Tag Archives: MSZP

Fidesz likely to lose the entire city of Budapest in 2022

A few days ago, HVG published a detailed list of the opposition candidates, broken down by supporting parties, in all 106 electoral districts. A link attached to the article takes us to an impressive inventory of not only the names and party affiliations of the entrants in the primaries but also the results of the 2018 elections, including the winners with the margins of their victories. Thus, for example, we can ascertain at a glance that the winner in District 2 of the County of Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén was György Hubay with a meager 38% of the votes. If we then visit the website of the Nemzeti Választási Iroda (National Electoral Office), we learn the details of how Hubay was able to win this district, which includes the city of Miskolc, with 38%. Actually, his job was easy. He won with 19,434 votes against MSZP’s László Varga (15,274 votes) and Jobbik’s Norbert Dudás (14,527). Thus, these two opposition candidates had a combined total of almost 30,000 votes. If the anti-Fidesz forces hadn’t split their votes between MSZP and Jobbik, today District 2 in Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén wouldn’t have a Fidesz member of parliament.

Immediately before and after the election of 2018, András Bódis, an investigative journalist, published two articles in the since defunct Heti Válasz. In the first one, titled “Elections—We show where Fidesz has a strong challenger,” Bódis claimed that “thanks to tactical voters overriding the centrist force, Fidesz could have a strong challenger in two-thirds of the districts.”

What do we mean by tactical voting? The idea is to urge voters to vote for the most likely winner in the district, regardless of party affiliation. A voter’s party preference can be expressed by his vote on the party list. Based on data from the 2014 elections, Heti Válasz identified 36 Fidesz seats as unassailable, but Bódis predicted that Fidesz might be surprised in 29 constituencies. It didn’t work out that way. Yes, tactical voting was effective in several districts in Budapest, where the electorate understood its rationale, but outside of the capital, as our example of Miskolc and environs shows, it was not. In the end, in 2018, opposition candidates won in only 15 districts, 12 of which were in Budapest and one each in Baranya, Csongrád, and Fejér counties. That’s not a typo. Only 14% of opposition candidates won their individual races over Fidesz adversaries.

In the second article, titled “Half = Two Thirds,” Bódis pointed out that the “large-scale opinion poll, that is, the election, showed that half of the country did not vote for Fidesz, with the governing party candidate scoring below 50% in 53 places. So, in half of the districts there was a chance of an opposition victory.”

Although the nationwide statistics from 2018 were devastating for the opposition, in Budapest, out of the 18 electoral districts Fidesz won only six, and all of the winners were elected with under 50% of the votes. Some of them are leading lights of the party. So it is not surprising that, in view of the opposition’s strategy to run only a single candidate in each district this time around, Viktor Orbán pretty much decided to put up less prominent Fidesz leaders in these Budapest districts. For instance, Mihály Varga, minister of finance who currently represents the second district and the neighboring part of Óbuda, won with 41.82% against candidates from five opposition parties. Now, in place of Varga, Orbán chose a sacrificial lamb for the district, a simple council member from District II.

The situation is quite similar in District 3, where Gergely Gulyás won with 43% against DK, LMP, Jobbik, MKKP (the two-tailed dog party), and Momentum. Gergely Gulyás considered Balázs Fürjes, undersecretary in the Prime Minister’s Office who is responsible for the development of Budapest, to be the best candidate, but so far Fürjes doesn’t seem to be eager to throw his hat in the ring.

In District 3, Balázs Fürjes or some other replacement for Gulyás will have to face Zoltán Komáromi (DK) or Miklós Hajnal (Momentum). The former is a politically active family doctor (háziorvos) who is a common participant in discussions of the pandemic and health issues in general. Miklós Hajnal is a member of the top leadership of Momentum, who is also very active in the media. Mihály Varga’s replacement will have to face either the very popular Olga Kálmán (DK) or Bence Tordai (MSZP-Párbeszéd). The replacement for Máté Kocsis (District 6), who received only 40% of the votes in 2018, will apparently be Botond Sára, formerly mayor of District VIII, not the most popular politician. This electoral district is one of the few where five candidates are running in the September primaries. According to Republikon Intézet, the independent András Jámbor, formerly editor-in-chief of the left-leaning news site Mérce, is leading the pack.

As it now stands, two women will be competing to be the opposition candidate in István Simicskó’s District 2. Since no announcement of his replacement has been made, it seems that he, with 42% of the votes in 2018, will have to face either Erzsébet Gy. Nagy (DK), currently deputy mayor of Budapest, or the young Anna Orosz (Momentum), a member of the city council and deputy mayor of District 11.

