on foreign relations, appeared, titled “The Cost of Trump’s Foreign Policy: Damage and Consequences for U.S. and Global Security.” Menendez, hoping to be the next chairman of this powerful committee, is a fierce critic of the Orbán regime. The 73-page report has 52 references to Hungary and 36 to Viktor Orbán.

Hungary is described as a threat to NATO and democratic principles, a free press, and democracy. In fact, Menendez devotes a whole subchapter to the country, titled “Hungary: Embraced in the White House.” Most of this subchapter is devoted to Hungary’s “Eastern Opening,” where the senator writes about “the movement of Russian money into Hungary, intelligence sharing, increasing commercial ties and a decision to move the Moscow-based International Investment Bank to Budapest.” A roughly equal amount of space is devoted to Hungarian-Chinese relations and the Chinese-built railroad between Budapest and Belgrade. I must say that it is a very professional summary of U.S. foreign policy under President Trump, with more than 350 lengthy footnotes.

At the end of the pamphlet, Menendez summarizes his recommendations, among which we find: “Autocratic leaders should be put on notice that the United States will hold them accountable for violation of human rights and efforts to repress their citizens” and “Effectively competing against Russia and China should be one of the United States’ central foreign policy goals.” If Menendez has his way, the White House and the Democrat-led committee on foreign relations will give the Orbán regime a very hard time.

October 22, 2020

No Faustian bargain: Orbán will not sell his dictatorship for €6 billion

According to Der Spiegel, although the European Commission accepted the “Rule of Law Report 2020,” the vote was not unanimous. Such occasions are apparently extremely rare in the history of the organization. This time, however, two of the commissioners, the Hungarian Olivér Várhelyi, in charge of neighborhood and enlargement, and the Polish Janusz Wojciechowski, responsible for agriculture, refused to go along. In both cases, the commissioners took their cues from their home governments instead of acting on behalf of the EU, as they pledged to do.

Photo by Pierre-Yves Thienpont

What happened at the Commission’s meeting yesterday points to the failure of President Ursula von der Leyen’s policy of appeasement, as many people have labeled it, toward Eastern Europe. She decided to take into account the “special situation” of the East European member states when formulating her positions.

The author of the Spiegel article spends no time on Wojciechowski but writes at length about Várhelyi, who “sometimes aggressively represented Viktor Orbán’s increasingly authoritarian politics in Brussels as Hungary’s ambassador to the European Union.” His confirmation hearing in the European Parliament for the job of commissioner was fraught, and his selection by von der Leyen to become the neighborhood and enlargement commissioner was considered especially troublesome. At the time, Várhelyi promised that he would “act completely independently” and wouldn’t accept orders from any government. Perhaps von der Leyen learned something yesterday about what promises mean in Fidesz circles.

It has been a matter of speculation whether Viktor Orbán consulted with Czech Prime Minister Andrej Babiš before writing his belligerent letter to Ursula von der Leyen, bitterly complaining about the insults heaped upon Hungary and the Hungarians by Czech Vice President Věra Jourová. Today, when journalists asked Babiš about this after he arrived at the European Council Summit in Brussels, he avoided giving a straight answer. Magyar Nemzet said that “the Czech prime minister has not yet taken a position on the matter.” On the other hand, the Babiš government’s socialist foreign minister, Tomáš Petříček, and the Czech opposition parties stand by Jourová, “who is only doing her job and does it well.” In any case, the Czech commissioner voted with the majority; mind you, the Czech Republic wasn’t one of the countries that had been singled out.

As far as the “The Rule of Law Report 2020” itself is concerned, Hungarian critics of the government, including Amnesty International Magyarország, K-Monitor, Magyar Helsinki Committee, Mérték Media Analysis Workshop, Political Capital, Romaversitas Foundation, TASZ, and Transparency International Magyarország, find the Report promising. But they point to a number of problems not covered by the Report in all four categories the Commission touched upon: the independence of the judiciary, the anti-corruption framework, media pluralism, and checks and balances issues. The Report is available in English on the EU’s website.

Naturally, the Hungarian government is dissatisfied with the document. The 31-page English-language “input from Hungary”  begins on the following note: “Hungary is committed to the fundamental values of the EU as enshrined in Article 2 TEU. Hungary participates in the network of national contact points on rule of law in order to contribute to a mechanism that is in line with Treaty provisions, conforms to the principles of conferral, institutional balance and equal treatment of Member States. Hungary reserves its decision on its commitment to the Commission’s rule of law mechanism depending on the outcome of the ongoing preparatory work.” The government’s subchapter on media pluralism is perhaps the most outrageous. If the topic weren’t so serious, it would be amusing. It definitely deserves a quick read.

