Tag Archives: László Kövér

László Kövér on the “culture of guilt”

One of László Kövér’s favorite pastimes is to visit Hungarian areas of the neighboring countries. This August he was especially busy. On August 4, he was in Slovakia unveiling a memorial created to mark the 76th anniversary of the so-called Beneš decrees, where he referred to Slovakia as the Highlands. Slovak Foreign Minister Ivan Korčok wasn’t at all pleased. Five days later, he was in Ukraine’s Transcarpathian region to unveil a bust of Saint Stephen.

His most recent trip was to Marosvásárhely / Târgu Mureș, as the patron of the cultural festival Vásárhely Bustle, an annual tourist attraction. He gave a speech following an ecumenical church service at the Fortress Church (Vártemplom), built in the middle of the fourteenth century and remodeled in the eighteenth century. Judging from the photos taken at the occasion, it is a very impressive building.

Less impressive was Kövér’s speech, which consisted of the usual mad harangue the president of the Hungarian Parliament is known for. Practically all Hungarian media outlets published a summary of the speech, as it was related by the reporter for MTI.

Although Kövér covered several topics, the main message he wanted to drive home was the threat the autochthon European population faces as a result of “illegal migration and resettlement, in a devious way, disguised as a refugee issue.” Perfect timing while we are watching with horror what’s going on at the Kabul Airport.

What is this mysterious autochthon European population? That is, who were the original or indigenous inhabitants?  Well, if we want to go all the way back, we might have to say that the first settler in Europe was Homo erectus from Africa or perhaps Homo sapiens, who settled in Europe by 40,000 BCE. But, more seriously, according to a study on the patterns of historical population movements in Europe, over 4,200 years 891 distinct ethnic units were identified. Moreover, most likely to the sorrow of László Kövér, population movements in modern times have been more frequent than earlier.

As far as the Hungarians are concerned, they were relative latecomers, arriving in the early Middle Ages, considerably later than, for example, the West Slavic ethnic groups. Given the waves of population movement over thousands of years in Europe, talking about an autochthon population is utter nonsense. What Orbán and his Fidesz paragons are really talking about is a Europe populated exclusively by Christians (and, reluctantly admitted to the fold, Jews) who are white, without a trace of black or any shade of brown. Middle Easterners and Blacks, Christians or not, have no place in Europe as far as Fidesz is concerned.

Kövér’s warning about the perils of immigration is slightly different from the thousands of similar speeches Hungarians can hear practically daily. Until now, I have not heard others, for example Viktor Orbán, claim that large numbers of immigrants will actually take over nation states so that the originally majority population will become a minority in its own country, which, by definition, will no longer be its own. The numbers, of course, don’t justify this prediction. Moreover, if being Hungarian isn’t defined by skin color or religion (admittedly, a huge leap for Fidesz) but by cultural criteria (speaking the language, becoming part of the national community, etc.), the track record of immigrants in every country belies this doomsday scenario.

Kövér didn’t exactly draw a large audience.

Kövér’s other claim is that “we are on the threshold of a ‘post-Christian’ and ‘post-national’ era [which is] defined by artificially created guilt” because “all Europeans should feel guilty about climate change, people living today should feel guilty about their ancestors, people about to have children should feel guilty about their unborn babies, white people should feel guilty about black people, men should feel guilty about women, heterosexuals should feel guilty about homosexuals, the elderly should feel guilty about the young, and Europeans should feel guilty about people on every continent of the world.” In his view, this new culture of guilt differs from the Nazi or communist ideology only in the sense that it does not label a minority with the stigma of inferiority and collective guilt. Instead, it turns everyone against everyone. By this point, Kövér’s soaring thoughts left me utterly earthbound.

Although Kövér allegedly wants to get rid of this “destructive culture of guilt,” when he was in Slovakia he said that “What was committed against the Hungarians in the Highlands between 1945 and 1947 was a sin against God and man.” And, he added, “the Hungarians could not forgive the crimes committed against them, because to this day they have not asked for forgiveness.” But “we have a moral basis to wait with gentle but steadfast patience for a gesture of apology and satisfaction for the crimes committed against Hungarians for the sake of peace for generations to come.”

Let me make myself clear on this issue. I think that the Czechoslovak government’s decision to expel all Germans and Hungarians was an unjust decision, just as was the expulsion of ordinary German peasants from Hungary after World War II. However, one cannot demand that people and countries shake off all feelings of guilt on the one hand and, on the other, require an apology and retraction from those who may have done wrong to you. But I guess for Kövér it is essential to distinguish between artificial guilt and real guilt; liberal guilt and illiberally-defined guilt.

In any event, Ivan Korčok was right. It would be a good idea to concentrate on the future. For example, to imagine a day when one doesn’t have to listen to László Kövér’s speeches.