Two other Fidesz MPs from Budapest are less known: Kristóf Szatmáry of District 13 and Mónika Budai of District 14. Zoltán Vajda, a candidate of Mindenki Magyarországa Mozgalom, was Szatmáry’s very strong opponent in 2018, when, after some unfair practices, Szatmáry won with 43% against Vajda’s 39.96%, Jobbik’s 9.14%, and LMP’s 7.27%. If Vajda wins the nomination, which is likely, Szatmáry will have a difficult time. Mónika Budai, with her 41% win in District 14, is in no better position. In 2018, she faced four opponents: MSZP (37.23%), Jobbik (13.04%), and LMP (4.89%). Her most likely opponent will be the same Károly Lukoczky (MSZP), who would probably have won the district if the opposition forces hadn’t been so fragmented.

On the basis of these figures, I think we can safely predict a clean opposition sweep in Budapest in 2022. From some of the early announcements, it seems that Viktor Orbán has resigned himself to the loss of all 18 Budapest districts.

Here I have concentrated only on Budapest, where the opposition is strongest. But there are a fair number of districts outside the capital where Fidesz won with under 50% of the votes against multiple opponents. Naturally, there are pockets in the country where Fidesz dominance will undoubtedly be maintained. Currently, the common wisdom is that the opposition will need to win in 60 districts. A quick calculation indicates that this can be done, but, as a saying goes, between now and the day of the election “a lot of water will flow down the Danube.”

July 30, 2021

Blog posts by Eva S. Balogh also appear in Hungarian at https://ujnepszabadsag.com/

Choosing opposition candidates for the primaries in Hungary

It is difficult to follow the protracted deal-making that is going on among the opposition parties as a prelude to the primaries. Several commentators with a large dose of antagonism toward parties as such would have preferred no intraparty negotiations over specific candidates. But the opposition forces in many districts are using the results of opinion polls to throw their weight behind the most likely winners. A good example of such a strategy is electoral district 2 in Budapest, where originally candidates from four parties planned to enter the race: Dániel Berg (Momentum), Bence Tordai (Párbeszéd), Olga Kálmán (DK), and a Jobbik candidate. Support for Jobbik’s candidate was very low, and Dániel Berg didn’t capture the imagination of the electorate, so only Kálmán and Tordai will remain in the race,

The opposition is not unduly limiting voter choice. In 90% of all 106 districts there will be at least two candidates. So far, I have heard of only one district where the candidate was so strong that all established opposition parties decided to back him. That popular candidate is István Hiller (MSZP), minister of culture and later minister of education in the Gyurcsány administration, who is supported by DK, Jobbik, LMP, and Momentum. Hiller won the seat in both 2014 and 2018. Hiller will, however, have a challenger from a new opposition party, Új Világ Néppárt (New World People’s Party), founded by József Pálinkás, minister of education in the first Orbán government and the Fidesz-supported president of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (2008-2014).

For the most part, the process of choosing the most promising candidates went relatively smoothly, but there were some bloody noses along the way.

The first case that has been widely discussed in the media is that of Budapest district 8 (Zugló), where Csaba Tóth (MSZP) won the district in both 2014 and 2018. Rightly or wrongly, he is considered to be a politician with a tarnished past. Yet, at the end, Párbeszéd, DK, and Jobbik decided to support him against Ákos Hadházy, who as a currently independent MP is the candidate of Momentum. This whole situation must have been very uncomfortable for Mayor Gergely Karácsony, who while mayor of Zugló had some quite unpleasant encounters with Tóth.

On the other hand, as we know, Hadházy is extremely popular because of his relentless pursuit of the brazen corruption that exists in the country. In fact, according to Medián, if one discounts the many undecided voters, he would win the primary in Zugló over Tóth (37% to 22%).

Zugló might be the first district where the public learned about tensions within the opposition, but as time goes by there will be more and more cases that will strain relations between the parties. This is definitely true about DK and MSZP. One mustn’t forget that Ferenc Gyurcsány and some of his followers left MSZP and established the Democratic Coalition on October 22, 2011. Some MSZP leaders have never forgiven him for abandoning the party. A good example of such an unrelenting MSZP politician is Tamás Harangozó, who, in response to Ágnes Kunhalmi’s remark that there will be a day when DK and MSZP will be one party again, angrily retorted that, in that case, he would immediately quit the party.