At the same time, the German presidency of the Council of the European Union worked to come up with a compromise solution to the conditionality between EU funds and the rule of law, which Viktor Orbán was ready to veto if the original version remained on the books. A couple of days ago, the wording was watered down considerably, and only corruption cases involving EU funds were left as reasons to impose a financial penalty. Even so, the Hungarian reaction was swift and dismissive. Judit Varga declared that the proposal was a unilateral amendment of the EU treaties and therefore it is unacceptable. Today Poland and Hungary predictably refused to agree to the terms because they considered them unfair, while a number of other member countries, including the Netherlands, complained that the German proposal wasn’t stringent enough.

The most significant news of the day is that Viktor Orbán, before he flew to Brussels this morning, announced in a brief interview with MTI that he is hoping there will be no conditionality between the rule of law and the EU’s  €750 billion pandemic rescue package, which includes €390 billion in grants. If there is, he will find ways to obtain the necessary funds from outside of the European Union. In his opinion, spending time on such a matter as the rule of law in the midst of an economic crisis is the greatest folly. If, however, the politicians in Brussels insist, “there is always the possibility of obtaining the necessary capital via intergovernmental agreements.” His “solution” would require Hungary to tap into the open market under much less favorable conditions.

If Hungary is left out of the rescue package, known as the Next Generation Program, it will lose about €6 billion in non-refundable aid, which Gergely Gulyás confirmed at today’s government info. It seems that Orbán finds his autocratic, dictatorial regime so precious that he is ready to deprive the Hungarian people of billions in free aid from the European Union just to avoid any loosening of the stranglehold of his power.

October 1, 2020

Hard times ahead for East-Central Europe: COVID-19 and the Pact on Migration and Asylum

Before I move to the main topic of the day, the European Union’s new pact on migration management, I would like to take a quick look at the economic and political situation in some of the East-Central European countries, starting with Hungary, as a result of the pandemic. The forint is ailing; currently it takes 365.43 forints to buy one euro’s worth of goods. Inflation is high. Economists suspect that about 200,000 people are unemployed, without any financial support from the government. At the same time, the so-called second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic is raging. Hungary is reporting around 1,000 new cases a day, and the number of people who are dying from the virus is also high. Slovakia has already announced the possibility of declaring Hungary a highly affected country which foreigners should visit only at the risk of quarantine. Several television crews have said that they will not be in the stadium for the UEFA Champions League Final, to be held in Budapest tomorrow. The Bavarian prime minister has asked fans of FC Bayern München to stay at home. Viktor Orbán, given the urgent discussion on the new migration pact in Brussels, can’t even attend the match he so fervently wanted to host in Hungary.

The Czech and Bulgarian situations are no better. While the first wave of the pandemic was kind to these East-Central European countries, the second round has hit them with a vengeance. A few days ago a three-member international team tried to find answers to “Why central and eastern European countries seem to be running out of luck.” Their conclusion was that, at the first sign of the virus, the populist leaders quickly imposed lockdowns and other strict measures, establishing themselves as responsible leaders. But then, they returned to their earlier restrictive economic policies, in addition to relying on public opinion as their guide.

We don’t know the outcome of the Orbán government’s secret polls, but Orbán has made references to the Hungarian people who made the decision to return to normalcy. The Czech results are public, and therefore we know Czech public sentiment on the issue: 20% of the Czechs supported strict public health measures in September, as opposed to 45% in April. The Czech Republic was unprepared for a second wave, and its government is now paying the price. During the first wave, Andrej Babiš’s party, ANO, gained supporters, but by now only 27.5% of the population would vote for his party. I suspect we will see a similar decrease in Fidesz’s popularity as well.

In addition to the fallout from the pandemic, other political perils might be waiting for those countries that have been the most forceful opponents of the EU refugee policy. Only a couple of days ago Viktor Orbán announced that “liberals and conservatives clash—and even engage in a life-or-death struggle—on the issue of migration.” We know that he is not ready for any compromise on the issue. Hungary’s position is that refugees should be enticed to stay at home and the Union’s borders should be fortified. He doesn’t mind if crazy liberals want to have non-Christian terrorists and anti-Semites, but the V4 countries, headed by Hungary, will continue to resist any attempt on the part of the European Commission to force them to assume any burden, including financial, in a common refugee policy.