August 29, 2021

Blog posts by Eva S. Balogh also appear in Hungarian at https://ujnepszabadsag.com/

Huxit: Could Hungary go the way of Great Britain?

An opinion piece by Tamás Fricz, titled “It is time to talk about Huxit,” began a frantic dialogue about the likelihood of Viktor Orbán’s leading Hungary out of the European Union in order to avoid any constraints on his dictatorial, undemocratic leadership.

Foreigners might find this terrified reaction of politically savvy, intelligent people to the words of a government propagandist masquerading as a political scientist bizarre. Anyone can sit down and write an opinion piece on any crazy subject. The fellow got carried away. We certainly don’t assume that what every op-ed writer in The New York Times, The Guardian, or Die Welt suggests is the God’s honest truth.

But this is not the case in Hungary, especially if that opinion piece appears in the government’s flagship paper, Magyar Nemzet. Within a few hours the news spread in opposition circles, among politicians as well as sympathizers, that Fricz’s piece was a message straight from Viktor Orbán. For example, Klára Dobrev, one of the opposition candidates for the premiership, declared that “the article on leaving the EU was written at Orbán’s behest and in Orbán’s interests.” The country should be ready for such an eventuality, even if the latest Medián opinion poll reaffirmed all of the earlier ones, that the overwhelming majority of the Hungarian people (83%), including 79% of Fidesz voters, are committed supporters of the EU.

Those who are convinced that without Orbán’s approval no such opinion piece could have appeared in Magyar Nemzet are not naïve political rookies. They know that Viktor Orbán is an extremely talented politician who would not rush into a move so fraught with danger, which might end up being a huge defeat for him. He must have something up his sleeve. Given the seemingly pointless insistence on the “child protection law,” Huxit may well be an issue he hopes to employ as an election weapon, especially if he loses too many battles with the bureaucrats of Brussels.

While the EU, as a source of financial benefits, enjoys wide support, Hungarian society is much more divided on the issue of the “child protection” law. The ratio of those who approve to those who disapprove is almost even: 47% to 42%. If the government can successfully convince the electorate that it is the European Union that is punishing Hungary for a law against pedophiles and the spreading of homosexual propaganda among children, it can, through the kind of massive propaganda at which it excels, turn them away from support of the European Union.

Moreover, as Gábor Bojár, a thoughtful businessman who is politically engaged, put it, Orbán needs to convince only about 50% of the electorate that Hungary is being unfairly punished by the European Commission. That number would be enough to trigger a referendum, where, given the Orbán regime’s propaganda machine, Hungarians might turn out to be the victims of the Hungarian equivalent of Nigel Farage. This is a real possibility, especially since Hungarians’ attachment to the EU is based on monetary considerations. At least this was the case in 2019, when Policy Solutions published a study titled “After 15 years: The European Union and Hungarian Society.” At that time, it was the EU subsidies that 50.8% of Hungarians saw as the greatest advantage of membership. That was followed by Schengen (15.5%) and foreign employment (14.4%). The best article on the dangers of a possible Huxit appeared in Válasz today.

I should point out that there have been several occasions on which Fidesz politicians suddenly began talking about leaving the European Union. The first such moment was in October 2014 when László Kövér, president of the Hungarian parliament, in an interview on Echo TV, complained about diktats coming from the EU, which reminded him of Soviet Russia. “If this is the future of the EU, then it would be worth thinking about how we should slowly and carefully get out of this.” However he added that “I’m convinced that this is not the future of the European Union, it’s a nightmare.”

Two years later, in July 2016, János Lázár, who at that time was the second most important man in the government, at one of his weekly press conferences, while discussing Brexit, said that he could not “in good conscience vote to stay in the EU.” That inspired Index to take a survey. It published an article titled “A narrow pro-EU majority in government.” At that time, the most enthusiastic supporters were Péter Szijjártó, Zoltán Balog, and Gergely Gulyás. Zoltán Kovács was less firm. “If the EU’s handling of illegal migration were the only basis for a decision, I would not be in favor of staying in.” Orbán, as usual, didn’t answer. His communications director told the journalist that “on this topic, please consider Viktor Orbán’s 70-minute press conference after the EU summit as a reference point,” which didn’t deal with the topic in any forthright way. It concentrated on migration as an issue which, if not resolved, will be troublesome.

In December 2020, during the Polish-Hungarian threat of a veto of the EU budget, several opposition politicians, among them Tamás Mellár, were certain that, as a result of the EU-Hungarian conflict, Orbán was planning a possible exit from the European Union. Péter Márki-Zaj, one of candidates for the position of prime minister, is convinced that if joining the European Public Prosecutor’s Office were made compulsory, Orbán “would rather drive the country out of the EU than stop stealing.” István Ujhelyi, an MSZP MEP, believed way before Fricz’s article appeared that “Orbán is preparing for the final battle, which could end—tragically—with Hungary’s exit from the EU.”