The reality is that MSZP is not doing well, and some MSZP candidates wanted to take out an insurance policy. Two important MSZP politicians — Gyula Molnár, chairman of MSZP between 2016 and 2018, and László Szakács, member of parliament between 2006 and 2010 and again between 2014 and 2018 — received DK support, with disastrous results as far as their membership in MSZP was concerned. On June 16, Népszava reported that the MSZP board had made two personnel decisions. It suspended Gyula Molnár’s party membership, since the former chairman of the socialists is standing as a candidate of DK in Budapest district 18. The decision was also made to withdraw the candidacy of László Szakács in electoral district 2 in the County of Baranya. According to the communiqué, the party’s leadership “takes note that some candidates don’t want to represent the party’s social democratic policy” and therefore “imagine their political future in another political community.” This decision means “a compulsory departure from the political community of MSZP.”

According to one of the rules of the primaries, candidates have to indicate their choice of parliamentary delegation in case they win and become members of parliament. For example, if Olga Kálmán, one of the deputy chairmen of DK, wins, she will be sitting in the DK “frakció.” So, since Molnár indicated that he would join DK frakció after the election, one would surmise that his desertion of MSZP was the cause of his dismissal. Apparently, however, the case was more complex than that. On June 1, Bertalan Tóth as co-chairman of MSZP, Gergely Karácsony in the name of Párbeszéd, and Ferenc Gyurcsány as the chairman of DK signed an agreement which designated Molnár as a member of the DK delegation. What happened in between no one knows.

László Szakács’s case in Baranya is equally strange. He was on his way to Komló to prepare the ground for his candidacy when he received a telephone call from Bertalan Tóth informing him that the board was no longer supporting his candidacy. The current Fidesz MP of the district is Péter Hoppál, whom I consider one of the most offensive and repugnant members of his party currently in parliament. From the present line-up, I would rank Szakács as the most likely man to win the primary and to be successful against Hoppál. Szakács was baffled and offended by the MSZP decision. It didn’t take long for him and for DK to announce him as a candidate of DK and Jobbik.

In just the last few months, four MSZP politicians have either abandoned their party or were suspended from party membership and thus joined DK. Tibor Szanyi, MSZP MP between 1998 and 2014 and MEP from 2014 to 219, the former enfant terrible of the party, wrote on his Facebook page that “the spectacularly corrupt MSZP board has also gone berserk.” Indeed, this party seems to be on a suicide mission.

June 21, 2021

An adequate minimum wage directive is on the table in Brussels

On September 20, European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivered her first State of the European Union speech in which she declared that the wages of too many people are not adequate to keep body and soul together. Low wages “destroy the dignity of work, penalize the entrepreneur who pays decent wages, and distort fair competition in the Single Market,” she said.

Given the great discrepancies in living standards between the richer and the poorer member states, no single EU minimum wage will be imposed on all 27 countries. Instead, “it wants to ensure there is a collective bargaining for wages in place, that different national systems have clear and stable criteria, that trade unions and employers are involved in the process, that there are few exemptions and that there are monitoring mechanisms in place,” as Reuters summarized the gist of the embryonic proposal back in September.

On October 28, the Commission proposed an EU Directive to ensure that workers in the Union are protected by an adequate minimum wage, allowing for a decent living wherever they work. What is a directive in European law? It is “a legislative act that sets out a goal that all EU countries must achieve. However, it is up to the individual countries to devise their own laws on how to reach these goals.” Or, as the Commission said in a statement, “the proposed Directive creates a framework to improve the adequacy of minimum wages and for access of workers to minimum wage protection in the EU.”

Klára Dobrev, the DK politician who later became one of the deputy presidents of the European Parliament, already during the EP election of 2019 declared her intention to fight for a European minimum wage, a European minimum pension, and minimum healthcare benefits. In September, a few months after the opening of the new parliamentary session, she announced that her proposal for legislative action with respect to a minimum wage that ensures a decent living had been well received by President Ursula von der Leyen. The President promised that the question of an adequate minimum wage would be discussed in the first 100 days of her program.

Fidesz immediately began a campaign against Dobrev and the idea of introducing an adequate minimum wage indexed to the existing median pay in member countries. Pro-government media outlets deliberately conflated her suggestion with a nonexistent plan to impose a universal minimum wage, from Luxemburg to Bulgaria. But here and there, they went even further, when, for instance, they asserted that “the European Commission has affirmed several times that it has no intention of interfering with the member states’ policies on minimum wage.” In reality, a “directive” is “interference” in the internal affairs of the member states because it sets goals that they have to achieve.