The new EU president, Ursula von der Leyen, announced at the very beginning of her tenure, however, that one of her priorities was a rethinking of the EU’s currently unworkable refugee policy. Almost a year has gone by, but the proposal is finally ready for discussion by the European Council and the European Parliament.

It is called a Pact on Migration and Asylum, which, according to the official release, “sets in balance the principles of fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity.” The European Commission’s position is that that, after creating “a complex internal market, a common currency and an unprecedented recovery plan to rebuild [the EU’s] economy … it is now time to rise to the challenge to manage migration jointly.”

For the time being, let’s concentrate on the most important provision of the Pact as it affects Hungary. Under the heading “Fair sharing of responsibility and solidarity” we learn that “Each Member State, without any exception, must contribute in solidarity in times of stress, to help stabilize the overall system, support Member States under pressure and ensure that the Union fulfills its humanitarian obligations.” What does this new “flexible contribution” entail? To put it in the simplest terms, it means that if a country refuses to accept refugees, it will be financially responsible “for returning individuals with no right to stay.” The appointment of a new EU Return coordinator’s job will be “to ensure consistency across the EU” in implementing this policy. If effective, such an overseeing body could perhaps end the pattern of arbitrary, uncooperative decisions by the Hungarian and other hitherto non-compliant governments.

So far, the only official Hungarian reaction to the proposed Pact came from Zoltán Kovács, the international spokesman of the government. Magyar Nemzet published a short announcement by the Hungarian Telegraphic Agency (MTI), according to which Kovács repeated the long-held Hungarian position that “the migratory pressure on the continent must be solved outside the borders of the European Union.” At the same time, he added that “Hungary doesn’t support compulsory distribution” but “defends the common border, for which it expects as much support as any other Schengen country.” That is, it expects to be fully reimbursed for the cost of the fence that the Orbán government erected in 2015.

While he was at it, Kovács attacked “the Germans’ sense of superiority and moral imperialism.” The German “moral imperialists” are indeed getting fed up with those countries that refuse to share in solving the present situation in Moria. Horst Seehofer, German minister of the interior, was quite blunt. If there is no cooperation, “Berlin will have to think about financial punishments.” Even the normally calm Angela Merkel lost her patience a few days ago when no other EU country was ready to take any of the refugees from Moria.

I doubt that, under these circumstances, Viktor Orbán will be able to arrive in Brussels with only venom in his briefcase. He will undoubtedly rail against the plan and will probably offer some alternative wording that would exempt Hungary from participating. But when the chips are down, he will most likely do what he normally does — vote for the plan. And then try to wheedle out of it.

September 23, 2020

One boring day in an ordinary parliamentary democracy

When, only a couple of days ago, we were told that Prime Minister Viktor Orbán would be visiting Slovenia, we didn’t realize that he was heading to Bled for the 15th Bled Strategic Forum (BSF). Those who want to know more about the purpose of the conference must be satisfied with the explanation on the official website of BSF, which states that it is “a gathering of participants from various fields with diverse knowledge, encouraging them to exchange views and seek innovative solutions to present and future challenges. In addition, the Forum also offers a unique opportunity for meetings and networking with regional and global stakeholders.” In brief, one of those conferences leading nowhere.

This year’s highlight was an hour-and-a-half-long panel discussion on “Europe after Brexit and COVID-19,” during which presidents and prime ministers from Serbia, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Slovenia, Poland, Croatia, and Hungary were supposed to present their views. Giuseppe Conte, president of Italy, and Kristalina Georgieva, managing director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), joined the discussion by video. The moderator was Dr. Nik Gowing, an internationally renowned broadcaster and visiting professor at King’s College.

Soon enough, it became evident that the leaders of East-Central Europe who were present weren’t at all interested in the ideas of Conte and Georgieva, who warned them of the dangers of nationalism and dissension in times of difficulty. But the most interesting part of the discussion came at the end, with Nik Gowing’s insistent and probing questions about the state of the rule of law in some of these East European countries.