So, the topic is not new. It emerges whenever Hungary is in sharp disagreement with the European Union. Until now, these disagreements have never had serious consequences for Viktor Orbán as prime minister of Hungary or as a member of the European Council. The Hungarian government’s attack on the homosexual community, however, has changed Orbán’s certainty of never experiencing any substantial consequences of his flagrant disregard of EU laws. Now that money has been withheld, the threat seems real. Norway’s decision not to release its usual funds to the Hungarian government infuriated him to such an extent that by now he has lost all sense of rationality. In this mood, what else remains? To threaten to bring down the whole edifice. Maybe out of fear the EU will apologize and continue to keep him and his clan fat for a few more years.

With the notion firmly planted in the heads of Hungarians that everything Orbán decides sooner or later becomes reality, it is no surprise that a Fidesz propagandist’s urgent call for Huxit sounds like a threat. But instead of panicking, the opposition parties must organize themselves into one unified group as soon as possible and make clear to the Hungarian public that at stake in the election is membership in the European Union.

August 16, 2021

Blog posts by Eva S. Balogh also appear in Hungarian at https://ujnepszabadsag.com/

A foreign policy grounded in constant conflict

Today I will look at two recent developments that have further tarnished the Orbán government’s reputation outside the country and have created avoidable diplomatic tensions.

Conflict with Norway

The first is the loss of the EEA and Norway Grants worth 214.6 million euros (77 billion forints), which represent the contribution of Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway, three non-EU countries that are nonetheless part of the European Single Market, toward reducing social and economic disparities in the European Economic Area (EEA), especially in its less well developed regions.

Those who have followed recent Hungarian politics may remember the assault on the Ökotárs Foundation, which was in charge of the disbursement of the Norwegian Fund. In 2015, officers attached to the National Office of Investigation sealed the foundation’s office and led the director of the foundation to police headquarters. The “investigation” was supposed to prove that Ökotárs, Norway’s choice to distribute its funds, was actually a criminal enterprise under the thumb of George Soros.

What the Orbán government wanted to achieve was a free hand in choosing its own administrator to be in charge of the money allocated to NGOs working on behalf of disadvantaged people, particularly the Roma. Because of the government’s stubbornness, Hungary is the only one of the 15 beneficiary countries with which the Norwegians have not concluded a cooperation agreement. As I said, we are talking here about 214.6 million euros, 10% of which can be distributed by the chosen administrator. The rest is at the disposal of the government for certain projects. But the entire package was at stake.

Ine Marie Eriksen Søreide, foreign minister of Norway

Although negotiations continued all through the intervening years, no agreement was ever reached, and by August 4, 2021, the Norwegian government had had enough, announcing that “Hungary is no longer eligible for the Norway Grants 2014-2021.”

But the last word always has to be Orbán’s. Yesterday the prime minister’s office announced that “Hungary doesn’t accept Norway’s diktat. According to the agreement between the two countries, the body that will allocate the grants of the Norwegian Fund must be designated by consensus.” Yes, but in over six years of negotiations Orbán didn’t bring any consensus.

The government spokesman outlined the government’s position, pointing out that “of the seven applicants, Hungary was willing to accept anyone but the Soros-backed organization. Norway, however, insisted on the Soros organization and excluded internationally recognized applicants such as the Hungarian Red Cross. Norway is in breach of its obligations as an EEA member and the government will take legal action…. Hungary states for the record that Norway owes Hungary HUF 77 billion for Hungarian market access.”

Among the NGOs rejected were indeed the Hungarian Red Cross, which has been the recipient of generous state subsidies and only recently distributed care packages provided by Lőrinc Mészáros. The International Children’s Emergency Service also applied; its president is László Kövér. Another favored applicant was the Miskolc-based foundation Women for Success,  founded by Katalin Csöbör, a Fidesz member of parliament. The organization’s board of trustees includes Beatrix Kelemen, the former wife of Lőrinc Mészáros. All “independent” foundations, Fidesz style. Viktor Orbán and his regime once again demonstrated that they are not willing to compromise. In order to be the sole decision makers, they were ready to take food away from disadvantaged children. Norway has been thinking about instituting some alternative way of supporting the country and its large group of needy people.

A quarrel with Slovakia

The second topic I consider important is László Kövér’s performance at the unveiling of a memorial erected in Šamorin/Somorja, close to Bratislava. It was created to memorialize the 76th anniversary of the so-called Beneš decrees, which, among other things, entailed the loss of Czechoslovak citizenship for Germans and Hungarians, natives of the country for centuries. It remains a controversial decision even in the Czech Republic and Slovakia. Inviting Kövér for such occasions always entails a certain risk for Hungarian diplomacy.