This summer Pesti Srácok announced that “Mrs. Gyurcsány  [Klára Dobrev] is lying left and right despite Brussels’ denial of her claim.” It is not true, as Dobrev claims, that the Hungarian government is against such a plan. The veracity of that assertion, however, can be called into question as a result of Enikő Győri’s statement on Hír TV the other day, according to which “the promise of Klára Dobrev is irresponsible and dangerous.” After all, Győri is one of the high-ranking Fidesz MEPs, who at one point was an undersecretary in charge of the Hungarian presidency back in 2010.

Dobrev, in her efforts to achieve an adequate minimum wage in the EU’s member states, was joined by István Ujhelyi, MSZP’s MEP. He described the goal in the following terms: “The proposal now announced by the European Commission takes into account the economic and development disparities between Member States, but seeks to guarantee fair conditions and a fair minimum wage for all European workers in the long term.” Dobrev, on “Egyenes beszéd,” was optimistic about the fate of her proposal. “We are not at the finish line, but we have reached the home stretch,” she said. She explained that the net monthly Hungarian minimum wage is now approximately 107,000 forints ($340), which could increase to 140,000-150,000 forints ($445-$476), depending on whether the minimum wage will be 50% or 60% of the average take-home pay.

The government media, most likely reflecting the government’s views, sneers at the proposal. Magyar Nemzet wrote today that even DK politicians refute Klára Dobrev’s claims about the chance of implementing the European Commission’s directive in Hungary. The DK politician Magyar Nemzet has in mind is Ferenc Dávid, the former secretary-general of the National Association of Entrepreneurs and Employers (VOSZ), who a year ago, in an entirely different context, talked about the government’s decision to announce a 10% raise for state employees in the middle of negotiations between VOSZ and the trade unions. But Dávid said not a word about the EU directives on an adequate minimum wage. The article also asserts that “the Fidesz-KDNP MEPs supported the suggestion of the European Commission because our country already meets these directives.”

Well, I don’t know, but somebody is not telling the truth because Klára Dobrev, on her Facebook page on October 23, wrote that “yesterday, the European Parliament voted by a two-thirds majority on my package of proposals to have a European minimum wage! But there are still those who do not support it. Fidesz MEPs voted against it. They are the ones who do not want every European Hungarian to have a fair salary. Don’t you think that is outrageous?” Well, one Fidesz loyalist proudly stood by the “outrageous” decision because “it shouldn’t be the new Soviet Union that tells us what to do.”

Hirado.hu quoted Nicolas Schmit, EU Commissioner for Jobs and Social Rights, who, according to the Hungarian government media, “stressed that it would be irresponsible to expect countries to introduce a common minimum wage level which would ruin the economies of the Member States.” So, let’s see what Schmit actually said: “Almost 10% of workers in the EU are living in poverty: this has to change. People who have a job should not be struggling to make ends meet. Minimum wages have to play catch up with other wages which have seen growth in recent decades, leaving minimum wages lagging behind. Collective bargaining should be the gold standard across all Member States. Ensuring adequate minimum wages is written in black and white in Principle 6 of the European Pillar of Social Rights, which all Member States have endorsed, so we are counting on their continued commitment.”

What do Hungarians think of the proposal? Blikk, a daily tabloid, made a list of pros and cons of the minimum-wage directive and found lots of positive aspects to it. It draws countries closer; it helps the country’s convergence; it would help ensure financial survival during the pandemic; and it motivates workers. And the cons? It will take too long to implement it; it will be difficult to achieve uniformity; and the governments “where an increase in the minimum wage is a political question” might want to sabotage it.

All in all, this is good news for DK and Dobrev and an uncomfortable development for the government party. But, of course, knowing the speed at which the European Union proceeds on all issues, it is eminently possible that it will be four or five years before we see the introduction of anything approximating an adequate minimum wage in Hungary. Unless, of course….

October 31, 2020

Is MSZP waging its last internecine war?

It’s time to take a quick look at internal political developments, specifically party politics on the anti-government side. This is especially justified in the present circumstances, when there are signs of more energetic political interest on the level of civilian resistance to the ever-growing dictatorial governance of the Orbán regime. What I have in mind is the courageous reaction to government pressure by the editorial staff of Index and the resolute stand by the students of the University for Theater and Film Arts (SZFE) demanding academic autonomy. There have been a few, unfortunately not enough, indications of solidarity among fellow students, and leading scientists are also showing a certain amount of restlessness over the arbitrary measures being taken by the new tsar of higher education László Palkovics, minister of innovation and technology.