From the recording of the panel discussion one can see that the presidents and prime ministers of the new member states were not accustomed to the kinds of difficult questions they suddenly had to face.  Andrej Babiš, prime minister of the Czech Republic, became irate and showed his ignorance by saying to Gowing: “I don’t know who you are, but your questions are based on fake news and articles from The Guardian and Der Spiegel.” In fact, Gowing is a much-respected former BBC TV reporter who, at the time of Princess Diana’s death, became legendary with his seven-hour reporting feat. He was also at the helm during the 9/11 attack on the World Trade Center. So, Babiš was just manifesting his ignorance. “Why are we debating the rule of law here? I am a businessman and a crisis manager. I have won elections several times. We have the best results in fighting the epidemic. Don’t read fake news,” Babiš suggested to the former diplomatic editor of the BBC.

Since the video of the panel discussion is available on YouTube, where the exchange between Orbán and Gowing can be seen, there is no need to summarize it all here. I would, however, call readers’ attention to the prime minister’s self-congratulatory smiles and quick glances at his fellow panelists to make sure that his witticisms were appreciated. And one remark, which immediately became infamous, cannot go unnoticed — that “Hungary is a boring parliamentary democracy.” This remark didn’t sit well with those critics of the regime who found it outright cynical.

444 came out with a witty but bitter little article that described the events of August 31, the day after the panel discussion in Bled, as one of those “average boring days” in Hungary.

On Monday, practically the whole teaching staff of the Színház- és Filmművészeti Egyetem (SZEF) resigned in protest over the government’s decision to convert it into a private university under the direction of a board headed by the director of the National Theater, Attila Vidnyánszky.

The assault on democracy on that day continued when the ministry of innovation and technology arbitrarily rewrote research projects recommended by three independent panels of experts. One of the leading scientists resigned in protest.

While in Bled, Babiš asked Orbán to change the existing law on closing the borders as of September 1 because of the growing spread of COVID-19. Right there, on the spot, Hungary’s autocrat agreed. If Czechs have two negative tests, they can enter Hungary without going into quarantine. Once the deal between Babiš and Orbán was sealed, I guess the other V4 countries complained. Thus, Orbán generously extended the privilege to the Poles and Slovaks as well. Again, without discussing the matter with experts on the pandemic.

On that same day, the government substantially reduced its financial support for Nóra L. Ritók’s Pearl Foundation, which looks after about 600, mostly Gypsy, children in a very poor area of the country. The stated reason for the cut was the additional expenses the government is incurring as a result of the pandemic. The amount of money the government is saving in this case is about $26,000. Whereas in the last two months various church projects received 6.4 billion forints (over $21 million) in financial assistance. The cost of the pandemic was just an excuse to slash support for the very successful Pearl Foundation. The Orbán government doesn’t tolerate any private social service initiative.

A few hours later, one of the undersecretaries of the foreign ministry explained that people are not really interested in Foreign Minister Szijjártó’s holiday on a yacht compliments of one of the richest Hungarian businessmen, who has extensive business connections with the government, because “they know that they have jobs because of him.”

Finally, the Hungarian media reported that in several schools teachers and parents have to disinfect the classrooms because either they don’t have a cleaning staff or they didn’t receive any disinfectant.

In the evening, the students of SZEF and their supporters demonstrated, and this morning they formed a human barricade in front of the building. They refuse to leave as long as Vidnyánszky remains the head of the university’s newly created board. Vidnyánszky doesn’t seem inclined to accommodate.

Photo by Péter Urfi, 444.hu

And, returning to the subject of borders in the time of COVID-19, let me quote Tamás Szele’s opinion piece titled “Orbán in quarantine?” which only semi-jokingly says that “there is no need for any EU reports to find out whether Hungary is a state governed by the rule of law and, if not, why not. If Viktor Orbán appears in Budapest without any problem [at the border], Hungary is not a state governed by the rule of law.”

While Orbán was in Bled, a government decree came into force which imposes a two-week quarantine on all Hungarian citizens returning from abroad after September 1. Surely, Szele wrote, Orbán is a Hungarian citizen, and therefore the decree applies to him just as much as to any of his fellow citizens, which in this case means that he either remains in quarantine for 12 days or he can have two tests, which means only 4-5 days of quarantine if he is free of the virus. If not, “the head of government himself proves that Hungary is not a state governed by the rule of law because its government decrees are not obligatory for everyone.” However bizarre it sounds, there is some validity to Szele’s reasoning.

September 1, 2020