Kövér stressed that “what was committed against the Hungarians in the Highlands between 1945 and 1947 was a sin against God and man.” And, he added, “the Hungarians could not forgive the crimes committed against them, because to this day they have not asked for forgiveness.” But “we have a moral basis to wait with gentle but steadfast patience for a gesture of apology and satisfaction for the crimes committed against Hungarians for the sake of peace for generations to come.”

The Slovak answer wasn’t long in coming. Foreign Minister Ivan Korčok reacted to Kövér’s admonition on Facebook by complaining that “Hungary’s most important public dignitaries routinely open up historical issues running counter to Hungary’s stated desire to build good bilateral relations with Slovakia.” He said that he was “disappointed that we constantly hear messages and lectures from Budapest addressed to us about our common history. And I strongly reject the fact that Hungary’s second highest public dignitary feels the need to come straight to Slovakia to present his own view of history.” Moreover, he noted that Slovakia is not the Highlands, the Hungarian designation for those territories that today comprise Slovakia.

Ivan Korčok, Slovak foreign minister

That was followed by a diplomatic note, calling on the Hungarian side to follow normal and standard diplomatic procedures and to inform the Slovak side in advance of the purpose of the visit. Although the pro-Fidesz Körkép (Panorama) called Korčok a chauvinist, I don’t think that his request that Budapest follow international diplomatic practice is too much to ask. I also think that the constant references to past grievances are counterproductive for both countries. For every Hungarian complaint there can always be a Slovak one. Korčok is right that one should concentrate on the present and the future instead of on either the greatness or the injustices of the past.

As for Korčok, he is Slovakia’s foremost diplomat, spending years as Slovakia’s representative at the European Union and as ambassador to Germany and Washington. He is a firm believer in a strong European Union and NATO and is a committed supporter of transatlantic relations. I doubt that he would be a chauvinist. He is certainly right about the bad habit of having Hungarian dignitaries show up in Slovakia, airing the country’s historical grievances.

Kövér, by the way, is not the first to make an inopportune appearance in a neighboring country. László Sólyom, president of Hungary between 2005 and 2010, was in the habit of spending Hungarian national holidays in Slovakia and Romania, allegedly as a private citizen, until the Slovak authorities in 2009 finally forbade him to cross the border into Slovakia on August 21, the date on which, in 1968, Warsaw Pact troops, including Hungarians, invaded Czechoslovakia. So Sólyom instead gave a press conference on the Komárom-Komárno bridge, remaining on the Hungarian side, precipitating quite a diplomatic brouhaha.

Ferenc Dávid, who is an adviser on economic matters for the Demokratikus Koalíció, called Kövér “an embittered, muddled-minded man who endangers good relations with Slovakia.” Kövér causes enough trouble at home, but abroad he is potentially lethal.

August 5, 2021

Blog posts by Eva S. Balogh also appear in Hungarian at https://ujnepszabadsag.com/

“The fight Europe has needed for years”

Few people thought that a hastily put together, practically incomprehensible law on pedophilia and “the defense of children” produced by the Orbán government and passed by the Fidesz supermajority amid enthusiastic applause might be a milestone in the history of the European Union. According to some, however, the conflict that is ahead of us between the European Union and the member governments representing the far right will determine the future of Europe. Luke McGee of CNN called the battle “the fight for the heart of Europe” and quoted a Polish MEP, who said that “if the Commission, the Council has no determination to protect the values [held currently by the EU], there is no future of the European Union.”

Ironically, László Kövér, speaker of the Hungarian Parliament, who has been an unabashed homophobe most likely all his life, also considers the recently passed legislation “the most important law of the last twelve years.” But while friends of the European Union hope that the EU remains steadfast in rejecting the discrimination inherent in the Hungarian pedophile law, Kövér hopes that the Union will back down, as it has many times before, and that it will eventually collapse on its own, preferably in his lifetime. Until then, however, Hungary should remain a member state because “for centuries [Kövér doesn’t have a keen sense of time], the European Union has offered the most advantageous conditions and the greatest room for maneuvering to represent Hungarian national interests.” At least this is honest talk. It should be heard, loud and clear, outside the borders of the country.

Taking a look at the history of homophobia espoused by leading Fidesz politicians, we see that László Kövér was the most blatant homophobe in the government. Two years ago, in May 2019, Kövér expressed his conviction that homosexuals don’t deserve the same treatment as heterosexuals. As he put it, “a normal homosexual knows what the order of the world is, that he was born this way, that he became this way. He tries to adapt to this world without necessarily considering himself an equal.” Pesti Srácok, as early as August 2019, asserted that school sensitization popularized homosexuality. “They are trying to draw the youngest, still in the process of personal development, into the LGBTQ world.” Even Viktor Orbán juxtaposed “the driving forces behind the millennia of greatness and success, the happiness of marriage and offspring, the spiritual energy of national cultures” with a “godless cosmos [and the] rainbowing of families.” As if homosexuality were a vehicle for the destruction of European civilization.