Under these circumstances, when many people see a glimmer of hope that Hungarians are becoming more politically engaged, the unification of forces on the democratic side would be an urgent task. Given the nature of the current electoral system, the optimal road to victory would be the creation of a new party for the sole purpose of winning a parliamentary majority in 2022. Although we hear a lot about all the successful talks among party leaders that are held behind closed doors, as far as public activities are concerned, each party, even those who don’t have a snowball’s chance in hell of ever getting more than a couple of percentage points of the popular vote, are still campaigning furiously with their own favorite slogans. Surely, we know that Párbeszéd and LMP will never get close to parliamentary representation. Of the remaining four parties, two might each receive more than 10% from the determined, active voters: DK and Momentum. Support for Jobbik and MSZP hovers around 7-8%, according to the latest polls. Pooling their forces would greatly increase voter enthusiasm and enhance their appeal.

In the last few days, the media outlets have been brimming with embarrassing news coming from MSZP. Considering MSZP’s already greatly weakened state, the last thing it needed was a public quarrel only days before the party congress, to be held on Saturday. But this is exactly what has happened. It was clear early on that the present chairman, Bertalan Tóth, would throw his hat in the ring again in the hope of reelection. The party also decided that, following LMP’s practice, the chairmanship would be held jointly by a male and a female party leader. Given the popularity of Ágnes Kunhalmi within the party and in the electorate at large, there was never any question that she would be the prime candidate for the co-chair position.

In addition to Tóth, Attila Mesterházy, MSZP chairman between 2010 and 2014, decided to enter the race. He felt that he would be more successful and more popular than the somewhat colorless Bertalan Tóth. He pointed to his success as party leader; during his tenure, support for the party increased significantly. He predicted that, without his leadership, MSZP by 2022 will be lucky to get 1% of the votes.

Seemingly independently from the upcoming congress, at the end of July the party suspended the membership of Zoltán Fekete, the Pest County chairman, allegedly because he recorded a conversation without the knowledge of the participants. Curiously, the letter informing Fekete of the decision ended up in Magyar Nemzet’s mailbox. The Fidesz propaganda media interpreted the suspension of Fekete as the beginning of a purge of those who are critical of the present leadership. According to the paper, the party leadership “began negotiations with Ferenc Gyurcsány’s party in order to secure winning positions on a common party list.” Fekete’s suspension was soon followed by the dissolution of the entire Pest County MSZP, which was apparently the strongest base of the pro-Mesterházy forces.

The Tóth faction was worried about Mesterházy, who apparently doesn’t support close cooperation among the opposition parties. The concern was that he might actually be working for Fidesz. The suspicion that Mesterházy and Fidesz are colluding is not at all new. And now, the obvious support of the Fidesz propaganda machine for Mesterházy lent credence to this long-standing accusation, even within party circles.

Gyula Budai, a Fidesz member of parliament best known for his unsuccessful career as the government commissioner for accountability and anti-corruption in 2010, suddenly became an enthusiastic supporter of Mesterházy. He informed his followers on Facebook that Mesterházy is the only one who deserves the job because he is “the last man of morality and normalcy on the left.” In Budai’s opinion, panic broke out in MSZP when Mesterházy announced his candidacy. Therefore, “Ágnes Kunhalmi and Bertalan Tóth, the best disciples of Ferenc Gyurcsány, immediately began a counteroffensive against supporters of Mesterházy.” Hence the dissolution of the Pest County MSZP. All the other leaders, Budai said, are slavish followers of Gyurcsány.

Zoltán Fekete and his followers are not taking the membership suspension lying down. They organized a demonstration in front of party headquarters and threatened to go to court over the decision.

Today one problem was resolved. Mesterházy withdrew his candidacy for party co-chairman. I don’t know what prompted his decision.

Still, this brouhaha was the last thing the long-ailing party needed because, as 444 said, “perhaps MSZP is waging its last big internecine war.” Very possible. Perhaps the decision has already been made to disband the party in the hope of a more promising arrangement. Of course, I’ve already buried MSZP several times and have consistently been wrong.