I’m sure that hundreds of similar quotations could be gathered that show that the roots of this law were planted a long time ago. And, contrary to the claim that the law in no way discriminates against a sexual minority, signs of anti-gay propaganda immediately came to the surface, not surprisingly with the encouragement of the government media. For example, Origo, taking its cue from Breitbart News, reported that “there is a direct correlation between the proliferation of LGBTQ programing for adults and the spread of children’s programing that sensitizes them to homosexual issues.” Híradó misinterpreted, intentionally or not, a sarcastic song by a gay choir from San Francisco and hence claimed to find six pedophiles in the choir. This fake news was then spread in every government propaganda publication, including Magyar Nemzet.

Given the barrage of antagonistic articles against the gay community supported by members of the government, it was inevitable that an openly anti-gay article would appear somewhere. The controversial piece, titled “Not even the children are spared by homosexuals,” appeared on the front page of Dunántúli Napló, a daily serving Baranya County.  The article complained that the gay community isn’t satisfied with holding a parade in Pécs in September, a first outside of Budapest. They also have a summer program planned by “organizations promoting homosexuality.” To make sure that readers understood the dire message of the article, the editor-in-chief of the paper wrote a supporting editorial.

The independent media reported, negatively of course, on this article. And, predictably, the reaction from government forces came fast and furious. The Hungarian National Media Association “strongly condemned the liberal media’s rampant practices of incitement, stigmatization of journalists, exclusion and threats to dissent.” The Association called “family day” a “homosexual propaganda event.”

The Hungarian media propaganda was also deeply offended by CNN’s article on the pedophilia law. Magyar Nemzet, for example, complained that “the U.S. news channel did not bother to ask the Hungarian government about its position.” Instead, the journalist turned to Katalin Cseh, a Momentum MEP, and a number of other left-liberal politicians and LGBTQ activists, who misrepresented the law, which only states that “the parent has the exclusive right to educate the child’s sexual orientation.” In addition, the Magyar Nemzet editorial distorts the conclusion of the CNN article. According to their version, Luke McGee concludes that “the European Union is facing a difficult autumn, as LGBTQ rights and the rule of law issues will clearly determine the future of Europe after the difficulties of Brexit and the recovery from the pandemic.”

In reality, the gist of the article is in its title: “this is the fight Europe has needed for years.” It emphasizes that, in the past, there has been a tendency to smooth over the difficulties with some of the countries which don’t seem to accept the rules of the game, the common values as stated in Article 2 of the EU treaty. Respect “for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities.” Now these suppressed conflicts have come to the surface, and, as Katalin Cseh, Momentum MEP, said in the article, “right now, the union is not fit for the challenges of the future. We can either go in the direction of a stronger Europe with more powers, or a weaker Europe, which is fragmented. I firmly believe that [the latter version of] Europe has no future.” It is this issue which is at stake.

July 10, 2021

Blog posts by Eva S. Balogh also appear in Hungarian at https://ujnepszabadsag.com/

Orbán’s eleventh samizdat letter

A few months ago Viktor Orbán began a letter-writing campaign, dubbing his missives “samizdat letters.” He claimed that in the liberal European Union he has no other way to express his views; he has to resort to self-publishing, the old method by which the “dissidents” of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries published their critiques of the regime.

I hoped back in October of last year that, after addressing so-called samizdat letters to European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen, Vice-President Věra Jourová, and Manfred Weber, leader of EPP, he would stop this ridiculous undertaking. I was wrong. We have just reached the eleventh samizdat letter.

Naturally, this latest missive is about Orbán’s stormy encounter with his colleagues at the latest summit of the European Council over the enactment of the pedophile law, officially called “Act LXXIX of 2021 on tougher action against pedophile offenders and amending certain laws to protect children.” When I first saw that this occasion in Brussels had warranted yet another Samizdat letter, my first thought was that “Orbán is explaining his report card,” a classic parody by Frigyes Karinthy of a student trying to explain his less than sterling grades to his father.

By all accounts, the summit was a highly emotional encounter where, according to Mark Rutte, prime minister of the Netherlands, “there were few dry eyes in the room” when Luxemburg’s prime minister, Xavier Bettel, a gay man, described his struggle with his own sexuality. Obviously, Viktor Orbán saw the encounter differently. According to him, “at the last European Council meeting, the rainbow-flagged prime ministers attacked in a phalanx,” but, he added, it was “a morally difficult, politically important, and intellectually beautiful debate.” What a bizarre scene — members of the Greek heavy infantry, armed with spears and pikes, having a beautiful debate about the Hungarian government’s latest assault on European values, a law that discriminates against a minority and censors content.