September 16, 2020

MSZP is pursuing the Mátra Power Plant corruption case

As background for today’s post, I suggest taking a look at my earlier article on the Mátra Power Plant (MPP), titled “Orbán is buying a white elephant from his stróman Mészáros.” In it, I summarized the lignite-fueled power plant’s recent history, which began with its sale to the German RWE (Rheinisch-Westfälisches Elektrizitätswerk AG) in 1995. The power plant was profitable until 2018, after which the company began losing substantial amounts of money. It was at that point that Lőrinc Mészáros gained control of the power plant for only 5.9 billion forints (€17 million). The company needed an immediate infusion of an additional 20 million euros, which the Orbán government promptly provided. The emergency aid didn’t stop the bleeding of the company, but the almost five billion forint loss in 2018 didn’t deter Mészáros, who owned 73% of the power plant, from taking out 11.2 billion forints (€32.5 million) in “dividends.” After he made roughly double his initial investment, in November 2019 Mészáros sold the power plant to the state-owned MVM (Hungarian Electricity Works), which had been the minority owner of the plant. The plant, it was determined, would require further modernization if it wanted to continue using lignite. The alternative was to change over to natural gas and RDF (refuse-derived fuel). At that time, László Palkovics, minister of innovation and technology, estimated that the change might cost between 200 and 300 billion forints (€600-870 million).

This is what Hungary’s lignite field, the largest in the world, looks like

The Orbán government initially refused to reveal the exact purchase price of what I called a white elephant. I argued that Orbán’s justification for building Paks II was that, once it was operative, Hungary would be able to export electricity to West European countries, which would not have enough energy because of their refusal to rely on nuclear energy. But if this is the case, why does Hungary need a new power plant at such a high cost?

I wasn’t the only one who was puzzled by the state’s purchase of MPP. A couple of weeks after the appearance of my article, Zoltán Jandó of G7, a blog dealing with economic questions, was seeking answers to the same question and found none that made any sense. Viktor Orbán’s own explanation for this enormous investment was the government’s concern over the loss of approximately 10,000 jobs as a result of the shuttering of the plant. First of all, MPP employs only about 2,000 workers, but even if we generously include enterprises that do business with the company, every job saved will cost the state 30 million forints. A rather expensive job-saving effort.

It was in March 2020 that Gergely Gulyás, head of the powerful prime minister’s office where the most important decisions are made, finally announced that the purchase price of MPP was 17.44 billion forints, or approximately 50.7 million euros. Economists and well-respected journalists specializing in economic matters, like Gergely Brückner of Index, considered the price exorbitantly high and, from the point of view of the taxpayers, inexplicable. It was pointed out that most likely MVM had no choice but to conclude the transaction, knowing full well that it was an unprofitable investment.

Not being satisfied with the information it received from the government, MSZP sued the government for all the documentation of the “adventurous legal maneuver” that, as it turned out, cost the taxpayers not 17.44 billion forints but 75.15 billion, or €218.33 million, which included a shareholder loan of almost 5 billion forints, a 26 billion forint capital raise, and an assumption of 26 billion forints of debt over and above the “purchase price” of 17.44 billion forints. And the documentation apparently is still not complete. For the missing information Bertalan Tóth, chairman of MSZP, is suing MVM.

Already in December 2019 it was suspected that something was amiss with this purchase. Bernadett Szél, an independent member of parliament, asked for an investigation into the deal for breach of trust because, as she said, it was the “purchase by the government of an unprofitable, financially plucked and bled-dry wreck of a power plant with significant environmental obligations at an unknown price from [Lőrinc] Mészáros.” It was surmised that the coffers of the company were empty because of the large amount of money Mészáros withdrew from the reserves that the German RWE had set aside for modernization.

Three days ago, László Szakács, deputy chairman of MSZP, gave an online press conference, announcing MSZP’s resolve to report the case to the European Commission because they consider the “purchase” of MPP by the government a form of state aid, which is illegal according to the Treaty. “State aid is defined as an advantage in any form whatsoever conferred on a selective basis to undertakings by national public authorities.” In a major loophole, however, the Treaty also states  that there might be exceptions, when state aid is justified by reasons of general economic development. I suspect the Orbán government would argue that, without the extra energy MPP produces, Hungary’s energy supply would be in jeopardy.

There is no question in my mind, and again I’m not alone in this, that the purchase of MPP is, in effect, a government bailout of Mészáros and whoever is behind him. The government not only rescued a disastrous business venture but also contributed handsomely to his already enormous private fortune. No rational explanation can be mustered to defend the decision except the obvious one, which all thoughtful commentators suspect. Another major case of government corruption, a company too close to the prime minister to fail.