In his description, “the liberals started from the premise that questions concerning the issue at hand could be answered in only one way, in accordance with the liberal hegemony of opinion,” that is, no group of people can be discriminated against within the confines of the European Union. On the other hand, the non-liberal democrats who were present, the Slovenian and Polish prime ministers, arguing on Orbán’s side, claimed that there can be different answers to this question and that, “in accordance with the pluralism of opinion, all states and peoples have a right to opt for a position against the liberal answer.” In plain English, certain member states of the European Union can discriminate against particular groups, in this case against gays, lesbians, and transgenders. In fact, he went even further when he added that “only a ‘unity in diversity’ can hold the European Union together.” So, during the discussion he must have told members of the liberal phalanx that if they insist on only a liberal interpretation of certain European values, like non-discrimination against minorities, and don’t allow “diversity,” they will be digging the grave of the European Union.

On the very same day that Orbán was battling the rainbow-flagged members of the European Council, László Kövér, speaker of the Hungarian parliament, delivered a speech to the audience of a conference held to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Hungarian constitution, which is basically a party document that was never approved by the opposition or the population. It has been amended nine times, and I have no doubt that, if it were necessary, the Fidesz two-thirds would amend it a tenth time.

Although most of Kövér’s speech was about the greatness of this constitution, a rampart in defense of Hungarian values, he echoed certain portions of Viktor Orbán’s message. Kövér asserted that “we do not believe in a so-called value-neutral state, politics, ideology, education, and constitution. We believe in the diversity of values, their hierarchy and respect for them.” Let’s keep in mind that László Kövér is not a member of the government. He speaks in the name of the party. So, essentially Kövér is telling us that it is his party that lays down the rules of the game. It is Fidesz’s values that will be foisted on society. Prior to 1990, MSZMP made up the rules and decided on the values of the regime. Now, it’s Fidesz’s turn. Although he talks about their belief in a diversity of values, he adds that these values have “their hierarchy.” Again, one must assume that this hierarchy is determined by the party.

Let’s take a final look at Samizdat 11. At the end of the piece Orbán insists that “sexual education of the child is the right of the parent and without his or her consent, neither the state, nor political parties, nor NGOs, nor rainbow activists can play a role.” This position of the non-liberal democrats is supported by “international law, EU law, and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,” whose Article 14 “ensures that the child has an appropriate upbringing.”

What, we could ask, does an “appropriate upbringing” mean? One is suspicious that Orbán doesn’t want to get into any serious discussion of that famous Article 14. And, indeed, one’s doubts are confirmed when one actually reads Article 14, “Right to education.” It is ¶3 which speaks to the issue. It says that “the freedom to found educational establishments with due respect for democratic principles and the right of parents to ensure the education and teaching of their children in conformity with their religious, philosophical and pedagogical convictions shall be respected, in accordance with the national laws governing the exercise of such freedom and right.”

So, this law is about the freedom to establish alternative educational facilities and to allow parents to make choices based on their convictions. To give a few possible examples. The state should allow Buddhist parents to send their children to a Buddhist school. Or allow them to educate their children at home. Or send them to Jewish yeshivas. In brief, ¶3 of Article 14 grants special privileges to parents while the homosexual amendments of the Hungarian pedophile law takes them away. It will be difficult for the Hungarian government to press its case on the basis of this law.

June 28, 2021

Bulgaria as a guidepost for the Hungarian opposition?

In the last two days I was preoccupied with domestic matters, especially the fate of the political system that Viktor Orbán has incrementally created since 2010 and is still busily tweaking to meet his needs. Given the widespread belief that the opposition parties might just pull off a victory, it is not surprising that interest is centered on how to dismantle the fortress of autocracy that Orbán has constructed over the years.

Orbán, despite his fervent nationalism, doesn’t hold onto power in total isolation from the rest of the world. In the region, several countries, friends and allies of the Hungarian prime minister, are experiencing a level of instability that may change the political map of East-Central Europe. I chose to write about Bulgaria today because of thought-provoking parallels between Boyko Borisov’s Bulgaria and Viktor Orbán’s Hungary

Boyko Borisov, Bulgaria’s second-longest serving prime minister, is a former policeman and member of the Communist party between 1979 and 1991 who, after several ministerial posts, became prime minister in 2009. Evgenii Dainov, a Bulgarian academic and political commentator, described him as a man who, although he has disdain for ideology, has redesigned the entire state machinery on the principle that “it is not the law that rules everyone in equal measure, but it is the strong who prey on the weak.” Within a decade after he took office, civil society was in disarray and the media under government control. To his mind, those who were against his regime were not legitimate politicians but “dissidents” or, as he calls them, “slime.” (The Hungarian equivalent is “moslékkoalíció” [pigwash coalition], coined by László Kövér, speaker of the house.) By 2018, there were again political prisoners in Bulgaria.

Given the state of Bulgarian democracy, Borisov, in addition to Orbán, had another admirer, U.S. President Donald Trump, who granted Borisov and entourage a visit to the While House in November 1919. After the meeting, Trump hailed the United States’ “great friendship” with Bulgaria. He claimed that “we have a lot of Bulgarians here who are wonderful people.” The independent media, however, wasn’t that thrilled with Borisov’s Bulgaria. A year later, just before the 2020 U.S. elections, Arisha Morris in Foreign Policy predicted that “if Trump wins, America could look a lot like Bulgaria.”

Hungarian-Bulgarian relations have been excellent throughout the past decade. The two prime ministers have supported each other in the European Council as well as in the European Parliament. Magyar Nemzet took every opportunity to defend Borisov whenever he was under fire, which, in the last few years, happened with greater and greater frequency. About a year ago, a photo made the rounds showing Borisov’s bedroom with a large stack of euros on the bedside table and a pistol lying on the bed, but Magyar Nemzet made light of it, calling it a fake. The paper defended the thoroughly corrupt newly-appointed chief prosecutor who, according to the Hungarian right, began “a ruthless showdown against left-wing oligarchs involved in post-regime privatization.” The Hungarian government reluctantly reported on the series of huge demonstrations that took place in Sofia during the summer of 2020 but quickly added a list of Borisov’s economic accomplishments, his disapproval of street protests, and his lecture on the nature of democracy which should be manifested at election time only.

Before the election, Magyar Nemzet kept fingers crossed for Borisov, although it admitted that under a certain constellation, “the liberal wing of GERB [Borisov’s party] under the influence of George Soros might force a coalition with Democratic Bulgaria,” which would result in Borisov’s retirement. Once it became clear that a fatal blow had been delivered to Borisov’s cause, Jordán Tütünkov, who teaches subjects related to tourism at the Metropolitan University in Budapest, said that “what failed last summer, with the help of the streets, could now be achieved after the parliamentary elections in March: the Bulgarian president, Rumen Radev, could overthrow the center-right forces led by Boyko Borisov.” He explained that the organizers of last year’s demonstrations “forced an anti-Borisov alliance on an all-against-all basis with the Bulgarian socialists and the Turkish ethnic party.” Their goal was “to permanently destroy the center-right Citizens for the European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) party, wiping it off the map, and consigning its president, Boyko Borisov, to the political dustbin.” Doesn’t it sound familiar? Something very similar is going on in Hungary at the moment.

A new caretaker government was formed under Prime Minister Stefan Yanev, which immediately began to undo the undemocratic features of the Borisov regime. They changed the electoral law to make voting abroad easier and allowed voting machines to be used that will, they hope, eliminate electoral fraud. The dissolved parliament set up a special committee to investigate the Borisov regime’s suspicious activities. The committee called on the prosecutor’s office to investigate 22 cases. They discovered abuses in the distribution of EU funds and corruption in the interior ministry, the defense ministry, and the state treasury. An investigation was begun into the state-owned Bulgarian Development Bank that was supposed to assist small- and middle-sized companies, but, just like in Hungary, was giving out large loans to eight big companies close to GERB. As the new interior minister said on a commercial television station, “the Bulgarian electorate wants change, and they will get it. Change is possible only by replacing those in positions of leadership.” After all, said a political analyst, what is happening in Bulgaria proves that even a mafia-like state can be dismantled. The hope is that the July election will give the forces of change a majority, which can begin real reform in earnest.

Although the political situations that existed in Bulgaria and that still reigns in Hungary are quite similar, there are also important differences that may be crucial when it comes to their fates. The first is that the toppling of the Borisov regime was possible only after Borisov was unable to form a coalition government. And the second is that in Bulgaria, unlike in Hungary, the president of the country is directly elected. Rumen Radev, the former commander of the Bulgarian Air Force, as an independent candidate with the support of the Bulgarian Socialist party won the election in 2016 over a GERB candidate.

Radev has criticized the Borisov regime for permitting corruption through “its reckless leadership style” as well as for attempting to strangle his political opposition. He used his presidential veto frequently. In the first two and a half years of his presidency he vetoed 19 legislative proposals. In Hungary, the person of the president is decided by parliamentary majority, and therefore ever since August 2010 all presidents have been puppets of Viktor Orbán. His first choice was a former Olympic champion of limited mental capacity who was found to have plagiarized his “doctoral dissertation.” He was forced to resign after a year and a half. In a great hurry, Orbán convinced László Kövér, speaker of the house, to fill the post for a few weeks while he tried to convince his old friend and founder of Fidesz, János Áder, to take over the job. Currently, Áder is serving his second five-year term, which will come to an end in May 2022. He, unlike Radev, signs everything that is put in front of him. He is part of the mafia-like setup of the Orbán regime. Yet, the determined moves of the Yanev government may serve as a model for the opponents of the Orbán regime, reinforcing the growing conviction that a directly elected president might act as a restraining force against government overreach.