August 1, 2020

MSZP in turmoil: Two district mayors have deserted the party

On Thursday afternoon, Index reported that two newly elected MSZP mayors, Sándor Szaniszló (Pestszentlőrinc-Pestszentimre/District XVIII) and László Kiss (Óbuda-Békásmegyer/District III), had announced their decision to join the Demokratikus Koalíció (DK), which automatically meant leaving the party each had joined almost 30 years ago. Their departure was an unexpected blow to the party leaders since the two mayors failed to inform their colleagues about their intentions ahead of time. Colleagues of Kiss think that his decision was based on personal considerations, specifically his less than friendly relations with Párbeszéd and Gergely Karácsony. As for Szaniszló, his friends claim that his relations with Ferenc Gyurcsány were always good, and “knowing his pragmatic disposition, he most likely sees better opportunities [in DK] for his political career.”

The two mayors’ decision to join DK had consequences beyond the soured relationship between DK and MSZP. It changed the power dynamics within the 33-member city council. Up to now, MSZP had a seven-member caucus (frakció) while DK was represented by four mayors. Now, DK, with six members, will have a commanding voice in the body. As Index wrote when the news broke, “Mayor Gergely Karácsony will not be able to achieve anything without the approval of the DK caucus.”

Initial reactions in MSZP were muted. The District III and XVIII MSZP chairmen expressed their disappointment but assured the two mayors of their continued support. Ágnes Kunhalmi, who until recently was the party’s chairperson in Budapest and represents District XVIII in parliament, said that the present crisis is “insignificant” in comparison to all the support she received from the voters of the district and added that she will continue to work closely with Szaniszló for the district.

In the last few months MSZP has lost a fair number of old-timers, including Tibor Szanyi, a former member of the European Parliament, and László Botka, the extremely popular and effective mayor of Szeged. As I wrote in an earlier post, shortly after the municipal elections, “once there is one desertion, usually more follow.” I called attention to an important MSZP politician in Budapest, Norbert Trippon, who at the end of October announced that he was leaving MSZP. He offered ideological reasons for joining DK, but I suspected that Trippon saw the handwriting on the wall as far as his long-term chances as an MSZP politician were concerned.

A day after the news of the latest defections broke, György Bolgár of Klubrádió’s “Let’s Talk It Over” had an opportunity to ask Attila Mesterházy, the former party chairman, about his reaction to the news. Like other socialist politicians, he was not happy with his former colleagues’ decision, but instead of blaming DK, Mesterházy suggested that the MSZP leadership take a critical look at their handling of the affairs of the party. The task ahead, he said, is to win the next national election in 2022, for which the “precious cooperation” among parties must be preserved.

Unfortunately, there seems to be little inclination to be moderate on either side. Two days after the loss of two MSZP mayors, Bertalan Tóth, the current party chairman, delivered a harsh message to the two deserters and to DK. Any socialist who deserts the party and joins another one cannot expect any future support from MSZP. And he warned DK against contemplating further “body snatching” from MSZP. His party is nobody’s “doormat”; MSZP must be an equal partner in the opposition’s collaboration. In addition to the verbal assault, MSZP will move next week to mute DK’s voice in the city council by creating an MSZP-Párbeszéd caucus with seven members, as Zsolt Molnár, the MSZP chairman of Budapest, announced on ATV.

There were also irresponsible words on the other side. Klára Dobrev was interviewed on ATV’s Egyenes beszéd about a new DK project involving an online questionnaire. It offers voters a platform on which to declare their own ideas about what will constitute a successful strategy for the next national election. And Ferenc Gyurcsány said, provocatively, “it is a mistake to think that cooperation is the business of the parties. It is the concern of all of us who oppose this government.” Hence the online consultation. While discussing this undertaking, the reporter asked Dobrev what would happen if the voters suggested that DK should enter the race alone. Dobrev announced that, in that case, “of course, the party will follow the will of the people.” Not surprisingly, such an answer gave ample ground for suspicions about Gyurcsány’s motives. Not so long ago, he insisted on one common leader and one list, but he also often talks about a coalition government as the only possibility. This last comment would indicate that his plans are still fluid, with everything depending on developments between now and the election.

Today, I don’t have enough time to write about the government media’s reaction to the quarrel between DK and MSZP, but some of the Fidesz propagandists’ concern over the fate of MSZP is highly amusing.

I’m sure that this is not the end of the story. After the weekend lull, the tit for tat will undoubtedly continue on Monday.

February 23, 2020

A good possibility of a rearrangement of the opposition forces in the next couple of years

I think it is almost inevitable that political configurations among the opposition will change considerably between now and 2022, when a new national election will be held. It will be a slow process, but as the number of parties on the left shrinks, a consolidation is practically preordained. The first party that will most likely disappear is LMP, especially if its founder, András Schiffer, gives a few more interviews like the one that appeared recently in Magyar Nemzet, in which he announced that “although at the moment it seems that the opposition can even defeat Fidesz, this conglomerate is not capable of governing.” He added that as a result of the elections, everyone can now see that there is democracy in Hungary. I think LMP will end ingloriously, similar to the final agonies of SZDSZ under Attila Retkes and Viktor Szabadai between 2009 and 2013.