May 22, 2021

A youthful Viktor Orbán revisited: 1985-1987

Yesterday Bálint Fabók, a journalist working for Direkt 36, wrote an article about Viktor Orbán’s road from anonymity to nationwide recognition between 1987 and 1990. Fabók’s claim is that, although Orbán’s critics normally emphasize the Hungarian prime minister’s ideological volte-face, on the basis of his reading of the contemporary press, Fabók sees a couple of important ideological tenets that Orbán has held on to for the last thirty years. These are the importance of independence and the “Hungarianization” of various economic sectors. In this post I want to concentrate on Orbán’s alleged long-term adherence to the notion of sovereignty.

I reported earlier to the readers of Hungarian Spectrum that, in the last few months, I also went through much of the material that Fabók relied on. My preliminary findings don’t exactly support his  article’s conclusion. The first difficulty—and this is not Fabók’s fault–is the paucity of any written work by Viktor Orbán in which he could have elaborated on his political ideas. Although he was the editor of Századvég (Fin de Siècle), a journal published for two years, between 1986 and 1988, by Bibó College, he wrote only two reports, each with a co-reporter, on conferences held during those years. His only “serious” article was also co-authored, this time with Tamás Fellegi, who happened to be his senior paper adviser. It dealt with Polish opposition movements in 1980 and 1981, a subject related to the material used in his senior paper.

Before I take a look at the two written accounts of the conferences, let me say something about the choice of title for Századvég, which was not only a tribute to the approaching end of the twentieth century but, judging from the cover of the periodical, was also a celebration of the final days of the 1890s and the dawn of the twentieth century. The portraits of Endre Ady, Mihály Babits, Oszkár Jászi, László Németh, and István Bibó adorn the cover, all liberals and with, two exceptions, writers and poets. A rather odd choice for a college for law students.

The first report, written with László Kövér, was titled “Reflections on a student camp.” At the end of August 1985, about 200 students from 20 Hungarian colleges and universities gathered in Szarvas for a six-day get-together at the invitation of several special colleges that had been established to foster particularly talented young students. The “szakkollégium” is considered to be a Hungaricum. It serves as a hatchery for future elites in assorted professions. They receive extra attention over and above the normal material offered by the university. By now, these special colleges play a vital role in the Hungarian educational system, which, to my mind, is an admission that the ordinary university education doesn’t satisfy the needs of the best and the brightest.

In any case, in 1984-1985, when the Szarvas student camp was organized, there were only a handful of these special colleges. They operated separately from one another. Eventually, there was a need for “long-term and productive cooperation.” It was in this short announcement that Fabók found the first sign of Viktor Orbán’s strong attachment to “independence.” The passage he quotes as proof is: “At the beginning of the organization [of the camp], we consciously tried to avoid the undesirable dependencies that might restrict our movement. Therefore, we relied only on self-sufficiency in both material and professional matters.” But, as it turned out, several colleges turned their invitations down, and they ran out of money. It seems that Fabók didn’t read any further to learn that “during the organization, we came to the conclusion that we needed support, which we found in the Hungarian Patriotic Front (HNF), which considered our idea [of the camp] a meaningful and worthwhile initiative and provided moral support without trying to force its own principles and ideas on us.” I should add that the head of HNF was Imre Pozsgay, a member of the Central Committee of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) and later the favorite candidate of the right-of-center Magyar Demokrata Fórum (MDF) led by József Antall.

The second reference to Viktor Orbán’s desire for political independence was an international event that Bibó College organized. It was a meeting of the East-West Dialogue Network (Kelet-Nyugati Párbeszéd Hálózat). After the university refused to rent them a room, the organizers were offered a venue by the National Peace Council (Országos Béketanács/OBT). Although OBT gave them assurances of absolute freedom, at the end it turned out that OBT wanted to be recognized as the official organizer of the event. No wonder that, under the circumstances, Viktor Orbán and the other members of Bibó College refused the offer. One cannot look upon this incident as an early manifestation of Orbán’s insistence on sovereignty.

In August 1987, there was another student camp, held this time in Pápa. Egyetemi Lapok, a student paper, covered the event thoroughly, and therefore we know what Viktor Orbán contributed to the discussion. He complained bitterly that, although the members and the leadership of the different colleges think similarly about “macrostructural” questions, no common program had emerged. “One doesn’t need individual action by institutions, but focused activity based on solidarity [because] direct political moves can easily lead to elimination.” The colleges must find “a form of action where the legitimacy of the community is not compromised.” In brief, Viktor Orbán suggested that they shouldn’t rock the boat. Eventually, a young lawyer, Sára Éliás, added her own “minority report” about what the best tactics would be. In arguing against Orbán, she claimed that “solidarity and real transparency can fall victim to the ‘god of legality,’” which Orbán clearly found essential. He was rebellious up to a point but was insistent on remaining within the parameters of the regime.

In brief, there is plenty we still don’t know about Viktor Orbán’s political ideas in those days.

January 2, 2021