There are many questions about the survival of Párbeszéd, despite Gergely Karácsony’s individual achievement. He proved himself to be an effective campaigner, but I would be very surprised if too many voters could name the party to which he belongs. Párbeszéd’s support is so small that public opinion polls have measured it at one percent for well over a year. Given this stagnation, it is unlikely that Párbeszéd, just because one of its leaders became mayor of Budapest, will be able to grow significantly anytime soon. As support for the larger parties, Momentum and DK, gains ground, the few active politicians of Párbeszéd will most likely find a place in another party.

As far as MSZP is concerned, I have my doubts about its survival in the long run as a separate entity. Just today I listened to Ágnes Kunhalmi, who as usual was very optimistic about the future, emphasizing the cyclical nature of MSZP support. In the past, these cyclical fluctuations were manageable, but now a cycle may have been replaced with a downtrend. When the electorate voted strictly on party lines during the European Parliamentary elections, MSZP did very badly. Perhaps the biggest blow MSZP suffered lately was László Botka’s departure from the party, even though it was no secret that the relationship between Botka and the MSZP leadership had been strained ever since 2017, when Botka, the highly successful mayor of Szeged, became the party’s candidate for the premiership. Nonetheless, it was somewhat of a surprise that Botka entered the race for the mayoralty not as a member of MSZP but as the candidate of a new association called Partnership for Szeged (ÖSZE). Once Botka defeated  his “independent,” Fidesz-created opponent by an enormous majority (60.56% to 36.41%), he didn’t join the MSZP caucus (frakció) but decided to sit with ÖSZE. A day later, he resigned his membership in the party.

What will happen to them next?

Once there is one desertion, usually more follow. Norbert Trippon naturally is not as well known as Botka, but he was considered to be an important member of the MSZP team in Budapest. At one point, he was deputy mayor of Újpest (District IV). Today, he announced that he is leaving the socialists and will continue his political activity in DK. He offered ideological reasons for joining DK, but I suspect that Trippon sees the writing on the wall as far as his long-term chances as an MSZP politician are concerned.

And that leads me to an interview with István Hiller, one of the founders of MSZP and a real authority in the party. He was interviewed by Györgyi Szöllősi, a new addition to the ATV team. She joined ATV after she lost her job at Hír TV, where I thought she did an extraordinary job. Szöllősi asked Hiller about the possibility that MSZP and DK will join forces one day. Hiller didn’t answer in the affirmative, but he didn’t say “no” either. He simply replied that the question at the moment is not on the table. I should note that I don’t see a fusion between the two parties in the foreseeable future because there is too much bad blood. But I don’t think one can rule out the possibility of several MSZP politicians on an individual basis transferring their allegiances to DK or even Momentum.

Finally, there is the matter of the joke parties, most notably the Two-Tailed Dog Party. I have to confess that I have never found Gergely Kovács, chairman of the party, personally funny. His responses often seem robotic. Admittedly, some of the party’s stunts were amusing, but as time went by, I started to dislike Kovács’s attitude and what he stood for. One expects a middle-aged man or woman to comprehend that there is no such thing as a perfect party or a perfect regime. In his particular case, he should able to grasp that in today’s Hungary the real enemy of democracy is Fidesz and not the other parties in the opposition. One could laugh at their jokes, but when they took votes away from perfectly respectable opposition candidates in close races, I was furious. My hope is that with the strengthening of the opposition forces there will be fewer and fewer people who are ready to waste their votes on the Two-Tailed Dog Party.

As for Jobbik, I have no idea what will come of the party. Just like in MSZP, Jobbik lost a leading member, its former chairman, Gábor Vona. He resigned from the party. The current party chairman, Tamás Sneider, is a mediocre character who was barely visible during the campaign. Péter Jakab, the spokesman of the party, strikes me as an energetic young man committed to democratic principles. He vied for the chairmanship, but it seems that internal resistance stood in his way. The party postponed a vote on the chairmanship. Jobbik, just like MSZP, lost a few percentage points of support in the last month. If in the future smaller alliances were formed in place of the present setup, I have no idea where Jobbik would end up. But I’m certain that party consolidations will start to take place in the next year or so.

October 30, 2019